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THE
SIVADVAITA OF SRIKANTHA

BY
S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI,
M.A., B.Sc., BARRISTER-AT-LAW.
READER, MADRAS UNIVERSITY.



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S. S. SUBYANARAYANAN.

TO THE MEMORY OF MY BROTHER.

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ABBREVIATIONS.

<i>AL</i>	.. Ananda Laharī: Appayya Dikṣita.
<i>Bh. Bh.</i>	.. Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara's commentary on the Taittiriya Upaniṣad.
<i>Bṛh.</i>	.. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
<i>Br. M.</i>	.. Brahma Mīmāṃsā: Śrīkaṇṭha.
<i>Ch.</i>	.. Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
<i>IP</i>	.. Indian Philosophy: S. Radhakrishnan.
<i>Īśa</i>	.. Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad.
<i>JOR</i>	.. Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.
<i>JRAS</i>	.. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London.
<i>Kaṭha</i>	.. Kaṭha Upaniṣad.
<i>Kauṣ</i>	.. Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad.
<i>Kena</i>	.. Kenopaniṣad.
<i>Māṇḍūkya</i>	.. Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.
<i>NŚŚB</i>	.. Nīlakaṇṭha Śivāttuvita Śaiva Pāḍiyam.
<i>PA</i>	.. Pauskara Āgama.
<i>PB</i>	.. Pauskara Bhāṣya.
<i>hFS</i>	.. Rāmānuja's Idea of the Finite Self: P. N. Srinivasachari.
<i>BTS</i>	.. Ratna-traya-parīkṣā: Śrīkaṇṭha-sūri.
<i>SBE</i>	.. Sacred Books of the East.
<i>Schomerus</i>	.. Der Caiva Siddhānta: Schomerus.
<i>SDS</i>	.. Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha.
<i>SSSS</i>	.. Sarva-siddhānta-sāra-saṅgraha.

<i>Stcherbatsky</i>	.. The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa : Th. Stcherbatsky.
<i>ŚJB</i>	.. Śiva-jñāna Bodham.
<i>ŚJS</i>	.. Śivā-jñāna Siddhiār.
<i>STV</i>	.. Śiva-tattva-vivekam.
<i>ŚN</i>	.. Śivādvaita Nirṇaya.
<i>SMD</i>	.. Śivārka-maṇi-dīpikā or Śivā-dītya-maṇi-dīpikā.
<i>ŚSM</i>	.. Śruti-sūkti-mālā.
<i>Śvet.</i>	.. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
<i>Taitt. Upa., or Taitt.</i>	.. Taittirīya Upaniṣad.
<i>TP</i>	.. Tattva-prakāśikā or Tattva-prakāśaḥ.
<i>YS</i>	.. Yoga Sūtras.

THE SIVADVAITA OF SRIKANTHA

CHAPTER I.

SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

From a very early stage in the history of Indian Philosophic speculation, there would seem to have been two currents of thought, the Vedic and the Āgamic, apparently independent and antagonistic. It is not possible to fix definitely the period when the Āgamas came into being. Some of them that exist now go in for a criticism of Jainism and Buddhism, the Sāṃkhya and the Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita Vedānta, and could have been evolved only after these systems; but some at least of these, the Pāśupata and the Pāñcarātra Āgamas, should have been current before the compilation of the *Vedānta Sūtras*, as those two systems are refuted by Bādarāyaṇa in the second pāda of the second chapter of the *Sūtras*. Some of the systems are at least as old as the *Mahābhārata*,¹ a fact quite in line with the traditional position as to the identity of Bādarāyaṇa and Vyāsa, the reputed author of the *Mahā-*

¹ See *Mahābhārata: Sānti Parva*, ch. 350, 63-67:

63. "There are various kinds of religion, O Royal Sage, which go by various names, such as Sāṃkhya, Yoga, the Pāñcarātra, Vedas and Pāśupata.

bhārata. It has been suggested that the Āgamic systems were developed out of the Brāhmaṇas in the same way as the Upaniṣads, though at a much later stage, and that some of the later Upaniṣads like the Śvetāśvatara, which address the Supreme Being by a sectarian title and not *param Brahman*, as of yore, probably grew up under the shadow of

64. "The promulgator of the Sāṃkhya religion is said to be the great Ṛṣi Kapila. The primæval Hiraṇyagarbha and none else is the promulgator of the Yoga system.

65. "The Ṛṣi Apāntaratamas is said to be the preceptor of the Vedas; some call that Ṛṣi by the name of Prācīnagarbha.

66. "The religion known by the name of Pāśupata was promulgated by the Lord of Umā, that Lord of all creatures, *viz.*, the cheerful Śiva otherwise known by the name of Śrikanṭha, the son of Brahman.

67. "The illustrious Nārāyaṇa himself is the promulgator of the religion contained in the Pāñcarātra scriptures....."

(From M. N. Dutt's translation, p. 583.)

It is matter for interesting speculation why the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas are not mentioned. Are their systems later than the *Mahābhārata*? Or is it because the claim is true that their founders were Śaivas? Bhandarkar in his *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems*, 117, refers to Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍḍarśanasamuccaya*, where it is said that Gotama and Kaṇāda were of the Śaiva faith. And the *Laiṅga Purāṇa* mentions both of these philosophers among the 112 disciples of the 28 Yogācāryas who professed the Mahāpāśupata Jñāna: "Ulūko vidyutaś caiva maṇḍūko hyāśvalāyaṇaḥ, akṣapādaḥ kumāraś ca, ulūko vasta eva ca" and so on (see Dr. V. V. Ramaṇa Śāstrin's incomplete translation of *SMD*, 13). The *Mimāṃsakas*—Pūrva and Uttara—are presumably included under the appellation "Vedas". Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar writing on Lakulīśa in the *Annual Report of the Archaeological Survey of India for 1906-07* refers to Śrī Guṇaratna Sūri's commentary on Haribhadra's work; that author says the Naiyāyikas were called Śaivas and the Vaiśeṣikas Pāśupatas. Curiously enough, the learned Professor converts the statements and says, "The idea that the Pāśupatas are Vaiśeṣikas and the Śaivas Naiyāyikas is no doubt fantastic..... It represents an attempt of the various religious sects to affiliate themselves to one of the six recognised schools of philosophy"! This misunderstanding is unfortunate. (The text cited by Dr. Bhandarkar reads thus: Naiyāyikāḥ sadāśivabhaktatvāt Śaivā ityucyante, vaiśeṣikāstu pāśupatā iti.)

the Āgamas.² Antagonism to the Vedānta is clearly present in the Āgamas as seen from frequent criticism thereof. For example, the *Mṛgendra Āgama* says:

Among the Vedāntas, we meet with such statements as these: 'The Ātman is one only, manifesting himself in forms sentient and insentient.' 'All this universe is Ātman alone.' 'There is no plurality here.'

This is but a mere assertion, it is certain; for what is the basis for it? If you say that the authority upon which you base it is also Ātman, then that itself becomes the very thing to be proved.

Wherever these two (proof and the thing proved) are found, there must also exist the four (the former two, with the knower and the knowledge). This will mean the abandonment of Advaita; otherwise there would be no such thing as proof.

Also, there must result (on this theory) identity of experience for all and absence of liberation, two conclusions which would be very repugnant indeed to the Ātma-vādins.³

The criticism is not very profound, and it identifies Vedānta with Advaita. But the identification is just what one may expect of a hostile critic, for, the Advaita offers a target for attack easy in proportion to the difficulty of understanding it. The contention that Bādarāyaṇa was responsible for the ekātma vāda is urged even to-day, not by Advaitins alone (of whom one might expect it), but by their opponents, the Śaivites, as well.⁴

There are at the same time Āgamic passages which claim Vedic authority for their doctrine.

² See P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 126-130.

³ Verses II, 12-15; translation by M. Narayanaswami Iyer in the *Siddhānta Dīpikā*, iv.

⁴ K. Subramanya Pillai, *Saiva Siddhānta Vilakkam*, 84.

The doctrine itself can be shown to be in consistency with theism, as found in the Upaniṣads. Here are some Āgamic passages which affirm the derivation of the Āgamas from the Vedas⁵:

Siddhānto vedasāratvāt, "as the siddhānta consists of the essence of the Veda": (Suprabhedāgama).

Vedasāram idam tantram, "this tantra is of the essence of the Veda": (Makuṭāgama).

Vedāntārtham idam jñānam siddhāntam paramam śubham, "this siddhānta knowledge which is the significance of Vedānta is supremely felicitous": (Makuṭāgama).

These two sets of passages exhibit a twofold relationship of the Āgamas to the Vedas and accord great support to the view that, while based on the Vedas, the former developed independently of the Upaniṣads which constitute the well-recognised body of Vedāntic doctrine.

The suggestion has been made that the present
 The alleged Dravidian origin of the Āgamas. Āgamas are Samskr̥t translations of Tamil originals, which constituted an altogether independent body of doctrine, that the translators into Samskr̥t assimilated the views as far as they could to their own Vedic religion, that when, owing to many causes partly natural and partly political, the Tamil originals were irretrievably lost, the Samskr̥t translations alone survived, that the suggestions they contain about the Vedic origin of the Āgamas are not worthy of credence and that the very names—Āgama, meaning that which has come (presumably

⁵ A number of such passages have been collected by the late Kāśīvaśi Sentinathier in his *Siva-jñāna-bodha-vacanālamkāra-dīpam* and his Tamil translation of the *Śrīkanṭha Bhāṣya*. See also Dr. Ramaṇa Śāstrin's translation of *SMD*, p. 52, and Ambalava Nāvala Parāśakti's introduction to his edition of the *Paṇṣkara Bhāṣya*, pp. 53, 54.

from another language), and Tantra (which comes from tantu, thread, the literal translation of the Tamil word *nūl*), meaning work,—are fairly strong indications in support of this contention. The discussion of this position⁶ and the final ascertainment of the origin of the Āgamas do not come within the scope of the present work. The recognition of the existence of an independent body of doctrine, the Āgama, showing opposition to another body of doctrine, the Vedānta, suffices for our purpose. One may remark, in passing, that the hypothesis of Tamil originals, while it is interesting, must remain barren in the absence of very much fuller material than we have, or can have, of a place long since washed off by the seas, and of the ancestors of a people long merged into, and brought up in the shadow of, an alien civilisation. The etymological support, at any rate, would seem to be a broken reed: truths about ultimate things are more likely to be referred to a Being that revealed them than to a language from which they were borrowed; and the Āgamas, it may be worth while to remember, constitute the teaching of the Lord Himself

⁶ There is this much to be said in favour of the theory; the displacement of sacrifice and the substitution of worship by meditations, symbols and idols in its place were probably due to non-Vedic influences. The non-Vedic peoples might have belonged to other races or they might have been adventurous sections among the Āryans themselves, who, having struck out for themselves new paths of life and thought, came back or were brought back subsequently to the fold, incidentally enriching the parent stock of culture. It is said that the Śaivism of the Atharva Veda is a contribution of the Vrātyas, who originally lost their position in Āryan society because of their laxity in the matter of observances, but subsequently came back to their own. See an interesting paper, *The Absorption of the Vrātyas*, by Mahāmahopādhyāya Hara Prasād Śāstrin (Bulletin of the Dacca University). Professor A. Chakravarthi is also of opinion that it is exceedingly improbable that the Vrātyas were members of a non-Āryan race: See his paper, *The Vrātyas*, in the *Jaina Gazette*, June, 1925.

to His devotees among gods and men, the expression denoting, as it certainly does, that which has come from the Lord,—a revelation, in short,—not a translation.

Yet a third view of the Āgamas is that their purpose is to interpret the Upaniṣads, that they develop the teaching of the latter and that they “bear the same relation to the Upaniṣads, as the New Testament of the Christian Holy Bible bears to its Old Testament.” According to this view, the Upaniṣads present the quest, and the Āgamas the attainment; the province of the former is limited by “charyā, kriyā and yoga, while the province of the Āgamas includes these as well as jñāna.” Upaniṣadic knowledge extends to the four states,—of waking, dreaming, sleep and the fourth beyond these three: Āgamic knowledge, however, extends to the turīyātīta, what is beyond even the fourth. The Upaniṣads, however, set out to explain not merely the search but also the realisation of what is sought. There is not in them any confession of failure, nor is the student of Vedānta aware of such failure. He who knows the Āgamas may be conscious of having attained a higher truth, but this consciousness is no warrant for its own correctness. Any system of Hindu philosophy that has a claim to respect, claims also to be a synthesis of all elements of experience in a higher measure than may be found in other systems. The Āgamas may make a similar claim, but the claim cannot guarantee its own validity. If there is anything higher than the fourth stage, the knowledge thereof is bound to be more valuable; but the quest for what is higher than experience may well prove endless, and the turīyātīta may turn out to be a mirage. The claim

‘Dr. Ramaṇa Śāstrin’s translation of *AMD*, 53.

of the Āgamas to present a higher body of doctrine may be recognised to exist, though its admission be matter for further inquiry. The point of interest and value in such a view is that it treats the Āgamas as a development of the Veda and the Vedānta and not as an entirely independent body of doctrine.

There is no reason to discredit this fundamental identity, even on a consideration of the alleged differences between Upaniṣadic and Āgamic doctrines. It is said that unlike Vedic ritual which is propitiatory and sacrificial, Āgamic ritual consists essentially in devout worship of and personal communion with the deity. The Upaniṣadic Brahman is universal and non-sectarian, while the deities of the Āgamas,—Śiva, Viṣṇu or Śakti,—appeal to particular classes of worshippers. The differences thus pointed out, though real enough, are not inconsistent with the theory of development. No two views can be more opposed than the geo-centric and the helio-centric theories; yet the latter was a legitimate development of the former. The difference between Vedānta and Āgamānta may have been the result of similar development. The human mind may well pass from sanguinary sacrifices offered to a plurality of deities to the devout concentrated worship of one supreme personality, being moved thereto by no forces other than the dawn of knowledge and the expansion of the moral consciousness. The frail individual unable to grasp Brahman in its universality or to concentrate his mind thereon for any length of time may well have preferred to concentrate on those aspects which appealed to him most and thus evolved the bodies of doctrine centering round Śiva or Viṣṇu or Śakti. Further, non-sacrificial ritual such as worship in temples is not confined to Āgamic literature, for, the worship

at Cidambaram is admittedly non-Āgamic. “Sec-tarian” deities, too, are not unknown to the Upaniṣads, as witness, Upaniṣads like the Atharvaśikhā, Kaivalya, Subāla, Śvetāśvatara and so on. There is yet another point of difference, in respect of competency for study: even this is not inconsistent with the development of one body of doctrine from another, for, the Āgamas, as the later body of doctrine, might have tended to catholicity, embracing all in the fold of studentship, irrespective of sex or caste, while the earlier speculations of the Vedānta attempted to restrict competency to certain classes. For such developments, external stimuli are conceivable, but are not necessary, and there is not sufficient material for postulating any external stimulus or for discrediting the view of the basic identity of Vedic and Āgamic doctrine.

However this may be, when we come to know Attempt to of these, we see two currents of show identity thought as also a certain amount of of Āgamic and antagonism between the two. This Vedic teaching.

1. Tiru-Mūlar. antagonism was deprecated by so eminent a thinker as Tiru-Mūlar, author of the *Tiru-Mantiram*, one of the twelve books of the canon of Tamil Śaivism. Sundara, one of the Tevāram hymnals, refers, it is believed, to this Tiru-Mūlar in his “Breviary of Devotees” when he says, “I am the slave of the devotees of our Lord Tiru-Mūlar.”⁸ Tiru-Mūlar (who must have therefore preceded Sundara, who is himself assigned generally to the 9th century A.D.), says that both the Vedas and the Āgamas are the creation of the Lord and that they are both true, the only difference between them being that the former are general

⁸ நம்பிரான் திருமூலனடியார்க்கு மடியேன்

—திருத்தொண்டத்தொகை. 5.

and the latter special. “The Veda with the Āgama is the truth: they are the word of the Lord: these revelations of the Lord are to be studied as the general and the special doctrines; on enquiry, they are taken to be different as giving rise to two different sets of conclusions: but, to the great ones they are non-different.”⁹

A very similar, if not identical, view is expressed by Śrīkanṭha in his commentary on
2. Śrīkanṭha *Vedānta Sūtra*, II, 2, 38. The Vedas and the Śaiva Āgamas are of equal authority, as both proceeding from the Lord, the only difference being that the latter may be studied by persons of all castes, while the study of the former is restricted to the first three castes. Indeed, Śrīkanṭha goes further than this and attempts to demonstrate that not the Vedas alone, but their later developments, the Upaniṣads also, are in harmony with the theism of the Śaiva Āgamas.¹⁰ To this end he has

⁹ வேத மொடாகமம் மெய்யா மிறைவனூல்
ஒதுஞ் சிறப்பும் டொதுவு மென் றுள்ளன
நாதனுரை யிவை நாடிவிரண் டந்தம்.
பேதமதென்பர் பெரியோர்க்கு பேதமே.

¹⁰ The following is a complete list of the twenty-eight Divyāgamas:—

“(i) *Śaivic* (‘God-taught’).

- | | |
|--------------------|--|
| 1. Kāmika | 6. Dīpta |
| 2. Yogaja | 7. Sūkṣma |
| 3. Cintya | 8. Sāhasraka (Sahasra) |
| 4. Karaṇa (Kāraṇa) | 9. Amśumān (Amśumat) |
| 5. Ajita | 10. Suprabha (Suprabheda, Suprabodha). |

(ii) *Raudric* (‘Man-realised’).

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| 11. Vijaya | 13. Svāyambhuva (Svāyambhū, Svayambhū, Svayambhūta) |
| 12. Nīśvāsa | 14. Āgneyaka (Āgneya, Anala, Anila) |

written his commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa which present the quintessence of Upaniṣadic teaching. The clear sense of the text having been clouded and obscured by prior commentators,¹¹ Śrīkaṇṭha proceeds to make the sense clear again. The final result of his teaching is that the Supreme Brahman is none other than Śiva, the blue-throated consort of Umā; without a knowledge of Him, men may not hope to attain salvation till they can roll up the heavens like a piece of hide; He is to be meditated on to the exclusion of all else, by those who desire release. It has been suggested that many of the Upaniṣads like the *Śvetāśvatara* and the *Atharvaśikhā*, quoted so extensively by Śrīkaṇṭha, probably came into existence under Āgamic influence.¹² It was a task eminently worth attempting to show that a conception of God probably presented, or at least elaborated, in the first

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- | | |
|--|--|
| 15. Bhadra (Vīra) | 22. Lalita (Lalita) |
| 16. Raurava | 23. Siddha |
| 17. Mākuṭa (Makuṭa, Mukuṭa) | 24. Santāna (Śānta) |
| 18. Vimala | 25. Nārasimha (Śarvokta, Sarvokta, Sarvottara) |
| 19. Candrahāsa (Candrajñāna) | 26. Parameśvara (Pārameśvara) |
| 20. Mukhayugbimba (Mukha-bimba, Bimba) | 27. Kiraṇa |
| 21. Udgīta (Prodgīta) | 28. Para (Pārahitā, Vātula, Vātula, Vātula).'' |

—Dr. V. V. Ramaṇa Śāstrin in his incomplete translation of *SMD*, p. 11. See also *Siddhānta Sāravali*, Caryāpāda, vv. 3, 4, and *Sivārcaṇā Candrikā*, pp. 103-104.

¹¹ Who these prior commentators (pūrvācāryāḥ) were, we do not know. The Advaita and Bhedābheda theories are criticised in the course of the *Bhāṣya*; the reference is possibly, therefore, to Śaṅkara and Bhāskara. But since their distinctive views were, in part at least, inherited by them, their ancestors in the line of philosophic tradition could also have been meant.

¹² Srinivasa Iyengar, P. T.: *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, 126-130. Profs. Belvalkar and Ranade believe that the *Śvetāśvatara* reveals four strata of development, the first chapter coming first, being succeeded by chapters 5 and 6; chapter 2, according to

instance by the Āgamas and adopted by some Upaniṣads was not alien or unacceptable to the main body of Upaniṣadic tradition, as that tradition is embodied in the *Vedānta Sūtras*. The attempt marks an eclectic movement, the presence of a desire to understand and to reconcile, to heal differences and to bridge chasms.¹³ Such a spirit of itself avails to make the commentary permanently valuable, even if it could be proved that the metaphysics of the commentary is not original, but borrowed largely, if not entirely, from other sources.

The desire to reconcile the two traditions inspired even those writers who apparently based themselves almost entirely on only one of them, the Vedāntic. Rāmānuja, who drew little on the Āgamas of even the Vaiṣṇava School for the exposition of his metaphysics, was at considerable pains to show that the Pāñcarātra Āgama was not condemned by Bādarāyaṇa, though the Sūtras in that regard are usually interpreted as a condemnation. Śrīkaṇṭha's attempt in the case of the Śaiva Āgamas is more or less similar, there being a difference in favour of Śrīkaṇṭha in that he has no hesitation in rejecting the Āgamas condemned by Bādarāyaṇa, instead of straining the texts as Rāmānuja does.¹⁴

them, belongs to the Neo-Upaniṣadic period, and chapters 3 and 4 to a later stage of that period. Chapters 3 and 4 constitute the distinctly Śaivite portion of this Upaniṣad: *History of Indian Philosophy*, II, 135, 300-310.

¹³ There was at least one other thinker Haradatta Śivācārya who believed in the divine authority of the Āgamas. (See *SSM*, v. 109.) But either by temperament or because of his Vaiṣṇava birth and surroundings, he was more a sectarian propagandist than an eclectic. But, as will be seen later, he too sought vigorously to reconcile the Āgamic with the Vedic tradition, labouring to prove that there was no aspect of Śiva worship which had not full warrant and authority from the Vedas.

¹⁴ In his commentary on *Vedānta Sūtra*, II, 2, 1, Rāmānuja says that the Sūtras "now, in order to safeguard their own position, proceed to demolish the position held by those very adversaries... Another

Very little is known of Śrīkaṇṭha's place, period or parentage. The *Śaṃkara Digvijaya* ascribed to Mādhavā-Ācārya mentions a Śrīkaṇṭha who was the head of a *maṭha* at Gokarṇam in the West Coast. According to that work he was a theist and Haradatta was one of his pupils: in a disputation with Śaṃkara, Śrīkaṇṭha owned himself defeated, and renounced his theism: thus, Śrīkaṇṭha was an elder contemporary of Śaṃkara. Unfortunately, this work is unreliable even in respect of its professed authorship.¹⁵ The work jumbles together a number of writers of various periods without any consideration for genuine chronology. The alleged contemporaneity of Śaṃkara and Haradatta is difficult to reconcile with the dates usually assigned to the two, as the latter is believed to have died in 878 A.D., while the former passed away, according to the view most current, as early as 820 A.D. It is contended by many that Śaṃkara really belonged to a period a few centuries earlier, while there is reason to think that Haradatta died probably two centuries and more later than the date assigned to him. In the light of this, the account in the *Śaṃkara Digvijaya* appears impossible of credence. The contemporaneity of Udayana (10th century) and Śrī Haraṣa (12th century) alleged in this work provides an instance of even more glaring improbability. A work abounding in such gross inaccuracies could scarcely have been the work of the great Mādhava; nor has the work any

pāda is, therefore, begun to the express end of refuting the theories of others." And yet he would have it that the concluding sūtras of the same pāda (40-43) justify instead of refuting the Pāñcārātra doctrine!

¹⁵ On the whole subject, see the article, "Śrīkaṇṭhācārya" in the *Jigṇyasa*, I, 2, especially pp. 3, 4 and 18.

claim to be considered authoritative other than its reputed authorship.

A Tamil translator of the Śrīkaṇṭha Bhāṣya mentions the existence of a statue to Śrīkaṇṭha at Vāḍa-Tirumullaivāyil, a village near Madras. He also expresses the hope that other Śaivite temples will similarly set up statues to honour the Ācārya and hold commemoration festivals (guru pūjā) in the asterism Puṣya of the month of Āvaṇi (August-September). It is not known on what authority he fixes the day for the guru pūjā.¹⁶ But the existence of a statue in South India would, along with a few other points, serve to indicate that the Ācārya was not improbably a South Indian, like the other great Bhāṣyakāras—Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Ānanda Tīrtha.¹⁷ It is also learnt from the *Śivārkaṇaḍīpikā* that that commentary on Śrīkaṇṭha's Bhāṣya was written by Appayya Dīkṣita at the command of the king Cinna Bomman, coin-

¹⁶ A visit to the temple elicited the fact that the statue had been set up about half a century ago, at the instance of the temple priests, who consider Śrīkaṇṭha to have belonged to their community. The information about the date of the *guru pūjā* would appear to have been supplied to them by the priests at the temple of Mantra Kālīśvaram, a place on the Godāvāri.

¹⁷ It is noteworthy that the *Prapañcahṛdaya* (Trivandrum Saṁskṛt Series, No. XLV), a compendium of universal knowledge, makes mention of the *Brahma Sūtras*, the Vṛtti known as *Kṛtakōṭi* compiled by Bodhāyana, an abridgment thereof by Upavarṣa, and the commentaries of Bhagavatpāda (presumably Śaṅkara), Brahma-datta, Bhāskara and others, but does not refer to Śrīkaṇṭha or Rāmānuja. The latter certainly was too important a commentator to be lightly classed with "the others". The inference is possible that the *Prapañcahṛdaya* was compiled before Rāmānuja's time. But this does not help us with regard to Śrīkaṇṭha the non-mention of whom might have been due to his not having been considered important enough. Even if we conclude that he came after Bhāskara and the author of the *Prapañcahṛdaya*, the question of his having preceded or succeeded Rāmānuja has still to be settled. (For the reference to the *Prapañcahṛdaya*, I am indebted to Dr. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar's *Manimekhalai*.)

ciding strangely, as it did, with Appayya's dream the previous night. " 'You must expound the impeccable commentary!' thus was I commanded by the Lord not only in person, in His Ardhanaṛīśvara form, during my 'sleep', but also in disguise under the mask of the king Cinna Bomman, while I was awake. The king Cinna Bomman, a pārijāta to his protégés, has found in the Lord his only refuge; he is a hero; and attaining the condition of a universal monarch, he feels that its sole consummation consists in his waiting on the Lord.'"¹⁸ Though Appayya makes out that the king's command was due to his devotion to the Lord, yet it is not unlikely that the king's interest in the Bhāṣya was also an interest in the author of it, possibly because he was a South Indian. Śrīkanṭha's own devotion to the dahara vidyā (the meditation of the Lord as the ether in the lotus of the heart), the fact that the famous shrine at Cidambaram is symbolic of the principle of that meditation, and his frequent use of the word Cidambaram (about six times) to signify Cit-Śakti or Cidākāśa¹⁹ may also tend to show that our author was familiar with that shrine. All such indications are exceedingly feeble, but anything more positive one is not able to find.

An indication which is, perhaps, of greater value, is supplied by the recension which Śrīkanṭha used for the Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad, referred to by him as the Mahopaniṣad. This Upaniṣad contains many hymns exalting Śiva. Almost the only difficulty in holding that, according to that text, Śiva is the Supreme Brahman, is provided by what is known as the Nārāyaṇa Anuvāka, which apparently praises Nārāyaṇa as the Supreme Brahman. To

¹⁸ From the introductory verses translated by Dr. V. V. Rāmāṇa śāstrin.

¹⁹ See Commentaries on I, 1, 2 and I, 3, 16.

get over the difficulty, the entire passage has to be interpreted so as to harmonise with the supremacy of Śiva. It is said that Nārāyaṇa is but the devotee, and that the Supreme Being is situated within the flame in the heart of Nārāyaṇa. The final sentence of that passage runs thus: "Sa brahmā sa śivas sendras śokṣaraḥ parama svarāt: He is Brahmā, He is Śiva, He is Indra, He is the Imperishable Supreme Ruler." The omission of Nārāyaṇa from this enumeration would justify the view that *He* is the Supreme Being who manifests Himself in these various ways. The difficulty is met by appealing to a similar passage in the Kaivalya Upaniṣad, which, after a similar enumeration of the manifestations of the Supreme Being, goes on to include among these Viṣṇu, the vital air, fire and so on. What is here explicitly mentioned should be understood in the corresponding passage of the Mahopaniṣad as well.

This mode of surmounting the difficulty is common to Śrikanṭha, Haradatta and Appayya Dīkṣita. The two latter are South Indians, and they followed the Drāviḍa recension of the Mahopaniṣad. The Āndhra recension includes Hari among the manifestations; its reading runs thus: "Sa brahmā sa śivas sa haris sendras śokṣaraḥ parama svarāt." This recension seems to have been known certainly at the time of Sāyaṇa, who mentions it, if he does not adopt it as his own text. If we may rely on the author of the *Uj्ज्वालā*, a commentary on Āpastamba's *Dharma Sūtras*, the Āndhra recension must have been known at least as early as the 3rd century B.C. The fact that Śrikanṭha does not utilise it, as one may well expect him to, would show that he was not, in any case, an Āndhra.²⁰ It is

²⁰ There is also a further indication to show that the Āndhra recension was not used by Śrikanṭha. The mantra, "Ṛtam satyam

also probable that he was a South Indian like Haradatta and Appayya. But of this there can be no certainty, for there were other recensions besides the Āndhra and the Drāviḍa, and we are not sure what their readings were: further, even Sāyaṇa who was an Āndhra and knew of the Āndhra recension has commented only on the 64 hymns of the Drāviḍa recension, though some manuscripts make out that he adopted the Āndhra text. One may at least venture the opinion that the community of intellectual tradition as between Śrīkaṇṭha on the one hand and Haradatta and Appayya may not be without significance in determining the place where the former worked and flourished.²¹

The only extant commentary on Śrīkaṇṭha's Bhāṣya is Appayya Dīkṣita's *Śivārka-manidīpikā*. Appayya flourished in the later half of the 16th century. The

Commentaries
on Śrīkaṇṭha's
Bhāṣya.

Bhāṣyakāra must have undoubtedly belonged to an earlier date, but how much earlier is the question. Mention has been made²² of three other commentaries: Nijaguṇa-Śiva-Yogin's *Tārā-vali*, Haradatta-Śivācārya's *Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya-*

param brahma," etc., is said to follow on the Nārāyaṇa Anuvāka (see I, 2, 8). This sequence is found not in the Āndhra recension, but in the Drāviḍa recension. It is not known whether it is common to any of the other recensions as well.

²¹ See further Rajendra Lala Mitra's Introduction to the *Bibliotheca Indica* edition of the Sāyaṇa Bhāṣya on the Taittiriya Aranyaka, p. 8.

²² By Dr. V. V. Rāmāṇa Śāstrin in his translation of *SMD*, p. 7. The learned doctor says in a letter that he came across several copies of Haradatta's *Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya-samartha*, subsequent to his referring to it in his work; but he made no copy of it himself and the present writer's attempts to get a copy have not so far been successful, though he had the information about the existence of the work confirmed by one or two other scholars. If there is such a work and it is found in however fragmentary a condition, it will be of great help in fixing a lower limit to the date of Śrīkaṇṭha.

samartha, and Brahma vidyādhvarīndra's *Vedānta-sarvasva-Śivadarpaṇa*. These works are not now available and little help could be derived from the knowledge of their existence once upon a time. We learn from the *Karnāṭaka-Kavi-Carite* that Nija-guṇa-Śiva-Yogin, who, before renunciation, was a king of some territories round about the Śambhu-linga hill, lived probably during some part of the 15th century. Śrīkaṇṭha must have lived earlier, if the information about the existence and the authorship of the *Tārāvalī* is correct. That some commentaries existed prior to Appayya's is exceedingly probable. Appayya in his *Śivādvaita Nirṇaya* sets out very elaborately the *prima facie* view that Śrīkaṇṭha's philosophy is qualified monism (*Viśiṣṭādvaita*) and it is not unlikely that the exposition was based in part on an extant commentary favouring that interpretation. In the course of that pūrva-pakṣa, reference is made to Sudarśanācārya (who is identical with Haradatta-Śivācārya) and in the light of one of his verses, it is argued that the identity of the individual and the absolute (Jīva and Brahman) is but imagined, as in the case of the magician, who, by the incantation of the Garuḍa Mantra, temporarily acquires the virtues of that bird in curing cases of snake-bite. There is room to wonder whether there was not in existence a commentary written by Sudarśana himself or by some follower of his. In any case, we have no positive knowledge of any such work. But the teaching of Haradatta presents many close parallels to Śrīkaṇṭha's, as we shall have occasion to notice in some detail presently.

In view of the commentary on the Apaśūdrādhi-karaṇa where our author states that the study of the Vedas is permitted only to the three upper castes, it is certain that Śrīkaṇṭha was not a śūdra.

That he was a brāhmin, no one can assert with certainty. The title Śivācārya is no guide in this respect, for it is applied to Meykaṇḍār, the Śaiva saint, who certainly was not a brāhmin. An attempt has been made to identify Śrikanṭha with an ācārya of the same name mentioned in the *Varuṇa paddhati* along with Durvāsas, Vidyākāṇṭha Śivācārya, and several others.²³ But the verse gives us no indication whereby this Śrikanṭha may be identified with the bhāṣyakāra; it does, however, mention him as the author of a paddhati (liturgical manual) and we have no such information about our Śrikanṭha.²⁴

The same kind of objection applies to the identification of the Śvetācārya mentioned as Śrikanṭha's guru, in introductory verse no. 4, with the ācārya of that name mentioned in the *Vāyu Saṃhitā* and

²³ See Sentinathier's Introduction to his *NŚSB*. It is interesting to note that while the Samskrit work and Appayya's commentaries thereon refer to the author as Śrikanṭha, Tamil Śaivite works mention him all the time as Nilakanṭha. See, for instance, *Māpāḍiyam*, pp. 16, 40, where his commentary is quoted or relied on and referred to as *Nilakanṭha Bhāṣya*. Dr. Ramaṇa Śāstrin says Śrikanṭha was also known as Nilakanṭha. The author of the *Nirmalāmaṇiprabhā*, a commentary on Aghora Śiva's *Paddhati*, refers to Bhagavān Nilakanṭha Ācārya (p. 135). Prof. S. Radhakrishnan in vol. 2 of his *Indian Philosophy* refers to him as Nilakanṭha. One would like to know when, by whom and with what justification the appellation Nilakanṭha was given, especially in view of the difference of usage appearing to go with a difference of language. Umāpati in his *PB* (p. 10) refers to our author as Nilakanṭha Ācārya, and to the work as the *Śrikanṭha Bhāṣya*. There appears to have been another Śivācārya of the name Nilakanṭha, the author of the *Kriyāsāra*, popularly mistaken for a commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras*. This Nilakanṭha probably lived in the 14th century (so we are told by Mr. C. Hayavadana Rao, who is engaged in bringing out an edition of the *Śrikara Bhāṣya*, a Vira Śaiva commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras*). One wonders how much confusion there has been between this Nilakanṭha and our Śrikanṭha. See M. A. Narayana Sastry's Introduction to the *Manovijaya* of Guru Basava, pp. 5-6.

²⁴ After the enumeration of ācāryas, the śloka says "paddhatīs have been written by these glorious Śivācāryas".

the *Liṅga Purāṇa*. He is said to be the first of the twenty-eight Yogācāryas who were incarnations of an amśa (element) of the Lord and pursued the traditions of the mahā-pāśupata-jñāna (as contrasted with the avaidika-pāśupata condemned in the *Vedānta Sūtras*). Without condemning the purāṇas as unhistorical, one may yet be permitted to look for a less mythical personality, as the inspirer of an author who is undoubtedly historical. In any case, if all the Yogācāryas represent the same tradition and Nakulīśa who is one of them and is styled Jagadguru (world-teacher) is the same as the founder of the Pāśupata system that goes by his name, it has to be noted that between that system and Śrīkaṇṭha's, there are significant points of difference; one is hence forced to the conclusion that there is little likelihood of Śrīkaṇṭha's guru having been the first of the Yogācāryas (ādye śvetaḥ).²⁵

One must, however, equally guard against going too far with the swing of the pendulum and making facile identifications in the passion for historicity. It has been said that Śvetācārya can be "easily identified" with Meykaṇḍār.²⁶

There is a good deal to be said in favour of the theory, in view of the considerable similarities of doctrine between Tamil Śaiva Siddhānta, of which as a philosophy, Meykaṇḍār may be said to have been the founder, and Śrīkaṇṭha's Śivādvaita.

²⁵ An important point of difference between Śrīkaṇṭha's Śaivism and that of the Nakulīśa Pāśupatas is in the regard that the Lord is said to have for Karma in creation. The latter denies such consideration, while the former affirms it in consistency with the Vedāntic tradition which it expounds. (See Śrīkaṇṭha Bhāṣya, II, 1, 34, and 35; also *Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha*, Cowell and Gough, pp. 109, 113, 116).

²⁶ In an article, "The Date of Śrīkaṇṭha", *JOB*, I, i.

The belief in the three categories, pati, paśu and pāśa seems to be common to both ; saṃsāra is conceived by both as due, not to God's cruelty, but to His desire that souls should purify and perfect themselves. But certain differences will also have to be noticed presently, in the light of which it will be very difficult to imagine Śrīkaṇṭha to have been a disciple of Meykaṇḍār. Apart from considerations of doctrine, the mere fact that Meykaṇḍār was a non-brāhmin need not make us conclude that Śrīkaṇṭha could not have been his pupil. For, in the first place, we are yet to know definitely that Śrīkaṇṭha himself was a brāhmin, while we do know that one brāhmin at least, Sakalāgama Paṇḍita, later known as Aruḷ-Nandi-Śivācārya, was Meykaṇḍār's pupil. Further, the ācārya is addressed only as "nānāgamavidhāyin, one who has settled the Āgamic canon," and the study of the Āgamas, as Śrīkaṇṭha says in the Pāsupatādhi-karaṇa (II, 2, 38) was open to all castes. No doubt Appayya Dīkṣita understands that expression to denote one who knows how to reconcile the Āgamas with the Vedas, but it may be due to a pre-conception that Śrīkaṇṭha and his teacher were brāhmins; and in any case, it cannot avail against the words of the text. Again, though we know that Meykaṇḍār was not a brāhmin, we do not know that he was a member of a class excluded from Vedic study. In the case of Jānaśruti Pauṭrāyaṇa (I, 3, 34), it is argued that he was not one of those so excluded, in spite of the explicit appellation "Śūdra" applied to him. It is argued that he was a kṣatriya, and part of the argument is based on grounds like these: he had a charioteer in his service, he used to make large gifts of cooked food, he had villages of which he made gifts and so on. Now, of Meykaṇḍār, we are told that his maternal

uncle was one Gāṅgeya-Bhūpati of Tiruvenkāḍu (Śvetavana, from which the alternative name of Śvetavanan is derived for Meykaṇḍār). This uncle was probably a minor feudatory chief, as his name "Bhūpati" shows. Further, there is a reference in stanzas 154-157 of the *Tamil Navalar Śaridai* to an Accuta Kaḷappālan of Cidambaram, who held captive at the same time a Cera, a Coḷa and a Pāṇḍya king. Meykaṇḍār's father too was an Accuta Kaḷappālan of Pennāgaḍam, about 30 miles from Cidambaram. It has been ably argued²⁷ that a historical occurrence like the one mentioned was not at all improbable in view of the troubled times in which Meykaṇḍār probably flourished (the beginning of the 13th century), when the history of South India abounded in kaleidoscopic vicissitudes and the meteoric rise of petty chiefs to power. It is also argued that since that was the period of the gradually growing power of the later Pallavas, with its centre at Śendamangalam close to Tiruvenkāḍu, and since of the three kings said to have been imprisoned, the Pāṇḍya was probably a protégé and the Cera a feudatory, it is exceedingly probable that the Accuta Kaḷappālan who imprisoned the kings was also the father of Meykaṇḍār, the suggestion being reinforced by the fact that Accutan's brother-in-law was a Bhūpati. If this identification is correct (and it has got very much in its favour), what warrant is there for classing Accuta or his son as persons who were denied the privilege of studying the Vedas? Would not the arguments used in the case of Jānaśruti apply here with equal, if not greater force? Meykaṇḍār was a non-brāhmin; he may, however, have belonged to a class not excluded from the study of

²⁷ By Mr. T. G. Aravamuthan in his work, *Saivism in South India*, which unfortunately is yet unpublished.

the Vedas. The argument is extremely thin, but not more so than the objection.

The real difficulty, however, is doctrinal. Śrīkanṭha's Śivādvaita is not identical with the system of the Siddhāntins. These latter distinguish four kinds of faiths, the most external (purapuraccamayam), the external (puraccamayam), those which are half in and half out (ahappuraccamayam), and those which have a correct perception of the central truth (ahaccamayam), though between these last and the Siddhānta there are some slight differences of doctrine. Śivādvaita comes in the last class. The system of Śrīkanṭha seems also to have some affinity with Aikyavāda Śaiva, the main feature of which is the denial of āṇava mala, the principle which figures largely in the Siddhānta as the power that obscures. It is not possible to say that Śrīkanṭha expressly denies the existence or the functioning of āṇava; but he nowhere refers to it by that name; his references to what may correspond to it in his system are very meagre and inconclusive.²⁸ Paśutva which he does mention need mean nothing more than the quality of being an individual soul; it need not be identified with an independent principle of individuation. And further, the function assigned to āṇava mala seems to be discharged by the concepts of karma and māyā in Śrīkanṭha's system. Nowhere do we come across the Siddhāntic notion that the functions of

²⁸ The synonyms of āṇava are:—paśutva, paśunihāra, mr̥tyu, mūrccā, mala, añjana, avidyā, āvṛti, ruj, glāni, pāpa, mūla and kṣaya. See *Mrgendra Āgama*, VII, v. 7. Besides the reference to paśutva, particularly in the *Ahaṅgrahādhikaraṇa*, there is mention of beginningless ignorance (ajñāna) in I, 1, 1. It is just possible that this term is used as synonymous with avidyā, one of the names for āṇava.

mala and *māyā* are different and opposed. But an argument from silence may easily be stressed too far. We have to remember, too, that in throwing a bridge between the Vedāntic and Āgamic teaching, our author was probably careful not to appear to read everything of the latter into the former, similarity in broad outlines and central concepts being deemed more essential.²⁹

It must, however, be said that he does not seem to get any nearer the Tamil Siddhānta than the *ahaccamayams* (the last of the four classes). For him, the world both intelligent and non-intelligent (*cit* as well as *acit*) is the result of the transformation of *Cit-Śakti*, the Lord's energy, which as Intelligence and Bliss is non-different from Himself. Thus we have two results, both unacceptable to the Siddhāntins: (1) the world is the result of the transformation of the Lord (for, between *Śakti* and the possessor thereof there is non-difference); (2) the non-intelligent world consisting of bodies, instruments and objects of enjoyment is derived from the same principle as the enjoying souls. To constitute one principle out of *māyā* and *Cit-Śakti* is repugnant to the Siddhānta. The refutation of this doctrine is to be found in Umāpati Śivācārya's *Samkarpā Nirākaraṇam*, in the section dealing with the doctrine of the transformation of the operative cause (*nimitta kāraṇa pariṇāma vādam*). The upholder of this view is made to say³⁰: "Understand that the whole world is but Śiva and *Śakti*, the forms of the Pure Being, and

²⁹ For a further reference to this topic, see Chapter V, *post*.

³⁰ புவனம் யாவையும் புனிதன தருவாம்.

சிவமுஞ்சத்தியு மெனத்தெளி, அவற்றுள்

அசேதன மென்றொன் றறைதற்கிலது.

that within these, it is not possible to distinguish one as non-intelligent." It is indeed this non-recognition of an independent origin for the non-intelligent world (*acit prapañca*) that gives a handle to Appayya Dikṣita to say that, in Śrīkanṭha's view, that world is *vivarta*, an illusory manifestation of Brahman; for, the non-intelligent cannot truly result from the transformation of what is intelligent.³¹

In the conception of *tādātmya* or *advaita*, again, there is a difference between Śivād-
 (c) The notion of *Tadatmya*. *vaita* and the Tamil *Siddhānta*.
 This is how the difference has been put. "Śrīkanṭha calls this relation, following Bādarāyaṇa, as one of cause and effect, and calls it as a peculiar *apūrvapariṇāma*, in which the efficient cause is not affected by the changes as in an ordinary case of causation, and yet his illustration of soul and body, would seem to bring, if not quite, within causation at all. Śivajñānayogī distinguishes between two kinds of *Tādātmyam*. One thing appears as two, as *Guṇi* and *Guṇa*, substance and attribute. This is one kind. Again two things might be so connected as to be regarded as one. This is also *Tādātmyam*; and this latter relation

³¹ The assumption that Umāpati had Śrīkanṭha in mind in his statement and criticism of the *Nimitta-kāraṇa-pariṇāmavāda*, would not be wholly warranted. Umāpati's charge of the non-recognition of the soul as different from the Lord, cannot be levelled against Śrīkanṭha's system. There is identity between the two in so far as the soul is the manifestation of the *Cit-śakti* of the Lord; but again, souls are said to be eternal, and even in release they become *like* Brahman, not identical with Brahman. This doctrinal consideration is in any case irrelevant to the question of the date of Śrīkanṭha, in view of Umāpati's specific reference to him in the *Paṇṣkara Bhāṣya*. The lower limit may thus be fixed at 1313 A.D., the date of the *Samkarpā Nirākaraṇam*, the only date definitely known in the history of Tamil Śaivism. See, however, Note A at the end of this Chapter; and on the question of Śrīkanṭha's relation to the *Siddhānta*, see Note B.

is what is called *Advaita* and the former relation is simply known as *Tādātmyam*; and Śrīkaṇṭha would seem to conform himself to *Tādātmyam* first described.’’³²

A further point of difference is in the conception of *Jīvanmukti*, liberation in this life. We are told in *Tiru-arul-payan*, that, “to men of matured knowledge, the hereafter (i.e., liberation) comes even here.’’³³ Śrīkaṇṭha cannot accept this idea. Even for the enlightened person, past karma which has already begun to take effect, continues to exist till the end of this life. No future karma may taint or bind the individual, but past karma whose effectuation has already begun cannot be cancelled. Such karma may be productive of results which do not disappear with the dawn of knowledge, but act as hindrances to realisation; these may be removed by the performance of agnihotra, etc.³⁴ Further, the state of bondage continues until Brahman is attained, and there is attainment only at the end of the path of the gods (*devayāna*). The declara-

³² J. M. Nallaswami Pillai, *Studies in Śaiva Siddhānta*, 266-267: the language is not happy and the thought is far from clear. Mr. K. Subramania Pillai in his Tamil work, *Śaiva Siddhānta Viḷakkam*, achieves far greater clearness. God stands in relation to the soul as the soul to the body. As the eyes cannot see but for the light of the soul, the soul cannot know but for the light of God. God and soul are one in the sense that they cannot be disjoined; they exist and function *together*, not as if they were two distinct beings. Their unity, however, is not that of the one causing or being transformed into the other. The latter is Śrīkaṇṭha’s conception of identity, though he holds to the body and soul notion also; a notion, Appayya explains, advanced for the benefit of those of very poor spiritual fitness, who can seek salvation only by the *dāsa mārga*, the path of devotion to the Lord as His servants. (*Śaiva Siddhānta Viḷakkam*, 98; see also p. 87, where it is said that Śrīkaṇṭha is a Śivādvaitin, upholder of a faith which in respect of the concept of release, has affinities with *ekātma-vāda*.)

³³ X, 9.

³⁴ IV, 1, 17 and 18.

tion that he who knows Brahman becomes Brahman indicates only *early* not *immediate* attainment.³⁵

There is yet another difference of some importance; of Meykaṇḍār, it is said that (e) The value of Reason. he expounded the truths he had realised, for the benefit of the world, in the form of syllogisms, employing hetu (middle term) and dr̥ṣṭānta (illustrative instance).³⁶ Śrī-kaṇṭha, on the other hand, holds fast to Śruti alone, and holds reasoning in no great esteem.³⁷ Inference is bound to fail, for lack of a dr̥ṣṭānta, to establish a single cause with a dual nature (both efficient cause and material cause). It cannot take us beyond pluralism and the causes so reached will also be subject to karma and bondage like the human agents known to us.³⁸ The opposition that exists between the two attitudes is made clear by Śiva-jñāna Yogin, who in his *Māpāḍiyam*, exhibits portions of Meykaṇḍār's work as supplying answers to objections identical with those of Śrī-kaṇṭha.³⁹

³⁵ IV, 2, 8-13. See also III, 4, 50; even he who performs karma cannot expect the fruit immediately on its termination; he does get it, if there are no obstacles; otherwise, the attainment is delayed, perhaps, till another life. Similarly with liberation. We also know of Vāmadeva and others who had attained knowledge but not liberation. On this point too, as on that of ānava mala, Śrīkaṇṭha's position is rather ill-defined. See further IV, 4, 14, where an incidental reference is made to jīvan mukti. "The man here referred to (*Taitt. Upa.* II, 8) is that person who has attained supreme knowledge and who performs the agnihotra and other sacrificial acts without longing for their fruits, while dedicating them all to Brahman. The bliss of such a man, who is liberated while still alive, and the bliss of Brahman are quite equal." (Translation by A. Mahādeva Śāstri.)

³⁶ சிந்தை செய்து தானுரைத்தான் மெய்கண்டான், தாரணியோர் தாமரை, ஏது திருட்டாந்தத் தாவின்மு. (சிறப்புப் பாயிரம்.)

³⁷ I, 1, 21.

³⁸ I, 1, 3.

³⁹ See pp. 77, 83 and 84 of the *Drāviḍa Māpāḍiyam* (Vidyānupālana Press Edition).

Śrīkaṇṭha maintains like the Vaiṣṇava Viśiṣṭādvaitin that the soul is atomic (aṇu), while, according to the Siddhāntin, it is pervasive (vibhu). The doctrine of atomicity is expressly condemned by the Tamil Siddhānta school.⁴⁰

The nearest approach in Śrīkaṇṭha's system to a distinction between śuddha māyā and aśuddha māyā is in IV, 4, 22, where the bodies taken on by released souls, are said to be products of pure Mahāmāyā, but this does not correspond to the Siddhānta distinction or usage.⁴¹ In view of the doctrinal and methodological differences above set forth, it is very difficult to maintain that Śrīkaṇṭha got his system "through serving the two feet" of Meykaṇḍār, for, the differences amount even to opposition.

The period when Śrīkaṇṭha wrote is still more difficult of determination. A careful study of the work seems to provide a number of clues, but they all in turn, reveal themselves as inconclusive. Every conceivable theory has been put forward—that he was the earliest of the known commentators, that he succeeded Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja too, and that he came after Haradattācārya but before Rāmānuja. Each one of these can find some plausible grounds in its support. An inquiry in some detail may show that not one of these theories can claim to have been proved, while the balance of probability inclines one to the view that Śrīkaṇṭha was probably a contemporary of Rāmānuja's.

The view that Śrīkaṇṭha was the earliest of the commentators has little argument to support it. It

⁴⁰ See *śJS*, IV, 2, and Umāpati's *PB*, pp. 274-275.

⁴¹ For an account of the latter, see *ETS*; cf. particularly verse 173.

is said that Appayya Dīkṣita in the *Catur-mata-leśa-saṅgraha* lists the commentaries in the following chronological order—Śrīkaṇṭhīya-Bhagavatpādiya-Rāmānujīya-Ānandatīrthīya.⁴² Assuming the correctness of the reference, it is by no means certain that the order is chronological; for, it conflicts with suggestions in the *Ānandalahari* and the *Sivādvaita Nirṇaya* (both by the same author) to the effect that Śrīkaṇṭha came after Śaṅkara and before Rāmānuja. Nor does it correspond to the order in which the bhāṣyas are treated in the *Catur-mata-leśa-saṅgraha*, that order being Ānanda-tīrthīya, Rāmānujīya, Śrīkaṇṭhīya and Bhagavatpādiya.⁴³

It has been said⁴⁴ that the Bodhāyana Vṛtti from which Rāmānuja professed to derive his inspiration never existed and that he got all his ideas from Śrīkaṇṭha's Bhāṣya, as shown by the identical interpretation given by both of the passage "kapyāsam puṇḍarikam evaṁ akṣiṇī (eyes like the lotus that has opened out with the sun)". This explanation which differs from Śaṅkara's, wherein "kapyāsam" is taken to mean the posteriors of a monkey, is no doubt remarkable; and a resemblance in this respect suggests a borrowing. But the argument that Rāmānuja was the borrower takes for granted the conclusion that Śrīkaṇṭha was the

⁴² Dr. V. V. Ramaṇa Śāstrin's translation of *SMD*, 24.

⁴³ The following reference is given as a further illustration of how Appayya Dīkṣita's authority is claimed for very conflicting positions. The position that Śrīkaṇṭha was the earliest of the commentators is sought to be supported by the Editor of the *Brahma Vidyā* on the authority of the *Sivādvaita Nirṇaya*: "Śrīmat Appayya Dīkṣita Swāmigal in his work '*Sivādvaita Nirṇayam*' states that Śrīkaṇṭha's Bhāṣya was first, and Śaṅkara's commentary was next" (quoted in the *Siddhānta Dipikā*, II, 9). We have yet to find any suggestion in the *Sivādvaita Nirṇaya* to support this statement.

⁴⁴ See Sentinathier's Introduction to his *NSSB*.

earlier. The borrowing may have been the other way round, as suggested by the *Suddhādvaita-mārtāṇḍa*.⁴⁵ To say that the Vṛtti of Bodhāyana never existed may be an easy way out of many difficulties; but it is far too easy for critical scholarship, which has to take into account the third possibility of a common original (in the shape of that Vṛtti or some other similar work), from which both writers borrowed either at about the same or at different times. This last possibility we shall never be able to get rid of.

It has already been remarked that Tiru-Mūlar and Śrīkaṇṭha take about the same view of the relation between the Vedas and the Āgamas. But the parallelism is not complete, for Śrīkaṇṭha has nothing corresponding to Tiru-Mūlar's distinction between General and Special. In any case, a resemblance of this kind gives us no clue as to which of the two is prior. It has been argued that while Śrīkaṇṭha speaks in the first person "vayam tu", Tiru-Mūlar refers to the authority of great men; and Śrīkaṇṭha was himself probably one of the great men referred to.⁴⁶ But it should not be forgotten that Śrīkaṇṭha in commenting on the *Brahma Sūtras* does not profess to air his own views, but sets out to make clear the sense acceptable to

⁴⁵ See the article, "The Date of Śrīkaṇṭha," in *JOR*, I, 1. It must be kept in mind that a great part of the charges of plagiarism and theft may be due to sectarian prejudice. Bhāskara, for instance, except in those places where there is acute doctrinal difference between him and Śaṅkara, seems to follow freely the latter's interpretation of the Sūtras, in respect of the texts considered, the statement of the *prima facie* view and so on. And yet no charge of plagiarism has been brought forward, probably because Śaṅkara and Bhāskara alike spoke of Brahman, not of Śiva or Viṣṇu.

⁴⁶ *Jigyasa*, I, ii; "Śrīkaṇṭhācārya."

Bādarāyaṇa. The reference in the first person need not therefore be to Śrīkaṇṭha himself, and it is quite consistent with the author being of late date, later even than Tiru-Mūlar. This conclusion too has nothing positive to support it, and in any case, no date is settled thereby; for, as already stated, we know that in all probability Tiru-Mūlar preceded the Tevāram hymnalist Sundara, but how much earlier he was, we do not know. Śrīkaṇṭha could have succeeded Tiru-Mūlar and yet preceded Śaṅkara, on the assumption that the date of the latter, as usually given (788 A.D.), is correct.

In I, 1, 4, Śrīkaṇṭha quotes a couplet which gives the marks whereby the significance of a text is to be determined. It runs thus:

Upakramopasaṃhārāvabhyāsōpūrvatā phalam,
Arthavāḍopapattī ca liṅgam tātparyanirṇaye.

“ The beginning, the end, the repetition, the novelty, the object, the glorifications, and argument—these are the canons for determining the purport.”⁴⁷ This couplet has been identified as a saṅgrahaśloka in the *Tattvadīpana* of Akhaṇḍānanda, a writer assigned to the beginning of the 13th century.⁴⁸ Śrīkaṇṭha who quotes the couplet must, therefore, have come later. But it is said that Akhaṇḍānanda himself owed the couplet to his teacher Prakāśātman, in whose work it is found in the form:

Upakramopasaṃhārāvabhyāsōpūrvatā phalam,
Arthavāḍopapattī ca yato jīvas tataḥ paraḥ.

As is well pointed out by the writer of the *Jignyasa* article, the concluding part about the jīva looks like the clinching of an argument about the jīva by an appeal to the maxims of interpretation as embo-

⁴⁷ Translation by Dr. V. S. Ghāte, on p. 53 of *The Vedānta*.

⁴⁸ See “The Date of Śrīkaṇṭha”, *JOE*, I, i.

died in a well-known form. In that case the couplet may belong to an earlier period than Prakāśātman himself.

That the couplet occurred in some independent work of early date appears probable from the reference to it by Ānanda Tīrtha in his commentary on I, 1, 4, as from the *Bṛhat Samhitā*. True, no known work of that name seems to contain the couplet ; but one should not lightly convict the ācārya of giving a false reference, especially when the subject-matter of the reference embodies only well-known and accepted principles of interpretation ; the metrical form of presentation is alone in question, and this was not likely to make any difference to the value or the authoritativeness of Mādhava's teaching. It is also interesting to note that Mādhava in his *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* mentions the couplet and the reference to the *Bṛhat Samhitā* by Pūrṇa-prajña. As a historian, Mādhava no doubt does not make himself responsible for statements made by the authors of the systems he discusses, but he does not invariably mention the references they give. Where this is done, it may be because the reference is true, though little known, or the doctrine itself is specious. The latter alternative does not apply to the present case. Hence, the former may prevail. The third possibility of the citation of a true doctrine with a false reference is an improbability.

It has also to be noted that the couplet containing the six marks determinative of purport is cited in a commentary on the *Lalitā Trisatī* ascribed to Śaṅkara. Commenting on the name "Sarva-vedānta-tātparya-bhūmiḥ", the writer explains "tātparya" as "samanvaya, harmonious purport", and cites the couplet as enumerating the marks determining such purport. He takes the Vedānta to

teach the doctrine of non-dualism and says that he does not exhibit on this occasion how this doctrine is arrived at from the texts, since it has already been done in *Vedānta Sūtra* I, 1, 4 (what is called the *samanvaya adhikaraṇa*), and further elaboration of the argument is needless. Such a remark would be inappropriate except on the supposition that the author of the commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras* is identical with the commentator on the *Trīsatī*; there would thus be comparatively little room to doubt Śaṅkara's authorship of the *Trīsatī Bhāṣya*. The couplet known even to Śaṅkara, can hardly serve to fix the date of Śrīkaṇṭha in relation to Śaṅkara's successors—Mādhava or Prakāśātman or Akhaṇḍānanda. (See *Lalitā Trīsatī Bhāṣya*, Memorial Edition, XVIII, 257.)

The mention of the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* leads us to another consideration, based

(3) **Madhava** on the non-mention of Śrīkaṇṭha or
Acarya. his system by Mādhava Ācārya who, however, gives an account of the systems of Rāmānuja and Ānanda Tīrtha. This gives rise to a strong presumption that Śrīkaṇṭha, or at least his reputation, was subsequent to the time of Mādhava. But the argument is not conclusive, as all writers worthy of mention have not found a place in the *Saṅgraha*, e.g., Bhāskara.⁴⁰

Mādhava's silence is, in any case, of little significance, for Śrīkaṇṭha is unambiguously

(4) **Umapati** referred to by Umāpati, who wrote
Sivacarya. about 1313 A.D. and was a contemporary of Mādhava's, if not senior to him.

The clearest of the references is to the passage in the *Bhāṣya* about the equal authority of the Vedas and the Āgamas, the only difference between them

⁴⁰ See the article in *Jignyasa*, I, ii.

being that the latter are accessible to all castes, while the former are accessible only to the first three. The commentary is cited as Śrīkaṇṭha Bhāṣya and the commentator is mentioned as Nīlakaṇṭha Ācārya. This suggests the possibility of the name Śrīkaṇṭha having been applied only to the work and not to the author. But since Umāpati makes only one reference by name, it is not possible to verify that suggestion, which has the further disadvantage of running counter to the usage of Appayya and others who refer to Śrīkaṇṭhācārya.

The author of the *Nirmalamāṇiprabhā* which is a commentary on the *Aghora Śiva Paddhati* refers to the identical passage of Śrīkaṇṭha's Bhāṣya, in almost the same words as Umāpati. Aghora Śiva belongs to the period about 1158 A.D. It is not known how much later the commentary came. It is interesting to note, however, that while the author of the *Prabhā* cites not merely the Āgamas but many of the commentaries thereon (e.g., he cites the *Mṛgendra*, the *Mṛgendra Vṛtti*, and the *Mṛgendra Vṛtti Dīpikā*), he mentions only the *Pauṣkara Āgama*, not the *Pauṣkara Bhāṣya*. That this bhāṣya by Umāpati is a work of considerable value goes without saying ; and the non-mention thereof would suggest for the *Prabhā* a date prior to the *Pauṣkara Bhāṣya*, possibly the middle or end of the 13th century. Apart from this conjecture, it is clear that even at the beginning of the 14th century, Śrīkaṇṭha must have been a figure of some importance, to justify Umāpati's reference to him.⁵⁰ Nor does Śrīkaṇṭha's Śaivism provide sufficient justification, for we know that that Śaivism was not of the variety which commended itself to Umāpati.

⁵⁰ See Note A at the end of the Chapter.

Srikanṭha calls his system Śiva Viśiṣṭādvaita and (5) Ramanuja. says that Brahman is cidacitprapañca viśiṣṭa (qualified by the world, intelligent and non-intelligent). It is said⁵¹ that so far as is known, these terms became current only with Yāmuna and Rāmānuja. Here again, one has to argue from ignorance of the presence of a particular usage at a particular time. This mode of reasoning is specially worthy of condemnation in this case, for, Rāmānuja does not profess to write an independent commentary on the *Sūtras*; he follows merely in the wake of Bodhāyana's Vṛtti. Viśiṣṭādvaita being the central idea of the doctrine so set forth by Rāmānuja, one may, in the nature of things, expect both the thought and the words expressing it in the Vṛtti.⁵² Though Srikanṭha does not mention the Vṛtti, he may have drawn on it all the same. That he should have done so without acknowledgment is not less plausible than that he should have plagiarised from Rāmānuja.

Reference has already been made to Appayya Dīkṣita and to his commentary, the *Śivārkaṇḍīpikā*. He wrote at least two other works, the *Ānanda*

**Appayya's view
of the chronology.**

⁵¹ "The Date of Śrikanṭha", *JOR*, I, i.

⁵² Reference has already been made to the *Prapañcahrdaya* which mentions the Vṛtti of Bodhāyana and the abridgement of it by Upavarṣa. An interesting point about the Vṛtti is that it covered the whole Mīmāṃsā Śāstra, in twenty chapters, embracing both the portions now known as the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta. It will be remembered that Rāmānuja interprets "atha" of I, l. 1, as marking the division of a new chapter, in the light of the whole of the Mīmāṃsā being but one Śāstra, and quotes the Vṛtikāra in support of the position. What little is known of the Vṛtti through the *Prapañcahrdaya* supports Rāmānuja's appeal thereto. May not Rāmānuja have similarly derived his other ideas from the Vṛtti, as he himself claims? It has to be noticed that Śrikanṭha gives the same explanation of "atha". The knowledge now gained of the Vṛtti would make it possible to derive Śrikanṭha's explanation direct therefrom, without making out that he got the idea from Rāmānuja.

Laharī and the *Sivādvaita Nirṇaya*, inquiring into the precise implications of Śrīkaṇṭha's system, and establishing that in essence his philosophy was Advaita. The passages which lean to the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of thought are for the benefit of people of slow wit who have neither the intelligence to comprehend, nor the strength of mind to remain concentrated in, the Nirguṇa Brahman. In the course of these two works, Appayya makes it abundantly clear that, in his own opinion, Śrīkaṇṭha came after Śaṅkara and that Rāmānuja came after Śrīkaṇṭha. Of Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya, he says that it follows in the wake of Śrīkaṇṭha's (*tadanukṛtī saraṇi*). In commenting on the expression pūrvācāryaih kaluṣitam (obscured by previous writers), Appayya gives examples from Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya, but points out that the writers referred to are Rāmānuja's ancestors in philosophic tradition.⁵³ To Appayya's mind, there was no doubt about Śrīkaṇṭha having preceded Rāmānuja.

This indication would indeed be very valuable but for the fact that Appayya seems to be not a wholly safe guide. His claim that Śrīkaṇṭha is an advaitin, we shall have to consider later. But we may look at two instances of Appayya's comments, with a view to judge the amount of consideration he has for the words of the author he is

The value of
Appayya as a
guide.

⁵³ For very much more in this strain see the article in *Jignyasa*, I, ii. The writer holds that in view of the high ideals imposed on commentators, they should be taken in every case to have been strictly faithful to their originals and not to have made any unwarranted statements. A not very effective counter-blast is provided by a writer in the *Vedānta Dipikā* for January 1929, who makes the very implausible suggestion that Appayya deliberately ante-dated Śrīkaṇṭha to please his patron, Cinna Bomman, who was a Śaivite, and that Appayya's reference to pūrvā pūrvā ācāryas is only a subtle method of rebuking Rāmānuja, by suggesting that not he, but his instructors were at fault.

commenting on. Both instances are taken from the *Ānanda Laharī*, the first of these coming from the comment on the very first verse.

Brahman is said in I, 1, 13 to be identical with the self that is *ānandamaya* (full of bliss). The scriptural reference is to the second chapter of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. But in that context we are told that of this *ānandamaya* self, Brahman is the tail (*i.e.*, the support). How then can Brahman be identified with that self? The *advaitin*, therefore, holds that the self that is so indicated is the *jīva* (the finite self). Not so, says the *Vaiṣṇava Viśiṣṭādvaitin*, for, the statement that Brahman is its support means nothing more than that Brahman has no support outside itself, but that it is rooted in itself. Now comes the sentence “*Śrīkaṇṭhā-cāryair eva sa panthā darśitaḥ*” (by *Śrīkaṇṭha* alone was this explanation shown or made clear). It may mean that he was the first to think of it or the first to make it intelligible, in the light of his own interpretation. It is unfortunate that neither interpretation finds support in the text of *Śrīkaṇṭha*’s commentary. The difficulty about Brahman being the tail is raised in the introduction to the comment on I, 1, 16, and the answer is provided in the *bhāṣya* to that *sūtra*. The passage about the tail may be interpreted in various ways: (1) Brahman said to be the tail is the *Pranava*; this is the support of *Parameśvara* which is the *ānandamaya* self; (2) the *ānandamaya* self is the *Parā-Śakti* otherwise called *Paramākāśa*, of which Brahman is the support; since there is no fundamental difference between *Parā-Śakti* which is Brahman’s *dharma* (attribute) and that which possesses the *dharma*, the *Sūtrakāra* refers to Brahman itself as the *ānandamaya* self; (3) the released soul is said, in the *Taittirīya*, to rise above the lords of the five sheaths,—food,

breath, mind, consciousness and bliss. The Lord of the sheath of bliss is Sadāśiva and his support, Brahman, is also referred to as ānandamaya because of non-difference. Appayya makes out, with abundant justification, that the second of these represents Śrikanṭha's own view. But we do not find Śrikanṭha setting out the position of the Vaiṣṇava Siddhāntin that Brahman is its own support. He cannot, therefore, be said to be the one who first or at any time indicated that mode of explanation. Nor is it that position which he has made clear. To say that the dharmin is referred to on account of essential non-difference from dharma, is not the same as to maintain that the dharmin is rooted in itself. Each position by itself is intelligible, but nothing can result but confusion from identifying the two.

To take another, perhaps, a clearer instance: the last sūtra of the topic about Brahman as the internal ruler is "ubhayepi hi bhedenainam adhīyate." The commentary shows with reference to both the Kāṇva and the Mādhyandina recensions of the Upaniṣad that the internal ruler rests in and is other than the ātman or vijñāna, the latter expression being frequently used synonymously with the former to denote the finite self. It would thus appear that the sūtra is intended to exclude the conception of the finite self as the internal ruler. Not so, says Appayya, for, no such doubt could conceivably have arisen. In the context, we hear of the internal ruler as residing in the earth and the other elements, and as controlling them. The meditating self obviously could not be imagined as residing in the earth or controlling the earth. Further, Kāpya when questioned whether he knew the internal ruler, replied that he did not. The answer could not apply to the finite self; for he knew

what was to be known about the *jīva*, since he was a performer of sacrifices; he should have known at least that the finite self is other than the body, the enjoyer of the fruit of action, and so on. Nor can the reference be to the presiding deities of earth, etc., for Uddālaka is told that the internal ruler is his own self; and there can be no identity between his self and the presiding deity of the earth. It must also be remembered that each such deity controls only one element, while the internal ruler controls all. Nor is a collection of these deities to be understood, as, of such a collection, residence in the earth, etc., cannot be predicated.

A combination of collective and distributive readings is of no greater help, for, the reference to the *antaryāmin* (the internal ruler) as thy self (the self of Uddālaka, who is addressed) still requires to be explained. Further, it has been already shown in the discussion of the golden person within the sun that the *antaryāmin* is other than the finite self, and there is no need to repeat this idea. It must, therefore, be concluded that since the previous *sūtra* has disposed of the possibility of *Nārāyaṇa* as the collective soul being the internal ruler, the present *sūtra* refers to the *Cit-Śakti* which is higher than *Nārāyaṇa*, being the material cause thereof. This *Cit-Śakti* may appropriately be referred to as *viñāṇa*, being of the nature of intelligence. The *antaryāmin* is not to be identified even with *Cit-Śakti*. He rests in that and is other than that. The doubt about the *jīva* being the *antaryāmin* is not appropriate at this stage. No doubt the *bhāṣya* appears to take that view, but it is only to show that the *sūtra* may be interpreted in that way also.

All this constitutes a piece of brilliant reasoning; but it seems to be so manifestly irreconcilable

with the text of the bhāṣya, as it stands. As an exposition of what Śrīkaṇṭha ought to have said it is almost perfect; but as an exposition of what he has actually said (and presumably meant as well), it is very much open to question; it is matter for legitimate doubt whether what is so clear to Appayya Dīkṣita may not require demonstration to the seeker after truth. That the jīva cannot be the antaryāmin is very clear, indeed, from what Appayya says; but it need not be equally clear before it is discussed and disposed of by the teacher. The fact that the question has already been touched upon in the antaradhikarana is no bar to its being mooted again; for, pupils may be dull enough to imagine a different conclusion possible, because the topics are different; in one case the reference is to the golden person within the sun, in the other to the internal controller of the whole universe. And the argument is not even plausible on the ground of the commentator going in for brevity; for Śrīkaṇṭha can be prolix without any need, even where the reasoning applied is identical and the conclusion reached is parallel.⁵⁴

The instances given above may show that Appayya, though a brilliant thinker, allows himself to be led away by considerations of logical perfection and adopts interpretations which are very difficult to reconcile with the texts themselves. From the point of view of a metaphysician, Śrī-

⁵⁴ See, for instance, "Etena mātariśvā vyākhyātaḥ" (II, 3, 8) which states that Vāyu like Ākāśa (discussed in the previous seven sūtras), is also originated, the reasoning applied being identical. Śrīkaṇṭha, unlike Rāmānuja, states in some detail both the objections and the method of meeting them—an entirely unnecessary proceeding. The only justification for it is perhaps, that given by Śaṅkara for making a new topic out of this, viz., that slow-witted people might boggle at differences in names—Vāyu and Ākāśa.

kanṭha occupies a position midway between Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja. The former is the exponent of Advaita, the crown of all philosophy; the latter professes a system which, however satisfying and necessary to the people to whom it may appeal, has few points of contact with the ultimate truth, which is Advaita. Indeed, Rāmānuja goes to the other extreme of abusing that truth. That extreme is avoided by Śrīkanṭha, who while expounding the theistic position which alone can be comprehended in the first instance by the generality of the people, and which prepares the ground for renunciation and the firmness of mind necessary for the attainment of pure Brahman without qualities, yet keeps the door open for passing on to this higher truth. His is a synthesis of the philosophy of Śaṁkara and the religion of Rāmānuja. On this very ground, one might argue that he should have come after both. But, since on purely logical merits Śrīkanṭha seems to occupy a position midway between those of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja, it is possible to consider him as marking a transition from the one to the other. Has this been the basis of Appayya's chronology? It is difficult to believe so, but Appayya has given us little more definite to go upon.

In the *Sivādvaita Nirṇaya*, Appayya makes mention of Sudarśanācārya who is **Affinity** to none other than the Haradattācārya **Haradatta.** already mentioned. The text quoted in this connection to show the similarity to Śrīkanṭha's doctrine, is verse 42, of Haradatta's *Śruti-sūkti-mālā* otherwise known as *Catur-veda-tātparyasaṅgraha*. The phrase used is "*tadanuvarttinām Śrīkanṭhācāryāṇām api tathaiva matam*" (that is the opinion of Śrīkanṭhācārya also, who follows him). It is not improbable that this "following" (anuvṛtti) stands for nothing more than affinity

in thought. Further, one hears and continues to hear of a commentary on Śrīkaṇṭha Bhāṣya, written by Haradatta; this, if found, will reverse the position of the two. But no such work is known well enough or extensively enough to provide a positive basis for any chronology. As it is, Appayya is our only guide. Assuming his statements to be correct and to have chronological value, we have to place Śrīkaṇṭha between Haradatta and Rāmānuja, and seek to make this period a little more precise. Here, again, we are faced with difficulties. Haradatta's date is fixed from data given in an obituary verse, as 878-9 A.D. He is said to have departed this life in 3979 Kali, in the cyclic year Viḷambi, on a Friday, which was the fifth day of the bright half of the month of Puṣya. This works either to Thursday, the 1st of January 879, or Friday, the 16th January 879. But, unfortunately, neither date corresponds fully with the data. Thursday is obviously excluded; Friday the 16th would suit, but for its being in the dark half, not the bright half of the month. One possible conclusion is that the whole verse is spurious, in which case we might give up all attempts to fix Śrīkaṇṭha's date with reference to that of Haradatta. Or it may be that the information about the date, day, month and cyclic year is correct, but not the position of the year in the Kali era. That there is a likelihood of this may be seen from the Hindu practice of commemoration ceremonies (guru pūjā) for which knowledge of the date, day and month will be required. Assuming that this information is correct, as also that about the cyclic year, one does get a Friday which happens to be the fifth day of the bright half of the month of Puṣya in the year 1119 A.D. This would make of Haradatta a junior contemporary of Rāmānuja. Since Rāmānuja gave

a fresh stimulus to Vaiṣṇavism, it is probable that the Vaiṣṇavas began to be aggressive towards Śaivites about this time. Such aggressiveness is evidenced in what we know of the life of Haradatta, who was made to defend his Śaivite leanings in public, while seated on a red-hot iron tripod. The work composed in such circumstances is known as the *Harī-hara-tāratamya* and is a monument of sectarianism, such as could have been called forth only by the intolerant spirit of a religion on the upward and onward march. There is thus a probability of 1119 A.D. being the correct date of Haradatta's death. And if Śrīkanṭha succeeded him, he must have come after Rāmānuja as well; this, as was said above, conflicts with Appayya's general position. The only possibility of reconciliation would thus seem to be to take all three to have been contemporaries, they being designated as earlier or later, according to the relative periods of their literary activity.

Reference has been made to the doctrinal similarities between Haradatta and Śrīkanṭha. These are numerous and significant as will be seen from Appendix II. We shall consider only a few of these here: (1) The word "Rudra" is explained as "he who drives away the miseries of bondage (*Sam-sāra rug drāvakaḥ*)" by Haradatta in verse 25, and by Śrīkanṭha in IV, 1, 12; (2) the principal deity inculcated in the Mahopaniṣad, as determined by the canons of interpretation (*upakrama, upasamhāra*, etc.) is shown to be Śiva, in verses 36 to 39 and in I, 2, sūtras 3, 4 and 8; (3) Kṛṣṇa could teach the Gītā to Arjuna and exhibit his majestic form (*Viśvarūpa*) as containing the entire universe, only because he had identified himself in Yoga with Brahman, in the same way as Vāmadeva; Kṛṣṇa speaks of that form, not as his, but as that of the

Highest Lord (paramam rūpam aiśvaram); all this occurs in verses 43 and 44, and in I, 1, 31 and I, 2, 6; (4) the authority of the Āgamas is as unquestionable as that of the Vedas; and the authority of the Vedas cannot be disputed, whether they be considered as self-created or as created by the Lord. This is discussed in ślokas 108-112, and in I, 1, 3. A comparison of the treatment of the last topic by the two writers, leads one to imagine that, perhaps, Haradatta's was the later of the two. One of the objections to recognising the authority of the Āgamas apparently is that they have introduced doctrines and refinements not having scriptural sanction. One such is the doctrine of the six-fold paths or adhvās. These adhvās are referred to by Śrīkaṇṭha in explaining the text: "So'dhvanah pāram āpnoti tad viṣṇoḥ paramam padam";⁵⁵ he says that Śiva is the goal of the six-fold path⁵⁶ and the supreme abode of Viṣṇu (IV, 3, 15; IV, 4, 22). In the text itself there is reference only to the path, and Śaṅkara takes it to mean the path of bondage (saṃsāra gatiḥ). The presumption is that the doctrine of the six-fold path is an innovation. As against this, Haradatta points to the Śruti recognition of a multiplicity of paths or adhvās as seen from the mantra "Adhvanām adhvapate śreṣṭhasyādhvanah pāramaśīya" found in the ekāgni kāṇḍa of the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, and used at the investiture of the sacred thread; this mantra clearly recognises a plurality of paths, some of which are superior to the others, while of all of them, Śiva is the Lord. Placing Śrīkaṇṭha's casual reference to the six-fold path side by side with Haradatta's justification of the doctrine by reference to Śruti, one may

⁵⁵ *Kaṭha*, III, 9.

⁵⁶ The six adhvās are: Kalādhvā, Tattvādhvā, Bhuvanādhvā, Varṇādhvā, Padādhvā, and Mantrādhvā.

with reason infer that the latter came after the former and was probably designed to meet criticism directed against the former. The same conclusion is suggested by the statement about the authoritativeness of the Vedas. Śrīkanṭha says⁵⁷ that the Āgamas are like the Vedas in being the creation of the Lord. In another context⁵⁸ he makes out that the Lord being free from desire and hatred, His creation of the Vedas does not detract from their value. Elsewhere,⁵⁹ however, he says, that in creating the Scriptures which had entered into Him and existed only in Him at the time of the deluge, the Lord pays attention to their original form and recreates them as they were; their creation is thus quite consistent with their eternity. Here we have two distinct accounts of the authoritativeness of the Vedas, either of which could be satisfactory in itself. Śrīkanṭha, however, gives both, and seems unable to choose finally between the two. In this respect, Haradatta's stand is firmer and more definite. He views the question of self-creation or creation by the Lord as of little account. The authoritativeness of Scripture follows in either case. Here, again, Haradatta would seem to come in more naturally after Śrīkanṭha. And if the conjectural date of Haradatta's death, 1119 A.D. is correct, we shall have a lower limit for Śrīkanṭha's period of activity as well. It goes, however, without saying, that it is extremely unsafe to rely on a conjecture based on information, which is itself at least partially incorrect; it would be safer to rely on Appayya's statements, re-interpreting them as consistently as possible with known facts.

⁵⁷ II, 2, 38.

⁵⁸ I, 1, 3.

⁵⁹ I, 1, 3 (earlier) and I, 3, 27-29.

A comparative study of the several Bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka, and Śrīkaṇṭha reveals the interesting fact that these commentators very often differ in their reading of the text, and not merely in their commentaries, and that Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja to a very large extent adopt the same readings. There is very much more identity between those two than between any two others, in so far as there are variations at all. The reading of seven sūtras is unique to Śrīkaṇṭha; forty-eight are common to him and Rāmānuja; Śaṅkara reads differently in all these cases, though some of the other commentators agree with Śrīkaṇṭha's reading in some cases. In the case of six sūtras, the reading is common to some bhāṣyakāras other than Rāmānuja. Chronological proximity is not of itself sufficient to account for the close agreement between Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja; for, though Rāmānuja intervened between Śaṅkara on the one hand, and Nimbārka and Madhva on the other, the text of the two latter shows a very great resemblance to Śaṅkara's. It seems, therefore, exceedingly likely that both Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja depended on a common text; on this evidence alone it is not possible to say that one of the two drew freely from the other.

The presence of doctrinal and verbal affinities between the commentaries of these two has been noticed in the past, and charges of plagiarism have been made against the one and the other.⁶⁰ From the mere presence of such affinities, no definite conclusion can be drawn, as that would be consistent with either of the two being earlier than the other.

⁶⁰ The author of the *Suddhādvaita-mārtāṇḍa* and Sentināthier have already been mentioned, as instances of such critics.

A fairly detailed list of such similarities is given in Appendix III while a few of them are here taken up for consideration.

Let us take, first, some verbal resemblances. In II, 3, 4, the question is whether “ākāśa” (ether)⁶¹ is originated or not. The *prima facie* view is that it is not, its origination being mentioned only in some texts and not in others. The mention of origination, where it is made, should be understood in a secondary sense. The word expressive of origin “sambhūtaḥ” is to be taken literally as applied to certain objects (fire and so on) and figuratively as applied to others (*e.g.*, ether). This is on the analogy of the word “Brahman,” which, in Muṇḍaka, I, 1, 8, and 9, is used literally in one case and figuratively in the other (as referring to prakṛti). The analogy is not on all fours, for, while the word “Brahman” is used twice, “sambhūtaḥ” occurs only once in the whole context, and has to be carried on right through. The difference is immaterial, says Rāmānuja, as a figurative sense may be understood in addition to the literal sense, even when a word is only carried on, just as much as when it is repeated (*anuṣaṅgepi śravaṇāvṛttāviva*). The logical procedure is to state the difficulty and meet it, as Rāmānuja does. But Śrīkanṭha straightway starts his commentary with the words “*anuṣaṅgepi śravaṇāvṛttāviva*”, etc., though the difficulty which these words are designed to meet is nowhere mentioned, the objection and the answer being lumped together in one sentence. There is resemblance between Śrīkanṭha and Rāmānuja in

⁶¹ The term “ether” is unfortunate as an equivalent to “ākāśa”, but it is used throughout in the present work, in the absence of a better equivalent. *Space* has some advantages over *ether*, but is not very suitable.

respect of the sense to be conveyed and also the words *anuṣaṅgepi*, etc., but there is also a difference in that the words make sense, as they stand, in Rāmānuja's *Bhāṣya*, but not in Śrīkaṇṭha's. An obvious suggestion is that Rāmānuja was copied and that in a slipshod fashion. It has already been remarked that Śrīkaṇṭha's reputation for brevity can be overestimated; he is at times, unnecessarily prolix, as shown in the very next topic dealing with the origination of air (*Vāyu*).⁶² That Śrīkaṇṭha made a brief suggestion which Rāmānuja expanded is extremely unlikely in that case; there is no reason why these two should have reversed their procedure only a few *sūtras* ahead. The hypothesis of a common original, however, may be still urged to explain this resemblance combined with difference.

The *antaradhikaraṇa*⁶³ discusses whether those who belong to no recognised stage of life (*āśrama*) are fit for Brahma-knowledge. The answer is in the affirmative, though it is generally understood that it is better to belong to some one *āśrama* than to none. *Sūtra* 38, "*Viśeṣānugrahaśca*" is interpreted by Śrīkaṇṭha to mean that *āśrama dharma* (the body of duties prescribed for each stage of life) has a special efficacy in promoting knowledge; while Rāmānuja takes it to mean that acts not exclusively pertaining to any *āśrama* conduce to knowledge (*anāśrama niyatair dharma viśeṣaiḥ vidyānugrahaḥ*). Śrīkaṇṭha uses the same words almost, but leaves out the negative particle in *anāśrama*, etc. Both appeal to the same text, *Praśna Upaniṣad*, I, 10: "*Tapasā brahmacaryeṇa śraddhayā vidyāyācātmanam anviṣya*" (seeking the self by austerity, chastity and knowledge). The last two virtues per-

⁶² II, 3, 8.

⁶³ III, 4, 36-39.

tain to all orders of life. The text may mean either that Brahma-knowledge is not confined to those in any one order of life or that the practice of the virtues of each order is of special efficacy in the attainment of that knowledge. The former sense is in consistency with the earlier part of the topic, while the latter leads up to the next sūtra, which begins with “ataḥ (therefore)” and declares the relative superiority of life in some recognised order (āśrama). The word “ataḥ” (interpreted by Rāmānuja to mean *but*) leads one to look for a reason in the previous sūtra; and Śrīkanṭha’s construction of that sūtra provides a reason. If this is correct, Śrīkanṭha must have borrowed, if at all, from a common original, not from Rāmānuja; he could, of course, have improved on Rāmānuja. Unfortunately, the former’s commentary is too scrappy, being confined to a single sentence, and gives little further information.

The concluding sentence of both commentaries “Sarvam samāñjasam” (everything is consistent or settled to satisfaction) is an interesting if not significant coincidence.⁶⁴

Among doctrinal affinities, mention has already been made of the interpretation of “kapyāsam puṇḍarikam evam akṣiṇī”, as also the sense in which “atha” of I, 1, 1 is understood.

This word, it is said, is used to mark the introduction of a fresh topical discussion, as in the commencement of Chapter III of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*. This is possible, because the two Mīmāṃsās constitute together one śāstra, from “athāto dharma jijñāsā” up to “anāvṛttiś śab-

⁶⁴ A few more verbal resemblances are noted in later Chapters. The article in *JOR*, I, i contains a fuller list.

dāt, anāvṛttiś śabdāt.” Rāmānuja quotes the Vṛtti-kāra in support of his position, and that the Vṛtti does say so is made probable by the reference thereto in the *Prapañcahṛdaya*. The resemblance in this respect, therefore, gives us no guidance as to whether there was borrowing *inter se* or from a common original.

Another resemblance is in respect of the concept of causation, the cause being conceived as sūkṣma cid-acid viśiṣṭa and the effect sthūla cid-acid viśiṣṭa.⁶⁵ The process is not of one thing becoming another thing but of one substance transforming itself from a subtle to a gross condition. The beings, intelligent and non-intelligent, are already there, in a subtle condition, indistinguishable by name and form (nāmarūpa anarhatayā). The evolution of names and forms marks the transformation of cause into effect. This notion too gives us no help in determining the question of borrowing or priority.

The relation of God to the soul is viewed as analogous to that of the soul to the body. This notion, known as śarīra-śarīribhāva is another point of identity between the two writers. There is, however, this difference, that while Rāmānuja is faithful to it throughout, Śrīkaṇṭha abandons it in the Ahaṅgrahādhikaraṇa (IV, 1, 3), where he maintains that the Lord is to be meditated on as identical with the self; this is one of the grounds on which Appayya maintains that he was at heart an advaitin. One can only wonder whether he took over Rāmānuja's conception and finding it unsatisfactory, gave it up. In any case, this does not give us a satisfactory indication in any direction. There

⁶⁵ See *Śrī Bhāṣya*, I, 1, 1; *Br. M.*, I, 1, 2; I, 1, 5.

is also the possibility that Śrīkaṇṭha got this notion from the Śaiva Āgamas.⁶⁶

The view that dreams are māyāmātram (very wondrous, momentary as they are and appearing only to the dreamer, unlike the objects of waking experience) and that, therefore, they can be produced by none other than the Lord who alone has satyasaṁkalpa (purposes which unfailingly come true), is found in the Śrī Bhāṣya also.⁶⁷ But there is a difference here too. In the Śrī Bhāṣya, it comes in as part of a consistent whole, a theory which holds that all cognition is of the real and that illusions and dreams constitute no exception to the rule. It must be remembered that the things we know are all the result of trivṛtkaraṇa (making tripartite) and that everything contains in it elements of everything else. "That one thing is called 'silver' and another 'shell' has its reason in the relative preponderance of one or the other element." And in mistaking one for the other we still cognise what is, not what is not or something which neither is nor is not. In dreams too, we perceive what

⁶⁶ Compare for instance the following passages:—

“Vidantyaṁkṣāṇi pumsārthān na svayam so'pi saṁbhunā,”

“Dṛśordarśayitācātmā tasya darśayitā śivaḥ”

—*Sivajñānabodham*, constituting part of the Raurava Āgama. It is held by some that all the 12 sūtras are an interpolation, being a translation into Saṁskṛt from Meykaṇḍār's Tamil work of that name. The discussion of this theory does not come into the present work. Umāpati seems to have had no doubt as to the genuineness of the Saṁskṛt original; see *PB*, pp. 14, 29, 256, 447. A writer in the *Vedānta Dīpikā* (December, 1928) relies on a statement of Vedānta Deśika to the effect that the śarīra-śarīri-bhāva was not, up to his time, recognised in any other system but Vaiṣṇava Viśiṣṭādvaita; this statement, if made by Deśika, only shows that even he could err; for, it has already been shown that Śrīkaṇṭha must have come before Mādhava, who was Deśika's contemporary.

⁶⁷ *Śrī Bhāṣya*, I, 1, 1; *Br. M.*, III, 2, 3.

is real, though particular and transient, this being created for the enjoyment of souls in accordance with their merit and demerit. Presented thus, the invocation of the Lord to explain the impermanent and the transitory is intelligible. Śrīkaṇṭha's statement is devoid of any such epistemological background, and, presented in isolation, appears to lack significance. He could not have developed a theory for dreams alone which Rāmānuja subsequently incorporated into his epistemology, for theorising could hardly have stopped short with dreams, and even in respect of that, what Śrīkaṇṭha has to say is neither intelligible nor complete. But even here, the question of borrowing *inter se* or from a common original cannot be decided finally, though it appears not improbable that Rāmānuja's theory was relied on and borrowed from.

The Bhāṣya of Śrīkaṇṭha shows numerous affinities with that of Śaṅkara also, especially in the statement of the pūrvapakṣa (the *prima facie* view). Appayya Dīkṣita refers to the close similarity between the two in respect of the statement of the pūrvapakṣa in III, 3, 10. The prāṇa is referred to in the Chāndogya, Vājasaneyi and the Kauṣītaki Upaniṣads as the eldest and the best, while the former two mention also the attributes of being the richest and so on. The question is whether these other attributes are to be imported into the teaching of the Kauṣītaki also. The *prima facie* view is against the importation (upasaṃhāra), for, each meditation is enjoined in a particular form as *thus* or *thus*, and for each a special result is prescribed; hence a mixing up of the meditations (vidyās) should be avoided. Not so, is the reply; for, since the vidyās relate to one entity, the prāṇa,

(2) Śrīkaṇṭha
and Śaṅkara.

the qualities mentioned in one context are likely to occur to our minds even in another, just as Devadatta who is a teacher at Madhura, but not at Māhiṣmati, will be recalled to mind as a teacher, even by one who meets him at the latter place. Thus, the qualities of being the richest, etc., are brought to mind in the other context also, and are included in the significance of the particular form of meditation prescribed. In the statement both of pūrvapakṣa and siddhānta (*prima facie* view and final position) Śrīkaṇṭha has very great affinities with Śaṅkara, even down to the Devadatta illustration, though Śaṅkara mentions a different set of qualities brought to mind in the case of Devadatta.

Śūtra II, 3, 9 asserts the non-origination of that which is, *viz.*, Brahman, on account of the impossibility of its being originated. Śrīkaṇṭha and Śaṅkara agree in understanding the sūtra to refer to this topic, the pūrvapakṣin, according to both, alleging that Brahman does originate, in view of statements like “Non-existent this was in the beginning” (*asad vā idam agra āsīt*). Rāmānuja would have it that the sūtra teaches the origination of everything else except Brahman, the latter alone being non-originated. And strangely enough, Śrīkaṇṭha’s last sentence is strongly suggestive of this position: “*tataḥ Brahmaṇa evāsambhavo’nutpattiḥ, tadanyasya sarvasya sarva vijñānapratijñā-nupapatteḥ sambhava utpattiriti,*” (hence non-origination applies to Brahman alone; origination applies to all else, on account of the failure otherwise of the promise that everything will be known).⁶⁸ This

⁶⁸ It is worth noting the resemblance between the concluding sentence of Śrīkaṇṭha’s commentary on the above sūtra, and the second sentence of Rāmānuja’s bhāṣya. The latter reads thus:

resemblance suggests either a transition in thought to the view of Rāmānuja or an attempt at syncretism. These possibilities will be found illustrated in a number of other cases too.

In II, 4, 15, the question is whether the sense-organs are the functions of the chief vital air (mukhya prāṇa) or are independent. The former alternative is the *prima facie* view, refuted on the ground that the sense-organs are declared to be independently eleven in number and that there are characteristic differences between these and mukhya prāṇa. There are, besides, scriptural statements of difference. Now, the pūrvapakṣa may be stated in the form that the prāṇa is also a sense-organ, which is how Rāmānuja understands it. In the statement of the pūrvapakṣa, Śrīkaṇṭha follows Śaṁkara.

The self in sleep is said variously to reside in the arteries (nāḍis), in the pericardium (purītat) and in Brahman. The question is raised in III, 2, 7, whether these statements should be taken as mutually exclusive or not. The former view is primarily urged on the ground that the statements have all one purpose, *viz.*, the description of the self in deep sleep, and when this purpose is

“Asambhavo’nutpattiḥ sato Brahmaṇa eva, tadvyatiriktasya kasya-
 eidanutpattir na sambhavati.” Appayya Dikṣita is at some pains
 to explain the interpretation given by Śrīkaṇṭha. The sūtra reads
 “Asambhavastu sato’nupapatteḥ”. Although it is possible to
 understand the anupapatti (unsuitability) to apply to sambhava
 (this is what Śaṁkara does), it is also possible to take the un-
 suitability to relate to the non-origination of all other things except
 Brahman; and there is this justification for the procedure, that
 the term “asambhava” of itself provides a sufficient reason for
 the non-origination of Brahman; and hence, the expression “anupa-
 patti” may well be taken to apply to what is other than Brahman,
viz., māyā; a doubt about its non-origination is possible, in view
 of its being the material cause of the world, and thus analogous
 to Brahman. Rāmānuja, it may be mentioned, understands the
 exclusion to relate to mahat, ahaṁkāra, the tanmātras, the sense-
 organs, the elements and so on.

served by one statement, the others should be excluded; just as, where rice and barley are prescribed for one purpose, only one of them is to be used, not both. In the setting out of this position, in the reference to a single purpose, the consequent disjunctive reading, and the instance of rice and barley, there is considerable similarity between Śrīkanṭha and Śaṅkara.

The Lord is to be contemplated as the self in the form "I am Brahman," not as another Being: so says IV, 1, 3. This is in accord with Śaṅkara's interpretation of the sūtra, while it departs from Rāmānuja's, with which, elsewhere, Śrīkanṭha's system has so much in common. Rāmānuja consistently carries through the analogy of the relationship of body and soul, and declares that God is to be contemplated as the Self that controls the individual, which is as the body of God. This conception is evidently not to the satisfaction of Śrīkanṭha, in the consideration of release, though he adopts it in his cosmology.

When a person departs from this life, speech is said to get merged in mind and so on. This merger is not of form, but of function alone. Hence, that in which the merger takes place need not be the material cause of what is merged. This is the doctrine of merger (*laya*) as understood by both Śrīkanṭha and Śaṅkara in IV, 2, 1-6. Here, again, Rāmānuja's exposition is different, as he understands *laya* to mean, not merger, but a "going with" or combination or connection. Speech goes with mind and so on.

To go back to the passages like II, 3, 9 which show partial resemblances to both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja: II, 3, 29 belongs to the Jñādhikaraṇa (the topic dealing with the self as the knower),

according to Rāmānuja; this particular sūtra justifies the self being referred to as knowledge also, that being the self's essential characteristic; the usage is paralleled by the appellation of knowledge (jñānam) applied to Brahman (as in "satyam jñānam anantam Brahma"). Śaṅkara, and with him Śrīkaṇṭha, consider the Jñādhikaraṇa to close with sūtra II, 3, 19. The present sūtra is part of a different topic discussing the size of the self. In consistency with this, Śaṅkara understands the sūtra to say that atomicity essentially belongs to buddhi (the determinative faculty), but is wrongly referred to the self, this being parallel to what happens in the comprehension of Brahman also. But strange to say, Śrīkaṇṭha adopts Rāmānuja's interpretation, while keeping the topical division of Śaṅkara. On this division, the question which the sūtra answers can hardly arise. Of course, the topical division might not be Śrīkaṇṭha's at all, but one made by unskilled hands. This is just possible, for, the text of Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary does not indicate the close of each topic, as the Śrī Bhāṣya does.

Sūtra III, 2, 40 states that in the view of Bādarāyaṇa, Brahman is the dispenser of rewards, He being declared by Śruti to be the cause, not karma either by itself or through some mysterious creation called apūrva. This is the sense adopted by all three commentators. But Śaṅkara understands the Śruti reference to be directly to Brahman as the dispenser; the illustration he cites is a Kauṣītaki passage, which describes the Lord as causing him whom He wants to uplift to perform good deeds and him whom He wants to send down to perform evil ones. Rāmānuja, on the other hand, considers texts which ascribe potency to the various deities,

and the texts are identical with those relied on by Śrīkaṇṭha. But, while Rāmānuja has to invoke the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa to prove the identity of these deities with Brahman, Śrīkaṇṭha from the first refers to the deities as “Parameśvarātmakatayā Vāyvādīnām,” etc. An argument in two steps is reduced to one of a single step, and the difference in procedure counts in Śrīkaṇṭha’s favour.

Sūtra III, 3, 25 discusses the value of introductory passages, like the invocation to Mitra, Varuṇa, etc., in the Taittirīya. This is not part of the vidyā proper, in spite of its proximity thereto. As shown by sentences occurring in it, such as “Ṛtam vadisyāmi, satyam vadisyāmi, I shall speak the right, I shall speak the truth” and so on, the introductory passage constitutes part of Vedic study, not of meditation. It is in the same position as similar passages elsewhere, which constitute part of sacrificial ritual. Śrīkaṇṭha takes the sūtra to refer exclusively to the Taittirīya invocation. Śaṅkara takes it to apply to all such passages, wherever found. Rāmānuja who follows Śaṅkara in his reasoning, applies the sūtra to the Taittirīya passage *also*, even though this does not refer to any sacrificial acts. It is possible to understand all such passages as syncretic or as marking a transition from Śaṅkara to Rāmānuja. The hypothesis of a common original is also applicable to these.

There are, as may be expected, several topics, Śrīkaṇṭha’s discussion of which is distinctive. It will be found that these are largely concerned with establishing the identity of Śiva and Brahman, or the non-existence of any Being superior or even equal to Śiva or of the relation of Śakti to Śiva and of Nārāyaṇa through

**Treatment and
conclusions dis-
tinctive of Śri-
kantha.**

Śakti to Śiva, or of other similar subjects. Such are I, 1, 21 and 22, where the golden person within the Sun is identified with Śiva, the mention of two eyes only (*akṣiṇī*, in the dual) and the non-mention of the third eye being explained on the ground that the third eye is ordinarily closed, and as such not comparable to the lotus blossoming with the Sun; I, 2, 5 where the Supreme Being is shown on Scriptural authority to be other and higher than *Nārāyaṇa* (*Nārāyaṇāt param Brahma*); I, 2, 8, where it is argued that in the *Mahopaniṣad*, *Śivatva* having been already predicated of Brahman, as shown by the application of the *upakrama* and other canons of interpretation, there cannot be predicated of the same subject, the nature of a subsequently mentioned deity (on the *āmikṣā nyāya*)⁶⁹; I, 1, 17 to 20, where the cause of the world is shown to be Śiva, not *Hiraṇyagarbha*, the expression *Prajāpati* in the context being equivalent to *Paśupati*; I, 3, 12 where the person seen by released ones is taught to be *Parameśvara*, not *Hiraṇyagarbha* or *Nārāyaṇa*, there being only a difference of function between Śiva and Viṣṇu, who are the operative and material causes respectively of the Universe; III, 2, 35 and 36 which establish the glory of Śiva and his superiority to Viṣṇu; III, 3, 15 and 17 which glorify Śiva; III, 3, 38 which discusses the propriety of importing a meditation of physical qualities like blue-throatedness, etc., in every *vidyā*, and decides in favour thereof, since Śiva should be distinguish-

⁶⁹ The *āmikṣā* (cream) alone appertains to the *Viśvedevas*, it being mentioned with them; the *vāji* (whey) belongs to another class of deities, the *vājins*. When *Śruti* mentions a particular offering as suitable to a particular deity, no other offering may be considered enjoined or suitable, even as a supplementary offering. The second offering (the whey, in the present case) must, therefore, belong to another deity or deities (the *vājins*).

ed from and meditated on to the exclusion of all other deities; III, 4, 48 and 49 which declare that the Pāsupata vrata, if practised for a long time and not sporadically will lead to release; and IV, 4, 9 which mentions the eight qualities of Śivatva realised by the released souls. It may be said generally that whenever Śrīkanṭha departs from Rāmānuja and Saṁkara, it is for the purpose of glorifying Śiva; any new topical division has this for its object in almost all cases. Sometimes such new topics serve to exhibit the author's very thorough knowledge of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, especially, the Mahānārāyaṇa portion. But even this secondary object is part of the primary one of glorifying Śiva, since the Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad is expounded only to demonstrate its recognition of Śiva as the Supreme Brahman.

It may be surmised that if Rāmānuja were later and had access to or knowledge of Śrīkanṭha's commentary, he would have demolished the latter's Śaivite position. Nothing of the kind is, however, seen in the relevant portions of the Śrī Bhāṣya. Rāmānuja does contend that the references to Śiva in the Atharvaśikhā and the Mahānārāyaṇa should be interpreted so as not to conflict with the supremacy of Viṣṇu; "Śiva" must be understood not in the direct, but in the derived sense, as meaning auspicious being; the praise of Śiva in the Mahopanīṣad, he says, is only preliminary to the glorification of Nārāyaṇa as the Supreme Brahman, and so on.⁷⁰ But it is not by any means clear that he is refuting Śrīkanṭha or that the latter has nowhere refuted him. It needs little argument to show that the primary sense of words should be preferred to the derived sense, except for very strong reasons

⁷⁰ See the article "Śrīkanṭhācārya" in the *Jignyasa*, I, ii.

to the contrary.⁷¹ Śrīkaṇṭha, however, cites a multitude of texts for accepting the primary sense. And he urges two arguments, besides, in respect of the correct understanding of the Mahānārāyaṇa. One is based on the interpretation of “Nārāyaṇa param Brahma,” as Nārāyaṇāt param (higher than Nārāyaṇa); the other is the āmīkṣā nyāya already mentioned. In the face of these, the contention that Śrīkaṇṭha has not answered Rāmānuja and that, therefore, the former could not have come after the latter, does not rest on a secure basis.

Nor is it safe to proceed on the assumption that a commentator's remarks express just what was in the original author's mind and no more. It is said that the commentary on Rāmānuja's *Vedārtha Saṅgraha* makes it clear that Rāmānuja criticised the view that Nārāyaṇa is the material cause and Śiva the operative cause. Rāmānuja's own remarks are to the effect that those who distinguish the material from the operative cause are opposed to the Vedas. Stated thus, the criticism may well apply to the system of Hiranyagarbha, which, distinguishing the two causes, maintains the Lord to be only the operative cause. And Śrīkaṇṭha's system may well escape the charge on the ground that Śiva and

⁷¹ As Appayya Dīkṣita says in his *STV*, the opponent's argument needs only to be stated to provide its own refutation: svarūpākhyānamevāśya pratyākhyānam pratiyate. It has also to be noted that Śrīkaṇṭha in I, 3, 41, while discussing the reference to the Supreme person (mentioned in the Chāndogya text which speaks of the attainment of the supreme light and so on), rules out the interpretation that “uttamaḥ puruṣaḥ” means Nārāyaṇa, on the ground that it is inconsistent with the predication of non-return in the case of those who have attained the light. Here is a case of Śrīkaṇṭha meeting the adversary with his own argument—that certain expressions are to be understood as significant singular names and not as proper names; and it is shown that interpreted in the former way “uttamaḥ puruṣaḥ” means Brahman, (as He is higher than all jīvas), though it is usually taken to refer to Viṣṇu, “puruṣottama” being one of the many names of the latter.

Śakti, the two kinds of cause are not really distinct and that Śakti has no being except as in and of Śiva. If the commentator Sudarśana's remarks may be taken to apply to Śrīkanṭha, the latter's view may have gained currency between the time of Rāmānuja and that of Sudarśana. That an appreciable interval of time must have elapsed between the two is evident from the fact that Sudarśana was but "the student of the grandson of the nephew of Rāmānuja".

In any case, Śrīkanṭha's substantiation of Śiva as Brahman, and his criticism of those who hold Viṣṇu to be Brahman are very direct and elaborate. One might naturally expect an equally elaborate refutation of the arguments, as and where they occur, in any later Vaiṣṇava commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*, especially in a commentary of the authority and importance of the Śrī Bhāṣya. We do not come across such a refutation. It seems difficult to resist the conclusion that of the two commentators, Śrīkanṭha was the later. But the argument from silence is notoriously weak, especially when the corroborative elements are, as we have seen, themselves inconclusive.⁷²

There is, however, one topic treated distinctively by Śrīkanṭha which has the appearance of clinching the whole question. The discussion in III, 3, 27-30 relates to the stage when the enlightened person's accumulated merit and de-

Discussion as to
when karma
abandons the en-
lightened self.

⁷² The articles in the *Vedānta Dīpikā* (November and December 1928, and January 1929), which appeared some months after these pages were written, set forth the above position in some greater detail. Some of the arguments, however, are very weak, the writer having committed himself to the position that Śrīkanṭha came after Rāmānuja and borrowed from the latter. The articles are valuable for setting out that aspect of the case which the writer in the *Jigyasa* ignored.

merit (karma) leave him, there being scriptural authority apparently for both positions, that they leave at death or at a later stage. The *prima facie* view is that there being no further use for karma, there is no object in its continuance after death. It ceases therefore at that stage. This is also the final view of Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Vijñāna Bhikṣu. Madhva, Vallabha and Baladeva interpret the sūtras in a manner quite unconnected with the present discussion. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka believe, along with Śrīkaṇṭha, that even the enlightened one has to proceed along the path of light, etc. (arcirādimārga) before attaining Brahman. The gross body being destroyed at death, and there being no karma left to form a subtle body, how can there be departure (gati) along a path? Hence, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, the cessation of karma has to be understood to take place in two instalments, partly at death and partly at a later stage, on the crossing of the river Virajā. This position, however, is not acceptable to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka: not so, they reply; though karma ceases, a subtle body may yet continue by the very potency of the meditation on Brahman. This is comparable to the attainment of special favours by those who serve the king (an illustration found alike in Nimbārka's siddhānta and Śrīkaṇṭha's pūrvapakṣa). Further, though the subtle body may require karma for its creation, it may be kept on independently thereof, just as a tank dug for irrigation purposes may continue to exist (when that purpose has been otherwise fulfilled) and serve as a source of drinking water. This latter is an illustration used by Rāmānuja. Thus is established what is the conclusion for Rāmānuja and Nimbārka.

bārka.⁷³ Bhāskara also maintains the doctrine of departure; but he does not foresee or meet this difficulty, his position being that destruction of good and evil deeds is essential to departure on the path of light; if bad deeds are not destroyed, there will be no upward departure at all; if good deeds are not destroyed, the departure will be followed by return to the world of saṃsāra; and this is inconsistent with enlightenment. Śaṅkara and Vijñāna Bhikṣu deny departure in the case of the enlightened one, the relevant texts requiring to be interpreted in *two ways*, as applying to some and not to others.

The final view of Rāmānuja and Nimbārka is what is refuted by Śrīkaṇṭha; and to this end, even the relative position of the last two sūtras of the topic is changed, the penultimate sūtra of all the other commentators figuring as the last sūtra on Śrīkaṇṭha's reading. Śrīkaṇṭha notices the difficulty about a body being required for departure (gati); he is also aware of the reply which postulates a subtle body as resulting from the very potency of the meditation. The answer, he says, does not meet the case. For, as long as departure along a path is admitted, the continuance of bondage must also be admitted, as only on the final attainment of Brahman does the intellect expand and the self manifest its full stature. Prior to that the intellect is in a state of contraction (saṃkucita), such as is characteristic only of saṃsāra. And saṃsāra cannot persist in the absence of karma. So long as saṃsāra persists, the presence of some residual karma must be admitted. This state of affairs lasts till the river Virajā is crossed; that is, in other words, till Brahman is attained; for, the

⁷³ The relevant passages from Śrīkaṇṭha, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka will be found extracted in Appendix IV.

Virajā runs along the confines of Viṣṇu-loka, beyond which is the abode of final release. Nor does it make any difference to appeal to the will of the Lord as accounting for the continuance of bondage, for, it is that same will to which we appeal through the medium of karma; there is, indeed, in our view no merit or demerit except such as is consequent on the Lord's will, as determined by the performance of what is enjoined or forbidden.

Logically, Śrīkaṇṭha's position seems quite clear. There are two states—bondage and release—and no third state, no half-way house between the two. If, as is admitted, release does not supervene in all cases immediately on death, bondage continues (*i.e.*, karma continues) to exist, beyond death. In the rare instances when release comes with death, there being no obstacles, the Virajā is crossed even with death and Brahman attained; in such cases, there is no residue of karma.

What is logically more perfect may well, in this case, be the chronologically later view also, since it recognises, states, and meets the other position. We have seen that Śrīkaṇṭha is aware and makes use of the explanation based on the power of meditation (*vidyā-sāmarthya* or *māhātmya*) and the illustration of those who serve the king. It is natural to consider the statement of such explanations and illustrations as anterior to the view which criticises them.

Apart from the explanation itself, there is the change in the position of sūtras 29 and 30, for which presumably Śrīkaṇṭha is solely responsible, as no other known commentator adopts that order. It is exceedingly unlikely that such a procedure would have escaped the attention of Rāmānuja, if Rāmānuja came later and was aware of Śrīkaṇṭha's

bhāṣya; for, apparently, we have here an instance of text-twisting in a very literal, almost a physical, sense. The conclusion, therefore, seems inevitable, that Śrīkaṇṭha came later than Rāmānuja.⁷⁴

There is still, however, considerable room for doubt, which will continue until the hypothesis of a common original from which both Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha may have drawn is finally dis-established. It may well be that the explanation given by Rāmānuja is common to such an original and that Śrīkaṇṭha's criticism is directed against that original, not Rāmānuja. Śrīkaṇṭha, however, makes no mention of the Vṛtti of Bodhāyana or any other source which could have been common to Rāmānuja also. Nor have we any knowledge of such a possible source other than the Vṛtti; and even of the Vṛtti our knowledge is secondhand and very poor. There are those who would dispute even the existence of two commentaries, one by Bodhāyana and another by Upavarṣa. To say that Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha, where they agree, derive their material from a common source, is to make a convenient, but a very large assumption, which, in the present state of our knowledge or ignorance rather, threatens to remain barren. But indications are not lacking to show that, perhaps, this is the hypothesis which squares best with the facts.

If it be true that Śrīkaṇṭha followed Haradatta, and if the conjecture as to the date of Haradatta's death is correct, Śrīkaṇṭha must have lived about the second half of the 11th century. This would

⁷⁴And possibly Nimbārka; the date of Nimbārka's death is conjecturally fixed by Bhandarkar at about 1162 A.D. See his *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and Minor Religious Systems*, pp. 62-63. Pandit Vinḍhyeshvari Prasād Dvivedin fixes his period as coming between 1081 Vikrama Era and 1199 Vikrama Era. See also Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy*, II, 751.

make Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja contemporaries, and the contemporaneity may account for the lack of effective criticism of either by the other. The resemblance between the commentaries of the two must in that case be due to dependence on a common original. If the original be as ancient as the Vṛtti of Bodhāyana, the text of it, as it came down to one or both of the commentators, may well have been mutilated and corrupt. In parts at least, Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary suggests that he relied, perhaps, on a mutilated original. Certain instances have already been cited of verbal resemblances between the commentaries of Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha, where the commentary of the latter appears to be fragmentary and not intelligible as it stands. If Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary had been the source of Rāmānuja's, it is hard to account for the fact that Rāmānuja passed over the defects of the former without criticising or even mentioning them. If Rāmānuja's commentary had been drawn upon by Śrīkaṇṭha, it is even more difficult to account for the defects of the latter's exposition; for, where Śrīkaṇṭha is obscure, Rāmānuja is very clear and it is hard to believe that the former would have failed to understand or profit by the latter's exposition. The difficulty is keenly felt in two more instances to be mentioned presently. In all these cases, the only hypothesis which fits the facts would seem to be the contemporaneity of the two commentators. That alone would explain the similarities together with the defects. Granted that both drew from a common original, contemporaneity might serve to explain how one was ignorant of the more perfect original which the other would seem to have had access to. Or, if the hypothesis of the common original be discarded, the similarities can

still be explained on the ground of the familiarity with each other's doctrine which contemporary teachers may be expected to possess. The teaching of doctrines may come long before they are set down in a book; and acquaintance with another's doctrines may long precede access to the other's book, if any. If, as is not improbable, both teachers lived and taught in the same part of the country, students might have passed from one camp to another, carrying the teachings of one preceptor to another. The possibility may have been all the greater in the case of two preceptors whose philosophical teachings had a basic identity, in spite of denominational differences. That certain stock words, phrases, and modes of expression became common to both, would not be unintelligible, in the circumstances, while at the same time, through the imperfect comprehension of the pupils or other like causes, the understanding of the one by the other could well have been imperfect in many cases. Some such mode of accounting for the similarities along with the differences would seem specially to commend itself in view of the following two instances.

One of these is the commentary on II, 2, 18. The question here is how, on the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, the aggregates they postulate can ever come into being. If, for answer, we are referred to the chain of co-ordinate dependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*), it does not solve the difficulty; for, though ignorance may lead to desire and so on, as they say, and in the end to ignorance once again, this does not explain the origination of the aggregates about which there is ignorance. To take mother-of-pearl for silver is an act of ignorance; the silver may be said to result from

ignorance. But how about the aggregate which is known as mother-of-pearl, and which is the substrate of ignorance, in this case? Ignorance does not account for that. Further, everything being momentary, the subject who experiences the silver in the mother-of-pearl passes away with that experience; and if desire and aversion result from ignorance, they occur not to the subject that was ignorant, but to a different subject. We are thus left with the anomalous consequence of one man's ignorance causing another's suffering. This is the sense of Rāmānuja's commentary on II, 2, 18. Śrīkaṇṭha's bhāṣya would be substantially identical with this, if, instead of reading "Vidhuṣas tadānīmeva tatra naṣṭatvāt," we read "aviduṣaḥ", etc. As it stands, the commentary seems to say that, when, through ignorance, mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver, the former does not really create silver. This is true enough, but is pointless, for such real creation is not urged by the Buddhist. It is also said that to the enlightened man, desire and aversion would cease to exist, though, since ignorance is one and homogeneous and persists at least in other persons, it should continue to affect even the man of knowledge. The point is very obscure in the bhāṣya; even as elucidated by Appayya, it is feeble and taken in a tortuous fashion. Rāmānuja's remarks couched in practically the same words are far more clear and direct. If Śrīkaṇṭha had been indebted to Rāmānuja, his failure to understand or profit by the latter's very lucid exposition, would almost defy explanation. The hypothesis that both drew from a common original which came to one of them—Śrīkaṇṭha—in a mutilated form offers fewer difficulties. The verbal resemblances, such as they are, would be explained along with the differences,

which so often seem to make little sense. It is also worth noting that the present reading of Śrīkanṭha's bhāṣya is common to all printed editions, based as they are on manuscripts from various parts of the country, in various scripts.

The other instance is provided by the sūtra "Asantateścā'vyatirekaḥ" (II, 3, 48). All other commentators read "Asantateścā'vyatikaraḥ". Rāmānuja understands avyatikaraḥ to mean absence of confusion; he says that there is no mixing up of the accumulated merit and demerit of various souls, since the souls are distinct. Śrīkanṭha's explanation based on his reading avyatirekaḥ is strained. He says that though the souls are distinct, their experiences are similar, since they all say, "I am short," "I am tall," "I am a brahmin" and so on; and then he adds as an after-thought that in spite of this similarity the experiences are not mixed up. This second statement is not called for by his reading of the sūtra. It seems to be a plain case of struggling to that interpretation (which he is already aware of) from a text which, as it stands, cannot bear it. Granted that Śrīkanṭha had before him an original (say, a copy of the Bodhāyana Vṛtti) where the reading of the sūtra alone happened to be corrupt, the *tour de force* involved in his commentary would be intelligible.⁷⁵

Here, then, we seem to have fairly definite indications that Śrīkanṭha could not have been aware of Rāmānuja's commentary (at any rate, not in detail). And the fact that Rāmānuja does not refer

⁷⁵ It is said that Rāmānuja had to go to Kashmir to get at the Vṛtti of Bodhāyana. This would show that by his time the work had become very rare and difficult to obtain, a fact quite in line with the suggestion that Śrīkanṭha had, if at all, only a corrupt original to draw upon. [See *Vaiṣṇavite Reformers of India*, p. 51.]

to or controvert Śrīkaṇṭha's understanding of II, 2, 18 and II, 3, 48 would make it appear that the former was not cognisant of the latter's commentary (at any rate, not in detail). Even if such points of difference had been dismissed by Rāmānuja as not worthy of criticism, the same attitude of indifference could not have been preserved in respect of the commentary on IV, 1, 3, where Śrīkaṇṭha seems to abandon Viśiṣṭādvaita and make common cause with Śaṁkara. Here at least there was both provocation and justification enough for an attack. Yet we see none. There is, in short, as was remarked already, no effective criticism of either author by the other; and the hypothesis of contemporaneity would seem to accord best with this fact.

If now, we turn to Haradatta and examine more clearly the question of his period, there is reason to think that he too was probably a contemporary of Rāmānuja's (who is credited with a life of 120 years from 1019-1139 A.D.) or lived certainly not long prior to him. There is a tradition that a Cola king, possibly Kulottuṅga I, who was an ardent Śaivite, insisted on all learned men subscribing to the supremacy of Śiva, that he was persuaded to invite Rāmānuja from Śrīraṅgam to go to his Court for the said purpose, and that fearing some evil to his master, one of his disciples—Kūreśa—set out for the Cola capital. On arrival there, he was asked to subscribe to the declaration of Śiva's supremacy; he, however, elected to dispute it, and urged several arguments in refutation of that allegation. These have come down to us in the *Kūreśa-vijaya*. The arguments address themselves to a categorical refutation of the grounds on which the supremacy of Śiva is set up by Haradatta in the *Pañca-*

ratna-mālikā.⁷⁶ Even the order of the arguments is the same. The style of argument is that adopted by Haradatta in this work as well as in his *Hari-hara-tāratamya*. Compare, for instance, the following two verses, the first from Haradatta and the second from Kūreśa:

Eko viveśa sarayūsasilāntarāle,
Hyanyo dadhau tripathagām ghaṭa vaj jaṭāyām.
Ko vānaylor adhika ityanucintya vṛddhās-
Satyam bruvantu tamimam vayam āśrayāmāḥ.

One of these (Viṣṇu) entered into the waters of the Sarayū; the other, verily, wore the Ganges like a pitcher on his matted locks. Let the learned ones consider and declare truly which of these is superior; in him we shall seek refuge.⁷⁷

Ekaḥ prasīśarat pādān anyat prakṣālayan mudā
Aparō'didharan mūrdhnā, ko'dhikasteṣu ganya-
tām.

One (Viṣṇu) stretched forth his foot, another (Brahmā) washed it with pleasure, a third (Śiva) bears it (the waters) on his head; who shall be reckoned the greatest among these?⁷⁸

Thus, the very quality of wearing the Ganges on the head is made use of by Haradatta and Kūreśa, though for opposite purposes. It is not unreasonable to surmise that two authors so much alike in the matter and manner of their disputation could

⁷⁶ Three of the manuscripts of the *Kūreśaviṣaya*, deposited in the Adyar Library were examined by the present writer. All of them set out first the verses of the *Pañca-ratna-mālikā*, as the verses containing the pūrvapakṣa refuted in the body of the work.

⁷⁷ Verse 87 of the *Hari-hara-tāratamya*.

⁷⁸ Quoted on page 194 of A. Govindācārya's *Life of Rāmānuja*. The source from which this verse is taken is not known; it does not form part of the manuscripts of *Kūreśaviṣaya* we have seen. The argument, such as it is, is refuted by Appayya Dikṣita in *Brahmatarkastava*, verses 35, 36 and 37.

not have been separated by a very considerable interval of time.⁷⁹

If thus, Haradatta's date is brought down to a period of contemporaneity with Rāmānuja's or at the latest to the early part of the eleventh century, Śrīkaṇṭha would have to be admitted to be a contemporary of Rāmānuja's, on the basis of Appayya's statement that Śrīkaṇṭha followed Haradatta. Some indirect support for this view of Haradatta's period is forthcoming from a Manuscript on the *Cola Vamśāvali Caritra*, deposited in the Tanjore Palace Library.⁸⁰ It purports to be an extract from the *Bhaviṣyottara Purāṇa*, and as such its historical value is comparatively small. The list of sixteen Cola kings it gives is also widely at variance with commonly accepted history, which is based on reliable inscriptional evidence. It may, however, be valuable to the extent that it connects Haradatta with the building of the Bṛhadīśvara temple at Tanjore. Epigraphy ascribes the construction of this temple to Rāja Rāja I, who is believed to have

⁷⁹ One of the commentaries on Haradatta's *Śruti-sūkti-mālā* is by one Śivaliṅga-bhūpa, who has been wrongly identified, by the editor of the Tinnevely edition, with a Cola prince, alleged to have been contemporaneous with Haradatta. The existence of such a Cola prince is vouched for only by the highly mythical and apocryphal life of Haradatta, said to form part of the *Bhaviṣyottara Purāṇa*. The commentator Śivaliṅga is certainly a prince, but a member of the Koṇḍaviḍu Reddy dynasty, which flourished from the middle of the 14th to the middle of the 15th century A.D. (See Hultzsch's *Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts in Southern India*, II, 91-94, also *MER*, 1900, pp. 23-24.) It may be noted that Śivaliṅga-bhūpa quotes freely and without acknowledgment from Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary. (See particularly pages 68 and 88 of the Tinnevely edition.)

⁸⁰ An abstract of this has been made available to the public in *JOR*, III, iii, by Prof. P. P. S. Sastri, Presidency College, Madras. Not the least of the improbabilities of this account is the ascription of a reign of 90 years, 70 years and so on to each of these kings.

ruled from 985 to 1031 A.D. If Haradatta had really anything to do with the construction, by way of advising the king and so on, he must have belonged to the early part of the eleventh century. All such conjectures, however, hang very much in the air.

There is reason to believe that Śrīkaṇṭha, who seems to have belonged to the Taittirīya śākhā, was familiar with Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara's commentary on the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*. In his commentary on what is known as the Brahmānanda Valli of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara expounds a Śaivite doctrine which closely resembles Śivādvaita, in the recognition of Śiva as Brahman, the transformation of Cit-Śakti, the position assigned to Nārāyaṇa and so on. The parallelism is so great that it is remarked by Appayya Dīkṣita who quotes from Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara in commenting on Śrīkaṇṭha's bhāṣya on the sūtra "Pariṇāmāt".⁸¹ There is even verbal identity in some of the descriptions, as where Cit-Śakti is described as the realiser of all purposes, directly for the Lord and the liberated ones, but indirectly for the rest (muktānām īśvarasya ca sākṣāt arthakriyā hetuḥ, paramparayā tvanyeṣām).⁸² Again, the commentary on the Mahānārāyaṇa passage beginning with "Sa no bandhuḥ," etc., and ending with "tadabhavat prajāsu," as set out by Śrīkaṇṭha in his commentary on IV, 4, 15 is identical with Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara's commentary on the same.⁸³ The peculiar conceit that Umā is the Praṇava,—Aum,—transmuted is common to both writers.⁸⁴ If borrowing be admitted, it is more likely that the

⁸¹ *SMD*, I, p. 570.

⁸² Page 34, *Bh. Bh.*, Mysore Edition; commentary on IV, 4, 19, *Br. M.*

⁸³ *Bh. Bh.*, pp. 81, 82.

⁸⁴ *Bh. Bh.*, p. 138; *Br. M.*, I, 3, 12.

writer of the commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras* went to the commentator on the Upaniṣads, rather than that the latter was indebted to the former. Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara would thus seem to have preceded Śrīkaṇṭha. This indication, however, is not as valuable as it may be, in the absence of full and reliable information as to Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara's own period. Burnell, who, on the strength of an obscure phrase in a colophon, takes him to be an Āndhra, assigns him, on the strength of tradition, to the latter half of the tenth century A.D.⁸⁵ If that tradition is reliable, Śrīkaṇṭha who seems to have come after him, must have belonged to the 11th century and thus been a contemporary of Rāmānuja.

If, now, we turn to the period of Rāmānuja's life (1019-1139), and see whether in that period there is mention of a Śrīkaṇṭha with any claim to distinction, we find one such figure mentioned by Aghora Śivācārya at the close of his *Mahotsava-vidhi*. In the last chapter of that work, he gives a list of his predecessors in the headship of the Āmardaka order to which he belonged. Aghora Śiva's immediate predecessors were Parameśvara and Hṛdaya Śaṁkara; their predecessor was Dhyāna Śiva, who was preceded by Śrīkaṇṭha Śiva Deśika, who hailed from Gauḍadeśa (Bengal). This Śrīkaṇṭha, it is said, came south to worship Naṭarāja (Abhrasabheśāna)⁸⁶ and while there, he was adopted as their preceptor by Vikrama Cola and others. The only Vikrama Cola we have positive knowledge of is Kulottuṅga's son and successor.

⁸⁵ See p. 7 of his catalogue of Saṁskṛt Mss. in the Palace at Tanjore; also p. 445 of the new descriptive catalogue of the Saṁskṛt Mss., etc., edited by Mr. P. P. S. Sastri.

⁸⁶ The Grantha printed text reads "agra sabheśa"; this seems to be clearly a misprint for "abhra". The Grantha characters *g* and *bh* greatly resemble each other.

He came to the throne about 1113 A.D. A person who, though not belonging to these parts, was adopted as a royal preceptor, must have possessed some distinction, such as may be expected of the author of the present commentary (Sūtra Bhāṣya). The fact that he came all the way to worship Abhra-sabheśa would also coincide with the partiality for Cidāmbaram indicated not too faintly in the Bhāṣya. The period prior to Vikrama's was one in which Vaiṣṇavism found little favour with the powers in the Cola country, as is evidenced not merely by the story of Kūreśa (whose eyes were plucked out by Kulottuṅga, as a punishment for his recalcitrance), but by the fact that Rāmānuja spent many years away from his headquarters at Śrīraṅgam, and under the patronage of the Jain king, Biṭṭi-deva, who later became a Vaiṣṇava with the title Viṣṇu-vardhana. The ascription of Śrīkaṇṭha to such a period would not be inappropriate.

The two commentators may, in these circumstances, have just come to know of each other's doctrines. Extensive knowledge, there may not have been, so as to admit of detailed criticism of points, as and where they occur; and the absence of such detailed criticism is just what we find on an examination of the two commentaries. And the priority of either commentary may also well be in doubt, either being acclaimed as the prior one, according to the Śaivite or Vaiṣṇavite persuasion of the disputant. Even if some of the criticism in the *Vedārtha Saṅgraha* (about Śiva as the efficient and Viṣṇu as the material cause) be taken to relate to Śrīkaṇṭha, this may be accounted for by the possibility of the *Saṅgraha* having come both after the *Śrī-Bhāṣya* and an acquaintance with Śrīkaṇṭha Bhāṣya.

The hypothesis of contemporaneity would thus seem to provide a satisfactory basis for (i) Appayya's statement that Śrīkaṇṭha followed Haradatta, (ii) Appayya's belief that Rāmānuja followed Śrīkaṇṭha, (iii) the allegations made even in early works like the *Suddhādvaita-Mārtāṇḍa* that the Śaivite commentator was the plagiarist, (iv) the lack of effective and detailed criticism of either commentator by the other. The resemblances, as we have already shown in some detail, may well derive from a common original, the postulation of such an original not being entirely barren, in view of Rāmānuja's explicit avowal of indebtedness to Bodhāyana.

The period about 1113 A.D. would also seem to fit in with the date assigned to Aghora Śiva himself, viz., 1158 A.D.⁸⁷ A period of 45 years is not an improbable interval for the three ācāryas who came in between Śrīkaṇṭha and Aghora Śiva. The principal difficulty in the identification is the absence of any hint as to Śrīkaṇṭha having been the pupil of Śvetācārya or the author of the *Sūtra Bhāṣya*. The magnitude of the objection cannot be minimised. Without, therefore, stressing this particular identification, one may conclude that our author may most suitably be considered to have flourished about the period so indicated.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ On the subject of the different orders and their liturgical manuals, see an article entitled "Behind Tamil Śaivism" by Dr. V. V. Ramaṇa Śāstrin in the *Hindu Annual Supplement* for 1924, pp. 49 and 50.

⁸⁸ The present writer's attention was drawn to the mention of a Śrīkaṇṭha in *Mahotsavavidhi*, by Dharmarāja Gurukkal, the temple priest at Vaḍa Tirumullaivāyil, who has himself no doubts as to the identity of the two Śrīkaṇṭhas, though he is unable to make others share his certainty. It may be noted that Parama Śiva, the immediate predecessor of Aghora Śiva is said to have been installed with the permission of Dhyāna Śiva, Śrīkaṇṭha's immediate successor.

Of this, as of much else, it is difficult to be sure. But enough has been said to show that in Śrīkanṭha's philosophy we have a system of Śaivism, which, while it has many points in common with the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja and the Śaiva Siddhānta of the Tamil country, is yet not devoid of distinctive features of its own. It seeks to reconcile two bodies of revelation and exhibit both as conformable to reason; it is theistic, yet not sectarian. Though its arguments may be paralleled elsewhere, its conclusions will be found to be its own; and throughout will be seen a spirit of compromise and eclecticism, such as is characteristic of the best Hindu philosophy.

This would serve to indicate that Dhyāna Śiva ceased to be the head even before he died, and that within his lifetime two successors were installed, *viz.*, Hṛdaya Śaṁkara and Parama Śiva. In these circumstances, forty-five years is not too short an interval between Śrīkanṭha and Aghora Śiva. There is also the possibility that Śrīkanṭha became the preceptor of Vikrama Cola, even while the latter was heir-apparent, and not after he was crowned king. This would throw the date back to some years before 1113 A.D. That Vikrama was himself a pro-Vaiṣṇava does not conflict with the alleged recognition of Śrīkanṭha as a preceptor, as the latter's Śaivism is not of the sectarian, anti-Vaiṣṇavite variety.

NOTE A

UMAPATI'S PAUSKARA BHASYA

The introductory verses and the colophon of the *Pauṣkara Bhāṣya*¹ make out that the commentary is the work of Umāpati Śivācārya, presumably the one who wrote the *Samkarpa Nirākaraṇam* in 1313 A.D. There is, however,² a reference to a Mādhva work named the *Nyāyāmṛta*. This work, so far as is known at present, belongs to the 16th century A.D., and its citation by an early 14th century writer is clearly out of the question. There are three possibilities: there may have been a different and earlier Mādhva work of the same name; or the reference to the *Nyāyāmṛta* have been a later interpolation; or the *Pauṣkara Bhāṣya* may not be Umāpati's work at all. It is difficult to decide among these at present. The chronological value of the reference in *PB* must in any case be taken with a grain of salt. If Umāpati's authorship be ever disproved, the earliest known reference to Śrīkaṇṭha's work would be the unacknowledged quotations in Śivaliṅgabhūpa's commentary on *ŚSM*. (It has already been noted that that commentary belongs to the period between the middle of the fourteenth and the middle of the fifteenth century A.D.)

¹ The present writer's attention was first drawn to this work by Mr. P. P. S. Sastri; and the reference therein to Śrīkaṇṭha Bhāṣya was brought to his notice by Dr. V. V. Ramaṇa Śāstrin.

² On p. 519.

NOTE B

SRIKANTHA AND THE SIDDHANTA

In spite of the many doctrinal differences noted between Śivādvaita and the Siddhānta, there are attempts made to claim Śrīkaṇṭha as a Siddhāntin of sorts. This is particularly noticeable in Śivajñāna Yogin's commentary on the *Śivajñāna-bodham*.¹ It is made out that since even according to Nīlakaṇṭha, Śiva is the material cause of the world only as qualified by Māyā, there is no substantial difference of doctrine distinguishing his teaching from the Siddhānta. In support of this interpretation, reference is made to Appayya's commentary on I, 1, 2 in *ŚMD*. Irrespective of what Appayya has to say, one must confess that in the *Śrīkaṇṭha Bhāṣya* itself, there is little justification for distinguishing between Māyā and Cit-Śakti, as the Siddhānta does. One may read such a distinction only with great difficulty into what Śrīkaṇṭha says, and then with little justification. Thus Dr. Ramaṇa Śāstrin (in his incomplete translation of *ŚMD*) seeks to make out that Śrīkaṇṭha's second introductory verse implies a distinction between *Cit-Śakti* and *Jaḍa-Śakti*. The verse is translated by him thus: "All-Powerful is that Gracious God (Śiva), the Supreme Spirit, the Highest Truth taught in all the Mystic Scriptures (Āgamas) on the panel of Whose Light (Śakti) all the world-systems stand painted as so many views." And this is the translator's comment: "The point here to note is that the 'nikhila-jagajjāla' is painted on Īśvara's 'nija-śakti-bhitti'.....Just as there is a wide difference between a wall (ādhāra) and the fresco thereon (ādheya), so also is there a fundamental disparity between the material (upādāna) and instrumental (nimitta) causes of this universe. The one is *jaḍa* and the other is *chit*. As the Dīptāgama says, the Lord's Śakti is of two sorts, Chit

¹ Māpāḍiyam, p. 125.

and Achit, and both inhere only in Him. Hence, Śrīkanṭha's meaning is that God is the moving, efficient or active cause of the Universe, His Achit-Śakti (Jaḍa and Ādheya), the material cause and His Chit-Śakti (Chit and Ādhāra), the instrumental and supporting cause."² No one can quarrel with the learned Doctor's interpretation of the Dīptāgama where there is an explicit reference to two Śaktis—Cit and Acit; the importation of that distinction into Śrīkanṭha's teaching has, however, little warrant. The distinction between ādhāra and ādheya can furnish little basis for the proposed superstructure, for, wall and fresco do not differ fundamentally as Cit and Acit are supposed to. If such feeble material is to be relied on, one may even argue that for Śrīkanṭha the universe is illusory since he uses the term jāla in jagajjāla.

As for Appayya's remarks in his commentary on I, 1, 2, the kind of causality he there sets up for Brahman is different from what figures in the exposition of the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa³ and his comments thereon. A doctrine of the transformation of Cit-Śakti is there expounded and analogies are drawn from Bhaṭṭa Bhāskarā's commentary on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*. It would almost appear that the earlier remarks were made only to indicate how far Śrīkanṭha's teaching could be assimilated to the Siddhānta. That no such assimilation was finally acceptable to Appayya is evident from the *Ānanda Laharī* and the *Śivādvaita Nirṇaya*. Any attempt to show that Śrīkanṭha is essentially a Siddhāntin is extremely forced and unconvincing.

² Pp. 5, 6.

³ I, 4, 23 *et seq.*

NOTE C
THE PARENTAGE OF MEYKANDAR

It is worth noting that according to one version Meykaṇḍār was *found* by Accuta Kaḷappālan, not born to him.¹ In this case, Meykaṇḍār need not have belonged by birth to the caste of his putative father; he might even have been a brāhmin. The possibility is not wholly without significance in view of the fact that not merely Aruḷ-nandi but the two others of the four Santāna Ācāryas,—Marai-jñāna-saṃbandha and Umāpati—were also brāhmins.

¹ See S. Anavaratavinayakam Pillai, *Saiva Siddhānta Varalāru*, 16, 20, particularly the quotation from *Tiru-venkāṭṭu-purāṇam*, on p. 16; also Schomerus, *Der Caiva Siddhānta*, p. 24.

NOTE D

THE ĀGAMAS AND THE MAHABHARATA

The difference between the Vedic and the Āgamic cults has been set out in some detail by Mr. P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar in his *History of the Tamils*,¹ where he tries to account for the origin of the Āgamas on the basis that they arose to satisfy the demands of spiritual weaklings, the survivors of the Mahābhārata carnage, to whom the pabulum of Vedic and aupaniṣada teaching was too strong and unsuitable. The Āgamic rites were fashioned, he says, on the Dasyu rites current even from the pre-Āryan times. If the rites here thought of had been proved to be specifically non-Āryan, the theory would have a certain amount of plausibility; but, even then, it would suffer from the disadvantage of running counter to the belief that the Pāsupata and the Pāñcarātra Āgamas existed at the time of that great war and that those Āgamas are recognised in that work. The portions of the work treating of these may be considered later interpolations (as indeed Mr. Iyengar does)²; but, so far as we can see, the proof of their interpolation seems to lie only in their content referring to the Āgamas, and this, by itself, can have no probative value until it is established conclusively that the Āgamas are of a later date than the Mahābhārata war. As it is, we have but a *circulus in probando*, though hardly appearing to be such. The view that the Āgamas are far older than the welter of the Mahābhārata shall have to be given up, if at all, after much fuller consideration than Mr. Iyengar has been able to spare.³

There is much truth in the contention that the Āgamic cult represents in the main the *dāsa mārga*, the path of

¹ See, particularly, pp. 103-115.

² See p. 87.

³ See in this connection, "The Pāñcarātras" by A. Govindācārya, *JRAS*, 1911, p. 935.

adoration as by a servant, but the way of the *dāsa* need not necessarily have been that of the *Dasyu*. It is a large assumption to make that the Āryans were all spiritually vigorous, or that there were not even among them weaklings from the earliest times. The practices of the weaklings among the Āryans themselves may have come to a head and got more defined and consolidated by the time when the Āgamic cult may be said to have arisen. The stimulus need not have come from the Bhārata conflict, where, after all, blood was shed not as a sacrifice to the gods, but for the acquisition (or re-acquisition) of a kingdom. Assuming that the non-sacrificial Āgamic cult was neither earlier than nor contemporaneous with, but subsequent to, the Vedic cult, the movement away from sacrifices may well have been due to a realisation of the impermanence and the comparatively small worth of the fruit thereof, a realisation which certainly came to the aupaniṣada seers. The weakness of the followers of the Āgamic cult would then be manifest not in the revolt against sacrifice but in the variety of the spiritual consolation sought, that being, so to speak, externally centred, while the aupaniṣada teaching was self-centred. It is also possible to contend, with some measure of reason, that the Āgamic cult which was that of the generality of the people, and the Vedic cult which was that of the priestly classes, officiating for themselves or for others, were both indigenous, that they existed and grew up side by side from the earliest times without any extraneous influence, and that the distinction between the two need in no sense be racial. Hence, the necessity for postulating non-Āryan influence at any stage is, by no means, plain; indeed, it is certainly very difficult to reconcile such a theory with the declaration of some Āgamic texts that the Āgamas are open to study by the three superior castes alone.¹ The claim of the Āgamas to be founded on the Vedas² and to be the expression of the quintessence of

¹ For example, see *Ahīrbudhnya Saṃhitā*, I, 24.

² In addition to the Śaiva Āgama texts cited in the body of Chapter I, see also A. Govindācārya, "The Pāñcarātras," *JBAS*, 1911.

the teaching of the Śruti constitutes a greater difficulty in accepting non-Āryan influence. The fact that among the Āgamas themselves, a distinction of śrauta and aśrauta obtains¹ makes it still more difficult to theorise about their Āryan or non-Āryan origin.

¹ The distinction is mentioned, for instance, in the *Vāyu Samhitā*: śaivagamo'pi dvividhah śrauto'śrautaś ca sa smṛtaḥ, śrutisaramayaś śrautaḥ, etc.

CHAPTER II.

BRAHMAVIDYĀ—PRELIMINARIES AND PRESUPPOSITIONS.

The object of inquiry in the *Brahma Sūtras* is the final truth declared in the Upaniṣads,—what it is and how it is to be realised. If that truth were either entirely clear or entirely beyond experience, there could be no inquiry: it must be apparent and yet not wholly clear (*prasiddhānati-prasiddha*). The inquiry must also contribute to the goal of human life,—the attainment of happiness, which is always sought, or, the termination of misery, which is always avoided. He who seeks either is a fit person to undertake the inquiry, provided he has prepared himself by acquiring that which is likely to be of greatest use thereto. What this preparation is and other questions related to it are settled in the first sūtra.

Knowledge of Brahman, the final truth declared in the Upaniṣads is to be acquired through hearing, reflecting on and understanding the Śruti. A considerable part of the Śruti is made up of injunctions and prohibitions, the consideration of which falls within the province of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*. Brahmayidyā too may be thought to be the object of such an injunction, with the result that a separate inquiry into it would not be necessary. This, however, may not be, for, no kind of injunction known to the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* can apply to the topic. The hearing of the Scrip-

Vedānta śravaṇa
not the object of
an injunction.

tures is seen to be succeeded by knowledge of what they teach in respect of Brahman; the result is perceptible and hence cannot be the object of that kind of injunction known as *apūrva vidhi*, this *vidhi* obtaining where the result is understood only on the authority of Scripture. If there were other means of obtaining the knowledge sought, as there are various ways of getting rice from paddy, such as pounding it with a stone, or husking it with finger nails, one of these might be prescribed to the implied exclusion of the others by a *niyama vidhi*, but, there being no other means of knowledge, this kind of injunction is also excluded. The only other kind of *vidhi* is the *parisamkhyā vidhi*, which consists in excluding all other modes of action except one. This too is inapplicable in the present case, for, if only hearing and meditating on the Śruti were to be enjoined, it would have the effect of excluding even the learning of the Vedas by rote (*adhyayana*); and this is absurd, for all subsequent knowledge is based on *adhyayana*. *Brahmavidyā* and the means thereto, therefore, require independent consideration.¹

¹ A distinction has to be made between *Vedānta śravaṇa* (listening to the texts, with the mind to undertake the inquiry into Brahman) and *manana* (reflection on and contemplation of Brahman). The former is not the object of an injunction, for the grounds stated in the text; but contemplation is enjoined. See the commentary on III, 3, 56, where it is stated that the *sūtra* repeats the sense of III, 3, 42 (about the multiplicity of the meditations on Brahman, though Brahman is one) with the view of refuting those who maintain that knowledge cannot be the object of an injunction (presumably by showing that not one, but many injunctions apply: see Appayya Dikṣita's *ŚMD*). It must, however, be confessed that Śrīkaṇṭha's position with regard to the whole question is difficult to understand and rather unsatisfactory. How can reflection and meditation be enjoined, when the preliminary act of *Vedānta śravaṇa* is itself not the object of an injunction? Later on, Śrīkaṇṭha would have it that Brahman is the subject of a *prayoga vidhi*, in view of the texts which say "ātmā vā are *draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo*

It may still be objected that such an inquiry can serve no useful purpose. Śruti teaches us that Brahman is identical with the self; and what is proclaimed by Śruti is known to any one who has learnt it by rote. What then is the object of a further inquiry? And in any case we cannot know Brahman, since knowledge implies determination and limitation, as when we say "this is a pitcher", while Brahman is said to be illimitable. As for the hope of securing happiness and avoiding misery, that is moonshine, for, this cycle of birth and death and consequent rejoicing and sorrow is as endless as it is beginningless. That the inquiry will contribute to achieve *puruṣārtha* (the *summum bonum*) need not be hoped for.

But it is just this Scriptural identification of the self and Brahman that starts the inquiry. The latter is said to be truth, knowledge, and bliss; He is eternally free from all imperfections and impurities, and as such, He is

Brahmavidyā
is not unnecessary,
impossible
or futile.

mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ" and so on. If texts like these are injunctive in character, how can it be maintained that śravaṇa is not enjoined? Further, the arguments used in the present context are not very convincing. The result of Vedānta śravaṇa is knowledge not of one object among others, but of Brahman, the one incomparably supreme Being; this knowledge like its object is unique and may claim novelty (*apūrvatā*) such as would justify the statement in respect thereof being considered an *apūrvā vidhi*. The assertion made about Vedānta śravaṇa leading to its results, in the same way as the science of medicine, is obviously defective. Again, it cannot be maintained in view of Śrīkanṭha's view about the authoritativeness of the Āgamas, that Vedānta śravaṇa is the only means of the knowledge of the highest; hence, such śravaṇa may well be the object of a *niyama vidhi*. That *Brahmavidyā* may be the object of a *niyama vidhi* or alternatively of a *parisaṃkhyā vidhi* is shown by Śrīkanṭha himself in his commentary on I, 1, 4. It is difficult to see on what principle he distinguishes Vedānta śravaṇa which is a necessary element of that *Vidyā* and contends here that it is not the object of an injunction.

very different indeed from the individual self who is in bondage to beginningless ignorance, takes on and abandons numerous bodies for the working out of the accumulated merit and demerit (karma) consequent on that ignorance, is not his own master and, therefore, suffers endless misery. How can the two be identical?²

Again, in various places, Śruti says that annam (food or matter) is Brahman, that ānandam (bliss) is Brahman, and so on. Which of these statements is correct? Hence, too, there is scope for inquiry, the object of which is the attainment of Kaivalya Lakṣmī (the Goddess of Release), on the removal of the soul's impurities by the grace of the Lord.

As for Brahman being illimitable, that is admitted. But though He cannot be the object of demonstrative knowledge, He may be known by being distinguished from all other subjects which do not possess the qualities ascribed to Him.

It is, further, vain to declare that the cycle of existence (saṃsāra) is endless, in view of the repeated declarations of Śruti to the contrary, as, for example, "He who knows Brahman attains the highest,"³ "Having known Śiva he attains perfect peace,"⁴ and "Having made of his self the lower and of Praṇava the upper stick and applying the churning action of contemplation, the wise one burns all bonds."⁵ Hence the inquiry into Brahman is not purposeless.

² The object of the inquiry is to discover the manner of the identity and not to deny the identity. The implication of the present argument is clear, viz., that for Śrīkaṇṭha, there is no ultimate difference between the jīva and Brahman, a point rightly stressed by Appayya Dīkṣita in his *śN*.

³ *Taittirīya*, II, 1.

⁴ *Śvet.*, IV, 14.

⁵ *Kaivalya*, 11.

What are its presuppositions? Adhyayana is one, for our ultimate and, indeed, our only authority is Scripture, and we ought to know it thoroughly before we inquire into its significance. It must not be thought, however, that learning by rote can of itself give us a knowledge of Brahman; what we acquire thereby is a knowledge of the word of the Vedas, not of their inner sense nor of the mode of reconciliation of various texts when they conflict.

The next requirement is a knowledge of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*. This is the significance of "atha" in the first sūtra. It does not signify commencement, as in "Atha Yogānuśāsanam",⁶ for, the desire for philosophic knowledge is not a matter for human effort: it depends solely on the attractiveness of the subject. Nor does it signify auspiciousness, for, there is no point in invoking auspiciousness for the desire to know Brahman. Whatever invocation of auspiciousness may be considered necessary at the commencement of a new enterprise may be secured even by the utterance of that word, without reference to its significance. The term "atha" must therefore have a different significance.

The knowledge of works also is preceded by adhyayana. It is succeeded by the study of the Vedānta. The study of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* is helpful in two ways in arriving at a determination of the sense of Śruti in respect of the final Reality. It gives us a knowledge of the principles of interpretation such as śruti, liṅga, etc.;⁷ it also leads to

⁶ YS., I, 1.

⁷ The sense of a disputed word is determined in the light of the following tests, each prior one being more significant and conclusive

the performance of right action, which, when unaccompanied by a desire for the fruit thereof, purifies the mind and makes it fit to know the Highest. "Atha" therefore must mean "after a study of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*". Further, the word may be used to mark the commencement of a fresh topic in the course of one and the same śāstra, as in Chapter III of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* "athātaśśeṣa lakṣaṇam." The present use of "atha" marks the same sense, for, the whole of the *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra* is one from "athāto dharma jijñāsā" up to "anāvṛttiśabdāt, anāvṛttiśabdāt."⁸

It may be thought that the view of action as purifying the mind and preparing it for knowledge detracts from the independent value of the injunctions in respect thereof. It would appear that action is to be per-

**Disinterested
action is con-
tributory to know-
ledge.**

than the following ones: *śruti*, the plain sense of the declared word *linga*, the characteristic mark, *vākya*, relation to other words in a sentence, *prakaraṇa*, the topic wherein the text occurs, *sthāna*, the place in which a word occurs, and *samākhyā*, composition of rudimental senses or interpretation in the light of occurrence in a similar context. It is contended by Śaivites, for instance, that the term *Īśvara* or *Īśāna* denotes Śiva, that being the direct significance of the word; it is no doubt used in certain contexts to refer to *Vāṇu*, but that reference has to be determined only in the light of the context; and in determining the sense of a word, *śruti* is more conclusive than *vākya* or *prakaraṇa*. See *STV*, verse 42, and commentary thereon.

* That is, from the first of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* to the last of the *Vedānta Sūtras*. Two different senses of "atha" are offered here, one indicative of the oneness of the whole *Mīmāṃsā* science, and the other the utility of a prior study of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*. The latter is also the later in Śrīkaṇṭha's account, and Appayya is of opinion that it is his final view also; for, in view of the many divergences between the two *Mīmāṃsās*, the doctrine of their constituting one śāstrā is neither intelligible nor profitable. That is why the exposition of the other sense begins with the word "athavā". This sense comes first in the present exposition to show that it is possibly more important for Śrīkaṇṭha than the other.

formed not for the benefit declared to be gained directly thereby, but only as contributory to knowledge. In such a case, scriptural declarations of fruit would be futile. This is not so. Action has a two-fold effect. It brings about the good results mentioned in each case by Śruti; it also prepares the way for knowledge of the Real. The former result accrues in the case of those who desire and seek the fruit of action. Those, on the other hand, who perform action disinterestedly gain the other result, viz., knowledge of Brahman.⁹

It may be objected that there is no warrant for settling an order of precedence between action and knowledge. It cannot be said that they stand together as principal (aṅga) and subsidiary (aṅgi) as between themselves; nor do they both stand subsidiary to something else which is the principal. Nor yet does it happen that while one of these is prescribed for all, the other is specially prescribed for those who desire a particular good in addition (as in the use of the godohana vessel, prescribed in the jyotiṣṭoma, for him who desires plenty of cattle). They do not even contribute to the same result, for, action brings about benefits in this or the next world, while knowledge leads to release. What, then, is the justification for settling the precedence in time or importance of one over the other?

The objection is not well-based, for, Śruti does link together action and knowledge as contributing to the same result, viz., release, as seen from the

⁹ That the same act may be both principal and subsidiary is shown with reference to the Sautrāmaṇi and the Bṛhaspatisava, which are enjoined both independently, and as subsidiary to Agnicayana and Vājapeya respectively.

passages: “Vidyām cāvidyām ca vastadvedobhayam saha, avidyayā mṛtyum tīrtvā vidayā'mṛtam āsnute, he who knows at the same time knowledge and non-knowledge overcomes death through non-knowledge and obtains immortality through knowledge (non-knowledge being equated with works)”¹⁰; “tenaiti Brahman punyakṛt, on it goes whoever knows Brahman and who has done good”¹¹; and “Satyena labhyas tapasā hyeṣa ātmā samyagjñānena brahmācāryeṇa nityam, by truthfulness indeed, by penance, right knowledge and abstinence must that Self be gained”¹². Further, as is made clear by the sūtra sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādi śruter āśvavat, knowledge, in the case of householders, has regard to all actions enjoined, such as agnihotra and so on, because of Scriptural statements to that effect; these stand to knowledge in the relation of accoutrements to a horse.¹³

Sūtra III, 4, 27, tells us that the qualities of śama, dama, etc., ought to be cultivated by him who meditates on Brahman. “All the same, he must be possessed of calmness, subjection of the senses and so on, since they are enjoined as auxiliaries to that (knowledge) and must be necessarily acquired.” The expression, *all the same*, relates that sūtra to the previous one, where the performance of such action as appertains to the individual's stage of life is insisted on. One's mind may get wholly absorbed in the performance thereof, and the troubles

Calmness, contentment, etc., required as auxiliaries, not as preliminaries.

¹⁰ *Īśa*, 11.

¹¹ *Brh.*, IV, 4, 9.

¹² *Mundaka*, III, 1, 5.

¹³ III, 4, 26. The interpretation of the illustration in the sūtra —“āśvavat” is original. It is similar to Rāmānuja's understanding of it, and yet distinct therefrom.

and sorrows attendant thereon. Hence the present emphasis on calmness, etc. Freedom from desire and aversion is calmness. To be subdued is to turn back the senses from all acts not enjoined; turning away from desired acts which are prohibited is contentment; patience is the endurance of extremes; turning towards the highest truths unhindered by indolence, etc., is collectedness; devotion to the Upaniṣads, which alone contain the highest truth about the highest self, and turning away from all knowledge not contributing to the attainment of man's *summum bonum* constitute faith; the religious act whereby one turns to the service of Śiva, having no further interest in the worship of other deities, is devotion. Desire for liberation is the eagerness to behold the supreme Mokṣa Lakṣmī, the abundance of unsurpassable bliss; this comes into being through the acquisition of calmness by one who has abandoned all desires for enjoyment here or hereafter, and acquired knowledge resulting from the distinction of the eternal from the transient. These high qualities must necessarily be acquired by men in all stages of life, for the sake of knowledge.

Śrīkaṇṭha has here enumerated, as necessary for knowledge, all the qualities the acquisition of which Śaṅkara in his commentary on Sūtra I, 1, 1, insists on as necessarily preliminary to the inquiry into Brahman. But there is this difference to be noted. Knowledge (vidyā) means for Śrīkaṇṭha (as for Rāmānuja) meditation (upāsana). What is considered essential to the successful practice of meditation need not be prescribed as preliminary to an inquiry into Brahman. It is also seen from the commentary on I, 1, 4, that the acquisition of calmness, etc., is *subsidiary* to the acquisition of the know-

ledge of Brahman, *not a preliminary* thereto; for, it is said that the injunction in respect of these is a *vinīyoga vidhi*, not an *adhikāra vidhi*, as Śaṅkara would make out. The principal consideration that determines the fitness of the subject (*adhikāritva*) is desire for release; the seeker of knowledge must be a *mokṣa kāmī*. Thus, Śrīkaṇṭha would seem to differ from Śaṅkara in his conception of the stage when and the purpose for which these qualities are needed.

How is fitness determined? Fitness for acquiring Brahma-vidyā has to be determined with regard to desire, capacity, knowledge, and the absence of disabilities imposed by the *śāstras*. Human beings generally possess these qualities, though in regard to certain classes, there is *śāstraic* prohibition. It is because of the general competency (*adhikāritva*) of human beings that the Lord, in His grace, assumes the same dimensions as the size of the human heart, in order to facilitate meditation on Himself.¹⁴

Fitness of the gods to acquire Brahma Vidya. It may be thought that the gods, who already reside in Heaven, have nothing further to gain, and hence, cannot have the desire to know Brahman. It is also said that they have no bodies, the ascription of physical attributes to them being merely figurative. So, they lack the capacity to meditate. They do not possess the required initial knowledge either, for, they are neither initiated nor do they go through a course of *adhyayana*. In almost every way they seem to be disqualified. But the objections do not hold. The status of the gods is certainly higher than that

¹⁴ I, 3, 24.

of men, but there is a higher state than theirs, that of Parameśvara. The word "Heaven" may have different senses, just as Īśvara may mean God or only a ruler of people in a state. "Heaven" as applied to Parameśvara means a state of unsurpassed bliss from which there is no return, while for the gods it means only happiness that might grow less in time, while it might always be surpassed by something higher. The gods might quite conceivably and legitimately desire to pass from the latter kind of happiness to the former.

Next, Śruti says that gods do possess bodies. And Śruti is authoritative in respect of what cannot otherwise be known and is not inconsistent with that which is otherwise known. The attribution of bodies to gods satisfies both these tests. There is no justification for disposing of these statements as merely eulogistic.¹⁵ Nor is our conclusion affected by the possible difficulty that the gods invoked in sacrifices at different places cannot be present at all of these sacrifices. For, each god may acquire several bodies at the same time, as did Śaumbhari¹⁶ and others.

The fear that bodies being impermanent, the gods would also be so, and that the Śruti which speaks of them would, so far, fail to be authoritative, is groundless. The words referring to gods denote not the individuals, but their general characteristics—size, genus and so on. This significance is eternal though particular things die and may be born again. It is with their general significance in mind that the

¹⁵ I, 3, 25.

¹⁶ I, 3, 26. Śaumbhari married fifty wives, all of them the daughters of Māndhātā and lived with them all, assuming a different form with each, never leaving any and never giving room for any one of them to suspect that he was ever anywhere except with her.

Lord takes up the work of creation, just as a potter makes a pot, only with the idea of the pot already in his mind. This position is supported by both Śruti and Smṛti.¹⁷

The claim to eternity for the Vedas is quite reconcilable with the reference to the Ṛṣis as the hymn-makers (mantra-kṛt). For, Brahmā creates only after recalling to his mind the significance of Vedic words: thus, with the memory of the former Viśvāmitra, he creates a subsequent one at the end of an intermediate deluge. The Ṛṣis come into being in full possession of the powers attributed to them by the hymns and they recite the Vedas without any preliminary initiation or learning by rote. They may be said thus to create the hymns.¹⁸ And the same consideration applies to the gods also in respect of the requirement of initial knowledge. They do not undergo initiation, but they have no need for adhyayana either. Śruti may stand self-revealed to them. Or, it may even be that they have not forgotten what they had learnt by rote in a previous birth. They neither lack the necessary knowledge nor are they prohibited by the śāstras from seeking Brahmavidyā.

Jaimini, however, is of the opinion that the gods are excluded, for some of them, such as the Vasus and the Ādityas, have nothing to gain from the contemplation (enjoined in the Madhu Vidyā)¹⁹ of the state of Vasu, Ādityas, and so on. Meditation leads to identity with what is meditated on (by what is called the tatkratunyāya) and in the case of the Vasus, etc., the states they are asked to con-

¹⁷ I, 3, 27.

¹⁸ I, 3, 28.

¹⁹ See *Ch.*, III, 6-10 and 11.

template have already been attained by them.²⁰ That contemplation of this kind at least is excluded is seen from the injunction that Brahman is to be meditated on by the gods as light.²¹ The objection, however, fails to note that the Vasus, etc., are asked to contemplate in the Madhu Vidyā, not themselves merely, but Brahman as manifesting Himself in and through them. Nor is such meditation fruitless, since it may help them to get to the same state again, in a fresh world-era (kalpa). The Madhu Vidyā indeed inculcates two kinds of contemplation, one on Brahman as the cause (unmanifested) and the other on Brahman as the effect (manifested). The former leads to release through the realisation of Brahman, the latter to the attainment of the state contemplated, in a fresh kalpa.²²

In the case of śūdras, there is a definite prohibition by śāstras. The appellation
 Unfitness of Sudras. of “śūdra” applied to Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇa by Raikva indicates not birth, but the latter’s realisation of the state of mind of him who, sorrowing at the words of the flamingoes, who spoke slightly of his good works, ran to find the teacher they mentioned. The śūdra is precluded from acquiring knowledge by adhyayana, and its place cannot be taken by what is learnt from Itihāsas and Purāṇas, for, he who has not learnt the Vedas does not even know what is to be sought or meditated upon. For such a person, Brahma-vidyā is clearly impossible. The Purāṇas are only auxiliaries to the Vedas; the study of these can of itself serve only to reduce the mass of accumulated demerit. There have undoubtedly been men of

²⁰ I, 3, 30.

²¹ I, 3, 31.

²² I, 3, 32.

knowledge among the śūdras, such as Vidura and Dharmavyādha; but, in their case, evidently, knowledge had been acquired in previous higher births, and not subsequently lost, their subsequent inferiority of birth being due to karma.²³

Further, that Jānaśruti was a kṣatriya is evident from his having had a charioteer, his lavish distribution of cooked food every day, and his gift of villages called Raikvaparna.²⁴ The mention, later, in one chapter of Abhipratārin Caitraratha along with Jānaśruti also indicates this fact: for, only equals are praised with equals, and it seems fairly certain that this Abhipratārin was a kṣatriya. It is said in *Chāndogya*, IV, 3, 5, that while the Abhipratārin Kaksaseni and Śaunaka Kāpeya were being served, a brahmacārin begged food of them. Elsewhere,²⁵ it is said that the Kāpeyas helped the Caitrarathas to sacrifice; since priests of one and the same family generally officiate for members of one and the same family, it is to be presumed that Kākṣaseni was a Caitraratha. We are told in another context that a prince was born of the name of Caitraratha; the Caitrarathas must therefore have been kṣatriyas. Hence, Jānaśruti must also have been a kṣatriya.²⁶

²³ I, 3, 33.

²⁴ I, 3, 34.

²⁵ In the *Tāndya Brāhmaṇa*, XX, 12, 5.

²⁶ I, 3, 35. It is noteworthy that the sūtra expounded through this ingenious tissue of reasoning is read by both Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja as a separate sūtra, and not as part of the previous "Kṣatriyatvāvagatēśca". Śaṅkara reads the two together, and the Caitraratha series of deductions looms large in his exposition. One wonders whether these protagonists of religions, which, while true to śruti and Smṛti, yet rose above the trivialities of caste distinctions felt ashamed of this ingenuity, and relegated that portion of the sūtra to the position of a secondary subsidiary argument. And yet Śaṅkara did not close to the śūdra all means of Brahman-knowledge, as Śrīkaṇṭha seems to do. See *PB*, pp. 167-175, especially p. 170.

Nor is it possible to say that a śūdra may hear and perpend the mahāvākyas alone (such as "Tat tvam asi, that thou art," "Aham Brahṁā'smi, I am Brahman," and so on), even though he is unfit for adhyayana, just as he is entitled to have mantras recited for ceremonies performed by him. For, even for this limited purpose of being taught the mahāvākyas, a person must have undergone initial purificatory ceremonies, from which the śūdra is excluded.²⁷ It is also seen that when there was a doubt as to the caste of the pupil (Satyakāma Jābāla), the teacher undertook the initiation only after making certain in his own way that the pupil could not be a śūdra.²⁸ Nor may it be argued that the knowledge only of sacrifices is prohibited, not of Brahman, for it is forbidden to such a person to study, hear or understand the Veda, a prohibition amply confirmed by Smṛti.²⁹

That release can be secured only by the conjunction of knowledge and action has already been mentioned in the first sūtra. It may be thought that knowledge is subsidiary to action, related

Knowledge is not subsidiary to action.

²⁷ I, 3, 36.

²⁸ I, 3, 37.

²⁹ I, 3, 38 and 39. It is difficult to reconcile this wholesale exclusion with what Śrīkanṭha has to say later about the Āgamas (which are as authoritative as the Vedas) being open to study by members of all castes. Itihāsas and Purāṇas may of themselves lead only to purification of the mind and the diminution of accumulated demerit; but is that all that can be said for a study of the Āgamas also? If not, and if it is really calculated to lead to a knowledge of their author, Parameśvara, how, then, can it be said that śūdras are excluded from Brahmavidyā? The path of approach through a study of the Upaniṣads may be barred, but that path according to Śrīkanṭha is not the only one. The recognition of another equally valid source of knowledge open to all is inconsistent with the attitude of total prohibition, unless the prohibition is construed as limited to the study of Vedānta as expounded in the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma Sūtras*.

thereto as its śeṣa. Such a view would be incorrect. Some Brahmajñānīs like Aśvapati Kekaya kept up observances, no doubt, but we also know of others who did not, like the descendants of Kavaṣa. It is certainly said that what is done with knowledge is more efficient, but this applies only to the udgītha vidyā (the meditation of the Praṇava as Brahman), not to all meditation. Though Śruti speaks of knowledge and action as taking hold of a man together, the “taking hold” (āraṃbhaṇa) should be understood distributively, as when we say that a person got two hundred by the sale of lands and gems, meaning thereby that he got a hundred from each source. Nor is it true that action is enjoined even on him who knows the Veda³⁰; for, the subject of the injunction in that context is one who knows only the word of the Veda by adhyayana.

Further, Śruti passages like the Īśāvāsya text, “only performing actions here, one may live to be a hundred” are not specifically intended for the man of knowledge (vidvān). It will be seen from the commencement of that Upaniṣad in particular, “all this is enveloped by the Lord, etc.,” that the leading topic is vidyā, not karma. Śruti alone declares the existence of a being who is higher than the individual and is to be *known*; hence knowledge would appear to be the end of man. Even the Īśāvāsya text mentions action only to glorify know-

³⁰ Ācāryakulāt vedam adhītya yathā vidhānam guroḥ
karmātiśeṣeṇābhisamāvṛtya kuṭumbe sucaudeśe
svādhyāyam adhīyāno dhārmikān vidadhat:

“having studied the Veda at the place of a teacher according to the prescribed rule, during the time left after performing the duties to the teacher, and having obtained his discharge, settled in his house, studying the Veda in some sacred place and begotten virtuous sons.” (Ch. VIII, 15, 1. The translation is based on Dr. Jha’s.)

ledge later on; as when it says that because of the power of knowledge one is not affected even by the unremitting performance of action.

It is also said that some sages acted as they liked and gave up the house-holder's state (*e.g.*, the descendants of Kavaṣa). Knowledge, according to Śruti destroys all action: "Kṣīyante cāśya karmāṇi tasmin dr̥ṣṭe parāvare: all his karma ceases, when He has been beheld, who is high and low."³¹ And we are told that knowledge resides even in ascetics leading a life of chastity. From all this, one concludes that knowledge is of independent worth and is no mere auxiliary to action. Action, on the other hand, if performed without desire for fruit, is subordinate to knowledge.³²

From this, one passes naturally to a consideration of the relative values of the various orders of life, from the point of view of Brahnavidyā. It is said³³ that the order of the ascetic is neither inferior to the other orders of life nor less an object of injunction. It is explicitly referred to in texts like the Jābāla Śruti. The prohibition of the neglect of Fire and the penalties in that regard apply to him only who is pledged, as a house-holder is, to tend the Fire. Even in his case, renunciation may follow on the loss of the right to tend the Fire (say, by the loss of his wife). The only prerequisite in all cases of renunciation is a genuine turning away from the things of the world (*vairāgya*). This may be secured even in the student's order of life, if the mind has been prepared by good deeds in a previous life. The re-

³¹ *Muṇḍaka*, II, 2, 8.

³² III, 4, 1-17.

³³ III, 4, 18-20.

nunciation thus achieved is even superior to the renunciation from the stage of a house-holder, as it does not involve the assumption and the subsequent relinquishment of duties towards Fire and so on. Beyond the requirement of vairāgya (non-attachment) no further restriction may be imposed on renunciation, as that would be opposed to Scripture.

It follows from this that the ascetic has no need to perform any action except such as appertains to his stage of life. The injunctions to tend the Fire, etc., for the sake of knowledge do not apply to him.³⁴

As has been already noted, in the case of householders, knowledge has regard to the performance of the duties pertaining to each one's station in life. Action reveals knowledge in its own nature and stands to it in the relation of 'accoutrements to a horse.'³⁵ But while engaging in action, one should not get lost in it; hence the insistence on calmness, subjugation of the senses and so on.³⁶

The doubt may arise whether, action being contributory to knowledge, he who possesses no knowledge is under an obligation to perform the duties prescribed for his stage of life. The answer is that he should, since the duties are enjoined and will, even in his case, prove instrumental to knowledge. The duties co-operate with knowledge in that they reside and function as subordinate elements thereof, as seen from the text "vidyām cā-vidyām ca," etc. The acts that give rise to knowledge and those that co-operate with it are not of

³⁴ III, 4, 25.

³⁵ III, 4, 26.

³⁶ III, 4, 27.

different kinds; for, the same acts are seen to possess both characteristics, in the same way as the khādīra wood, the use of which for the sacrificial stake is enjoined as a matter of course, is said by its use to bring about also the wished for attainment of strength.³⁷ It is also seen that sacrifices, by their potency, prevent knowledge from being overpowered, and rapidly destroy obstacles to its growth.³⁸

There are some who do not belong to any of the āśramas. To them, knowledge is not denied, though they are inferior to those who belong to an āśrama and keep up its observances. They may attain knowledge with the help of prayer, incantations, etc.; Smṛti too supports this opinion. There is no room to fear that the grant of option would render āśrama dharma futile; for, it is said that that dharma possesses a special efficacy in respect of the promotion of knowledge, as seen from the Praśna text,³⁹ “by penance, chastity, faith and knowledge, seeking the Self.”⁴⁰

No concession, however, can be shown to him who falls from a higher to a lower stage of life. The fallen person has no capacity for Brahmavidyā. No expiation is prescribed for his sin, though some hold that, since it is an upapātaka, not a mahāpātaka (a minor, not a major sin), expiation is possible. However this may be, both Smṛti and all principles of right conduct dictate the exclusion of such persons from Karma and Brahmavidyā.⁴¹

³⁷ Khādiro yūpo bhavati; khādiram vīryakāmasya yūpam kurvanti.

³⁸ III, 4, 32 to 35.

³⁹ Praśna, I, 10.

⁴⁰ III, 4, 36-39.

⁴¹ III, 4, 40-43.

Śruti mentions the house-holder's state last,⁴² in order to show that knowledge is attainable in all orders of life, not merely in that of the ascetic; for, samnyāsa is but a renunciation of the fruit of action, and, to control the senses is to be a yati.⁴³

Among auxiliaries to knowledge may be mentioned bālyā, pāṇḍityā and mauna, i.e., a child-like state of freedom from desire and aversion, full understanding of the sense of all the Upaniṣads, and repeated contemplation. The last of these is as much enjoined as the other two, though no specific injunctive term is employed, as in their case.⁴⁴

Having thus considered the preliminaries to the inquiry into Brahman, as also the presuppositions of Brahmavidyā, the auxiliaries thereto, and the relation of knowledge to action, we pass on to the means of Brahma-knowledge as determined by Śrīkaṇṭha.

Śruti is our sole authority and source of knowledge in respect of Brahman.⁴⁵ The authoritativeness of Śruti would be impaired, if indeed, any other means of knowledge, e.g., inference, were found to apply equally. But it is clear that the infinite first cause transcends our powers of perception and inference. The latter could never take us to the conception of a single creator for this multifarious world, in the absence of anything else that is similar and may be used as an example (dṛṣṭānta)⁴⁶; in no case could it give

⁴² The reference is to *Ch.*, VIII, 15, 1, to a passage already mentioned in this chapter.

⁴³ III, 4, 47.

⁴⁴ III, 4, 46.

⁴⁵ I, 1, 3.

⁴⁶ Cp. Ward: "The teleological argument does not carry us beyond pluralism." *Pluralism and Theism*, p. 230.

rise to the conception of a cause that is at once material cause and efficient cause.

Even should the idea of a single creator be somehow suggested by inference, such a being would be conceived, not as free, but as subject to karma, as our knowledge of agency is confined to beings of this class. Śruti, therefore, does not become content-less (*aprāptaviṣaya*). Inference, however, may be found useful as an auxiliary in determining the nature of Brahman.⁴⁷

Śruti being the only means of knowledge applicable to Brahman, we stick to it and we hold reasoning in no great esteem.⁴⁸ When a multitude of texts proclaim, for instance, that Śiva takes on countless forms and yet is free from sin and imperfection, it is no use urging arguments based on analogies from human experience.⁴⁹ For, authority is claimed for and is conceded to Vedic passages which declare what is not otherwise known and are not inconsistent with what is otherwise known.⁵⁰ Such, for instance, is the statement that gods have bodies. A human being with a body may not find it possible to be in different places at the same time; but divine bodies may conceivably possess a different character and enable those who possess them to be present at several sacrifices at the same time. Inconsistency is not of itself fatal, unless the con-

⁴⁷ I, 1, 4.

⁴⁸ The statement in (I, 1, 21) disparaging reason is couched in very wide and incautious terms. Immediately afterwards, Śrikantha proceeds to give an instance of the co-presence of opposed qualities; e.g., fire, which, though known to burn everything which it comes in contact with, yet fails to burn some specially gifted people. Arguments like this could not proceed from one who believed in the futility of reason.

⁴⁹ I, 1, 21.

⁵⁰ I, 3, 25.

fict happens to be with what is known of the very subject about which the present statements are made.

That inference of itself is valueless is shown by the fact that it has no finality. Conclusions of inferences are always liable to be upset by counter-arguments.⁵¹ Nor is it of any avail to look for a mode of inference not liable to be thus upset; for, the skilled dialectician falls a victim to a more skilled one, and freedom from the possibility of counter-arguments can never be guaranteed. Unaided reasoning, therefore, can never attain finality.⁵² What Śruti says about dharma and Brahman has to be accepted without reservation. Relying only on inference, we cannot get even so far as the conception of a single material cause of the world. Hence it is that all the qualities repeatedly predicated of Brahman, such as blue-throatedness, etc., should be accepted without exception, not rejected in part in the fear that the recognition of physical qualities might subject Brahman to increase and decrease, and, consequently, to finitude.⁵³

It may be objected at this stage that it is by no means clear that even Śruti can give us valid knowledge of Brahman. For, a word is understood to signify either an act or what is related to an act; it has not the power of denoting an ever-accomplished existence like Brahman. A child sees one grown-up person asking another to do something, whereupon the other starts to do it. Since the act is commenced after the expression of the wish or command, the former is seen to be re-

**The Vṛddha-
vyavahāra doc-
trine stated and
criticised.**

⁵¹ II, 1, 11.

⁵² II, 1, 12.

⁵³ III, 3, 39.

lated to and indicated by the latter; later, it is understood that the act is what is meant by that word or group of words. Though things may come to be denoted also, in course of time, this is because they have stood in some relation to action, sometime or other. Further, Śruti is concerned with laying down injunctions and prohibitions; and Brahman, the ever-existent finally accomplished Being, cannot be the object of either.

All such objections are misconceived. Words do denote accomplished facts, as when we say "a son is born to you". Even in deriving knowledge through seeing others act, one concludes that since the knowledge of what induces one's own activity is derived from the synthesis of the significance of words, the meaning of the command of the person who is served similarly arises out of the sense of the words employed; hence words may signify facts accomplished. Further, knowledge of what words mean is secured by other means also, not only by the one here described, which is known as *vṛddhavyavahāra*. The child comes to know the names of persons, things, etc., by having them pointed out to him and named, by his parents or by other relatives. We see also that those ignorant of literary works acquire knowledge thereof by approaching persons learned therein and understanding the sense of the whole by splitting it up into sentences and words and grasping the sense of each. In any case, therefore, an ever-existent Brahman may legitimately be the object of Śruti knowledge.

As for the objection that Śruti is exclusively concerned with injunctions and prohibitions, and that Brahman cannot be the object of these, we meet it with the statement that Brahman

**Meditation on
Brahman is the
object of an
injunction:**

Objections considered.

is, as a matter of fact, the object of an injunction to the effect that He should be known and meditated upon, as in “*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*,” etc. It may be said that Brahman cannot be the object both of knowledge and of an injunction thereto; any text so interpreted would be liable to the charge of *vākyabheda* (conveying two different senses in one sentence, an unpardonable offence, where Śruti constitutes the sole means of knowledge). But, just as the eye which perceives colour perceives with it the substance possessing colour, the injunction may lead on to knowledge, both pertaining to Brahman. Such an answer, however, cannot be final. For, while perception by the eye is not confined to a particular object but extends to its fringe or background, whether intended or not, the same claim cannot be made of speech which indicates only what is intended and has, consequently, to be very precise. But the charge of *vākyabheda* cannot stand, since Śruti may in some cases have more than one reference, as when information is conveyed not merely about acts to be performed, but also the order in which they are to be performed. Hence, the Vedānta may teach the reality of Brahman and also lay down an injunction for the meditation thereof.

An injunction would still appear unnecessary, for he who has learnt the Śruti by rote knows Brahman. To this the rejoinder is that just as mantras have to be recited even after the object indicated by these have been understood, Brahman similarly understood may yet be the object of an injunction (*prayoga vidhi*). But, a *prayoga vidhi* cannot exist in the absence of its elements—the *utpatti*, *viniyoga* and the *adhikāra vidhis*, and these

seem to be absent in the case of Brahman. Not so, is the reply, since it is he who is desirous of release (*adhikāra vidhi*) that is to seek Brahman (*utpatti vidhi*) through Vedānta śravaṇa and so on, with a mind made pure by the acquisition of calmness, contentment and other qualities (*vinīyoga vidhi*).⁵⁴ It must also be remembered that the knowledge of Brahman gained from Śruti is only indirect (*parokṣa*). The immediate and full realisation (*sāksātkāra*) of Brahman is brought about by meditation which is enjoined for the purpose.

But an injunction, it may be argued, must aim at some definite result—an origination or an attainment, a change or a purification. None of these can be intended or effected in the eternally pure and perfect Brahman, the object of the injunction. In some cases, indeed, the nature of an injunction is modified by construing the object of the karma as an instrument, reading the accusative case as equivalent to the instrumental; thus “*śaktūn juhoti*” is interpreted as “*śaktunā juhoti*”. But such principles of construction do not help in the present case, for, the flour (*śaktu*) conceived as object or an instrument is destroyed in the fire, while no such change is contemplated or is possible with Brahman. This objection is valid, so far as it goes; but it lays undue stress on a result in respect of the object of the injunction. A change may come about in the subject, in the person who observes the command, and this will be all that is necessary to conserve its injunctive character. Such a change in the agent (*kartā*) is certainly expected and declared in respect of the meditation of Brahman.

⁵⁴ The *utpatti vidhi* prescribes a particular act, the *vinīyoga vidhi*, its auxiliaries; the *adhikāra vidhi* declares what constitutes fitness for the performance of the act. All these go to make the *prayoga vidhi*.

Nor is there a rule that that of which knowledge has already been acquired may not be the object of injunction, positive or negative. There may be meditation of such an object, whether optional and intermittent or constant. In the former case, there is room for a positive injunction to the effect that that (viz., the Self) should necessarily be contemplated; and, if the meditations are intended to be constant, there is occasion for a negative rule that nothing else should be meditated on and that the mind should be turned away from the unproductive knowledge of the not-self.⁵⁵

Now comes another difficulty about the authority of the Śruti, as such, not merely in regard to Brahmavidyā. It gives us knowledge which admittedly no other means of knowledge can compass. But what guarantee is there of the validity of such knowledge?

We can rely only on two facts, that it is beginningless and uncreated and that the Lord is the author thereof. How can these two be reconciled? Of a certainty, they emanate from Him; but in producing them afresh at the beginning of each kalpa (world-era), He has in mind the forms as they were before and reproduces the words with those forms. In this sense, the Vedas are eternal.

Nor is pauroṣeyatva (being created by a person) necessarily a detraction from the authority of the Vedas; for, their creator is none other than the Lord, whose purposes are eternally accomplished, who is free from desires and anxieties, who is the embodiment of Truth and Righteousness. Further, the production of Śruti is said to have been

⁵⁵ I, 1, 4. In the former case, we have a niyama vidhi, and in the latter a parisamkhyā vidhi.

effortless like the act of breathing. "What we have as the R̥g Veda, etc., has been breathed forth from this great Being."⁵⁶ Effort involving pain may lead to a distortion of the truth; there can be room for no such fear in what is effortless and natural.⁵⁷

The fear that Śruti is non-eternal, since words signify what is impermanent, is groundless; for the significance of words is general, not particular. Their eternity is thus secured, in spite of the transitory nature of the particulars.⁵⁸

The eternal Śruti which is the creation of the Lord should concern itself only with knowledge of the Lord; but, as
Even the Karma Kāṇḍa treats of the Lord. a matter of fact, a great part of it is taken up with a discussion of duties, injunctions and prohibitions not directly connected with that knowledge. It is apparently occupied with the fleeting instead of the eternal. But this is not really the case; for, even the karma-kāṇḍa will be found to refer to Brahman. Texts like the *Puruṣa Sūkta* and the *Śata Rudrīya* have for their purport the teaching of the universal immanent Brahman, as may be seen from the predications of universal causality, transcendence of (the) darkness (of ignorance), immortality and

⁵⁶ *Bṛh.*, II, 4, 10.

⁵⁷ I, 1, 3. In his role of syncretic philosopher, Śrīkanṭha has juxtaposed two notions of authoritativeness. The first of these is the Advaitin's: production by the Lord is *apauruṣeya*, as it pays regard to similar prior declarations, as it is a reproduction, with the memory of what obtained in prior kalpas; while the second notion which argues from the perfection of the creator is the Naiyāyika's. The two are in part at least conflicting views. And yet our author presents both to us, as if the acceptance of both together were the most natural thing in the world. Truly, the path of the reconciler is strewn with imperfections!

⁵⁸ I, 3, 27.

so on. Nor may one point to the predication of anger, etc., as indicating a reference to some being other than the highest, for, “manyu” in that context means “wisdom” and not “anger”; or it may even mean anger voluntarily assumed for the purpose of punishing the wicked, not the vulgar passion that overpowers the intellect. Wherever, in these texts, there is a reference to an intelligent or a non-intelligent entity as the cause of the world, the Self thereof, *i.e.*, the Supreme Lord is to be understood, those entities being the body of the Lord.⁵⁹

To sum up: Śruti is eternal; it is the creation of the Lord, and it purports to give us knowledge of the Lord whom no other means of knowledge can reach to. Śruti can claim to be authoritative in respect of what is not otherwise known, and what is not inconsistent with that which is otherwise known. This claim is capable of a very wide construction. It may be said that we know nothing of the gods or of Brahman, and that therefore anything is possible. Though the language of exaggerated contempt for reason favours such a view, in practice, a narrower construction is adopted. For instance, in the sūtra Śrutes tu śabdāmūlatvāt,⁶⁰ it is said (in answer to the Sāṃkhya objection that either the whole of Brahman is transformed or there is contradiction of texts declaring Brahman to be without parts), that Śruti, which is our sole source of Brahmavidyā, declares Brahman to be capable of such transformation without passing over in its entirety into the effect.⁶¹ Not content

⁵⁹ I, 4, 29.

⁶⁰ II, 1, 27.

⁶¹ An even stronger condemnation of reason occurs in I, 1, 21: “Indeed, we have recourse to Śruti as authoritative, and hold reason in no great esteem.”

with thus asserting the authority of the Śruti, Śrīkanṭha proceeds to justify the position by an illustration from what he would consider the adversary's armoury of arguments. Look at the Tārkika's conception of Jāti (genus), he says, which, though one, is yet fully present in each of its manifestations. This conception is not rejected on the ground of unintelligibility, though it is like nothing else in our experience. At least similar consideration may be claimed for our concept of Brahman.⁶² Thus, in practice, though not professedly, Śrīkanṭha was far from being an anti-intellectualist.

The canons applicable to the interpretation of Śruti texts are upakrama (the beginning) taken with the upasaṃhāra (the conclusion), abhyāsa (repetition), apūrvatā (novelty), phalam (the object), arthavāda (glorification), and upapatti (reasoning).⁶³ Bādarāyaṇa has composed his Sūtras,

⁶² The idea of the genus, as here expounded, would lead one to expect from Śrīkanṭha a doctrine of the concrete universal; but, unfortunately, there is no further elaboration of this notion or any indication that it is adopted by Śrīkanṭha as part of his own thought. Elsewhere (in II, 3, 45 and III, 2, 28), he speaks of the genus as if it were a quality of the species; it is mentioned as in the same relation to the species as attribute to substance, and radiance to a gem that possesses it. In all such comparisons, Brahman is conceived as the gem, the substance, the species and so on; so that, the possibility of conceiving Brahman as itself the genus, the universal, does not appear to have been entertained or approved by Śrīkanṭha. It is worth noting that the relationship of Brahman to the world, as genus and species (suggested in III, 2, 27) is refuted (in III, 2, 28) on the ground that the defects of the world (the species) would attach to Brahman (the genus). Here at any rate, the genus is not viewed as an abstraction or a quality of the species.

⁶³ I, 1, 4. An interesting variant of the śloka "Upakramopasaṃhārau," etc., is found on page 4 of Śrī Kumāra's commentary on Bhojadeva's *Tattvaparakāśa* (Trivandrum Samskṛt Series, 68). It reads thus:

having determined the sense of the Upaniṣads by the application of these canons. We shall follow in his foot-steps and discover that significance, with Śrīkaṇṭha to guide us.

Ādimadhyāntasaṅgānam abhyaso'pūrvatā phalam
Arthavādopapattī ca liṅgam tātparyanirnaye.

The reading has some obvious advantages in that the first of the marks mentioned calls for the harmony not only of the introductory and concluding passages, but also of those in the middle. There is also the further advantage that not the passages themselves, but their *harmonious sense* is shown to be the mark of significance, this aspect not being quite evident in the reading “upakramopasaṃhārau” (as will be seen from Ghate's translation). No details seem to be to hand as to the place or period of Śrī Kumāra. He was the son of one Śaṃkara and of the Bhāradvāja kula.

NOTE E.
GOD'S CREATORSHIP AND THE VALUE
OF INFERENCE.

Śrīkaṇṭha maintains that God's creatorship cannot be a matter of inference, because we may infer at best only creators like those we know, *e.g.*, potters, etc., who are subject to ignorance and karma, that we have no instance of a cause that is itself both material and efficient cause, and that the diversity of the creational order would lead to the inference of a plurality of creators, not a single creator. It is interesting to note that in the commentary on an early āgamic work, the *Mokṣa Kārikā* of Sadyojyoti Śivācārya, the first and last of these arguments are met, while the second of them is irrelevant for that system. It is said that the potter is no doubt ignorant in many ways, but not in respect of the making of the pot; the universal creator, we infer, cannot similarly be ignorant either of the universe or of the mode of its creation. And since the universe is all that is, the God we infer cannot be ignorant of anything. As for the same cause not being known to be both material and efficient cause, that is of no account, since for the Siddhānta, God is not the material cause. The argument from the diversity of effects would be valid, granted the truth of the premises; but beyond all this diversity, there is a unity, *viz.*, that of the purpose served, enjoyment with a view to release. This unity of purpose necessarily leads us to infer a single creator (see commentary on verses 1 and 2 of the *Mokṣa Kārikā*). The commentary is by one Bhaṭṭa Rāmakāṇṭha, who certainly came before Aghora Śivācārya (1158 A.D.) and is assigned by Dr. Ramaṇa Śāstrin to 550 A.D. It is interesting to note that the arguments do not constitute a thorough-going vindication of the self-sufficiency of inference; for, the unity of purpose which is appealed to is not itself a matter of perception or inference and has to be established by revelation.

CHAPTER III.

CRITICISM OF RIVAL THEORIES.

The consideration of rival theories is not of as much interest here as in the Śāṃkara **Criticism of rival theories.** Bhāṣya, where Śaṃkara incidentally criticises such concepts as causality and relation. Śrīkaṇṭha either pre-supposes this criticism or takes it to be unnecessary. To this extent, the purely metaphysical interest in the discussion falls off; but a study of this part of the *Brahma Mīmāṃsā* is none the less necessary for an adequate comprehension of the whole. It will also be found that here and there Śrīkaṇṭha puts in some distinctive touches, one of which at least is cardinal to his system,—the famous declaration about the Vedas and the Śaiva Āgamas being non-different in essence and equally authoritative.

The Sāṃkhya was evidently the most redoubtable rival of the Vedānta, based, as it **The Sāṃkhya.** was, partly on reason and partly on its own interpretation of the revelation. Its appeal to authority, however, is its less important characteristic. It is thought that the texts relied on are not authoritative or are capable of a different interpretation; hence, the system itself is designated *Smṛti* and the cause it postulates, *viz.*, *pradhāna*, is known as *smārta* (what is known through *Smṛti*) or *ānumānika* (what is inferred).¹ The almost

¹ See I, 2, 20; and I, 3, 3.

purely rational character of the Sāṃkhya is very much to the fore in the Vedāntin's treatment of the system. The Sāṃkhya claims that its own conclusions accord with reason while those of the Vedānta do not. This double claim is examined and refuted in the *Sūtras*.

Briefly stated, the Sāṃkhya postulates two principles—*puruṣa* and *prakṛti*—the former unchanging, the latter changing, the former intelligent, the latter devoid of intelligence. It is *prakṛti* that evolves as the world; *puruṣa* is but the witness of the evolution. Happiness and misery are due to the mistaken identification of *puruṣa* with the changing world. When the manifestation of *prakṛti* is complete, *puruṣa* gets disgusted therewith, as a man gets disgusted with a dancer who has freely exhibited all her wiles; he then realises his own nature as eternally free and unchanging; and thereby, the function of *prakṛti*, which is but the leading up of *puruṣa* to realisation of his own nature, is also fulfilled.

The criticism of this doctrine starts quite early, as soon as the definition of Brahman and the sources of knowledge thereof have been set forth. The Supreme Being described as the cause of the creation, etc., of the world² and mentioned as "Being only" in the *Sad Vidyā* of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*,³ should not be identified with that which is not based on *Śruti*, that is to say, the *pradhāna*, for, the texts declare the First Cause to have seen (*īkṣata*).⁴ The function of sight mentioned here is consistent only with the presence of intelligence, while *prakṛti* is characterised by its absence.

² I, 1, 2.

³ *Ch.*, VI, 2, 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, VI, 2, 3; *Taitt.*, II, 6, 1.

It may be said that what Śruti declares to be the First Cause may be suitably interpreted only as pradhāna, in the light of such passages as that of the Śvetāśvatara which mentions the one she-goat (ajā)⁵ with three colours, red, white and black, where the three colours seem manifestly to refer to the three constituents (guṇas), sattva, rajas and tamas, held in equipoise by prakṛti. The guṇas, sattva and rajas, may be understood to be the cognitive and volitional powers (jñāna and kriyā śaktis) through which prakṛti evolves as the world. In this there is nothing inconsistent and it ought to commend itself to reason more than the transformation of what is intelligent, a view which presents many difficulties.

To all this we reply that, as pointed out in “Camasavadaviśeṣāt”⁶ there is no mark which indicates unambiguously the identification of ajā with the pradhāna. Elsewhere⁷ we hear of a cup which has its mouth below; the denotation is indefinite and is made definite only by a later statement, “this is the head”. When words signify objects indirectly, they require to be used in conjunction with an independent unambiguous distinguishing mark. And no such mark is found to help us to identify ajā with pradhāna.

The identification of sattva and rajas with the cognitive and volitional powers has no value, for it cannot serve to explain creation so long as prakṛti is conceived as an equipoise of the three guṇas. Until this equilibrium is disturbed, there is no opportunity for the energies to come into play; the

⁵ Śvet., IV, 5.

⁶ I, 4, 8.

⁷ Brh., IV, 2, 3.

cause, if any, of that disturbance, will be the primal cause, not the *pradhāna*.

Transformation of what is intelligent does no doubt lead to difficulties, but not on our theory. We conceive of a change not *of* Brahman, but *in* Him. The whole world, intelligent as well as non-intelligent, is already *in* Him, in a subtle condition, indistinguishable by name and form; and creation consists in making gross what is subtle, in the change from *sūkṣma cidacid viśiṣṭa Brahman* to *sthūla cidacid viśiṣṭa Brahman*.

The attribution of sight (in “*tadaiksata bahu-syām prajāyeya*”, etc.) may not be interpreted figuratively in the light of other texts which speak of the waters seeing and so on, for even in the latter case, the reference is not to the fire or the waters as such, but to the presiding deities thereof; and, in any case, the figurative interpretation would be inconsistent with the use of the word “Self (*ātmā*)” in the concluding portion of the same context (*Sa ātmā, tat tvam asi*).⁸

Again release is said to follow on the attainment of that Being who is the First Cause. The reference clearly cannot be to the *pradhāna* which has to be abandoned in order to secure liberation; nor can the individual soul be meant, as Śruti is quite clear that he who seeks release should contemplate Śiva alone to the exclusion of all else,—even individual selves.⁹

Further, knowledge of everything in the universe is promised by Śruti as the result of the knowledge of the one Being. If this Being were the *pradhāna*, the promise would be falsified, for, only what is

⁸ I, 1, 6.

⁹ I, 1, 7 and 8.

non-intelligent can be known through a knowledge of the *pradhāna*; and there is no justification for rejecting that part of the world which is intelligent.¹⁰

That the First Cause should be intelligent follows also from numerous statements that the individual souls when they sleep are re-absorbed in the First Cause¹¹; and what is intelligent cannot be absorbed in what is non-intelligent.¹²

It is also clear from other texts¹³ that the origination of the world proceeds only from the Self, and that the expression Being (*sat*) refers elsewhere, as here, to *Parameśvara*.¹⁴

The *Śāṅkhya* appeals to a *Śruti* passage¹⁵ where the words *mahat* and *avyakta* occur, and claims support therefrom for its doctrine, these terms being peculiar to that system. The sense-organs, *manas*, *buddhi*, *mahat*, *avyakta* and *puruṣa* are there spoken of each as higher than the preceding one. But *avyakta* cannot be equated with the *pradhāna* of the *Śāṅkhyas*, since it has to be understood differently in the light of other references, notably the simile of the chariot and the charioteer.¹⁶ All the entities mentioned earlier are repeated here,

¹⁰ I, 1, 9. The *sūtra* "Pratijñā-virodhāt" is common to *Śrīkaṇṭha*, *Rāmānuja* and *Nimbārka*; it is not part of the text of *Śaṅkara* or *Bhāskara* or *Madhva*. The *pratijñā* referred to is the *Chāndogya* reference in VI, 1, 1, to that by which the unheard becomes heard and so on.

¹¹ *Ch.*, VI, 8, 1.

¹² I, 1, 10.

¹³ *Ch.*, VII, 26, 1: *Ātmataḥ prāṇa, ātmata ākāśaḥ*.

¹⁴ *Cf.* "Puruṣo vai rudras san maho namo namaḥ" (*Mahopaniṣad*, XXIV, 42). *Śrīkaṇṭha* proceeds, from the very beginning, on the basis that *Brahman* and *Parameśvara* are identical.

¹⁵ *Kaṭha*, III, 10 and 11.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, III, 3 and 4.

with the exception of avyakta; one of these is compared to the horses of the chariot, another to the reins and so on; avyakta alone is omitted, and, in its place, the body is mentioned as the chariot. To complete the analogy we have to follow the Method of Residues and identify avyakta with the body.

The mention of these entities one after another is to show that each preceding one is to be subordinated to what comes next higher, till one gets to puruṣa, who is the limit, the supreme goal.¹⁷ That this gradual subordination is intended is also seen from other Śruti passages.¹⁸ Hence the unmanifested one (avyakta) which is thus subordinated to puruṣa can be only the body.¹⁹ Nor is there any impropriety in speaking of the body as the unmanifested, for the reference is to the subtle body that alone is the potential condition of the gross body and all that follows therefrom.²⁰

Again, from the references to the successive subordination of each element to the next higher one in the list, and the mention of the Lord as the limit and the goal, it follows that what is called avyakta is subject to the control of the Lord; this is clearly opposed to the identification of avyakta with the pradhāna.²¹ Nor do we come across any text which enjoins that this avyakta is to be known in the same way as that in which the pradhāna is required to be known.²² It cannot be said that the injunction to meditate on what is not heard, not felt and so

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, III, 11. The puruṣa that is the goal is not the jīva, but Brahman.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, III, 13.

¹⁹ I, 4, 1.

²⁰ I, 4, 2.

²¹ I, 4, 3.

²² I, 4, 4.

on,²³ refers to the pradhāna, since that topic relates to the Self as seen from the earlier reference to prājña (Yaced vān manasī prājña, etc.). Further, the questions of Naciketas and the answers refer only to three topics,²⁴—the meditation and the subject and the object thereof; there is no occasion

²³ *Kāṭha*, III, 15. Knowing that which is soundless, touchless, formless and so on, a man escapes death. The being so described is to be determined in the light of III, 13 (yaced vān manasī prājña, etc.). As that verse makes use of the word “intelligent being”, the reference in verse 15 cannot be to non-intelligent pradhāna. But verse 13 refers to the individual soul, while verse 15 indicates that which the individual soul should know in order to escape death. How then can it be said that the sense of the latter verse is to be determined by the former? The only explanation would have to proceed from the advaitin’s hypothesis of the identity of the jīva and Brahman. So argues Appayya Dīkṣita in *SN*, making a further point in favour of his argument to show that Śrīkaṇṭha is an advaitin at heart.

²⁴ Naciketas was granted three boons by Yama. The first request of Naciketas related to the prosperity of his father; then came the request for knowledge of the triṇācīketa fire. The third boon related to knowledge of the Self. It is noteworthy, as Appayya Dīkṣita points out (in *SN*), that while the question is about what happens to the individual after death, the answer is about the Supreme Self; this in itself is a very clear indication of the identity of the two selves. The fact that Naciketas had only one boon yet to receive would not justify an irrelevant answer, in the absence of the identity of reference between question and answer. In any case, the boons being exhausted with the answer to this question, there is no occasion for Naciketas to ask, or for Yama to impart, information about the pradhāna. This is how Śaṅkara understands the reference to three questions and three answers in the sūtra. Such an interpretation necessarily indicating the fact that only one boon yet remained, and that the other boons did not relate to knowledge of the Self, would not suit Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and others interested in maintaining the difference of the finite self from Brahman. They, therefore, take the number “three” to refer to the three aspects of the one question, the answer to which was to the third boon; the three aspects are the upāsaka (the meditator), the upāsana (the meditation), and the upāśya (the object of meditation). Once we get to such sub-divisions, there is no reason why there should have been only three or why a question about the pradhāna may not be presumed at least for the purpose of clarifying the knowledge of the self. Śaṅkara’s interpretation is far more convincing.

to discuss the *pradhāna*.²⁵ Indeed, there is no reason why the term *avyakta* should be more exclusively identified with Sāṃkhya usage than *mahat* which occurs in the same series. That *mahat* is not used in the Sāṃkhya sense is seen from its being qualified by such expressions as *ātmā*.²⁶

The term “*ajā*” does not refer to *prakṛti*. We get valuable help in interpreting it correctly, from the *Mahopaniṣad*²⁷ which uses the same word to signify *prakṛti* which is effected by *Parameśvara* who is spoken of as light, as the cause and soul of the world, as greater than the great and minuter than the minute and as the Being from whom the seven *prāṇas* proceed.²⁸ There is no impropriety in referring to what is effected by the Lord as “un-born”, for, *prakṛti*, thus understood, is unborn both before its creation and after its destruction, existing in a subtle form in the Lord, as part of His own Nature. The statement is analogous to those made about the Sun being the nectar of the gods (*deva madhu*) and about its neither rising nor setting and so on. The two predications do not conflict, for this property (*madhutva*) is possessed by the Sun only after creation, not before that; nor does it persist after destruction in *pralaya*, when that quality is resumed by the Lord and exists in Him in a subtle condition indistinguishable by name and form.²⁹

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*³⁰ uses the expression *pañca pañca janāḥ*, which apparently

²⁵ I, 4, 6.

²⁶ I, 4, 7.

²⁷ *Mahopaniṣad*, XII, 26.

²⁸ I, 4, 9.

²⁹ I, 4, 10.

³⁰ *Bṛh.*, VI, 4, 17.

means the twenty-five principles of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of evolution. But the resemblance is only apparent; for, Śruti goes on to say that these are established in the ākāśa. The Sāṃkhya does not recognise any support or abode for its twenty-five categories; further, ākāśa is itself one of the twenty-five. The legitimate interpretation of the term takes “pañca janāḥ” to indicate a well-defined group of beings habitually designated by that name, just as a particular group of sages is indicated by the word “saptarṣi”; in referring to such a group, the number may well be mentioned again; we may, for instance, speak of the seven saptarṣis, and, looking to what follows in the context,³¹ we have to take it that the expression denotes the five senses beginning with prāṇa.³² And though some readings mention four only, leaving out “annam”, the interpretation holds, for, the reference to pañca janāḥ comes almost immediately after the mention of the Lord as jyotiṣām jyotiḥ, the light of all lights; and these other lights can be only the senses which light up their objects as it were.³³ The propriety of understanding the term “pañca janāḥ” in the light of what precedes and follows is unquestionable. Do we not see the same principle of interpretation adopted in the case of texts which speak of the cause of the world as “asat”? We relate those texts to others which say that the self alone was in the beginning, and understand “asat” to be not non-existence, but existence indistinguishable by name and form.³⁴ On the same principle, we conclude that the pañca

³¹ *Ibid.*, VI, 4, 18.

³² I, 4, 11 and 12.

³³ I, 4, 13.

³⁴ I, 4, 14 and 15.

pañca janāḥ, are not the twenty-five categories of the Sāṃkhya.³⁵

It is the concern of Śruti to enjoin certain rituals and prohibit certain acts. With this its function is complete. Inquiry into the origin and nature of the Universe is an independent pursuit taken up by the Sāṃkhya Smṛti; if this too were arrogated by Śruti, Smṛti would have no function, while Śruti would have more than one object. Such usurpation would be unjust and purportless. Smṛti must be given a free hand in its own field; its independence should be guaranteed and its conclusions accepted. If further grounds of belief were needed, the name of Kapila should of itself be a sufficient guarantee of truth. To respect the Sāṃkhya is the proper course, not to discredit it, leaving it functionless and valueless.

Such a conclusion, though unfortunate, may none the less be inevitable. True, Smṛti should have a function, but the Sāṃkhya is not the only Smṛti. If we have to choose between these, the other Smṛtis must have our support, since we know that Śruti at least is in agreement with them, whereas the conformity of the Sāṃkhya Smṛti with the nature of things or with Śruti is only a matter of guess-work and inference. Kapila was a great sage, but it is very strange that his intuitions have

³⁵ The whole procedure is clumsy. The principle of looking before and after, in order to discover the meaning of a term, is well established and needs no illustration or justification. The truth seems to be that by some chance, two distinct topics got grouped together under one head, the Sāṃkhyopasaṅgraha adhikaraṇa, and that Śrīkaṇṭha makes a Herculean attempt to be faithful to this topical division and to make sense out of it. It is interesting to note that Nimbārka seems to take I, 4, 15 as refuting the suggestion that pradhāna is the cause of the world: Jagatkāraṇa-pratipādaḥ śūnyo vākyeṣu lakṣaṇa-sūtrādinaḥ nirṇītam brahmaiva grāhyam na pradhānaśāṃkāgandho'piti bhāvaḥ.

not been corroborated by the experiences of other equally great sages. Manu and other Smṛti writers who are equally worthy of our regard make no mention of the pradhāna as the cause of the world.³⁶

The advocate of the Sāṃkhya finds fault with the notion of Brahman as the cause, on the grounds that at the time of absorption the defects of the universe would inhere in Brahman and that causation would mean the transformation of the whole of Brahman's being into the world, as otherwise the texts about Brahman being without parts would be contradicted. The objections are not insurmountable. Śruti assures us that the defects of the world do not attach to Brahman and that in creation the whole being of Brahman is not transformed into the world; and we take our stand on Śruti. Further, the statements of Śruti can also be shown to be intelligible in the light of experience. The Sāṃkhya doctrine suffers from as great difficulties as those urged against us, without any way of escape; for, while reason can show no way out, appeal to Śruti also is impossible, as it fails to support the position. The difficulty about the whole of the cause being transformed into the effect applies equally to the notion of the pradhāna as the cause.³⁷ As for the

³⁶In the commentaries of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, the pūrva-pakṣin himself notices Smṛtis like those of Manu and says that they justify their existence because of the injunctions and prohibitions they are concerned with and not by their metaphysics. The siddhāntin in either case upholds the authority of Manusmṛti by its conformity to Śruti, a point mentioned by Śrīkaṇṭha, though he does not appear to notice the pūrva-pakṣin's objection to Manusmṛti being cited in this connection; this omission of Śrīkaṇṭha's need not be taken as a failure to note the point, since the only answer given by other commentators is mentioned by Śrīkaṇṭha also; and in view of his generally condensed and terse exposition, the non-mention of futile objections is not unintelligible.

³⁷ II, 1, 29.

imperfections of the world, the Sāṃkhya cannot explain how they come into being. It is said that the mistaken identity of puruṣa with prakṛti is responsible for all the troubles of the former; but no such super-imposition (adhyāsa) can take place, in the total absence of any identity or point of contact between the two; non-intelligent prakṛti cannot proceed to identify itself with anything, rightly or wrongly; and the puruṣa being unchanging, there is difficulty in understanding this identification in his case also.³⁸ The Sāṃkhyas attack their adversaries, all unconscious of the weakness of their own position, which will be further demonstrated here.

We do not see wood becoming transformed of itself into chariots and palaces; it requires intelligent control. Wherever such control is exercised, we see creative activity. Non-intelligent pradhāna cannot, therefore, of itself be the cause of the world. The only plausible argument to show the sufficiency of the cause is based on the alleged composition of prakṛti out of the three constituents of sattva, rajas and tamas. These are held to explain adequately the qualities of pleasure, pain and delusion found in all created things; for, everything in the world is an object of pleasure or pain or indifference to the experiencing subjects. But, the causal explanation is inadequate, since the effect is *not*, in any case, pleasure or pain; these are subjective feelings, while the effected world of phenomena is external and objective.³⁹

It may be said that even non-intelligent beings may be active in the creation of new forms, as when milk gets transformed into curd or water into ice. But the argument begs the question, for, that these

³⁸ II, 1, 10.

³⁹ II, 2, 1.

activities proceed without the intervention of intelligence has itself to be proved.⁴⁰ Nor is the instance of grass being converted into milk any better, for, grass does not become milk in any case, but only when eaten by a particular kind of sentient being, *viz.*, a cow; grass that is merely stored or eaten by a bull undergoes no such transformation.⁴¹ If creation required no intelligent prompting or guidance or purpose, activity so started might last for ever, and there would be no final destruction or *pralaya*.⁴²

That what is itself non-intelligent may take one to a goal is sought to be proved by the analogy of the partnership of the lame man and the blind one; but the analogy does not hold, since intelligent control enters into that partnership. The goal is reached not by the mere presence of the lame man, but by his activity in giving directions; similarly, it is the attraction exercised by the lodestone that causes the iron to move. But activity of any kind is excluded from the Sāṃkhya conception of *puruṣa*.⁴³

Since *prakṛti* holds the *guṇas* in a state of equipoise, creation cannot result unless there is some means of disturbing the equilibrium and bringing about a relative super-ordination and subordination of the *guṇas*. The Sāṃkhya doctrine gives us no suggestions as to how the disturbance comes about; hence, creation is impossible on that theory.⁴⁴

The difficulties shown above will apply to all other attempts to explain creation from a non-intel-

⁴⁰ II, 2, 2.

⁴¹ II, 2, 4.

⁴² II, 2, 3.

⁴³ II, 2, 5.

⁴⁴ II, 2, 6.

ligent principle.⁴⁵ Nor does it appear that any benefit results from accepting the pradhāna doctrine. So long as the puruṣa is conceived as unaffected by the changes taking place in prakṛti, there can be for him neither enjoyment nor release. The Sāṃkhya thus cannot claim even practical value.⁴⁶ It is further riddled with numerous contradictions, such as calling the unchanging puruṣa a seer and an enjoyer. This doctrine has, therefore, to be rejected.⁴⁷

The fallaciousness and unacceptability of the Yoga system follow on the very grounds urged above. The only claim to distinction for this system is that its reputed promulgator is none other than Hiranyagarbha. It is also known to be rooted in Śruti, since the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, for instance, treats incidentally of the practice of yoga. But the primary object of the Yoga system is to teach the control of the functioning of the mind (cittavṛtti nirodhaḥ) through the eight-fold discipline mentioned in the Śruti. It is not directly concerned to establish the pradhāna as the ultimate cause. The Yoga Smṛti is undoubtedly true, but only to a limited extent, *i.e.*, to the extent to which it teaches what is novel and not otherwise secured.⁴⁸

The Hiranyagarbha Āgama⁴⁹ holds the view that the Lord is only the efficient cause of the uni-

⁴⁵ II, 2, 7.

⁴⁶ II, 2, 8.

⁴⁷ II, 2, 9.

⁴⁸ II, 1, 3.

⁴⁹ Guṇa-ratna-sūri (quoted by Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar) says (himself quoting from some earlier author) that Yaugas is another name for Naiyāyikas (naiyāyikānām yaugā iti nāmāntaram); and later on, he proceeds to make out that the Naiyāyikas were Śaivas. There would thus seem to have been a close inter-relation between the Śaiva system of religion, the Yoga school of discipline and

verse, and the criticism in II, 2, 35 to 38 is probably directed against that system by Bādarāyaṇa. It is also probable that those sūtras answer only a casual doubt that may arise in the course of the inquiry (an avāntara śaṁkā) as to whether the Lord may not be conceived as efficient cause alone. In either case, the view itself is unsustainable, being opposed to Scripture and Reason alike. The analogy of the potter who makes his tools and sets to work with them cannot apply to the Lord's creation of the world; for, other agents, being embodied, deal with things outside of them, like mud, etc., whereas the Lord is bodiless.⁵⁰ In the absence of

the Nyāya school of thought, the particular variety of Śaivism adopted being that which held to the notion of the Lord as efficient cause only. See further the article on "Lakulīśa" in the *Annual Report of the Archaeological Survey of India*, 1906-07. In no case is the criticism of the section to be understood as directed against any Śaivāgama; for, between these and the Vedas, there is no difference in authorship, authority or purpose. Appayya in commenting on this statement shows that though Śaiva Āgamas like the Kāmika, Kāraṇa, etc. (the Siddhānta tantras) speak of the Lord as the operative cause only, these are not to be condemned, since all they mean to assert is that the Lord is not subject to or affected by change. Nor is any condemnation implied even of the unclean Vāma Pāśupata Āgamas and other similar systems, for, these too are authoritative for those who have not the fitness for higher pursuits, the study of the Śruti, or the Āgamas which conform thereto. The real object of condemnation in this section is the doctrine that the Lord is merely the efficient cause. It is rather doubtful if the plain text of Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary will bear all this interpretation. Appayya, one fears, is here out-doing Rāmānuja in the matter of straining the texts.

⁵⁰ This seems to be in direct conflict with what Śrīkaṇṭha has to say elsewhere, that Brahman does have a body and physical attributes, as otherwise the denial of hunger, thirst, old age, etc., by Śruti would have neither occasion nor significance. It is interesting to note that Rāmānuja gives the same explanation of the sūtra, but, according to him, the Lord has no body; "for—as we have shown in I, 1, 3—there arise difficulties whether that body, which, as body, must consist of parts, be viewed as eternal or non-eternal." Śrīkaṇṭha has not undertaken a similar demonstration elsewhere, having indeed proved the reverse. It may also be noted that Śrīkaṇṭha's

a body, he cannot exercise any effective control, and thus becomes a superfluous entity; the Sāṃkhya which recognises no God seems to be a more acceptable doctrine.

Nor can it be said that the Lord controls the world, as the soul controls the body, for, enjoyment and sorrow are incidental to the latter relationship; if the same relationship held in the other case, the Lord too would have to be an enjoyer, and a sorrower. And, on the analogy of the potter, the Lord's power and knowledge must be considered to be limited; he would be neither omnipotent nor omniscient. The only way out of the difficulty would be to appeal to Śruti to show that the Lord is not an enjoyer though he acts. But once we betake ourselves to Śruti, it becomes plain that the Lord is also the material cause (upādāna) of the world.⁵¹

The Vaiśeṣikas hold that the world arises out of the combination of atoms (paramāṇus) which come together because of karma, as controlled by the Lord. This system seems to be superior to the Sāṃkhya in so far as there is recognition of intelligent control. But the atomic theory is none the less full of difficulties. The paramāṇus have no magnitude at all, their only property pārimāṇḍalya being subtler than atomicity; these paramāṇus come together in pairs, it is said, and constitute dvyaṇukas, which have some magnitude that may be called minuteness; these by combination in threes give rise to the tryaṇukas, which are gross and long. It is

statement closely resembles Rāmānuja's: "Saśarīrānām eva hi kulādinām adhiṣṭhānaśaktir dṛṣṭā" (Rāmānuja); "loke śarīriṇa eva kulālāder mrtpiṇḍādyupādānādhiṣṭhānam dṛṣṭam" (Srikantha). Perhaps, both authors mean no more than that the Lord has no limited body, external to Himself, like the potter.

⁵¹ II, 2, 35 to 38.

evident from this that the effect in each case possesses properties not found in the cause and is thus unlike the cause. There is consequently a violation of the principle of causation recognised by the Kāṇādas themselves. They say that a new thing is created by the six parts (sides) of each element coming into contact with corresponding parts of other elements. How can this happen to paramāṇus which have no parts.⁵²

The difficulty about creation is too fundamental to be explained away by a doctrine of adrṣṭa. It is stated that atoms originally inert started to be active because of adrṣṭa. But this adrṣṭa has either to wait for maturation⁵³ or it has not. If it has not so to wait, the activity of the atoms may well have been beginningless. If, on the contrary, maturation (vipāka) is essential, this process must be due to causes other than atoms and adrṣṭa, which thus show themselves unable to explain fully all that is to be explained. Nor can vipāka be considered a quality of adrṣṭa, for, on Vaiśeṣika principles, the latter being itself a quality cannot take on another quality. Adrṣṭa is directed to securing for each act its appropriate fruit. If that alone were active, all acts would bear fruit at one time or in one manner, which, we know, is not the case. Thus, it is seen that creation cannot be explained on the basis of paramāṇus even when influenced by adrṣṭa.⁵⁴

⁵² II, 2, 10.

⁵³ Maturation (vipāka) means the arrival of the time decreed for the fruition of any act; or, where no time is fixed, the absence of other karma which may hinder fruition. Adrṣṭa signifies the unseen tendencies in all souls, due to their respective karma. Evolution and involution are determined by the operation and cessation of adrṣṭa.

⁵⁴ II, 2, 11.

The Vaiśeṣikas set great store by their conception of samavāya (inherence or organic relationship) classing it as a distinct category (padārtha), like substance, quality, genus, and so on. But the concept has no special virtue. If genus, quality, etc., stand in need of being related to substance, samavāya stands in no better position; that too has to be related to substance. And a relation that requires to be related leads only to an infinite regress.⁵⁵ Further, it is claimed that samavāya is eternal. This cannot be unless everything that is related is also eternal, which would lead to the conclusion that the world is eternal, that there is neither creation nor destruction and so on, which is absurd.⁵⁶

We see from experience that whatever possesses form, colour, etc., is impermanent. On the principles of causation accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas, the cause must be like the effect; thus, the atoms causing fire must themselves possess the property of colour. If they do, they too must be impermanent; if they do not possess such properties, then being unlike the elements, they cannot be the causes of the elements.⁵⁷ The system of the Kāṇādas is thus illogical. That it should wholly be disregarded follows from its being acceptable in no part, unlike the Sāṃkhya which has at least the saving grace of being sat-kārya-vāda.⁵⁸

The system propounded by Buddha bears some similarity to that of the atomists, in so far as the external world is said to be compounded of different kinds of

**The Vaiṣṇavikas
and Saurantikas.**

⁵⁵ II, 2, 12.

⁵⁶ II, 2, 13.

⁵⁷ II, 2, 14 and 15.

⁵⁸ II, 2, 16.

atoms. But while the Vaiśeṣika recognises five kinds of atoms—ether, air, fire, water, and earth, the Buddhist recognises only four, ether being, according to him, non-substantial. The self is said also to be compounded of aggregates called skandhas; there are five of these: rūpa (form, *i.e.*, perception), vedana (feeling, including pleasure and pain), vijñāna (consciousness), samjñā (cognition of things by their names) and saṃskāra (impressions, including accumulated merit and demerit). With regard to the reality of these two sets of compounds and the means of knowing them, there are four different views, two belonging to the Hīnayāna (the lower vehicle) and two to the Mahāyāna (the higher vehicle). As the author of the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* puts it, pithily if not pleasantly, “Though the venerated Buddha be the only one teacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of this diversity of views; just as when one has said ‘The sun has set’, the adulterer, the thief, the divinity student and others understand that it is time to set about their assignations, their theft, their religious duties, and so forth, according to their several inclinations.”⁵⁰ The followers of Hīnayāna were realists; they believed in the reality of the external world, though one school held that world to be directly perceptible while according to the other it is inferrable only. The Mahāyāna schools are idealistic, one of them holding to the reality of the subject consciousness alone, the other discounting even that and holding to the doctrine of a void. But even where the external world is recognised, it is not permanent. “All is momentary, momentary” is the cardinal doctrine. It is

⁵⁰ *SDS*, Cowell and Gough, p. 15.

this feature of the system that is primarily fastened on by the Vedāntin in his criticism of Buddhism.

Taking the realist schools—those of the Vaiśhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, we find that despite their acknowledgment of an external world, they are not able to explain how it can come into being or serve any purpose. They cannot explain how an aggregate can result from elements which disappear every moment.⁶⁰ They propound an elaborate causal chain, according to which ignorance causes desire and so on, the last links in the chain being birth, old age, death and misery. Even accepting this causal chain, we are no nearer to understanding how the aggregates are formed. Avidyā (ignorance) is the wrong apprehension of the impermanent as permanent; from this arise attachment and aversion which again lead to delusion and avidyā.⁶¹ The two are mutually dependent and

⁶⁰ II, 2, 17.

⁶¹ The following account of the causal chain is taken from *The Doctrine of the Buddha* by Grimm (pp. 288-289): "Inasmuch as that is, thus is. Thus, namely: In dependence on ignorance arise the processes, that is, the organic processes especially those of the senses, the Saṅkhāra. In dependence on the processes (of life, especially on the activities of the senses) arises consciousness, viññāna. In dependence on consciousness arises the corporeal organism—nāmarūpa. In dependence on the corporeal organism arise the six organs of sense—Salāyatana. In dependence on the six organs of sense arises contact—phassa. In dependence on contact arises sensation—vedana. In dependence on sensation arises thirst—tanha. In dependence on thirst arises grasping—upādāna. In dependence on grasping arises becoming—bhava. In dependence on becoming arises birth—jāti. In dependence on birth arise old age, and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair. Thus comes about the arising of this entire sum of suffering." It will be seen from the opening words of this extract that "itaretara pratyaya" is a Buddhist technical term signifying a dependent chain, and that it has nothing to do with reciprocal causation, though Śrīkanṭha seems to attach this significance to the term. Śaṅkara does not understand the expression thus, nor does Rāmānuja. The latter does allude to the fact that the causal chain is a recurring

cause each other. This, however, does not explain how the aggregates about whose nature there is ignorance and to which there is attachment themselves come into being. When through ignorance, mother-of-pearl is perceived as silver the mistake does not really create silver. Further, to the enlightened man, desire and aversion cease to exist; though, since avidyā is one and homogeneous and persists at least in other persons, it should continue to affect even the man of knowledge.⁶²

In any case, origination is unintelligible on the Buddhist hypothesis of momentariness, for, causation requires at least the partial co-existence of cause and effect, while here we have to understand the effect as coming into being, after the cause has ceased to be. It is non-existence that may justly be described as the cause in such a case; and non-existence is not the cause of one effect rather than another. There is no point in calling it cause at all.

And this difficulty as to causation affects the value of the recognition of the external world. Granted that somehow it comes into being, it would be valueless unless the production of the knowledge thereof could be explained. In this production, four kinds of causes are involved: (1) the ālam-

one, and that of itself it never works itself out; for, from despair, we have again ignorance and then the whole round. But, this remark of Rāmānuja's is an *obiter dictum*; it is not offered as an explanation of the term "itaretarapratyaya". The supposition of a common original would seem to accord best with the resemblance between Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja, as well as the difference between the two.

⁶² II, 2, 18. Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary at this point is far from clear. The interpretation given here is based on what Appayya says in *SMD*. Rāmānuja's explanation which bears certain verbal similarities to Śrīkaṇṭha's is both fuller and simpler. The point has been mentioned and elaborated in Chapter I.

bhāna (data); (2) samanantara (suggestion); (3) sahakāri (co-operative cause); and (4) adhipatirūpa (the dominant organ).⁶³ In the perception of a pot, the pot would be the ālambhana, prior knowledge would constitute the samanantara, the light of a lamp, etc., would be the sahakāri, and the eye the adhipati; causation thus is a necessary concept.

If causation is conceded, at least two things—cause and effect—cannot be merely momentary. Nor can cause and effect be said to co-exist though both are momentary; for, this will make simultaneous events of them, but cause and effect are never perceived together as co-existent. If this could happen, sense-contact and perception should be simultaneous, a possibility denied even by the teaching of the Bauddhas who make vedana (feeling) succeed sparśa (contact).⁶⁴

As contrasted with the conditioned (saṃskṛta) world of momentary phenomena, the Buddhists distinguish three varieties of the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). These are ether (ākāśa) and the two kinds of destruction, subtle and gross (pratisaṃhkyā and apratisaṃhkyā-nirodha). These are supposed not to conflict with the doctrine of perpetual flux, for the asaṃskṛta is also the non-existent. Such a view, however, is hardly tenable. The view that ether is non-existent is patently absurd, for, as the medium for the flight of birds and so on, it is as much an object of perception as the other four elements. The perception not being contradicted any more than in the case of the earth, water, etc., there

⁶³ See *IP*, I, 622.

⁶⁴ *II*, 2, 19 and 20.

is no justification for treating ether alone as non-existent.⁶⁵

As for destruction, we fail to see what the Buddhist can mean by that term except change of state. If, indeed, there could be a baseless and residueless destruction, it could be treated as eternal and yet non-existent. But it is the clay which becomes the pot, which in its turn becomes potsherds or dust. The potsherd which is the destruction of the pot is but another state of the pot. It is on the analogy of this example that we have to understand the destruction even of water evaporated by contact with hot iron as but a change of state. Further, since the unconditioned is eternal, and it is this which conditions the phenomenal, it would follow that any phenomenon may come into being everywhere and at all times. Nor may we expect any spatial or temporal determination, for these determinations too must be based only on the unconditioned and eternal destruction. Nor may we say that destruction is the ground only of that which accords with the nature of the material cause; for there is no such restrictive principle and no one to impose the restriction. Of a verity, the properties of the material cause are observed in the effect; but since the continuance of the properties is unintelligible in the absence of their substrate, the recognition of material causation will of itself militate against the acceptance of unconditioned non-existence as the cause.⁶⁶

The doctrine of unconditioned non-existence as the cause is subject to two further objections. If something can come out of nothing, then since *nothing* has no distinctive nature, the whole world

⁶⁵ II, 2, 23.

⁶⁶ II, 2, 21.

may result from the non-existence of the pot; for, with the adoption of nothing as the cause we have to give up the principle that only particular causes determine particular effects. If, however, we stick to this principle, then what comes out of nothing must itself be nothing.⁶⁷

The phenomenon of recognition, again, is inconsistent with the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness; for, it involves a knowledge of something which both was in the past and is now. Such knowledge arises out of sense-contact in a person who has an impression produced by the previous experience. The continuity and identity involved in the experience cannot be explained consistently on the hypothesis of momentariness. Hence, the doctrine of aggregates cannot be accepted.⁶⁸

It is held by the Sautrāntikas that the existence of even the momentary external world is known not directly, but only by inference from the multiplicity of impressions that constitute our knowledge. This, however, is incredible, for, our impressions are themselves momentary and cannot serve as the basis for any inference. Nowhere do we see the transference of character of that which is itself momentary; the existence of the world cannot, therefore, be a conclusion inferred from the momentary existence of sensations.⁶⁹

A further objection to Buddhist doctrine in general is that since the agent dies with the act, and he who reaps the fruit is some person other than the agent, there will be no incentive to action or to right action; even the indolent and the in-

⁶⁷ II, 2, 22; see particularly the comments in *SMD* on both sūtras 21 and 22.

⁶⁸ III, 2, 24.

⁶⁹ II, 2, 25.

different may continue in their ways without worrying about the goal, which will be attained in due course, for, there is no bond between striving and attainment.⁷⁰

External reality is admitted by the realists to no purpose, since its functioning cannot be explained. When further it is said, as by the Sautrāntikas, to be not even perceptible but only inferrable, it verily becomes an "irrelevant ghost" like the Kantian thing-in-itself. The Vijñānavādins (so called because they admit the reality of consciousness alone) cut away this irrelevant appendage and reduce everything to the nature of consciousness. "What is of the nature of consciousness is indeed indivisible; but by those whose vision is confused, it is seen to be, as it were, differentiated into the perceived object, the perceiving subject, and (then) the perception (itself)."⁷¹ The Vijñānavādin is an idealist. He explains the diversity and order of experience on the strength of the impressions of past experience; experience not dependent on an external reality is not foreign to us, for dream-experience is of this nature. The variety of experience does not destroy the unity of consciousness; for "in regard to one and the same body of a fine young woman, a religious ascetic, an amorous man, and a dog have (respectively) three different

⁷⁰ II, 2, 26. Rāmānuja says that sūtra 25 is directed against the Sautrāntikas, but he does not recognise a new adhikaraṇa. The reason seems to be fairly obvious, that sūtra 26 applies to both Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas. It would, therefore, be preferable to recognise one topical division treating of both schools, though one sūtra is specially applicable to one of the two schools. Śrīkaṇṭha's recognition of a new topic is not, in the circumstances, very happy.

⁷¹ SSSS, translation, p. 12.

views, to the effect that it is a (mere) carcase, a beloved mistress, and a thing fit to feed upon.”⁷²

Consciousness which subsumes within itself the distinction of subject and object may be understood to be the finite particular consciousness or the absolute self. The doctrine of the Vijñānavādins never made the distinction quite clear, with the result that there is “the tendency to identify the ālayavijñāna with skandha-vijñāna, which is only a property of the finite mind.”⁷³ On any such identification solipsism and scepticism are inevitable. And it is this aspect which the Vedāntin stresses in his criticism. Such a doctrine, he says, cannot commend itself to any one as it fails to recognise the implication of two elements in every cognitional relation, the agent and the act. Knowledge is surely of such a nature that it helps the individual to the experience of specific things; it is not and cannot be entirely subjective.⁷⁴ The example of dreams is misconceived, the difference in character between waking and dreaming not being adequately grasped. That the latter is defective is shown both by its manner of origination⁷⁵ and by its being sublated by waking experience. In regard to this experience itself, no such defects are perceived. Hence, it is improper to treat the two forms of experience as of the same level.⁷⁶ Further, conscious-

⁷² *SSSS*, translation, p. 13.

⁷³ *IP*, I, 632.

⁷⁴ *II*, 2, 27.

⁷⁵ The expression used by Śrīkanṭha, “Kāraṇa doṣaḥ” is not very clear. The efficient cause of dreams is not the individual, but the Lord, as will be shown later. That in which the defect lies must be the instrument employed, the sense-organ; if this be meant, it is expressed more clearly by Rāmānuja who says of dreams that they are “nidrādi doṣa duṣṭa karaṇa janyāni”. Śrīkanṭha uses the generic term “Kāraṇa” and Rāmānuja the specific term “Karaṇa”.

ness without external reality is improbable, for this is nowhere seen. Even dreams are objective.⁷⁷ Hence, the Vijñānavādin's theory is unacceptable.

The criticism thus urged fails to take note of the elements of truth in the doctrine,—the views that ālayavijñāna is universal, that there is a distinction between the phenomenal and the transcendental self and that a functionless extra-conscious reality is both superfluous and irrelevant. This failure, however, is not so noteworthy in Śrīkanṭha, who, at least to all appearances, was a pluralist, as in Śaṅkara, who, as a monist and an idealist, ought to have had greater sympathies with the Mahāyāna doctrine.⁷⁸

The Vijñānavādins started a logical inquiry which they did not carry far enough; this task was left to the Mādhyamikas. External reality was dismissed by the former as unintelligible; the latter could not find any conception that was intelligible. "The ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from all alternatives, viz., from reality, from unreality, from both (reality and unreality), and from neither (reality nor unreality). To exemplify this: If real existence were the nature of a water-

⁷⁶ II, 2, 28.

⁷⁷ This probably provides a link with Rāmānuja's theory that all cognition is of the real. It is also possible that nothing more is claimed for dreams than the relative degree of reality, which even Śaṅkara insists on, especially in this context. As it is, Śrīkanṭha's commentary is too brief and scrappy to afford a clear indication. Appayya Dikṣita is of opinion that the present commentary should be read along with what is said in the Sandhyādhikaraṇa about the creation of dreams. Even this does not help us to determine whether the theory of dreams was just a fragment, or part of an epistemological theory as with Rāmānuja.

⁷⁸ Cp. *Stcherbatsky*: "In Hīnayāna, in a word, we have a radical pluralism, converted in Mahāyāna in as radical a monism."

pot and the like, the activity of its maker (the potter) would be superfluous. If non-existence be its nature the same objection will accrue; as it is said—

‘Necessity of cause befits not the existent, ether and the like, for instance;

No cause is efficacious of a non-existent effect, flowers of the sky and the like, for instance.’

The two remaining alternatives as self-contradictory, are inadmissible.’⁷⁹ The categories of motion and rest, time and space, substance and attribute, causality and change are subjected to similar rigorous criticism (in a manner which irresistibly recalls Bradley to mind) and are dismissed as unreal, because unintelligible. “The teaching of Buddha relates to two kinds of truth, the relative conditional truth, and the transcendent absolute truth.”⁸⁰ The former is *saṃvṛti*, the latter is *paramārtha*. The empirical world with its distinctions is real enough for the former. “Not being able to withstand the lion’s roar of Relativity, the Hīnayānist, the man of a poorly religious enthusiasm, runs away, like an antelope, into the dark forest of Realism.”⁸¹ The transcendent truth is *śūnyatā* (*void* as usually understood, *relativity*, according to some modern exponents). “Relativity (*śūnyatā*) is the Middle Path.”⁸²

The criticism of the system does no justice either to its negative logic or to its positive faith in the Cosmic Body of the Buddha (*dharma kāya*) to be realised in mystic intuition. The argument that everything is “void” seems to be transparently

⁷⁹ *SDS*, Cowell and Gough, pp. 22-23.

⁸⁰ Nāgārjuna quoted in *IP*, I, 658.

⁸¹ *Stcherbatsky*, p. 44.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 50.

absurd; and this is what the Vedāntin urges.⁸³ However we may cognise the world, whether as existent or as non-existent it cannot be *śūnya*. The distinction of existence and non-existence (“*sat*” and “*asat*”) relates to different states of the existence or otherwise of mutual opposition among things. Further, the statement that nothing is perceived but illusion is ridiculous; where there is only a void, what can be the objective basis of illusion? And who is it that is deluded? *Śūnya-vāda* is thus riddled with contradictions.⁸⁴

According to the Jainas, there are two substances—the *jīva* and *ajīva*. The former has the same size and parts as the body it occupies. *Ajīva* is of six kinds: forests and hills, *āśrava*, *saṃvara*, *nirjara*, *bandha* and *mokṣa*. The aggregate of the senses is *āśrava*. *Samvara* is the ignorance that envelops knowledge. *Nirjara* consists of acts of penance, etc., which destroy evils like lust and anger, without leaving even a trace of them. *Bandha* is the cycle of existence caused by the eight-fold karma (four, sinful and injurious, and the rest non-injurious and meritorious). Freedom from this cycle is release or *mokṣa*. These substances take on different states in accordance with what is called the *Sapta-bhaṅgī-naya*. The states are, existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence, indescribability, existence and indescribability, non-existence and indescribability, existence and non-existence and indescribability. The doctrine is

⁸³ It is worth noting that Śaṅkara does not, like Śrīkaṇṭha or Rāmānuja, take sūtra II, 2, 30, to single out the Mādhyamikas for criticism.

⁸⁴ II, 2, 30.

known as *syād vāda*, the particle “*syād*” meaning “to a limited extent”.

The ascription of such contradictory characteristics as existence and non-existence, permanence and impermanence to one and the same substance is unintelligible. Such attributes may conceivably apply to different states of one substance, such as the three states of a pot,—lump of clay, pot, and potsherd,—but their presence at one time in the same subject cannot happen. Hence, the Jaina doctrine is found to be self-contradictory.⁸⁵

The view that the self is of the same size as the body is also open to objection, for, when in the course of re-birth, the self has to take on a smaller body than before, some of the self would be left over unprovided with a body.⁸⁶ Nor do we get over the difficulty by assuming that the self expands or contracts to the size of the body it has to take on, as in that case, the self would have to consist of parts and be consequently liable to change and destruction.⁸⁷ And since the soul is said to possess dimensions even at the stage of release, its size must be essentially eternal, and there can be no difference therein even prior to release. Hence, the view that its size varies with those of its various bodies, has to be given up.⁸⁸

The school of Vaiṣṇava theism based on the Pāñcarātra Āgamas holds that the individual (Saṃkarṣaṇa) who created the mind (Pradyumna), which in turn gave rise to egoity (Ani-

⁸⁵ II, 2, 31.

⁸⁶ II, 2, 32.

⁸⁷ II, 2, 33.

⁸⁸ II, 2, 34.

ruddha). These are four manifestations (vyūhas) of the universal soul (sarvātmā). A greater degree of validity is claimed for the Pāñcarātra than for the Pāsupata Āgamas, on the ground of Vāsudeva's superiority to Hiraṇyagarbha. In spite of this claim, however, the theory has to be rejected, for it makes out the soul to be originated and consequently liable to destruction. This would lead to actions ceasing without producing their fruit; there will also be accrual of karma, even in the absence of the action necessary therefor. One soul performs acts, good and bad, and is destroyed at the time of the deluge; another, newly created thereafter acquires the impressions of these acts, though it had no connection with the acts themselves. In view of such unacceptable consequences the jīva cannot be said to originate.⁸⁹

Nor is it anywhere seen that the agent produces his own instruments. But, here, the mind is said to proceed from the self. Further, the changes that take place in Nature (prakṛti) are wrongly ascribed to intelligent beings; mind and egoity are variations of unintelligent prakṛti.⁹⁰ If it be maintained that not the origination of souls but only control of them is taught by the Pāñcarātra doctrine, even that way, condemnation cannot be escaped, for, the fact remains that it teaches the causality of Vāsudeva in creation and in release, the efficacy of branding with symbols to secure release, and other doctrines condemned by Śruti. The followers of this system are also seen to be condemned by the Sūta Samhitā along with Bauddhas, Kālāmukhas and the lowest among brāhmins.

⁸⁹ II, 2, 39.

⁹⁰ II, 2, 40.

Now, as seen from the text “Puruṣo vai rudrah” (*Mahopaniṣad*), the Being referred to as puruṣa and sarvātmā is none other than Parameśvara; even worship of Vāsudeva as puruṣa leads by gradual stages to the realisation of that Parameśvara. If the Pāñcarātra which inculcates the worship of Vāsudeva is banned, one mode of approach to Brahman is closed; hence the Pāñcarātra should not be condemned. Not so, is the reply, for, though the particular system be declared unauthoritative, there is other support for the recognition of the worship of Viṣṇu, whereby one may in course of time get to realise Brahman. It will be seen from this passage⁹¹ that Śrīkanṭha is interested in establishing only the supremacy of Śiva, not in denying other religions or the worship of other gods. Like a true syncretist, he tries to see the elements of value in them all and link them in subordination to his own faith.

Some of those who accept the Vedānta doctrine consider Brahman as taught by Sruti to be devoid of qualities. They rely on passages like “Sadeva somyedam agra āsīt”, etc., to show that Brahman is pure Being and that predication of attributes is due to nescience. But the *eva śabda* (the word “only”) is used to distinguish Being from Non-Being, not pure Being from qualified Being. For the former distinction there is an

⁹¹ The passage is not to the taste of the Tamil translator, Sentinathier, who consequently leaves it out. This is not the only liberty taken by Sentinathier with Śrīkanṭha’s text. He considers all the passages in Adhyāyas III and IV, about the devotees of Nirguṇa Brahman, to be interpolations; but, though he is aware of Appayya Dīkṣita’s commentary, he makes no attempt to meet the justification or interpretation offered of such passages by Appayya. Nor does he offer any argument worth the name to prove his theory of subsequent interpolation.

occasion inasmuch as other texts speak of what existed in the beginning as Asat (non-being). There is a necessity to assert as against this view that the primal cause is Sat; if a similar statement had been made elsewhere that Brahman with qualities existed at first, there would be occasion to understand the word *eva* ("only") to negate the possession of attributes; for, significant negation can arise only when there is an occasion therefor, that is to say, an affirmation or suggestion of that which is denied.

Further, even the text under reference makes at least two attributions of Brahman, a temporal and a causal predication. The cause *was* and *was in the beginning*. The words "one only" negate the possibility of another, controlling Being; "without a second" shows that a separate material cause of the world is not to be looked for. Thence follow the attributes of omniscience and omnipotence, for, how indeed can the creation of the world proceed in the absence of these qualities?

Again, the word Sat which is of the form of both stem and suffix (*prakṛti* and *pratyaya*) cannot denote merely one subject. Hence, it is said that that expression denotes both Śakti and Śiva; the two together are Brahman; conjointly they are the Self of the whole Universe. Sat denotes the Supreme Being. Parameśvara is qualified by Śakti, that is of the form of the whole world, intelligent and non-intelligent, gross and subtle. There is thus no justification for understanding the Śruti to refer to Brahman without qualities.⁹²

Though statements like "Tat tvam asi" (That thou art) appear to teach the identity of the *jīva*

⁹² I, 1, 5.

and Brahman, they are not to be taken literally; for, the difference between the two is taught by numerous texts, *e.g.*, those which speak of the states of sleep and departure. In neither state has the jīva any knowledge of what is within or without; but he is said to be embraced^{92-a} or mounted⁹³ by Prājña (the knowing self). Thus is taught the difference between the two selves, a difference which persists even in sleep and in departure.⁹⁴

It must, however, be noted that release can be secured only by forgetting paśutva (the state of bondage) and contemplating Parameśvara as identical with the self, in the form "I am Thou, Thou art I" to use the words of the *Jābāla Śruti*.⁹⁵ To such devotees Brahman shows His Grace by bestowing on them His own form; these in turn instruct their pupils by means of such truths as "Tat tvam asi", though they are different from and other than Brahman that is the object of realisation. Such statements of the supreme truth signify, therefore, not an initial, but a final identity, to be worked up to and realised through meditation.⁹⁶

There is identity between Brahman and His creation, but it is not absolute; the Lord's glory exceeds that of His creation. He is one with the latter and yet more than the latter. That is apparent from a consideration of numerous texts which speak of the individual and the Lord as different. For instance:

^{92-a} *Brh.*, IV, 3, 21.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, IV, 3, 35.

⁹⁴ I, 3, 42 and 43.

⁹⁵ This text is not traceable in any of the Jābāla Upaniṣads now extant, though it is unambiguously referred to as a Jābāla text by Śaṅkara and Śrīkaṇṭha.

⁹⁶ IV, 1, 3.

“Kṣarātmānau isāte deva ekaḥ, the one Lord rules over both the perishable (matter) and the individual self”;⁹⁷

“Dve brahmaṇi veditavye paraṃcāparamca, two Brahman are to be known, the higher and the lower”;⁹⁸

“Nityonityānām cetanaścetanānām, eternal among the eternal, intelligent among the intelligent”;⁹⁹

“Antaḥ praviṣṭaś śāstā janānām, he who having entered within, controls individuals”.¹⁰⁰

Since, however, passages like “Tat tvam asi” inculcate non-difference, are we to understand a combination of difference and non-difference? Not so, for the simultaneous predication of such attributes leaves us with an unresolved contradiction. It is possible to base the assertion of identity on the falsity of one of the two elements, as when mother-of-pearl appears as silver. But this is not our doctrine. Nor do we maintain the absolute difference of the two, like the relationship between a cloth and a pitcher. Our conception is rather that of cause and effect, substance and attribute, a relationship where one element cannot exist without the other. Without clay no pot can be cognised; nor blue colour apart from the lily which is so coloured. So too, Śakti cannot exist or be known apart from Brahman. And Brahman cannot be cognised except in relation to Śakti, as fire cannot be known except in conjunction with heat. The difference between Brahman and the world is due to their very nature; the two are yet identical since the one cannot exist apart from the other. The doctrine of Viśiṣṭādvaita thus propounded agrees with both

⁹⁷ *Śvet.*, I, 10.

⁹⁸ *Maitrāyaṇi*, VI, 22.

⁹⁹ *Kātha*, V, 13.

¹⁰⁰ *Taittirīya Aranyaka*, III, ii, 21.

ets of texts, those proclaiming identity, as well as those establishing difference.¹⁰¹

Those who maintain that the Highest Self limits itself really or fictitiously and appears as the jīva in the face of texts which refer to Brahman as that which enters the self and as that which stands within the self, or as the controller distinct from the self and so on. Passages like “*āyam ātmā brahma, this self is Brahman*” teach not absolute identity, but the relation of pervasion, the self being pervaded by Brahman. It is in this sense that Brahman is said to be identical with fishermen, slaves and gamblers, because, these as elements of Brahman are pervaded by Him. Though the faggot pervaded by fire is itself called fire, the difference between the two does not disappear.¹⁰²

On the hypothesis that the individual is identical with Brahman (even as limited, really or fictitiously) confusion of individual experiences will result, thus demonstrating the fallaciousness of that position. For, each individual will be identical with every other; nor can the limitations avail to distinguish them, for, since Brahman is the only reality, the limitations too belong to Him; and every act and every consequence that in an unseen fashion moulds the being and the future of the individual is also of Brahman. The same must be said of every desire and wish that determines action, for they all belong to Brahman. Since whatever avails to distinguish one individual from another and keep their experiences separate, belongs thus to Brahman, Brahman himself will be affected by the limitations, while at the same time finite experiences get

¹⁰¹ II, 1, 22.

¹⁰² II, 3, 42.

mixed up and individuality is lost. To attempt to keep up distinctions on the basis of the places (*i.e.*, the bodies) wherein Brahman is manifested is a desperate measure which forgets that in Brahman in whom all limitations are resolved there can be no room for distinctions of place.¹⁰³

This ought to be the last word on the advaita; yet it is not. If the text of Śrīkaṇṭha's Bhāṣya that has come down to us is reliable, there are indications in it which give considerable support to Appayya's statement that Śrīkaṇṭha was at heart an advaitin of Śaṁkara's school. In spite of considerable similarities between Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja, it is difficult to apply to the former Thibaut's conclusion about the teaching of the sūtras, based largely on Rāmānuja's interpretation. "If now I am shortly to sum up the results of the preceding inquiry as to the teaching of the sūtras", says Thibaut, "I must give it as my opinion that they do not set forth the distinction of a higher and a lower knowledge of Brahman, that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and Īśvara in Śaṁkara's sense; that they do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world; and that they do not with Śaṁkara proclaim the absolute identity of the individual with the highest self."¹⁰⁴ It has been already shown that sūtra IV, 1, 3, teaches something very much like absolute identity of the two selves. We shall have occasion to revert to this later. Appayya's logic is well-nigh irresistible where he tries to demonstrate that the non-intelligent world (*acit prapañca*) is, for Śrīkaṇṭha, an illusory manifestation of Brahman (*Brahma*

¹⁰³ II, 3, 49-52.

¹⁰⁴ Introduction to the translation of the *Vedānta Sūtras* (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XXXIV, page c).

vivarta). This too we shall notice later. We do know definitely from the text of the Bhāṣya itself that Śrīkanṭha distinguishes between niranvaya upāsakas and devotees of Saṁgha Brahman, and says of the former that they need not pass along the path of light, etc. (the devayāna) after death; thus two Brahmans would seem to be recognised, as also a distinction in nature and results between the knowledge of the two. It would thus appear that Śrīkanṭha's teaching diverges almost in every point from Thibaut's view of the teaching of the Sūtras.

The references to the devotees of the Non-related occur in III, 3, 32; IV, 2, 13; and IV, 3, 1. They always begin with the words "some say", etc. This need not imply that the view is unacceptable to Śrīkanṭha, for his own view is occasionally introduced in that fashion; as when he mentions the doctrine of the ānandamaya (blissful) self being Cit-Śakti, a doctrine cardinal to his system, though it is introduced with the words "Kecid āhuḥ". Further, in the first of these passages, after saying that the sūtra about the departure by the devayāna not being compulsory is interpreted by "some" to mean that departure by that path is not prescribed for all devotees, *e.g.*, the devotees of the niranvaya, he proceeds to justify that view with the words "tatra na doṣaḥ, in that (view) there is no defect". While on this subject, however, it should also be noted that in IV, 3, 14, it is said that Brahman is higher than Nārāyaṇa, the material cause of the world, and Hiraṇyagarbha, who is effected by Nārāyaṇa, that this Brahman has been elsewhere described as Righteousness, Truth, the Supreme Brahman, dark and tawny in colour, diverse-eyed and so on, and again as Rudra, higher than the

universe, and that in consequence, it is unreasonable for the followers of the Vedas to imagine a higher Being than Śiva. One wonders how all this is to be reconciled with the passages about the nirānvaya upāsakas. Is the Nirguṇa Brahman a toy, a concession to the demands of unreasonable children? Is it a lower, instead of being, as is usually supposed, a higher concept? For a definite answer to these questions, one looks to Śrīkaṇṭha in vain. What may be involved by way of logical implication is exhibited in Appayya Dīkṣita's interpretation, which will be considered in its proper place.

CHAPTER IV.

BRAHMAN AND THE WORLD HE CREATES.

It has been already said¹ that though Brahman cannot be made the object of demonstrative knowledge, He may yet be defined as distinct from other entities, by knowledge which will take us near Him, if not to Him (by *tatastha*, if not *svarūpa laksana*) The *janmādi sūtra*² defines Brahman as the cause of the creation, preservation and destruction of the world and of the functions of concealment and grace in respect of the soul (*sr̥ṣṭi*, *sthiti*, *samhāra*, *tirobhāva* and *anugraha*). The two last mentioned functions are distinctive of Āgamic doctrine. According to that doctrine, the soul is impure from the beginning of time, the impurity being innate as verdigris in copper. The only way to get rid of it is to engage in action, as one passes metal through fire in order to purify it. Since action involves a cycle of birth and death, it is not likely to be undertaken unless it is presented as pleasant and attractive, while the soul's own eternal perfection is concealed. This concealment of the real nature of things with a view to the ultimate good of the *jīvas* is called *tirobhāva*. It is an expression of the Lord's energy, though, in view of the impurities with which it is associated, through which it operates, and to the

¹ I, 1, 1.

² I, 1, 2.

removal of which it is directed, that energy is itself figuratively known as an impurity (mala).³ When by successive performance of action, and enjoyment of the fruit thereof, the soul is purified and made fit for release, the Lord bestows grace on it and helps it on to the final realisation of what is essentially His own form. The creation, preservation and destruction of the world result thus from the concealing activity of Brahman, and they cease when the bestowal of grace supervenes.⁴ Tirobhāva and anugraha are the two termini without which the intervening processes have, as such, no significance; and the Āgamic recognition⁵ of these two functions is

³ Cp.

பாகமாம் வகைநீன்று திரோதானசத்தி
பண்ணுதலான் மலமெனவும் பகாவா.

—*Śivaprakāśam*, II, 2.

When in the commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*, I, 1, 13, Śrīkantha refers to tirodhāna mala, it is difficult to determine whether his usage is the same as that of *Śivaprakāśam* or whether he means generally “impurity that obscures”. The Tamil lines quoted mean “the energy (of the Lord) known as Tirodhāna is also spoken of as mala (impurity), since it associates with impurity and works towards its maturation.” Śrīkantha does not explain why a divine obscuring energy is necessary in addition to the impurity innate in souls. The Siddhāntin would say that the impurity being non-intelligent (acit) cannot be active of itself; hence the need for tirodhāna śakti.

⁴ There are intermediate periods of cessation known to us as pralaya, the object of which is to give some rest to souls weary of the transmigratory cycle; thus, these periods too are indicative of the Lord’s grace. It has to be noted that creation, etc., are of the non-intelligent world (acit prapañca); for, souls are eternal and not subject to creation or destruction.

⁵ The five-fold division of function is common to the Vaiṣṇava Āgamas as well, the ascription being made even in the case of the jīva; the functions in his case are perception, attachment, abandonment, mental impression and dissolution. See *Lakṣmī Tantra*, XIII, 18 to 29, quoted by P. T. Srinivasa Iyengar, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 183: “The jīva, too, always does the Five Actions. His activity as in blue, yellow, etc. (differentiated objects), is called creation by the wise. (His) attachment to objects is called sustenance (sthiti). His giving up an object grasped, on account

pressed into service by Śrīkaṇṭha in the interpretation of the janmādi sūtra.

The cause so described is Himself uncreated, as origination of the Supreme Being is impossible.⁶ Some texts no doubt say that in the beginning there was non-existence; but that is inconsistent with other texts like "Existence only this was in the beginning", etc., and "In the state of darkness, when there was neither day nor night, neither Being nor Non-Being, Śiva alone existed", etc. Śruti also asks, "how can Being come out of Non-Being?" If, on the other hand, existence itself be the alleged cause, Brahman becomes His own cause; and self-dependence is a fallacy to avoid in an attempt at causal explanation.

Brahman is the Being signified by all names, primarily and not secondarily. The reference is not to be taken as analogous to the understanding of the child by the term "cradle". All names and forms are created by Brahman and are dependent on Him for their existence and functioning. Wherever a secondary significance is implied, there is either little in common between the term and the object so signified or else a relation as purely external as possible, as, for instance, between the child and the cradle. Brahman, however, is the internal informing entity in all existence, including names and forms. When we say "Here is a brāhmin" we

of the desire to grasp a new one is called destruction (samhṛti) by those that know the tattva śāstras. Its vāsanā (deposit in the mind) is tirobhāva; its dissolution, anugraha." For the five-fold division of Viṣṇu's saṁkalpa (called Sudarśana), see also *Ahīr-budhnya Saṁhita*, XIV, vv. 14, 15.

refer to the soul, not to the body; on the latter assumption, purificatory and other ceremonies would attach to the body and have no value for the soul. In the same way, all language primarily indicates Brahman, He being the Self of the world, as the jīva is the self of the body.⁷

The jīva is not created. The statements to the effect that Brahman is one only without a second or that in the beginning Śiva alone existed cannot serve to negate the reality of souls which exist and are eternal. Souls are not created, though names and forms are; Brahman's secondless existence implies the non-existence only of names and forms.⁸

Creation: Tripartition. The elements that we perceive as such are not pure. Each of them, fire, water, and earth contains parts of the other two. The process of breaking up the primary elements and reconstituting them, introducing a bit of each into the rest is called *trivṛtkaraṇa* (the process of making tripartite). Brahman is the author of name and form and also of tripartition.⁹ Some would assign the tripartition to the four-faced *Brahmā*, the reputed creator of the world; but this is putting the cart before the horse. We are told that Brahman created the waters and placed his virility therein. This developed into the golden egg, and *Brahmā* came out of this egg. The process of making tripartite was already accomplished before *Brahmā* came on the scene.

⁷ II, 3, 17. Both Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja import a negative into the interpretation of this sūtra; “*carācaravyapāśrayastu syāt tadvyapadeśo’bhāktah*”, etc.

⁸ II, 3, 18. Cp. the Siddhānta interpretation of “*ekam eva*” as establishing the existence of *only one god*.

⁹ II, 4, 17.

It may, however, be thought that since the process of tripartition continues even after creation, as in the partition of food into faeces, flesh and the mind, Brahmā may be taken to exercise that function at least in the later stages. But the three-fold change that takes place in food is not a case of tri-*vṛtkarāṇa* at all; if it were so, one element, the grossest, would be of the nature of food, and the other two of the nature of fire and water, whereas we are told that flesh and mind are also of the nature of food, not of the nature of fire and water. Subsequent changes, therefore, do not partake of the character of tripartition, whose special feature is that each element enters into combination with the rest, distinctive designations being applied to the effects, in accordance with the nature of the dominant element.¹⁰

Brahman is the dispenser of rewards.¹¹ It is not true that action brings about its own reward, for, in itself it is momentary; and, instead of invoking an unseen principle in the shape of *apūrva* to make karma effective, it will be more in conformity with experience and the principle of parsimony to conceive the Lord as the dispenser of the fruit of action. For, we see that deities are invoked in ritual, and it is not right to postulate a fresh principle while these deities are kept as idle supernumeraries. The gods, ensouled by the Supreme Being bring about the fruit of action; hence, as established by both Śruti and reasoning, it is the Lord that is in the last resort responsible for bringing about the enjoyment of reward or punishment. The view is also consistent with the

¹⁰ II, 4, 18 and 19.

¹¹ III, 2, 37.

experience of what happens in the case of a king and his servants. The latter earn their reward through the grace of their master, not through the service of itself.¹² Those who believe that service is its own reward may find fault with the moral tone of this passage. But, it must be remembered that this part of the teaching is intended for those who do look for a reward other than what service itself can provide. To such, not the need for or the existence of the fruit, but the source of attainment is the only question. And it is desirable that they should be taught to look to the Supreme Being in that connection, as they may thereby become less self-centred and less self-confident.

The existence that pervades all our perceptions and judgments such as "the pot exists", "the cloth exists", etc., is **The subject of all existential judgments.** Brahman. It does not, however, follow that Reality is confined to this "existentiality", the varying appearances being unreal; if that were so, one might expect to know that reality by perception or other means of knowledge. But it is well known on the authority of Śruti that knowledge of Brahman cannot be had by any such means; Brahman cannot, therefore, be identified with bare "existentiality". While Brahman is the existence which all our judgments imply, such bare existence does not exhaust the nature of Brahman, who is comprehensible only by devout meditation.¹³

¹² III, 3, 38, 39 and 40.

¹³ III, 2, 22 and 23. As against the view that the existentiality (*sattā*) common to all our perceptions of existents is Brahman, the material cause of the Universe, the Siddhāntin holds that *sattā* is only a generic quality pertaining to both the world and its first cause. See *Paramokṣanirāsa Kārikā*, commentary on verse 48; also *PB*, p. 88. The apparently conflicting statements of Śrīkaṇṭha in his commentaries on I, 1, 2 and III, 2, 22 and 23 are possibly due in part to the influence of the Siddhānta doctrine.

The present doctrine affords an interesting approximation to the theory of judgment, as formulated by Bradley and Bosanquet. The logical subject of every judgment is different from the grammatical subject, and is Reality, according to these two writers. When we say "Roses are red" we mean that "Reality is such that it is qualified by the content rose-redness". This is, of course, different from the statement that rosiness or redness or rose-redness all refer to the Real which is within all appearances; but there are great affinities between the two positions. When, further, it is said, as by Śrīkaṇṭha, that the judgment "Roses exist" or "these are roses" derives its existential import from the existence of the Real, we get closer approximation to the statement "Reality is such that it is qualified by rosiness", which is the Bradleian way of putting it. From the point of view of that theory of judgment, Śrīkaṇṭha's view of existential judgments is an improvement on the general doctrine common to him and Rāmānuja that Brahman is *sarva-śabda-vācī*, the ultimate significance of all names. This latter doctrine is not even special to the Vedānta, being shared by the grammarians also.

As the operative cause, the Lord is higher than
Transcendence. the universe, though He is the soul
 thereof as its material cause; He is
 the ruler of the Universe; other than Him there is
 nothing to be known by the seeker of release. It
 is He who, at the time of departure, imparts the
 doctrine of the Tāraka Brahman (the Saviour),
 whereby men realise their own being and become
 immortal. He is the Lord of all sacrifices, the
 best physician for the disease of *samsāra*; He is
 the Lord of Umā; He dwells in the hearts of all; it

is His supreme energy, *Māyā*, that manifests itself in "the variegated flower-show called the Universe."¹⁴

The identification of Brahman with Śiva has been indicated in the course of the last-mentioned *definition of Brahman. It remains for us to consider in some greater detail other passages where the same identification is effected and where it is shown that no other deity, not *Hiraṇyagarbha* nor *Nārāyaṇa* can claim the same supremacy. The *janmādi sūtra* gives eight names of Śiva: *Bhava*, *Śarva*, *Rudra*, *Īśāna*, *Paśupati*, *Ugra*, *Bhīma* and *Mahādeva*. All these are shown to be applicable to Brahman as defined by that *sūtra* (*i.e.*, the cause of the creation, etc., of the world). The first of these eight names signifies existence which runs through all things like a string; the next (*Śarva*) denotes the destroyer of all. It will be shown later¹⁵ that only the cause of destruction can be the cause of creation as well. *Īśāna* is the possessor of illimitable lordship. The name *Paśupati* indicates both the relation of the Lord to the creatures whom He rules and the bonds whereby He holds them. *Rudra* is He who drives away the miseries of the cycle of re-birth. *Ugra* is the transcendent light that cannot be surpassed or eclipsed by any other. The ruler of the world has also to inspire fear in the minds of evil-doers; hence He is *Bhīma*. The Supreme Being is possessed of infinite splendour; hence He is *Mahādeva*. The qualities required of Brahman by the definition are amply met by the qualities

¹⁴ IV, 2, 16.

¹⁵ I, 2, 9.

signified by the eight names, which specifically denote Śiva. Brahman is thus none other than Śiva.

The Samanvaya sūtra¹⁶ establishes the same identity on the strength of the following: the Mahopaniṣad text about "Ṛtam satyam param brahma puruṣam kṛṣṇaṅgalam, ūrdhvaretam virūpākṣam viśvarūpāya vai namaḥ, obeisance to Him who is righteousness, truth, the supreme Brahman, the puruṣa who is partly dark and partly fair, who has three eyes, whose virility is the uprising fire, and who is of the form of the universe"; the Atharvaśikhā injunction to meditate on Śiva alone, the doer of what is auspicious, to the exclusion of all other deities; and the Śvetāśvatara declaration that men can indeed attain release without knowing Śiva, when they can roll up the skies like a piece of hide.

Sūtras I, 1, 17 to 20 raise and answer the doubt as to whether the cause of the world is Brahmā (Hiraṇyagarbha). Brahmā cannot be the cause, for, while Śruti declares the Supreme Being to be beyond the worlds, Brahmā only pervades the universe. Further, it is said that they who know the cause attain liberation (ya enam vidur amṛtās te bhavanti).¹⁷ This can apply not to Brahmā, but to Śiva, by contemplation of whom alone release may be attained. The reference to Prajāpati indicates not Brahmā, but Śiva in the sense of Paśupati. It is also stated by Śruti that Brahman witnessed the birth of Brahmā and initiated the latter in the Vedas. In so far as creation is ascribed to the will and purpose of Prajāpati, this may be not the original creation, but any one or more of the intermediate acts of creation, which Brahmā as an aspect of

¹⁶ I, 1, 4.

¹⁷ Mahopaniṣad, I, 2.

Brahman, may well have undertaken. That the former stands in a relation of subordination to the latter is evident from the text which speaks of the Lord as “*Brahmādhipatir brahmaṇo’dhipatiḥ*”.¹⁸

Sūtra I, 1, 21 shows that the golden person within the sun is Śiva, though Śruti mentions only two eyes (*akṣiṇī*, in the dual); for, the third eye of Śiva is ordinarily closed and cannot be compared to the lotus blossom mentioned in the text.¹⁹ Sūtra I, 1, 22 makes it clear that the reference cannot be to Nārāyaṇa, though he is usually spoken of as the lotus-eyed, and as residing in the centre of the solar orb; for, these are not special qualities with an unambiguous reference. Even human beings are spoken of as lotus-eyed. We have to look to other texts to determine the precise reference; and such

¹⁸ *Mahopaniṣad*, XXI, 22.

¹⁹ Appayya Dīkṣita in *STV* elaborates these and other arguments. The number implied by the dual form is not a material part of the text; the description would apply even to what has less or more than two. As Śrīkaṇṭha says, if of two sons of a brāhmin, who has three sons, it is said that they are like fire, the comparison has not the effect of denying the existence of the third son. As for the attribute of being lotus-eyed, it may be urged that the expression *punḍarikākṣa* has acquired by usage a definite denotation, *viz.*, Nārāyaṇa. Even if this be admitted, the same definiteness cannot be claimed for the split-up components of the name; and the text speaks not of *punḍarikākṣa* (the lotus-eyed) but of one who has eyes like the lotus (*punḍarikam evam akṣiṇī*). The former may be a significant singular name, but the latter is only a general name, whose specific denotation, if any, will have to be determined by other considerations. It must be noted that Rāmānuja’s explanation of *kapyāsam*, etc. (see *Vedārtha Saṅgraha*, Pandit Reprint, pp. 234-235), is not as simple as Śrīkaṇṭha’s. He says of the eyes that they are “*gambhīrāmbhas samudbhūta sumṛṣṭa nāla ravi-kara-vikāsita punḍarikadala amalāyatekṣanaḥ*, pure eyes long as the petals of the white lotus which grows in deep water on a stout stalk and is made to blossom by the rays of the sun”. The commentator Sudarśana, shows how this implies three possible explanations of *kapyāsam*: *kapi* is the sun, he who absorbs water; *kapi* is the stalk which absorbs water, and supports the lotus; *kapyāsam* is what rests on the waters, *i.e.*, the lotus. It has been suggested by a friend (Mr.

passages are to be found in the *Mahopaniṣad*, where after the praise of the sun as splendour, strength and fame, as puruṣa and as the Lord of all creatures, it is said that all is Rudra and obeisance is offered to the golden-armed one, the lord of gold, the lord of Āmbikā, the lord of Umā, and so on.

It is also seen²⁰ that Nārāyaṇa is only an upā-saka (a devotee), not the object of meditation, Parameśvara alone being dhyeyaḥ, worthy of contemplation. The first part of this conclusion follows from the words “padmakōśapratikāśam”, etc., of the Nārāyaṇānuvāka; the lotus-bud is the heart of Nārāyaṇa, and the Supreme Being established therein is necessarily another, viz., Śiva. Though in the *Mahopaniṣad*,²¹ Viṣṇu is not included among the manifestations of the Supreme Being, the deficiency may be made up by a reference to the *Kaivalya Upaniṣad* which repeats the text “Sa brahmā sa śivas sendras sokṣarah paramasvarāt” and goes on to say that He himself is Viṣṇu, prāṇa, time (or death), fire and so on. That this Being is no other than Śiva is clear from the earlier portion of the *Kaivalya* text which describes Him as the three-eyed consort of Umā.²² As for the statement in the Nārāyaṇānuvāka that Nārāyaṇa is the supreme Brahman (Nārāyaṇa-param-brahma), this ought to be interpreted as Nārāyaṇāt param brahma, i.e., Brahman higher than Nārā-

V. Narayanan, Advocate, Mylapore) that Rāmānuja probably got the idea from the *Tiruvāymoli*:

தன்பெரு நீர்த்தடங் தாமரை மலர்க் தாலொக்குங்
கன்பெருங் கண்ணன். (9, 5, 9).

²⁰ I, 2, 2-4.

²¹ XIII, 30.

²² The same omission in the *Mahopaniṣad* and the same manner of supplementing it are noticed by Haradattācārya in *SSM* (see Appendix II), and by Appayya Dīkṣita in *STV*.

yana.²³ The truth of this position is testified to by Smṛti. The wondrous form exhibited by Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna is spoken of as the supreme form of the Lord (paramam rūpam aiśvaram).²⁴ And Śiva says in the *Mahābhārata* that Kṛṣṇa is His devotee, and that there is none dearer to Him than Kṛṣṇa.²⁵

A detailed consideration from beginning to end of the daharavidyā, as expounded in the *Mahopaniṣad*, will show that Parameśvara alone is taught to be the object of that contemplation throughout. First comes the description of the Lord as minuter than the atom and as residing in the hearts of all creatures; the glory of that Lord is perceived by him whose sorrows have ceased by the Lord's grace. Next we are told that from Him proceed the seven prāṇas (meaning the eleven senses); this indicates that He is the immanent material cause of the world. Then comes the statement that the great sage Rudra saw Hiraṇyagarbha being born; this indicates His omniscience and His transcendence of the world, including Brahmā, the first of created Beings, and thus shows that Rudra is the transcendent operative cause also. The Being that is in the supreme ether (i.e., the Bliss of Brahman) can be realised by those who have renounced the world, and who, having ascertained the sense of the Vedānta, and pursuing the path of asceticism with a pure mind, contemplate Brahman as residing in the ether of the heart. This Being is Maheśvara; that Maheśvara in the context means only Śiva is made clear by the text which comes immediately after the Nārāyaṇānuvāka about the Being that is Righteous-

²³ I, 2, 5.

²⁴ *Bhagavad Gītā*, XI, 9.

²⁵ I, 2, 6.

ness and Truth, that is partly dark and partly fair and so on.²⁶ The sense of the whole text being thus one and continuous, Nārāyaṇa, who finds mention in one anuvāka in the middle, can be not the object of contemplation whose nature is otherwise determined already, but only the person who contemplates. Though there are many devotees of Brahman, Nārāyaṇa is mentioned preferentially as he is the principal devotee of Śiva, than whom indeed none is dearer to Śiva. That Nārāyaṇa may himself be the object of devotion is a possibility ruled out by the āmiksānyāya, according to which a specific appropriation having been made (as of cream to the Viśvedevas), a further appropriation or predication is unjustifiable.²⁷ Since Nārāyaṇa meditates on himself as non-different from Brahman, the ascription of the qualities of the latter to the former is not inappropriate.²⁸

The Being that destroys the world is Śiva, since that capacity can exist in no inferior Being. That He is also the cause of all things is seen from the text, "when there was darkness, and neither day nor night, neither Being nor non-Being, Śiva alone existed."²⁹ The primal darkness here mentioned is not inconsistent with the existence of Śiva, for, darkness means only the absence of specific knowledge, such as arises on the creation of name and

²⁶ The sequence here mentioned is observed only in the Drāviḍa recension.

²⁷ I, 2, 8. The cream is appropriated to the Viśvedevas even in the injunction that prescribes an offering to the latter (the utpatti vidhi); the whey must therefore be appropriated to some other deity or deities. In the same way, the text which mentions meditation and the objects thereof defines the latter as Maheśvara, Rudra and so on. A later definition with a different denotation is therefore inappropriate.

²⁸ See *SSM*, 42 (also Appendix II).

²⁹ *Svet.*, IV, 18.

form, which were unevolved at that stage. The destructive activity of the Lord is not due to anger or hatred which are *tāmasic* qualities. We are authoritatively told that Śiva is beyond *tamas*, and possesses the opposite qualities of wisdom, freedom from attachment and so on.³⁰

He who meditates on the *Pranava* is guided by the *sāman*-hymns to the world of *Brahmā*, where he perceives the Self that is higher than all the *jīvas*. The Being so perceived is Śiva, and *Brahmaloka* refers to the world of Śiva. The expression “*jīva ghana*, collection of individuals or collective individual” denotes *Brahmā*; since the Self perceived is higher than that, Śiva must be meant. But the word “*puruṣa*” used in the context commonly refers to *Nārāyaṇa*, who too is higher than *Brahmā*; it is also said elsewhere that released souls constantly perceive the supreme abode of Viṣṇu (*tad viṣṇoḥ paramam padam sadā paśyanti*

³⁰ I, 4, 27; III, 2, 35. Appayya Dīkṣita in *STI* (p. 20) cites numerous passages from the Āgamas and Purāṇas in support of this position. Thus, he says: “ ‘It is the supreme energy known as *Bhāvānī* that manifests herself as *puruṣa*. There is but one energy of *Paramēśvara* that divides herself into four: as enjoyment she becomes *Bhāvānī*; as enjoyer *Viṣṇu*; in anger she is *Kālī*; and *Durgā* in war,’ say the Āgamas. ‘What is *Umā*, that is *Hari*, what is *Hari*, that is Śiva’s consort.’ ‘Thou art *prakṛti*; the *puruṣa* is *Rudra*; thou bearest his seed; the five-faced *Brahmā* came out of thy navel’ says the *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*. The *Vāyu Purāṇa* says, ‘there is no difference between us; without a doubt thou art my *śakti*; thou art the Moon and I the Sun, thou the night and I the day.’ There is also the story of Śiva and *Viṣṇu* entering the *Devadāru* forest, as husband and wife.”

Appayya makes out both in *AL* and *SN* that in the present context any statement about the identity of Śiva and *Viṣṇu* is irrelevant; what Śrīkaṇṭha has to show is the identity of the abode of *Viṣṇu* with that of Śiva; it is well-known from the Āgamas and Purāṇas that *Cit-śakti* is the material cause of *Viṣṇu* and that Śiva and *Viṣṇu* are identical; the conclusion is inevitable that Śiva and *śakti* are identical though Śrīkaṇṭha only suggests it without making it explicit.

sūrayah). Nārāyaṇa, however, is not the Self referred to; the “supreme abode of Viṣṇu” denotes the supreme “ākāśa, the effulgent expanse” that is Śiva-Śakti, which, indeed, in its primary manifestation as enjoyer is called puruṣa or Viṣṇu.³¹ The Being that is perceived is said to be higher than the universe (viśvādhikah) whereas Nārāyaṇa is only of the form of the universe (viśvarūpaḥ). Passages like “Nārāyaṇa-param-brahma,” “Ṛtam satyam param brahma,” etc., also indicate the existence of a Being who is higher than Nārāyaṇa and no other than Śiva; the text “puruṣam kṛṣṇa-piṅgalam” shows that the word puruṣa is applicable to Śiva also. It is appropriate to refer to Śiva-Śakti as the abode of Viṣṇu, since between Śiva and Viṣṇu, there is a difference not of being, but only of function, the former being the operative and the latter the material cause of the universe.

The supreme person (Uttamapuruṣa) mentioned by the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, as what is attained on liberation, is Śiva, not Nārāyaṇa; for, though Puruṣottama usually denotes the latter, that significance is inconsistent with the declaration of non-return, in the case of those who have realised the supreme Self. Only the very highest Being can be meant, and that is Śiva; He being higher than all individuals (jīvebhyah adhikah) may be designated Uttamapuruṣa.³²

Sūtras III, 2, 30 to 34 show that there is nothing higher than Brahman, though the occasional references thereto as a bridge and so on may suggest that Brahman leads to what is higher.

**There is no
Being higher
than Brahman,**

³¹ I, 2, 9.

³² I, 3, 41. This is eminently a case for the application of Appayya's famous argument about the occasions on which general

Brahman is spoken of as a setu (embankment) because he functions as a bank, as it were, keeping the worlds apart. He is all that is, and higher than all that is. He cannot be attained except by His own grace. "He whom He chooses, to him He reveals His person" says Śruti.³³ He is, therefore, both the end attained and the means of attainment. Other expressions indicative of finitude may be similarly interpreted or shown to be figurative statements helpful in meditation.

Is there any Being equal to Brahman, though
 or equal to Him. not higher than Him? This seems possible, because of numerous passages ascribing parallel attributes to Śiva and Viṣṇu, such as being the material cause of the world, being the means of liberation, presence in the supreme ether as well as in the ether of the heart, superiority to darkness, and so on. But this parallelism cannot affect other passages where the final supremacy of Śiva alone is repeatedly affirmed. In the light of these, the predication of the same qualities with reference to Nārāyaṇa has to be differently interpreted. As the creator of Hiraṇyagarbha, Nārāyaṇa is the material cause of the world; but, being the controller, Śiva is also the cause of the world. From Śiva, the transcendent Lord, first arises the supreme energy (Parā-Śakti). This Śakti in the capacity of enjoyer is called puruṣa, who is, thus, but a manifestation of the greatness of Śiva. Since the effect cannot come about but for the will of the agent, the agent is higher than the material cause;

names can function as significant singular names. *Puruṣottama* may mean Nārāyaṇa, but not *uttama puruṣa*. The components once split up have their own significance, and regard must be had thereto in determining the denotation of the fresh compound.

³³ *Kāṭha*, II, 23.

but the qualities of the former are often ascribed to the latter, as the two work in close harmony.³⁴

The identification of Brahman with Śiva has been set out in some detail, it being one of the cardinal points of Śrīkanṭha's system. There are numerous other passages which have not found mention here for fear of undue prolixity.³⁵ The argument is based in essence on texts declaring the ultimate supremacy of Śiva, which supremacy is sought to be reconciled with the claims of other deities, not only by the bare declaration of their inferiority, but by their subsumption as manifestations more or less direct of Śiva himself. The procedure is interesting, if not highly original, and does credit both to the heart and head of Śrīkanṭha; that it has the sanction of Śruti, Śrīkanṭha shows quite elaborately, though his is not the wealth of illustration and argument subsequently put forward by his commentator, Appayya Dīkṣita.

The qualities of Brahman may now be briefly noticed. It is believed that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, "neti, neti, not thus, not thus" denies all qualities of Brahman, since the statement follows closely on the declaration of two forms, sensible and super-sensible (mūrta and amūrta). The negation, it is thought, extends to both of these with the result that nothing can be predicated of Brahman. Such a conclusion ignores the fact that but for the earlier part of the Śruti one would never have thought of predicating either form, sensible or super-sensible. In first making that affirmation and then denying it *in toto*, Śruti seems to achieve self-stultification, a supposition consistent neither

³⁴ III, 2, 35.

³⁵ Most of these passages will be found in Appendix III-c.

with its character nor with its authority. The negation should be taken to mean that the nature of Brahman cannot be exhausted by the qualities already mentioned, by the this-much-ness predicated in the context; such an interpretation is quite in harmony with the illimitable nature of the infinite Brahman.³⁶

Brahman is characterised by both sets of attributes, positive and negative. He is the treasure-house of all auspicious qualities. He is free from anything that is defective or objectionable. All the negative statements about Brahman predicate of Him the absence of objectionable qualities alone (*heya-guṇa-rāhitya*).³⁷ As the cause of creation, etc., He has all the qualities looked for, but not found, in other suggested causes, such as *pradhāna*, *karma*, *kāla*, and so on.³⁸

These qualities are both physical and non-physical. Brahman is connected with a body, though the connection does not lead to imperfection, as Śruti assures us of the contrary. The analogy of the *jīva* being imperfect in the same circumstances does not apply; for, the *jīva* has his true nature concealed by the will of the Lord, and his connection with the body is not voluntary, but due to *karma*, whereas, Brahman who is self-effulgent Intelligence and Bliss assumes forms at His own will. That the *jīva* and *Parameśvara* may be connected with the same body and yet possess different characteristics is clear from the *Śvetāśvatara* text which speaks of two birds sitting on the same tree, one of whom eats the fruit, while the other does not taste it.

³⁶ III, 2, 21.

³⁷ III, 2, 25.

³⁸ II, 1, 36.

Brahman's possession of physical form is established indirectly too by the denial of hunger, thirst, old age, etc. These are properties of bodies, as we know them; there is no occasion for their being denied in the case of Brahman, except on the assumption that Brahman has a body.³⁹

As for the non-physical qualities, it is thought by some that Brahman is Intelligence alone, on the ground that He is said to be Intelligence. But there is no force in this contention. The name "golden crown" does not preclude the possibility of the crown being set with precious stones (III, 2, 16). Further, the same *Taittirīya Śruti* which in one place describes Brahman as knowledge (jñānam) refers to Him later as vipaścī,⁴⁰ which means, "He whose intelligence perceives the manifold collections of things." Perception of the manifold not being excluded from the earlier predication of undifferentiated knowledge, it follows that no such exclusion can apply to the auspicious qualities either.

The qualities that necessarily go with the conception of Brahman as cause are omniscience, omnipotence, independence, eternal contentment, beginningless

**The six-fold
qualities of omni-**

³⁹ III, 3, 38 and 39. Negation is not aimless; it arises only when there is occasion for the affirmation of that which is denied. Cp. the Bradleian theory of negation: "But in the negative judgment, where 'yellow' is denied, the positive relation of 'yellow' to the tree must precede the exclusion of the relation. The judgment can never anticipate the question. . . . What negation must begin with is the attempt on reality, the baffled approach of a qualification" (*Principles of Logic*, 2nd ed., I, p. 115). This part of the Bradleian doctrine remains unchanged, though, in other parts, it underwent considerable alteration as the result of Bosanquet's criticism. See also Terminal Essay VI in the *Principles of Logic*, II, pp. 662-673.

⁴⁰ So 'śnute sarvān kāmān saha Brahmanā vipaściteti (*Taitt.*, II, 1).

science, etc. understanding, and undiminished energy. No one who does not know all that is to be known can undertake the work of creation, etc. Brahman, moreover, is not merely the material cause of the world, but the directing agent as well. Omniscience must, therefore, be an essential characteristic. That Brahman possesses it is established by His authorship of Śruti. The author of that body of unquestionable authoritative knowledge must Himself be all-knowing.⁴¹ His knowledge is not of the same kind as that of the sages who know all the Vedas, for the latter know only the product, while Brahman is the producer, and the author is always greater than the work. His knowledge is not exhausted by nor fully expressed in the work. This is evident from the fact that the Scriptures treat of some topics generally, some by implication, and only a few in full. Knowledge of this kind cannot claim to be omniscience.

This understanding must result from Brahman's own nature; if it were dependent on another source or had a beginning in time, it would not endure for ever; and when it ceased, Brahman's functioning would also cease. Such a Being could be only an intermediate cause like minor deities, not the First Cause. Brahman, therefore, is anādi-bodha.

Intelligence divorced from power is ineffective. The First Cause is, therefore, all powerful and is not under the orders of any Being other than Himself. Thence the possession of svatantra (independence) and anantaśakti (omnipotence). And the creative activity follows out of the Self, unhindered and undimmed; hence His alupta-śakti (undiminished energy). Even though endowed with all these qualities, Brahman would make an undesira-

⁴¹ I, 1, 2.

ble ruler, if he were a slave to the senses, at the mercy of every passing desire. Eternal contentment must be characteristic of Him; and of this we are assured by Śruti which says that He delights in prāṇa and that His bliss is of the mind (prāṇārāmam, mana ānandam).⁴² What need is there for Him to seek happiness outside of Himself through the external senses, when His own Śakti, called the supreme ether (paramākāśa) abounds in Bliss?⁴³

We know from the *Taittirīya Śruti* that Bliss is indeed of the essence of Brahman; that text describes the Bliss of Brahman after leading up to it through a description of various other kinds and grades of bliss.⁴⁴ Nor is there room to hold that since the suffix “mayat” in “ānandamaya” signifies what is effected, Brahman is other than the ānandamaya self; for “mayāt” denotes abundance as well. Even of this abundance of Bliss, Brahman is spoken of as the support, thus implying a distinction between the two; but the distinction is only between Brahman and His own Intelligence-energy (Cit-Śakti),⁴⁵ and this is a distinction without a dif-

⁴² *Taitt.*, I, 6.

⁴³ I, 1, 2; I, 2, 11.

⁴⁴ *Taitt.*, II, 8.

⁴⁵ For two other ways of meeting this difficulty (both mentioned by Śrīkaṇṭha), see Chapter I, *ante* p. 36; but, from the consistent reference to Cit-Śakti as ākāśa (lit. effulgent expanse) and as ānanda (Bliss), it would appear that Śrīkaṇṭha himself preferred the present interpretation to the other two, though he refers to it in that context, as the view of “some”. Appayya Dīkṣita furnishes his own argument for identifying the ānandamaya self with Cit-Śakti, not Brahman directly. “Mayat”, he says, can, according to grammatical rules, signify abundance in regard only to the denotation of the expression of which it forms part, not as referred to something else of which it is an attribute. Thus “annamaya” would mean “abundance of food”,—if we think of food as such, not in relation, say, to a sacrifice of which it forms part; in the latter case, the meaning would be “effected by food”, “mayat” becoming a vikārasabda, an expression indicating a modification or a

ference.⁴⁶

The first chapter of the *Sūtras* undertakes numerous identifications of Brahman with the person within the eye (akṣini-puruṣa), with the Imperishable (akṣara), with the internal ruler (antaryāmin), with the object of perception (īkṣati karma) by released souls, and so on; but it is not necessary to enter into these in detail. The reasoning in all the cases is based on relevant texts occurring earlier or later in the same context, in the light of which it is impossible to understand a reference to unconscious matter or to the finite self, or, indeed, to anything short of the Supreme Brahman. Illustrations have been given already of the procedure, while discussing related topics. In view, however, of the importance of the doctrine of ākāśa in Śrīkaṇṭha's philosophy, the identification of Brahman with ākāśa is set out here. The word literally means that which shines everywhere (samantāt prakāśate). Because of this all-pervasive splendour it can be neither limited nor inert. It is of the nature of Intelligence and Bliss, the substrate of the various manifestations, intelligent and non-intelligent, which rise therein as bubbles on a vast expanse of water. It is the material cause of the world, the supreme energy of Brahman, otherwise called Cidambaram, which is, literally, the effulgent expanse of Intelligence.⁴⁷

Sūtras I, 1, 23 and 24 read thus: Ākāśas talliṅgāt;
Identi- ata eva prāṇaḥ. The two together

characteristic. If the term "ānandamaya" were applied to Brahman, "mayat" would mean modification instead of abundance, for, Cit-śakti is Bliss and Cit-śakti is an attribute of Brahman. Hence, the ānandamaya self is Cit-śakti.

⁴⁶ I, 1, 13 to 16.

⁴⁷ I, 1, 2.

fication with
Akasa.

constitute one topic, the reasoning applied being identical. The world is said to have originated from ākāśa⁴⁸ and again from prāṇa.⁴⁹ The ākāśa and prāṇa here mentioned do not denote the elemental ether or the vital air, these being themselves created entities. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*,⁵⁰ does no doubt say that all beings came out of prāṇa; that however represents not the final teaching, but only a stage in the realisation of the final truth that Bliss is that which creates and sustains all Beings and into which they all return.⁵¹ Hence, the vital air and the elemental ether are not meant. Here, the bhāṣyakāra raises a question as to the significance of the word "elemental" used by himself to qualify ether, and replies that the supreme ākāśa, the glory that is Intelligence and Bliss, the Cīṭ-Śakti of Brahman is not meant to be excluded, unlike the elemental ether; for, that supreme energy is indeed the cause of the origination, sustenance, etc., of all beings.⁵¹ It will be seen later that Appayya fastens on this very doubt and answer as significant elements of Śrīkanṭha's doctrine, corroborating his thesis that the Śivādvaita of the latter is basically identical with the Advaita of Śaṅkara.

The small ether (dahara ākāśa) within the heart⁵²
The dahara is Brahman. It is that Brahma-loka
akasa. to which creatures return from day

⁴⁸ Sarvāṇi ha vā imāni bhūtāni ākāśādeva samutpadyante, ākāśam pratyastam yanti: *Ch.*, I, 9, 1.

⁴⁹ Sarvāṇi ha vā imāni bhūtāni prāṇam evābhisamviśanti: *Ibid.*, I, 11, 5.

⁵⁰ III, 3.

⁵¹ To raise and answer doubts arising from the words of the commentator is a special feature of a Bhaṣya, as distinguished from a vyākhyāna or vṛtti.

⁵² *Ch.*, VIII, 1, 1, *et seq.*

to day and yet know not.⁵³ As seen from another Śruti passage,⁵⁴ this means that every day in sleep they return to Brahman (referred to as "Sat") and yet know not that they have been with Brahman. The dahara ākāśa to which they return must, therefore, be none other than Brahman. Further, it is said of this ākāśa that it is free from sin, sorrow, old age, death, and so on.⁵⁵ Such qualifications can apply only to Brahman, not to the jīva, who is limited, or to the pradhāna, which is non-intelligent and inert.

Though some passages⁵⁶ speak of that which is within the ākāśa as the ruler of all, controller of all, etc., yet meditation is not to be confined to what is within, nor is the relation to be contemplated as between abode and the dweller within. From the assertion of the qualities of freedom from sin, etc., it follows that ākāśa is itself to be contemplated; and these qualities characteristic of the supreme Being cannot attach to what is only His abode. Hence, a relation of non-difference has to be understood as between the two, a relationship of substance and attribute,—dahara ākāśa as Cidāmbaram, the radiant expanse of Intelligence, being the attribute of Brahman.⁵⁷

⁵³ *Ch.*, VIII, 3, 2.

⁵⁴ *Ib.*, VI, 9, 2.

⁵⁵ *Ib.*, VIII, 1, 5.

⁵⁶ *Brh.*, IV, 4, 22; *Mahopaniṣad*, XII, 28 (tasmin yadantastadupāsītavyam).

⁵⁷ I, 3, 13 to 16. The word Cidāmbaram is used here for about the sixth time to signify the effulgent expanse of Intelligence* (Cidākāśa, i.e., Parā-śakti). Its use in this context may have a special significance, in so far as the temple and the worship at Cidāmbaram are symbolic of daharopāśanā.

Brahman is both the material and the operative cause of the world. The fact that in our experience the two kinds of cause are not identical, need not prevent us from accepting the truth of this doctrine based on Śruti. If

Both the material and the operative cases.

Brahman were not the material cause, both the promissory statement⁵⁸ and the example would be falsified. That statement is to the effect that by knowledge of the one, knowledge of all is brought about; the illustration is from clay and things made of clay. The identity of cause and effect here indicated cannot be true if the material cause be conceived as other than Brahman.⁵⁹

That Brahman is the efficient cause as well follows from the desire and willing ascribed to Him

⁵⁸ Ekaviññānena sarvaviññāna pratijñā. It is worth noting that though willing to conserve the authoritativeness of this promissory statement, the Śaiva Siddhāntin does not concede that Brahman is the material cause of the universe. The attempt to make out that Brahman in conjunction with māyā or śakti functions as the material cause finds no favour with him, for, he contends, to be a material cause in any sense—whether as co-operating with māyā as each strand of a rope co-operates with the other, or as qualified by māyā—is to be subject to transformation; and the texts which proclaim Brahman's immutability are more direct and more authoritative than any promissory statement about universal knowledge resulting from knowledge of the One. The latter has, therefore, to be understood figuratively. Just as from knowledge of the one (clay) there results knowledge of the rest (posts, etc.), where the two are non-different in nature, so too, even where there is difference, as between God and the universe, knowledge of the latter results from knowledge of the former (*PB*, p. 87). Śiva is the Lord of the universe, and knowledge of the owner implies knowledge of His possessions. He who understands the king may be said to understand his ministers as well (*Māpāḍīyam*, p. 126). The efficient cause, as directing the material cause, may itself be said to be the material cause, but this is only a mode of speech with little value; for, in this sense, even the potter is a material cause of the pot (*PB*, p. 87; *Māpāḍīyam*, p. 126). It must be confessed that the Siddhāntin's position is even less intelligible than Śrīkanṭha's.

⁵⁹ I, 4, 23.

(I, 4, 24). It is not possible to choose one of the two kinds of cause and identify Brahman therewith, for, the texts predicate of Him both kinds of causation. Śiva is both *viśvādhika* and *viśvākāra* (above the universe, and of the form thereof).⁶⁰ It is also said that Brahman creates Himself⁶¹ and that He transforms Himself.⁶² Now, there is great difficulty in conceiving of a perfect Being as undergoing transformation even at His own hands; for, transformation means impermanence, which is synonymous with imperfection. How then may *pariṇāma* (transformation) be predicated of Brahman? There is no harm, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, for, as he claims, his is a unique conception of *pariṇāma*. It is a change, not *of* Brahman, but *in* Brahman,—not of substance but of form;—it is a manifestation, a development from subtle to gross. To use a favourite analogy repeated elsewhere, the change is like the growth from childhood to youth; virility which was absent from the former is manifested in the latter, though it was there, all the time latent. The world, as characterised by distinctions of name and form, is not a creation out of nothing. It has all been evolved in regular order by the Lord from His Śakti. Prior to creation there was darkness, a state of neither day nor night, of neither Being nor Non-Being; at that time Śiva alone existed, one without a second. From Him proceeded the ancient *Prajñā* (otherwise called *Jñāna-Śakti*) the destroyer of that primal darkness. The Lord, who, as cause, had for His body neither name nor form except in a subtle condition, desired that in His effected condition the distinctions should

⁶⁰ I, 4, 25.

⁶¹ I, 4, 26. *Tadātmānam svayam akuruta* (*Taitt.*, II, 7).

⁶² I, 4, 27.

he made manifest. When they were manifested, He entered them and He became all things real and unreal. Thus is the *Śvetāśvatara* text interpreted by Śrīkaṇṭha. Elsewhere,⁶³ he says, the Lord, through his Icchā-Śakti, desired "may I become many"; by Jñāna-Śakti he considered the means and instruments necessary; with Kriyā-Śakti he created the universe which is like a picture painted on the wall of Icchā-Śakti.

The conception of Śakti is of inestimable value in Śrīkaṇṭha's system. Energy can be treated at will as either identical with or different from the energiser. Hence, Brahman, who, as Appayya says, is neither the energiser nor the energy alone, but the former as qualified by the latter, can be the material as well as the operative cause of the universe; He can be immanent in His creation and yet transcendent; He can take all forms, engage in all actions, and yet not suffer. He is unity-in-duality, an identity-in-difference, a personality that is unlimited, a grade of Bliss that is untrammelled, a Self that is its own other, the philosopher's ideal and the poet's dream. The only drawback is that this concept, from the standpoint of finite intelligence, stands our questioning as little as its components, identity or difference. The two aspects, each in its turn both necessary and baffling, may be more or less mechanically put together; and it may be permitted to us to doubt whether any system of theism, inclusive of Śrīkaṇṭha's, has achieved more than this. Religion, however, is more than philosophy, as life is more than logic. And, as religion, this doctrine of māyā-śabala Brahman, of

⁶³ I, 2, 9.

the Being that is partly dark and partly tawny, showing His spiritual composition even in His physical frame, is endowed with infinite possibilities of calling forth enlightened fervour and devotion. Śrikanṭha, who is a clear enough writer (except when he is in a hurry for no obvious reasons), possesses a style simple, terse and unadorned. But even he grows diffuse and rises to heights of poetic expression when he starts to write of the glory of Parā-Śakti. She is the form of the Lord, of His very nature, figuring as His wisdom, strength and activity. She is of the form of the intelligent and non-intelligent worlds that express His glory; she is existence, knowledge and bliss; she is unrestricted and undefined. It is she, indeed, that constitutes the forms and the qualities of Brahman. But for her, neither the six attributes nor the eight names would be predicable of Śiva. To greater heights than this, it is difficult to rise in the conception of a deity.

Brahman is non-different from the universe, just as the pot is non-different from the clay of which it is made. The text which gives this illustration uses the words “vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam”. This may be interpreted in two ways. The pot is that which is broad-based and so on; the name is the word used to refer to that object; both are the causes of vācā, *i.e.*, speech and action based thereon. Though clay and its modifications are substantially identical, yet, in respect of name and form, which subserve the purposes of speech and action, they are different; but the difference is not ultimate, clay alone being the reality of pots, etc., as seen from the judgment “that very clay was made into the pot,” and from the

**Non-difference
of cause and
effect.**

recognition of qualitative and quantitative identities between cause and effect. The other interpretation is as follows: the form "pot" does not denote a fresh substance other than clay, being but the object of the judgment "this is a pot." Yet names like pot, not applicable to the original substance are applicable to the present form, since the truth of the names is but the clay. Interpreted either way, what the text intends to teach is the identity of cause and effect, the former being subtle and self-contained, the latter gross and evolved. The evolution may be compared to the unfolding of a piece of cloth originally rolled up and the setting it up as a tent.⁶⁴

And yet the cause is not completely one with the effect, as otherwise several difficulties arise. For one thing, the world is mostly non-intelligent, whereas the cause is intelligent. How can the former proceed from the latter? There is no impossibility here; for, we do observe causal relationship even among objects of an unlike nature; scorpions, for example, are generated from cow-dung.⁶⁵ Further, if complete identity were

⁶⁴ II, 1, 15 to 20. The tent illustration is paralleled in the *SJS*, I, 24. Cf. also *RTS*, vv. 49, 67 and 69.

⁶⁵ Śrīkanṭha's treatment of this problem is rather inadequate, especially as compared with Śaṅkara's and Rāmānuja's. The origination of scorpions from cow-dung, even if authoritative, is susceptible of another explanation; the scorpion, though a living moving thing, has also a body, i.e., something in common with its alleged cause. What is there in common between Brahman that is pure Intelligence and the world of matter? Rāmānuja raises this question, but gives no satisfactory answer; he provides only what he considers to be a better example, the generation of worms in honey. The difficulty applies to this example too, for it is possible to conceive of some common feature between the two, since they are not opposed in the way Brahman and matter are. It may be thought that Śrīkanṭha has provided an answer to this difficulty, in so far as an answer is possible, by the oft-repeated analogy of the growth of hair, nails, etc., occurring in the body only so long

claimed, all the defects of the effects would inhere in the cause, at the time of absorption; and this is unacceptable. The whole world, intelligent and non-intelligent, whether as subtle or gross, constitutes the body of Īśvara; change, ignorance and other undesirable qualities attach to this body, while glorious qualities like permanence, omniscience, etc., belong to the Self. This is paralleled in the growth of a man through childhood and youth to old age; we say that these states belong to the body, while the pleasure, etc., enjoyed belong to the soul.⁶⁶

For this causal process, the co-presence of Paramesvara and Parā-Śakti is necessary. **Co-presence of Paramesvara and Para-Śakti.** It is not possible for hair, nails, etc., to grow from the body alone, in the absence of the soul, though they have nothing in common with the soul.⁶⁷ Even if a non-intelligent effect be conceived as identical with a non-intelligent cause, the presence of Intelligence is necessary to bring about the transformation of the one into the other. This observed fact co-operating with Śruti establishes firmly the doctrine that Brahman is the cause of the world.

The fact that Brahman has no instruments other than Himself, since He is all that is, does not contradict the notion of His causality; for, we see that milk transforms itself into curd without the need of any instruments. Nor is the diversity of effects an argument for the mul-

Instrumental causes not needed.

as it is united to a soul. In so far, however, as the answer is effective, the notion of God as the material cause of the world has to be given the go-by. With this we have a closer approach to the Śaiva Siddhānta.

⁶⁶ II, 1, 8 and 9.

⁶⁷ I, 4, 27.

tiplicity of causes, for in one and the same body we see diverse effects such as hair, nails, and so on. And it must not be forgotten that Brahman may have special gifts, in the same way in which certain objects within our experience are seen to be endowed with special virtues.⁶⁸ It is futile, again, to insist that the transformation, if it takes place, must be of the whole of Brahman, as, otherwise, there would result a contradiction of the texts which proclaim Brahman to be without parts; for, Śruti alone can give us knowledge of Brahman, and Śruti definitely asserts that Brahman transforms Himself. At the same time, the notion of that which is without parts, yet transforms itself and is not exhausted in the transformation is not inconceivable, as is seen from the logicians' category of Jāti (genus), which is without parts, which is realised in the particulars and yet is more than the particulars.⁶⁹

The creative activity of the Lord is mere sport. Creation, mere and no motive⁷⁰ may be sought therefor; for, there is nothing which the Lord has to gain by such activity.⁷¹ Though what is sport to Him may appear to be death to His creatures, yet He may not be charged with partiality or cruelty; for, in all His acts, He is guided by the accumulated merit and demerit of the crea-

⁶⁸ II, 1, 24 and 25.

⁶⁹ II, 1, 27.

⁷⁰ This has to be understood in a limited sense, in view of the later statement that *Parameśvara*, though perfect, carries on the work of creation for the good of others. The good of others is a motive, though not of a self-seeking variety. It is only the latter type of motive that is excluded by the *sūtra* under discussion. Cf. *Mokṣa Kārikā*, 1: "Bhoginām bhuktaye viśvam vicitrām kurute Śivaḥ, Śiva makes the universe diverse for the enjoyment of enjoying souls."

⁷¹ II, 1, 32-33.

tures.⁷² Nor may it be urged that the Lord must have been partial and cruel prior to the origination of karma, for karma is beginningless, as Time itself, coming down in an unbroken current.⁷³

The Lord endows different souls with different bodies, having regard to the diversity of their beginningless karma. Even destruction during the periodic deluge should be ascribed, not to cruelty, but the desire to give a period of rest, as in sleep, to souls weary of the cycle of life and death.

It may not be thought that karma, which is so potent, may of itself be the cause of the bodies and the consequent experiences, for, being unintelligent, it requires to be controlled by the Lord. But this apparently takes us back to the old difficulty. If the Lord controls karma, He is still responsible for its inequalities and iniquities; once again we come up against the charge of partiality and cruelty, like the carter, who, avoiding the high road to evade paying toll, found himself nearing the toll-house at break of day.⁷⁴ This objection, however, does not hold; for, the potency to produce diverse experiences belongs only to karma, the Lord's function being confined to the direction thereof; inequalities do not arise out of the directing function. Even thus, we are not out of the wood. If the Lord had not interfered as director, karma could not have started to function; there would have been no creation, and much misery

⁷² Cp. Ward: "God respects his world, a world that is cosmic, not chaotic from the first." *Pluralism and Theism*, p. 245.

⁷³ Cp. Ward: "This conception of God-and-the-world is beyond us; we can assign it no beginning and we say it is 'eternal'; we can find no ground for it and so we say it is 'Absolute'." *Ib.*, p. 241.

⁷⁴ This is known as the *ghaṭṭa-kuṭi-prabhāta-nyāya*.

could have been saved. In such a sense, since God and His creation are identical, the misery of the latter is also the misery of the former; and it is difficult to see why the Lord did not avoid causing misery to Himself.⁷⁵ This particular charge may be avoided on the ground that the Lord is not barely identical with, but is more than, His creation; the inadequacies and imperfections of the latter need not be felt as such by the former.⁷⁶ But the answer does not avert the responsibility for the sufferings of His creatures, sufferings which would never have been experienced, if creation had never taken place. All this ignores the facts that release is impossible without knowledge, that knowledge comes only with ripening of karma, that the maturation of karma requires the enjoyment of joy and sorrow in proportion to desert, and that for such enjoyment bodies are required. When karma fructifies and knowledge is generated, the Lord manifests Mokṣa-Lakṣmī, the goddess of liberation, whose form is unsurpassed Bliss, to such souls. Creation is thus undertaken in the interests of the creatures themselves. The world is not indeed "a vale of soul-making", for, souls are eternal, but it is a place for the purification and perfection of souls, where they get rid of the bonds that prevent the realisation of their equality with Brahman. Nor may it be urged as a fresh proof of partiality that the Lord could, if he chose, release all souls at the same time; this He can no more do than the Sun can make all lotus-buds blossom at the same time. Release of the soul,

⁷⁵ Cp. Ward: "It is God thus who, more than the world, needs deliverance from the evil." *Pluralism and Theism*, p. 333. The argument as developed so far is substantially identical with the Sāṃkhya refutation of creation by the Lord, as presented by Vācaspati Miśra; see *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī* on *Kāṇikā*, 57.

⁷⁶ II, 1, 21 and 22.

like the blossoming of the bud, depends on the preparation made and the maturity achieved.⁷⁷

In the world thus created, the Lord is ever present as the internal ruler; and He is yet transcendent. **Immanence and Transcendence.** Māyā transforms itself into the world; the Lord possesses and controls māyā, He is the māyin. He is higher than the world (viśvādhikah), the controller of all (sarvaniyāmakah).⁷⁸ His immanence and transcendence may be explained by the illustration of the ether, which, though all-pervasive, is also present in several receptacles, but as limited by them. As this illustration may induce the erroneous belief that Brahman is similarly limited, another analogy is given,—that of the presence of the Sun in numerous reflections. There is, of course, the difference that while the Sun is not really present in the water and so on, the Lord is present in the world. This does not affect the value of the illustration, which, in the nature of things, cannot be expected to agree in every respect with what is to be explained.⁷⁹

The relationship may also be exhibited on the analogy of the snake and the postures it may assume—straight or coiled,—or that of light and its substrate, where both are of the nature of brightness.⁸⁰ But on both analogies, imperfection would necessarily attach to Brahman. It is better, therefore, to take the world to be related to Brahman, as brightness to the gem, genus to the species, quality to its substrate and the body to the soul.⁸¹ The theory

⁷⁷ II, 1, 34 and 35. See also *ETS*, vv. 309-311.

⁷⁸ I, 2, 20.

⁷⁹ III, 2, 18-20.

⁸⁰ III, 2, 26 and 27.

⁸¹ III, 2, 28.

thus propounded is one of Viśiṣṭādvaita (qualified non-dualism). In view of the identification of the Supreme Being with Śiva, the doctrine is called Siva-Viśiṣṭādvaita. Effect cannot exist apart from the cause, nor the attribute from its substrate. Similarly, Śakti cannot exist apart from Brahman; nor can Brahman be cognised apart from Śakti. As Brahman does not exist apart from the world, the two are said to be non-different; the difference between the two is due to their very nature.⁸² The multiplicity of illustrations shows only the difficulty of forming any clear notion of this relationship, a difficulty common to all varieties of theism.

The third and the fourth pādas (quarters) of the second chapter are mainly taken up with the creation of the elements, the order of creation and so on. Sūtras II, 3, 1-7 decide that ether is originated in spite of its non-mention by some texts, and the claim of eternity for it by others. The reasons for the conclusion are, briefly, that there is no express contradiction of origination (as in the case of the Jīva, that the independent un-originated existence of ether would interfere with the realisation of the promise that knowledge of the one (Brahman) will bring about knowledge of all, that everything else that exists must be a modification of Brahman, and that whatever is a modification must be an effect; certain texts declare ether to be eternal, but Śrīkanṭha passes this by, though he refutes in the next topic a similar claim made for air (vāyu), dismissing the statement as

⁸² II, 1, 22. Cp. Ward: "God is transcendent to it, for it is not God, but his utterance and yet because it is *his* utterance and because he ever sustains it, he is immanent in it, it is his continuous creation." *Pluralism and Theism*, p. 240.

mere praise. The silence is surprising for the claim of eternity is mentioned in the statement of the *prima facie* view. One has regretfully to conclude that this is an instance of rather slipshod work on the part of our commentator. A desire for brevity cannot be urged as the excuse, for the very next topic about the origination of *vāyu* is unnecessarily elaborate, showing in this respect, a divergence from the treatment in the *Śrī Bhāṣya*. That topic decides, on the same reasoning as that of the previous seven *sūtras*, that air (*vāyu*) is originated.

Fire, water and earth (elsewhere called *annam*, food) are caused directly by Brahman, not merely by the next preceding element in the series.⁸³ In this respect the interpretation is different from Śaṅkara's. To Śaṅkara, causation is in the last resort an unintelligible category, and there is no special virtue in invoking Brahman's direct intervention in the production of these phenomena. Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja, however, hold that Brahman as qualified by the preceding element in the series is the cause of Brahman as qualified by the succeeding element. Such a theory avoids most of the difficulties of the causal hypothesis, while preserving in full measure the immanence of Brahman. That Brahman is present in these elements is clear from the desire and willing attributed to them (as in "tat teja aikṣata", "tā āpa aikṣanta" and so on)⁸⁴ in the act of creation. Further, the presiding deities of these elements are all of them forms of Śiva. Sadāśiva controls the ether, Ratheśvara the air, Rudra the fire, Janārdana the waters, and Brahmā the earth. These five *Pañca-Brahmas* constitute the body of the Supreme Brahman; with

⁸³ II, 3, 16-20.

⁸⁴ *Ch.*, VI, 2, 2 and 4.

the aid of His body, He proceeds to create. That the Supreme Brahman is Śiva is seen from the Atharvaśikhā mention of Śambhu as the supreme Lord, the cause of causes, from whom originate Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra and Indra, together with the elements they control.

The fourth quarter of the second chapter starts with the origination of the senses (prāṇas). These are eleven in number—the five organs of cognition and the five of action, and the mind; the organs of action are also useful to the self abiding in the body, and should not be excluded. The senses are atomic in nature, for, they are said to rise and depart from the body of man, along with the chief vital air; and this could not happen, if they were pervasive. The fact that objects at a distance are apprehended by the senses is due to other causes; in the case of the eye, for instance, perception of distant objects is possible, because it is the nature of light to travel swiftly.⁸⁵ The senses are controlled by the presiding deities and by the jīva; but both these are dependent in the last resort on Brahman for the control they exercise,⁸⁶ for, Brahman is universal and eternal.⁸⁷ Here, again, Śrīkaṇṭha differs from the advaitin and the bhedaḥbhedaḥvādin in pressing for the recognition of the immediate presence of Brahman; it would thus appear that the viśiṣṭādvaitin is a greater champion of immanence than the advaitin. One wonders if this is an exaggerated attempt to make up for the transcendence implied in Pluralism.

⁸⁵ II, 4, 4-6.

⁸⁶ II, 4, 13.

⁸⁷ II, 4, 14.

Because the senses go by the name *prāṇas*, it should not be thought that they are functions of the chief vital air, for the difference between the two is both proclaimed by Śruti and perceived in experience, as when we see, that the senses of a sleeping man are quiescent, though he continues to live and breathe.⁸⁸

The chief vital air (*mukhyaprāṇa*) is also originated. It cannot be identified either with the elemental air or with a function of the senses. It is an instrument of the self, like the senses, but is principal among them. Its function is to keep the body and the senses unrelaxed. The single function has a five-fold aspect distinguished by the names *prāṇa*, *apāṇa*, *vyāṇa*, *udāna* and *samāna*; these are analogous to the five-fold division (*kāma* and so on)⁸⁹ of the functioning of the mind; they are not distinct entities.⁹⁰ The chief vital air is atomic (minute), since it departs from the body, followed by the senses.

The discussion as to the exact order of creation is of little moment.⁹¹ What is of interest is the repetition in II, 3, 16, of the view that every thing originates immediately from Brahman; to prove this, it is said that the clause “*etasmājjāyate*, from this originates” should be understood distributively of every item, the origination of which is mentioned in the particular text.⁹² We have thus a re-iteration of the immanence of the cause and of the identity of cause and effect.

The conception of creation offers innumerable

⁸⁸ II, 4, 15 and 16.

⁸⁹ *Kāma* (desire) *saṁkalpa* (resolve), *vicikitsā* (doubt) and the rest—(Appayya Dīkṣita: *SMD*).

⁹⁰ II, 4, 7-11.

⁹¹ II, 3, 15 and 16.

⁹² *Muṇḍaka*, II, 1, 3.

Some difficulties. difficulties. Not the least of these are the existence of evil, the purposelessness of creation, the immanence of God, and the unintelligibility of the causal concept. Śrīkaṇṭha's contribution (the originality of which is not our concern here)⁹³ to the solution of these consists in the notions that divine activity proceeds in and through Cit-Śakti and that cause and effect are identical, both being Brahman (the change which is one of form, not of substance, taking place in Brahman). It may be permitted to one to doubt if the solutions contain anything more than a re-statement of the problems. There may be greater accuracy of statement, a pruning off of irrelevant details and unprofitable notions; but it is difficult to see that any final solution has been reached. We desire to know how the One becomes many, how the immutable can yet change, how the infinite can be identical with the finite; and, for answer, we have a third concept offered to us, of a Being that is identical in nature with both, that changes while yet it is of the form of the immutable, that becomes the manifold while continuing to express the nature of the One, and so on. Mediators are generally welcome, especially when, because of their reputation and their virtue, they inspire faith; but they are bound to fail in their mission, except in the cases where the parties themselves desire reconciliation.⁹⁴ The same may be said of Cit-Śakti

⁹³ The idea of Cit-Śakti is undoubtedly derived from the Purāṇas and the Āgamas; the identity of cause and effect may have been independently arrived at or taken over from Vaiṣṇava Viśiṣṭādvaita. The language, as has been remarked elsewhere, is strongly reminiscent of Rāmānuja's, but this proves nothing.

⁹⁴ To vary the illustration: a buffer state can function as such only when its integrity is recognised and respected by all parties; where one or more of these prove intractable and recalcitrant, the buffer state might as well not have existed.

as a mediatrix. As presented by religion and expounded by Śrīkaṇṭha, she is a figure to evoke faith and command adoration; in the ecstasy of worshipping her, one may feel that discords are harmonised, and evil set at naught; she may appear to be the marvellous adjuster of whatever is conflicting and discordant (aghaṭita-ghaṭanā-ṣaṭīyasī);⁹⁵ but once this religious ecstasy passes, and things are examined in the dry light of reason, we find ourselves in no better position than before. Instead of having two aspects to relate, the finite and the infinite, we have now a third, the finite-infinite to relate to both. Would it not be simpler to recognise only one concept—that of the finite-infinite? Mediation takes us nowhere, for the mediator has to be mediated, and the process is endless. It is only another instance of the notoriously inadequate concept of relation, which ever launches one on an infinite regress.

It may, of course, be thought that the analysing away of the concrete unities presented in experience is a vicious process prompted by an intellectual bias; to such a charge only one answer can or need be given. It may be morally a vice, and a sin from the point of view of religion, to analyse what are believed to be ultimate concepts; but metaphysics is the attempt to understand the universe in the light of reason. A metaphysician has no right to vary the game or play it otherwise than according to its rules. A person pledged to metaphysical inquiry may indeed turn on the others and ask them not to encumber him with their religious prejudices; but even without going to this extreme, he may plead to be left alone to carry on his analysis, as his result will affect only those who, like him, are prepared,

⁹⁵ Not Śrīkaṇṭha's phrase.

at least for the moment, to follow reason alone. Nor may the Vedāntin seek to put him out of court on the ground that, in Brahma-knowledge, Śruti, not reason prevails; for, reason may test even though it cannot build; and not the vociferation of a hundred Śrutis can establish what is opposed to reason. In the light of reason, therefore, it would appear that the notion of Cit-Śakti, though a genuine and noteworthy attempt at reconciling irreconcilables, does not offer a final solution to the problem of creation or that of the One and the many.

The same judgment has to be passed on the new notion of cause. The crux of the problem is the difficulty of reconciling identity and difference. Cause cannot be wholly different from the effect; for, the phenomenon of becoming is unintelligible, in the absence of all identity. Nor can we talk of becoming, where there is identity alone. The concept of cause is of value in so far alone as it undertakes to explain this co-presence of identity and difference. But a searching analysis such as that undertaken by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara⁹⁶ shows clearly that that concept is in the last resort unintelligible. When we say that A produces B, we certainly assume that A is not wholly identical with B, nor wholly different therefrom. If we say that A is partly B and partly not B, our old difficulty continues, for, A produces B in so far as it is identical with B, i.e., in that part of it which is so identical; but if that part is already identical with B, what is the point of claiming that it produces B? If, on the other hand, it is the part that is not B that causes B, we have bare difference and the problem still baffles us. Again, is the cause ante-

⁹⁶ See in particular *Māṇḍūkya*, *Gauḍapāda Kārikās*, 10, 11 to 23.

cedent in time or not? On the former hypothesis, we are started on an infinite regress, for, each cause will require to be explained in terms of its antecedent. On the supposition that cause and effect are simultaneous, we fail to understand the concept altogether. The two horns of a bull are co-existent; can we say that one is the cause of the other? Is there any other intelligible mode of conceiving simultaneous causation? If each is the determinant of the other, neither can come into existence before the other; both cause and effect get reduced to the position of the horns of a hare. The only possibility of reconciling simultaneity with causation is to abandon the idea that cause and effect are two entities. They must both be taken to be one substance, now appearing as cause, as it were and now again as effect, as it were.

Śrīkaṇṭha's conception of cause makes an attempt to avoid criticism of the kind sketched above. There is causation by antecedents in time; such is the causation by minor deities such as Brahmā and the rest. But the cause of causes is eternal, ever-present, ever-active. In thinking of Him as the First Cause, the charge of infinite regress cannot be urged, for, He is more the ground of the world than its cause. He is not the material cause alone, nor the efficient cause alone, but the creator and the sustainer and the informing spirit. Nor does the difficulty about simultaneous entities not causing each other apply here, as cause and effect are both variations of one substance. They are both Brahman. The cause is sūkṣma-cidacid-viśiṣṭa-Brahman, the effect sthūla-cidacid-viśiṣṭa-Brahman. Thus, *prima facie*, it would appear that Śrīkaṇṭha presents us with a causal notion that can withstand even the incisive criticism of Śaṅkara.

But the satisfaction is short-lived. The advaitin's notion that one and the same substance is cause, as it were, and effect, as it were, may or may not be metaphysically sound; but the distinction between gross and subtle (sthūla and sūkṣma) is, indeed, baffling. We are not given any guidance to understand it beyond the statement that the former admits of distinctions of name and form, while the latter does not. The former is empirical, in the sense that it constitutes the world that is the object of speech and action; the latter rises superior to such empirical needs. How does the distinction of name and form come about; how does the sūkṣma become sthūla? If both forms are declared to be eternal, we are faced with the problem of the identity of such divergent appearances. If, on the other hand, differences arise in what is undifferentiated, what precisely is its nature, and how does it arise? *Prima facie*, what is gross may be a development of what is subtle by accretion or attrition. Neither is likely, for, both cause and effect are said to be Brahman; if the cause could be added to, it would not be Brahman; and if anything is taken away therefrom, the effect could not be Brahman. Again, how are we to explain attrition, *i.e.*, division of what is essentially homogeneous? What are the agents involved? What are the instruments employed? Are they Brahman or other than Brahman or parts of Brahman? The last two are impossible, for, Brahman is without parts, and there is nothing outside of Brahman. The first possibility is unintelligible. Further, on the assumption that the distinguishing agency is of Brahman, is it a harmonious element of the total experience? If so, how is it possible to derive from Him the evolution of such discordant elements as

are seen to make up the empirical world, this gross world distinguished by name and form? If, on the contrary, the distinguishing agency fails to harmonise with the rest from the start, with what justification may we conceive of Brahman as harmony and bliss and the treasure-house of all auspicious qualities?

Illustrations have been given; but they serve to indicate only the difficulty, not the solution. It is very creditable indeed for a philosopher to have caught hold of the notion of personal identity and the continuity of growth from childhood to youth and old age. But the notions explain nothing; they provide interesting analogies to the fundamental metaphysical problem and themselves demand solution therewith. That virility, absent in childhood, is present in youth, that organs originally dormant to all appearance begin to function only at a later stage, these are physiological facts, for which sufficient physiological explanation may be found. But, whatever explanation there is involves the causal category which is itself unintelligible to the metaphysician. And the fact that I affirm my identity with what I was yesterday or a year ago does offer only an additional instance, not an explanation of this identity.

Nor does the notion of manifestation help us. This, along with the words "latent" and "patent," serves only to camouflage the central problem of becoming and to make a solution appear within reach, if not already achieved. How does the latent become the patent? What was holding the process in check? If there was nothing, the two are surely identical; a difference even of name cannot be justified. If, however, there was some obstacle, what happened to it? Was it alien to Brahman the

cause? If not, was it annihilated? How could this happen unless it was nothing from the start? If it was not annihilated, was it absorbed? Was it not a discordant element? How, then, was it harmonised? To all these and similar recurrent questions, the theory provides no answer.

It thus appears that the difficulties of causation will always be with us. One solution is to abandon the concept, as the advaitin does. But Śrīkanṭha is not prepared for it. The other alternative is to have recourse to authority and to condemn all this as logical quibbling. This Śrīkanṭha does; but one may be pardoned all the same for subjecting his concepts to metaphysical criticism, for, he himself has not consistently followed the policy of scouting reason and holding fast to Śruti alone. For such an attitude, the mere assertion of Brahman's causation of the world would have sufficed. There should have been no occasion for evolving the notion of causation as a change not of substance, but of state. All disclaimers notwithstanding, Śrīkanṭha recognises the importance of satisfying the demands of reason; and so long as this is the case, metaphysical criticism of his concepts is abundantly justified.

CHAPTER V

THE JIVA—HERE AND HEREAFTER

The most patent facts about the finite self are ignorance, dependence and bondage. He is associated with bodies, which, one is told, are necessarily assumed to work out the consequences of karma which is beginningless. So striking are these characteristics that at the first blush, there seems to be no possibility of understanding the texts which teach the identity of the jīva and Brahman.¹ But some reflection in the light of Scriptural teaching convinces us that the jīva cannot be intrinsically impure, though there may be beginningless association with impurity dependence and ignorance. If impurity were an essential characteristic, no release would be possible, except with the destruction of the self; and this would be not merely inconsistent with the teaching of śruti, but opposed to its very existence, its only object being the attainment of the highest goal of man, *viz.*, release. The dirt which envelops the self from time immemorial cannot be part of the inner nature of the self, which is essentially pure, and shines forth on the removal of the impurity, like the moon when the clouds roll off.² Bondage, like the world, is beginningless in time. If a commencement were postulated, there would be no possibility of explaining it. The jīva, in himself pure, could not have created the impurity

¹I, 1, 1.

²I, 1, 13; I, 2, 9.

or voluntarily associated therewith. Nor could Brahman have created it and caused its association with the jīva, as the Lord would then lay Himself open to the charges of cruelty, partiality, ignorance and incapacity to compass even His own happiness. Impurity is thus beginningless; it is because of his connection therewith that the finite self is not an independent agent.³

Because the jīva is essentially pure, it does not follow that he is identical with Brahman. The texts declaring release speak of the attainment of equality and not of identity with Brahman.⁴ The predication of equality establishes the distinctness of the jīva from Brahman.⁵ In some contexts, as in the conversation between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru in the *Chāndogya*, and in Yājñavalkya's teaching to Maitreyī, though the expressions jīva and ātman are used, the reference is only to Brahman as may be determined by the application of the marks determinative of purport, upakrama, upasamhāra, etc.⁶ Further Yājñavalkya says that everything else is known by the knowledge of the ātman which itself is not known; such a qualification is manifestly not applicable to the jīva; hence, the term denotes the Supreme Being in that context.⁷

The reference to Brahman in terms expressive of the jīva is justifiable, because there is some identity between the two. This identity has been variously conceived by different sages.

³ I, 2, 1.

⁴ *Muṇḍaka*, III, 1, 3.

⁵ I, 3, 21.

⁶ I, 4, 16-18.

⁷ I, 4, 19.

In the opinion of Āśmarathya, the use is indicative of the realisation of the promissory statements, *i.e.*, the promise that by the knowledge of the one thing, all else will be known, a promise which can be redeemed only if there is substantial identity between Brahman and all other beings (including jīvas) which are to be known. The relation between the Brahman and the jīva is one of difference and yet non-difference (*bhedābheda*). Auḍulomi believes that the identity intended is what is achieved on final realisation; while Kāśakṛtsna thinks that the identical reference is possible, because of Brahman's residence within the jīva, ensouling him and functioning as the internal ruler. In the opinion of Śrīkaṇṭha, the last is the view of the Sūtrakāra too, since it is set out after the other two, and no other view is mentioned later.⁸

The jīva is not originated, as Śruti⁹ declares his eternity. There are certainly texts like the *Yadā tama* hymn in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*¹⁰ which speak of Śiva alone as existing in the beginning and Intelligence as proceeding from Him. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*¹¹ likens the selves to sparks flying forth from fire. What is implied by these is not an original state when souls were non-existent, but one when name and form could not be applied to them or to non-intelligent things, which together constitute the body of Brahman. It is the rise of name and form which is compared to the rising of sparks from a fire; generation of the souls themselves is not to

**Non-origination
of the Jīva.**

⁸ I, 4, 20-22.

⁹ *Kaṭha*, II, 8; V, 13.

¹⁰ IV, 18.

¹¹ IV, 1, 20.

be understood.¹² If the self could be created, he could also be destroyed; and this process would be accompanied by the unaccountable lapse of karma accrued, and the influx of karma not acquired; for, the *jīva* is the abode of karma, and cannot exist in bondage but for karma.

So long as the world continues the *jīva* is connected with bodies human, divine, etc.; before creation and after the deluge, he is still associated with bodies, but these are indistinguishable by name and form. The beginningless connection with bodies may be partly responsible for the concealment of the true nature of the *jīva*;¹³ the more potent reason is, of course, the will of the Lord, on which, indeed, depend bondage and release. Because of the beginningless *apacāra*¹⁴ of the *jīva*, the Lord wills that the true nature of the former should be concealed.¹⁵

**Embodiment
due to beginning-
less *apacāra* serves
as a veil.**

¹² II, 3, 18.

¹³ III, 2, 5.

¹⁴ *Apacāra* may mean either a transgression or a deficiency or a flaw. Śrīkanṭha does not make clear the sense in which he uses the term. On the former interpretation, we shall have an interesting doctrine of a beginningless original sin; on the latter we have an approximation to Siddhānta Śaivism, according to which the envelopment by *ānava* is a congenital flaw, as verdigris is a natural flaw of copper. The view that the *jīva*'s powers are concealed, because of association with a body, marks a divergence from the central idea of the Siddhānta, namely, that *ānava* veils, while *māyā* helps to unveil by providing the body, senses, etc., as means of enjoyment for the working out of karma. Appayya in his commentary seems to have no doubt that *apacāra* means transgression of the commands of the Lord. He also considers III, 2, 5 to propound a doctrine of the obscuration of the soul's powers by *ānava mala*, in addition to the association with bodies; the sign of disjunction "*vā*" in "*dehayogād vā (so'pi)*" is interpreted by him as equivalent to the sign of conjunction "*ca*".

¹⁵ III, 2, 4.

It is of the essential nature of the jīva to be a knower. We do come across texts which call him ajña, the ignorant one, but they only intend to distinguish him from Parameśvara, the former being kiñcijjña (little-knower) while the latter is sarvajña (all-knower). And though the knowledge of the finite self seems to be limited and determined by some form of matter, *e.g.*, the body, this holds true only of the state of bondage; when the triple dirt is washed away, the naturally illimitable knowledge of the jīva shines forth, and in that condition, it is comparable to Brahman's knowledge.¹⁶

The difference between knower and knowledge is taught by Śruti;¹⁷ they are distinct like the earth and its quality, *smell*.¹⁸

The knower is also spoken of as knowledge, for the latter too is an attribute of the jīva, latent in him, and gradually manifesting itself like virility in the physical body. The use of this term to denote the jīva has as much justification as the use of the term jñānam (knowledge) in the case of Brahman (in passages like "satyam jñānam anantam brahma"). There is also this further justification, that knowledge exists in constant association with the jīva. The name "cow" is applied to all animals that possess the generic attributes connoted by that word; the application of the name "knowledge" to the jīva is of the same kind, and may be explained in the same way.¹⁹

¹⁶ II, 3, 19.

¹⁷ *Bṛh.*, IV, 3, 30.

¹⁸ II, 3, 27 and 28.

¹⁹ II, 3, 29-31.

It is matter for legitimate doubt whether Śrīkaṇṭha realised all the implications of the illustration used by him. Rāmānuja, whose illustration is largely identical with Śrīkaṇṭha's, is interested to make out that the knowing subject and the object known cannot be merged into the act of knowing or into knowledge.²⁰ To this end, he has to refer to the jīva as the knower and seek a justification for the use of the term "knowledge" as referring to the finite self. Śrīkaṇṭha apparently agrees with this view, though as noted in the appendix, he closes the topic about the knower (jñādhikaraṇa) with sūtra 19, and is supposed to be here concerned with the discussion of the size of the soul. But, if the illustration he gives in II, 3, 30 is to apply, the jīva becomes a species of knowledge, just as short-horned cows are a species of cow; and one more affinity with Advaita would be indicated. And yet, since Rāmānuja uses the same illustration, the monistic implication, one may infer, was not fully present to the minds of either. Of course, a viśiṣṭādvaitin is also an advaitin, in his own way; but, as pointed out elsewhere, he prefers to conceive of Brahman as the species or the individual to which generic attributes apply rather than as the universal realised in different ways in various particulars of experience. In so far as non-dualism may be distinguished from monism, the former is non-dualistic, the latter monistic. The illustration in question has a monistic implication, though the main doctrine is non-dualism.

That the jīva is atomic in size is understood from passages which mention his
Atomicity. departure from the body,²¹ his going

²⁰ See his criticism of Advaita in his commentary on I, 1, 1.

²¹ *Bṛh.*, IV, 4, 2.

to other worlds and his final return here.²² There are other texts which speak of the ātman as non-atomic,²³ but these refer to the Lord. The minute size is mentioned both directly and also by comparison with a measure, *e.g.*, the point of a goad or the point of a hair divided a hundred-fold.²⁴ In spite of this limitation, the self may feel what happens in any part of the body, just as the pleasure derived from a spot of sandal paste is diffused throughout the body; and the analogy with the latter is complete, since, just as the paste is located in some one part of the body, the self is also located in one part, *viz.*, the heart. An even better analogy is that of the pervasiveness of the qualities of a substance, as, for example, the radiance of a gem.²⁵ If the self were not minute, there would be eternal perception or eternal non-perception or eternal limitation of one by the other.²⁶

The finite self is the agent in all action, as otherwise the futility of injunctions and prohibitions would follow. He is also referred to by Śruti²⁷ as one who takes the senses with him and moves about in the body. Agency may not be ascribed to buddhi (the discriminative faculty) or prakṛti, as this brings about many difficulties. Śruti says “vijñānam yajñam tanute (vijñāna, *i.e.*, the self performs the sacrifice).”²⁸ The name “vijñānam” does not denote buddhi, for, where it is used elsewhere in that sense, we find also the use of the instrumental

²² *Brh.*, IV, 4, 6.

²³ *Ib.*, IV, 4, 22.

²⁴ *Svet.*, V, 8.

²⁵ II, 3, 20-26.

²⁶ II, 3, 32.

²⁷ *Brh.*, II, 18.

²⁸ *Taitt.*, II, 1, 17.

case (vijñānena).²⁹ Buddhi is thus an instrument and cannot be an agent.

Prakṛti being one and common, its agency would bring about non-discrimination of results. Further, the agent is expected to be the enjoyer as well; how can prakṛti which is non-intelligent be the enjoyer? And what becomes of the enjoyment predicated of the self? Does the latter only enjoy and not act? Again, meditation has to be practised by the self to attain final release; but if prakṛti be the agent in all action, the self could neither meditate nor be released. All things considered, agency is best ascribed to the self who can either act or refrain from action, according to his desire, just as a carpenter works when he pleases and refrains when he does not desire to work. This change from activity to inactivity and back cannot hold good of buddhi and prakṛti as agents, for, desire is alien to their nature; and consequently, perpetual action or perpetual inaction would follow if they were agents.³⁰

The jīva, however, is not an entirely free agent, since his activity depends on the Lord and is derived from Him. This does not necessitate the conclusion that injunctions and prohibitions are purposeless or that the Lord is cruel and partial, for, the Lord pays regard to the efforts made by the self. The jīva embarks on action of his own free-will for the ripening of his karma, with a view to secure final liberation. The Lord sees and estimates these efforts, permits the jīva to act and makes him act in certain ways. The position of the finite self is analogous to that of a lad who can lift a log only

²⁹ *Bṛh.*, II, 1, 17.

³⁰ II, 3, 33-39.

with the help of a strong man, but is yet subject to being commanded to do or refrain in respect of lifting the log.³¹

This reconciliation of free-will and determinism is at least as interesting as any other attempt to solve the problem. The general outstanding feature of the jīva is his dependence, his limitation, his being at the command of others.³² Elsewhere, it is said that he to whom the prāṇas belong, *i.e.*, the jīva, is controlled by Brahman³³ and that bondage and release are dependent on the will of the Highest, whereby the true nature of the self is concealed.³⁴ In spite of the predication of such absolute power and full control, room is left for individual initiative. In common with the best traditions of the Hindu philosophy of action, attention is directed to the endeavour, not to its results. The end may or may not be accomplished, in the form in which the individual wills it; and in so far as it is accomplished, this may be due almost wholly to the will of the Lord, the senior partner in the enterprise. What is of importance, however, to the jīva is that he should put forth effort and strive to realise what is enjoined, while avoiding what is prohibited. The striving constitutes the act of freedom, whereby karma gets matured, and release is brought near. This seems to be about as near as we can get to a solution of the problem of free-will. That the solution is perfect, no one can claim; for the question is insistent, "if the Lord is the cause of everything, does He cause or influence the will of the jīva or not?" If He does, then the Lord is

³¹ II, 3, 40 and 41.

³² I, 2, 11.

³³ II, 4, 13.

³⁴ III, 2, 4.

responsible for all acts, and there can be no freedom; if He does not, there is limitation of His omnipotence or of His benevolence. If He really wills the good of His creatures, why should He not make them do what is right? If He cannot make them so act, is He omnipotent? The answer of the theist of the West would be that omnipotence is not to be conceived as the arbitrariness of a despot, seeking to disregard all laws, natural and moral; he would add that the Lord desires voluntary service, not the adoration of machines warranted not to go wrong.³⁵ The essence of the answer is that the limitation is a self-limitation on the part of God. The answer of the Śaivite, through substantially the same, is slightly different. According to him, souls exist from eternity, tainted by separatist tendencies; they have to rid themselves of their impurities and attain knowledge; there is only one way of achieving this end, the ripening of karma through a series of births. Souls not being originated, the responsibility for their creation does not rest with the Lord; and the same has to be said in respect of the inequalities and original imperfections among souls. The Lord is not accountable for these; but yet, out of His infinite grace He seeks to remedy their condition. That human beings are free to do evil is a fact; the perfection of such beings can come about only through the exercise of that freedom. This fact has nothing to do with the Lord's like or dislike for mechanical toys. The trials and tribulations of the world constitute a necessary part of the process of purification; the Lord cannot be asked to mitigate these, any more than the surgeon can be asked to cure a case of cataract except by opera-

³⁵ Cp. Pringle—Pattison, *The Idea of God*, pp. 403-405.

tion. For the pain of the operation he is no more responsible than for the occurrence of the disease. The provisional externalisation of souls and the notion that they are beginningless help this doctrine over difficulties which are surmounted but indifferently by Western theism.³⁶

It must, however, be remembered that the externalisation is but provisional. In spite of all the declarations of beginninglessness, the world both intelligent and non-intelligent, expresses the Cit-Śakti of the Lord and Cit-Śakti is the body of the Lord. The jīva was not created out of the void at a particular time; but he is none the less an expression of the nature of the Lord. How, then, does he happen to be so very imperfect while his Archetype is also the type of perfection? This is the final problem to which, one ventures to think, theism as such fails to find a solution. To postulate a multiplicity of beginningless entities is frankly to shirk the problem. And, however much one may avoid the notion of a cause in time, the conception of the Lord as the ground of the souls cannot be banished; and all our difficulties continue along with this notion. Further, the combination of non-origination in time with metaphysical dependence provides just the distinction of standpoints that seems almost inevitably to lead to the Advaita doctrine.

The jīva is a part of Brahman. Texts which assert the identity of the two establish only the pervasion of the former by the latter. As a result of this pervasion, the name "Brahman" is applicable

**The Jīva is an
amsa of Brahman.**

³⁶ Cp. Ward: "This conception of God-and-the-world is beyond us; we can assign it no beginning and we say it is 'eternal'; we can find no ground for it and so we say it is the 'absolute'." *Pluralism and Theism*, p. 241.

to both. In the same way, a faggot pervaded by fire is itself called fire. This explanation is quite in accordance with the description in the Śruti; Brahman is spoken of as being fishermen, slaves and gamblers, because all these beings are pervaded by Him; the soul is said to be one of the forms (the eight mūrtis) of Śiva.³⁷

Imperfection of the parts does not attach to the whole, the whole being greater than the parts, just as the gem is greater than its radiance, and a species more than its generic quality.³⁸

The Smṛtis too say that the jīva is only a part of Brahman. All the parts are not uniform, but are subject to different sets of commands, on account of their connection with different bodies; but though there is thus non-continuity, there is an essential similarity of experience among the souls, since they are all limited by bodies, and consequently entertain thoughts like "I am tall, I am short, I am a brāhmin" and so on. This common feature distinguishes their experience from that of released souls, who have attained to the state of the Highest Self, whose knowledge, etc., are eternal and unsurpassable.³⁹

The contention that it is Brahman who manifests Himself as the jīva through limitations, real or fictitious, is fallacious; in so far as such limitations are admitted, they cannot but affect the nature of Brahman Himself; and if they do not exist, there can be no difference between the jīva and Brahman or among the jīvas themselves. Thus,

**Fallacies of
Abheda and Bhe-
da bheda.**

³⁷ II, 3, 42-44.

³⁸ II, 3, 45.

³⁹ II, 3, 46 to 48.

confusion cannot be avoided, whether in the *adr̥ṣṭa* of the *jīvas* or in the mental activity in the shape of desire, resolve, etc., that causes both action and *adr̥ṣṭa*. Nor can this confusion be avoided by the postulation of distinctions of place, as all such distinctions are resolved in the Absolute, in the absence of limiting adjuncts, which, if present, would limit the Absolute and thus detract from its absolute character.⁴⁰

Coming to the states of the finite self, we distinguish three—waking, dreaming and sleep. The characteristics of the waking state are those already described. The state of swoon is a half-state, being mid-way between sleep and death. It is different from waking and dreaming in that consciousness is absent; it is also different from sleep, since the sleeping person has a pleasant countenance, while that of the person in a swoon is distorted.⁴¹

The *jīva* is not the shaper of dreams, though the text of one *śākhā* speaks of him as the shaper of what is desired.⁴² The creations in dreams are wonderful in that they are neither permanent nor universal. Only a Being all of whose purposes come true can create these; and this faculty of *satya-saṁkalpatva* is but latent in the *jīva*; it is not freely manifested, because of beginningless *apacāra*. Another indication to the effect that the *jīva* cannot be the creator is provided by the fact that dreams are portents, very often of evil, and these no *jīva* would willingly create for himself.⁴³

⁴⁰ II, 3, 49 to 52.

⁴¹ III, 2, 10.

⁴² *Kātha*, V, 8.

⁴³ III, 2, 1 to 6.

In deep sleep, the jīva rests in the Supreme Self and returns thence in waking. The various statements about resting in the arteries (nāḍis), in the pericardium (purītat), and in Brahman have to be taken cumulatively, as when it is said of a man that he sleeps on the terrace on a couch. To take the alternatives as exclusive by adopting a disjunctive reading would lead to eight kinds of difficulty: (a) if the arteries alone be taken as the resting place, the truth of the passages which mention Brahman and the pericardium must be abandoned (and thus Śruti would be falsified); (b) this falsity which cannot be established is assumed; (c) if, at a later stage, the pericardium and Brahman are considered the resting places, the truth, abandoned at first would now be accepted; and (d) the falsity assumed before, would now be abandoned. We thus have four faults of interpretation with reference to the texts about the purītat and Brahman, viz., the abandonment of the established, assumption of the non-established, the assumption of what was abandoned, and the abandonment of what was assumed. A similar set of four difficulties will arise, in respect of the texts about the nāḍis if we start with discrediting them. Because of these eight faults consequent on the disjunctive reading, the cumulative reading is to be preferred.⁴⁴

The individuality of the jīva does not cease with sleep, for it is seen to continue after waking. It is the person who went to sleep that again wakes up, for it is he who has to enjoy the fruit of action performed without knowledge. It is also seen that he can recall past experience as his own. Śruti too says that

Return to bondage in waking.

⁴⁴ III, 2, 7 and 8.

all such beings regain *their* own nature as lion, or tiger, or wolf, when they return from the Self.⁴⁵ Further, the injunctions in regard to the attainment of release would become futile, if one could finally realise Brahman in sleep. We are also told that "they come from the Self, they do not know" implying their ignorance of the Bliss that is Brahman. Hence, the identification in sleep is temporary and it is the sleeper that awakes.⁴⁶

Śrīkaṇṭha speaks of the triple dirt (*mala-traya*) that envelops the soul⁴⁷ and is shaken off only by knowledge and the constant contemplation of Brahman. He does not enumerate them categorically and leaves us in doubt as to their identity.⁴⁸ But karma is undoubtedly one

⁴⁵ Ch., VI, 10, 2.

⁴⁶ III, 2, 9.

⁴⁷ II, 3, 19.

⁴⁸ But Appayya Dikṣita in his commentary enumerates the bonds as *mala*, *karma* and *māyā*; *mala* means for him, as for the Siddhāntins, *ānava mala*. It is worth noting that the commentary on the *Mokṣa Kārikā*, vs. 47-52, distinguishes between two kinds of ignorance (*ajñāna*), that caused by remembrance of qualities observed previously in another object, and that caused through obscuration by some agency. An example of the former is the mistaken cognition of silver in mother-of-pearl; this is removable by enlightenment. Not so the other kind of ignorance, which is exemplified in the perception of two moons because of an organic defect in the eye. What is needed in this case is the removal of the defect, not bare enlightenment. Bondage, argues the commentator, is due to the latter kind of ignorance, consequent on association with impurity and not to the former; hence it is removable by *dikṣā* and not by knowledge alone. It is very doubtful if Śrīkaṇṭha ever intended to distinguish between the two kinds of ignorance; he has certainly not made it clear in his commentary. This would so far be an indication of his leaning to Advaita, and a point favourable to Appayya's thesis. It is, therefore, surprising that Appayya should act in opposition to the interests of his position and seek to read in the *bhāṣya* a notion of *ānava* never clearly presented therein. One possible explanation is that Appayya wanted to be faithful to the text and the spirit of the original; another is that he was reading Siddhānta into Śivādvaita, as, at a later date, he read Advaita into it; a third is

of the bonds and the treatment thereof is fairly extensive. In the sūtra “ānandamayo’byāsāt” there is reference to the impurity that obscures (tirodhāna mala). Just as the highly lustrous moon is concealed by clouds, the eternally pure Being is also hidden from view by impurity. Now, tirodhāna is one of the activities of the Lord. The Siddhāntins speak of it as impurity because of its association with impurity, with a view to its removal.⁴⁹ It is not known if Śrīkanṭha is following the same usage or if the word tirodhāna mala means nothing more than the impurity which conceals, no reference to a technical term being intended.

Further references to the veiling of the individual’s purity or knowledge are to be found in I, 2, 9 and II, 3, 21 (where the jīva’s capacity and intelligence are said to be manifested on the removal of the veil of dirt), III, 2, 4 and 5 (where the concealment is said to be due to the connection with bodies and to beginningless apacāra), and IV, 4, 1 (which says that the true nature of the self is not originated, but made manifest through the destruction of the enveloping impurities, by the grace of Śiva). None of these helps us to a more positive knowledge of the full number or the exact nature of the various bonds. Appayya Dikṣita in his commentary on II, 2, 38 sets out a full list of the thirty-six tattvas (categories) and distinguishes three kinds of māyā (śuddha, aśuddha and prakṛti), but it is difficult to see the basis for the distinction in Śrīkanṭha’s doctrine.

that he had not yet realised fully the possibility of an Advaita interpretation. A statement in the *AL*, p. 144, lends some colour to all the three suppositions.

⁴⁹ See *Sivaprakāśam*, sūtra 2, verse 2. Cp. also verse 5 of *TP* and Aghora Śiva’s commentary thereon.

The only bond of which we have definite knowledge from Śrīkaṇṭha is karma. This **Karma.** is beginningless, just as its abode, the individual (kṣetrajña) is beginningless. It is an ever-flowing stream, the result of which is bondage to the cycle of re-birth.⁵⁰ The differences of enjoyment noticed in the state of saṃsāra, are due to the respective karmas of the souls concerned.⁵¹ But it is not a self-sufficient principle, for, though not originated by the Lord, it has yet to be directed by Him. The apparent inequalities of dispensation, however, are due to the varying potencies of different karmas, not to the Lord's direction.⁵²

Release can be secured only by realisation of one's own essential nature, and this cannot take place until karma fructifies and is fully experienced through enjoyment or suffering. The Lord wills to release all, but His will is effective only in the case of those whose karma has ripened; just as the Sun, whose action is impartial and uniform, can yet make only those lotus buds bloom as are ready.⁵³

Karma cannot bring about its own fruit, any more than service can bring about its own reward. The attainment of the fruit of action depends on the grace of the Being in whose name the action is undertaken. The postulation of apūrva (a novel unseen principle) cannot help us to do away with a superior Being or the need to obtain His grace; its only function is to obtain the production of effects at a future time, by what is itself momentary. Since the recognition of the Lord as the dispenser of fruit cannot be avoided, the assumption of an apūrva is

⁵⁰ II, 1, 35.

⁵¹ II, 1, 34.

⁵² II, 1, 35.

⁵³ II, 1, 35.

superfluous, and unjustifiable on the law of parsimony.⁵⁴

One set of good works, like agnihotra, etc., attains its consummation in knowledge; another such set vanishes with the advent of knowledge. There is still a third set inherited by the friends of the man who attains release. This too could have been worked out, but for the process having been held in check by the stronger karma of a previous life; it continues to exist, therefore, contributing to the conditions auxiliary to knowledge, such as health, mental purity and so on; these auxiliaries do not disappear with the rise of knowledge. That counter-action of the kind mentioned is possible and can be overcome, we see from the mantra, "Yad eva vidyayā karoti, tad eva vīryavattaram bhavati, whatever is performed with knowledge, that becomes stronger": the "becoming stronger" is the acquisition of the ability to overcome obstacles due to prior karma. It is indeed to surmount such difficulties that such rites as agnihotra are recommended.⁵⁵

Just as a man's good work goes over to his friends, his evil karma, if any, passes to his enemies. The acquisition by friends and enemies is complementary to the process of discarding, and the two should be contemplated together, though the mention of them occurs in two different contexts and śākhās. The supplementation of the information contained in one śākhā by reference to another is both correct and usual. For instance, the bits of broken twigs used for counting the number of oblations are in one context merely said to be children of the tree; the tree is specified as the uḍumbara

⁵⁴ III, 2, 37.

⁵⁵ IV, 1, 17 and 18.

only elsewhere; but the specification holds good for all śākhās. Instances of this kind may be multiplied.⁵⁶

Final release from good and evil deeds takes place for the enlightened one, not at death, but only on crossing the Virajā, the river that constitutes the boundary of Viṣṇu-loka, beyond which lies the abode of Śiva, the region of final liberation and the full attainment of self-hood. Till that stage is reached, the intellect continues in a state of greater or less contraction, *i.e.*, in the condition characteristic of saṃsāra; and the continuance of saṃsāra is inexplicable apart from a residue of karma. The suggestion that a subtle body may persist in the absence of karma is irrelevant; for, the material factor in the problem is not that a subtle body persists, but what it does. This, as we have seen, is departure along the path of the gods at the end of which alone realisation comes about, causing expansion of the intellect. Up to that stage, both saṃsāra and karma continue.⁵⁷

Even good deeds are productive of results undesired by him who seeks liberation and are in that sense opposed to liberation. Previously acquired good karma serves to secure favourable conditions for knowledge, by creating sound health and so on, and disappears with the death of the individual. Other good deeds which are practised as part of meditation (*vidyā*) or as contributory thereto do

⁵⁶ III, 3, 26.

⁵⁷ III, 3, 27 to 30. This is an intelligible position in itself but difficult to reconcile with IV, 1, 13-14 and 17, where evil karma is said to be destroyed even with the advent of contemplation, and good karma too ceases either at death or earlier. What is said to cease at death is just the kind of vidyānugūṇa karma which is inherited by a man's friends when he attains release. The statement as to the cessation of karma at death has presumably to be interpreted as partial cessation, in the light of III, 3, 30.

not cling, being performed without any desire for fruit.⁵⁸

When contemplation commences, accumulated karma ceases to exist and future action fails to taint.⁵⁹ Texts like “nābhuktam kṣīyate karma kalpakoṭīśatair api”⁶⁰ (*Paṇḍara Āgama*) are intended to apply only to the average jīva who has not yet secured enlightenment.⁶¹ But only that part of past karma which has not yet begun to take effect is destroyed by contemplation; the rest goes out with the destruction of the body, that being the limit set by Śruti for release: “Yāvad eva ciraṁ tāvaṁ na vimokṣye, atha sampatsye, there is no release so long as there is stay (in the body), then there is attainment.”⁶²

Persons of enlightenment like Vasiṣṭha who are placed in high office, are released when their period of office comes to a close, *i.e.*, when all the karma for which the office is a requital is exhausted.⁶³ The enjoyment they may derive in that state, as the fruit of karma, does not lead to forgetfulness, as the two are not identical or necessarily connected; hence, the original enlightenment continues undim-

⁵⁸ IV, 1, 14.

⁵⁹ Sūtra 13 confines itself to evil karma; it is sūtra 14 that refers to good karma. That sūtra does not mention the cessation of any part of good karma on the advent of knowledge. The introduction to sūtra 17, however, speaks of good action that ceases with the beginning of knowledge, “anyā ca pūrvakṛtā sādhu-kṛtyā vidyā-prārambhe sati vinaṣṭā.” Hence, the statement in the present exposition is made so as to cover both. An exception is, of course, to be made, where cessation at a later period is definitely mentioned as in IV, 1, 14.

⁶⁰ “Except by enjoyment, karma does not diminish, even in hundreds of aeons.”

⁶¹ IV, 1, 13.

⁶² IV, 1, 15.

⁶³ III, 3, 31.

med. There is no occasion to fear an endless cycle of re-birth for these souls also. The lapse of knowledge at death is not final, but similar to the lapse of consciousness during sleep; and memory can serve in good stead in the former case, as much as in the latter.⁶⁴

The eschatology of the Vedānta is largely based on the pañcāgnividyā of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, the knowledge of the five fires, which was imparted by the king Pravāhaṇa Jaivali to Gautama, and had not before been taught to any brāhmin.⁶⁵

Eschatology:
the pañcagni-
vidya.

⁶⁴ IV, 1, 19.

⁶⁵ The five fires are this world, parjanya (rain), the earth, man, and woman. From the libation in the fifth fire, man is born; hence it is said that the water in the fifth libation becomes man. Then comes the description of the paths of the gods and the fathers;

“1. Those who know this and those who in the forest meditate upon Faith and Penance, go to Light, from Light to Day, from Day to the bright half of the month, from the bright half of the month to those six months during which the Sun rises northwards;

“2. From these months to the year; from the year to the Sun; from the Sun to the Moon; from the Moon to Lightning. There is a person, not human; he carries them to Brahman. This is the path of the Gods.

“3. And those who live in villages, perform sacrifices and works of public utility, and give alms,—they pass on to smoke, from smoke to night, from night to the dark half of the month, from the dark half of the month to the six months during which the Sun rises southwards, from there they do not reach the year.

“4. From the months they go to the Region of the Fathers, from the Region of the Fathers to Ākāśa, from Ākāśa to the Moon. That is Soma, the king. That is the food of the Gods. That the Gods eat.

“5. Having dwelt there till the falling off, they return again by the same path as they came to Ākāśa; from Ākāśa to Air; and having become the Air, they become smoke; and having become smoke, they become mist.

“6. Having become the mist, he becomes the cloud; having become the cloud, he rains. Then they are born as rice and barley,

Release does not come with death even to the enlightened one; for, the state of
The Deva-yana. samsāra continues up to the stage of the union with Brahman, and prior to that there is departure by the path of the gods. The declaration of immortality in the case of one who knows Brahman, indicates only *early* attainment of immortality, not *immediate* attainment thereof; nor is departure by the path of the gods inconsistent with the early liberation at the end.⁶⁶

How can departure along the path take place when the body is no more and the senses have departed? Embodiment does not finally cease with the destruction of the gross body. The jīva in departing from this life goes forth enveloped in a subtle body, constituted by water that is tripartite, and accompanied by the senses and the chief vital air. True, it is said that the senses return at death to their presiding deities, *e.g.*, sight to Agni and so on; but this is only figurative, as seen from the accompanying statement that the hairs become grass. That there is a subtle body, the basis of which is water, is indicated by the pañcāgnividya which declares water in the fifth libation to become man; this water constitutes the subtle body.

herbs and trees, sesamum and beans. Henceforth, the exit becomes extremely difficult; for, whoever eats the food, and who sows the seed, he becomes like unto him.

“7. Those whose conduct here has been good will quickly attain some good birth—the birth of a Brāhmaṇa, the birth of a Kṣatriya or the birth of a Vaiśya. And those whose conduct has been bad, will quickly attain some evil birth—the birth of a dog, the birth of a hog, or the birth of a Caṇḍāla.

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“9. On none of these two ways are those small creatures continually revolving; they die and are born. This is the third place.”

(Ch., IV, 10, Dr. Jha's translation.)

* IV, 2, 8.

The existence of a subtle body is known even in life, as the source of heat, which is not the property of a gross body, not being seen in a corpse. With the destruction of the latter, the subtle body is not destroyed. How else could we understand the possibility of departure along a path or discussion with the Moon?⁶⁷

Nor is there any declaration of Śruti discountenancing departure for the enlightened ones. The text quoted in this connection “Na tasya prāṇā utkrāṃanti, of him the prāṇas do not depart” states only that the senses do not abandon the soul that is about to start on the path; that this is the correct interpretation is seen from the reading of the other śākhā “na tasmāt prāṇā utkrāṃanti, from him the prāṇas do not depart.” Smṛti too declares the passing of the wise man to the path, through the 101st artery, the mūrdhanya nāḍi.⁶⁸ According to some, however, there is no passing along the path for the devotees of the Non-related (niranvaya).⁶⁹

As to what happens to the enlightened person at the end of the path, there is some doubt, because of the different views of Bādari and Jaimini. The result of enlightenment is, in any case, release, early, if not immediate. The discussion of the conflicting opinions and the statement of the final view must, therefore, form part of the treatment of release in the next chapter.⁷⁰

**Enlightenment
leads to release.**

⁶⁷ IV, 2, 9 and 11.

⁶⁸ IV, 2, 12 and 13.

⁶⁹ IV, 2, 13.

⁷⁰ Further details as to the Deva- and Pitṛ-yānas will be found in the accompanying Note F.

NOTE F

THE DEVA- AND PITR-YANAS

It is not the subtle body alone that is to be understood to depart on either path, the self being divorced therefrom; for, the text speaking of those who perform sacrifices and works of public utility, refers unmistakably to the selves, not to the bodies merely. They attain the state of King Soma. It is also said that they become the food of the gods; but from this implication of non-sentieny, it may not be argued that only the bodies reach that state. All that is meant is that a person so involved in the daily round of duties, and consequently ignorant of the Self, is in no better condition than a good servant, a means of affording pleasure to the gods.⁷¹

From the mention of the manner in which re-birth is determined for those who return, it is evident that, at the time of return, there is a residue of karma, which settles the station and the mode of re-birth. The expression "caraṇa" used in the context means good and evil deeds, directly and not by implication only, as some would make out.⁷²

The mention of a third class of beings who are born and die shows that both departure and return are not invariably necessary for all. Men of knowledge depart, but do not return; those devoted to good actions merely, both depart and return; those who lead evil lives, they also return, but they do not have to go first to the Moon. Their descent and ascent are confined to a visit to Yamaloka for punishment and a return to the earth. Nor need there be any difficulty about their not coming through the fifth libation and the antecedent stages, for, that is not the only mode of birth. There have been men, not born of women, like Agastya, Droṇa and so on. Further,

⁷¹ III, 1, 1 to 7.

⁷² III, 1, 8 to 11.

Śruti itself tells us of the possibility of birth from a germ, such creatures being included in those originating from heat.⁷³

The path beginning with light is the only path leading to the attainment of Brahman. There are other texts which apparently inculcate other paths; but those lead only to the realisation of the appropriate manifestation of Brahman, in each case. Whenever there is mention of a path to Brahman, it can be shown to be identical with the path of light, etc. (*arcirādi mārga*). For instance, the Taittiriya (I, 6) description of departure by the roots of the hair is identical in sense with the texts mentioning departure by the *mūrdhanya nādi*. It is claimed by some that departure on the path of the gods is unnecessary for the devotees of the Non-related.⁷⁴

The expression *kāla* used in the description of the path in the eighth chapter of the *Bhagavad Gītā* must be understood to signify not time, but the presiding deities, who serve as guides. There is, indeed, no restriction as to when a man should die in order to attain release; for, Śruti says that for the enlightened one there is delay only so long as there is continuance in the body. A person may die at night or in the southern course of the Sun, and yet be sure of his liberation, the prohibition in this respect applying only to unenlightened persons. Nor need there be any difficulty about the absence of the rays of the Sun to conduct the soul at night; they are undoubtedly present even then, as may be seen from the presence of warmth.⁷⁵

At the time of departure, speech gets merged in the mind, and the mind in the chief vital air; the vital air goes to the self and along with the self enters into union with the elements that have been rendered tripartite. The merging mentioned is not comparable to the absorption of an effect into its material cause. It is a merger of

⁷³ III, 1, 12 to 21.

⁷⁴ IV, 3, 1. As Appayya says, the exception about *niranvayo-pāsakas* comes in wherever there is occasion to insist on the one and only path to Brahman-realisation.

⁷⁵ IV, 2, 17 to 20.

function only. At death speech first ceases to function, its activities being refunded into the mind; thinking next fails, and mental activities are refunded into breath; and so on. Though the earth which is the substance of the mind is itself the effect of water, of which *prāṇa* is a form, *prāṇa* should not be taken to be the material cause of the mind; for, *prāṇa* (breath) and *annam* (food or earth) are *different* specifications of water.⁷⁶

The subtle elements related to the self are merged in the Highest; their merger too is of function only, the expression used (*sampatti*) being most aptly understood as indistinguishability of the elements from Brahman.⁷⁷

The merger of speech in mind, etc., the lighting up of the heart, and all other stages of departure are common to the wise man and the unenlightened one, up to the moment when the former goes up through the skull and the 101st artery by the power of his knowledge and meditation, and the grace of the Lord within the heart. The Lord is the one object of knowledge for those who seek release. He favours His devotees with divine illumination, whereby they attain unsurpassable Bliss and themselves take on the blissful form.⁷⁸

The enlightened soul is led up by the person in the lightning to Śiva that is supreme Brahman. For, of Śiva it is said, in numerous Śruti texts like the *Śiva Samkalpopaniṣad*, that He is greater than other deities, Brahman and Nārāyaṇa: “*parāt parataro brahmā, tat parāt parato hariḥ, tat parāt paratorīśaḥ*: Brahman is greater than the great; Hari is greater than that; even greater than that one is Īśa”.⁷⁹

The *jīva* that has not yet attained final release returns from the world of Soma. He is said to become ether, air, smoke, mist and so on. What is asserted here is the attainment of similarity, not identity. For the self to *become* any of these would mean its taking on a body of the nature of one of

⁷⁶ IV, 2, 1 to 6.

⁷⁷ IV, 2, 14 and 15.

⁷⁸ IV, 2, 7; IV, 2, 16.

⁷⁹ IV, 3, 15.

these;⁸⁰ and for the assumption of a body at that stage there is no need or justification. Bodies are taken on for the sake of enjoyment, while the soul here has nothing to enjoy; for, the efforts of the past karma have been fully experienced; what residue there is determines the manner of birth in this world, and hence cannot come into play at any earlier stage.

An ingenious suggestion may be made that there is something other than both the above mentioned sets of karma, *viz.*, the sin involved in the sacrificial acts, such as killing an animal, and that this has to be expiated by means of an intermediate birth. What is enjoyed up to the stage of the Somaloka is only the merit resulting from the sacrifice; its incidental sinfulness has to be made up for later, when the jīva becomes ether and so on. Such a position misconceives entirely the nature of the sacrificial act. It is not the infliction of an injury, for, according to the declaration of Śruti⁸¹ the animal sacrificed goes

⁸⁰ That it changes its essential nature and really becomes another thing is inconceivable.

⁸¹ Rg Veda, I, 162, 21. The reconciliation of the injunction to kill for sacrificial purposes, with the general injunction not to kill, is the subject of a lengthy and interesting discussion by Appayya Dīkṣita in his *Pūrvottara-Mīmāṃsā-Vāda-Nakṣatra-Mālā*, pp. 32 *et seq.* He says that the Rāmānujīyas adopt merely the statement of Śrīkaṇṭha, and do not attempt to reconcile the two injunctions. That is to say, they do not perceive the contradiction, but make out that sacrificial killing is not injurious. Indeed, Rāmānuja goes further and says that the killing is a beneficial act, since it helps the animal to go to heaven. This position, according to Appayya, is unsatisfactory. The act is no doubt injurious; but it does not come within the prohibition, being vidhi sprṣṭa, like the injunction not to kill. Where Śruti seems both to enjoin and to prohibit, the two prescriptions cannot be contradictory; they must be synthesised harmoniously as general rule and exception or in some such fashion. This is the explanation which is declared by Kumārila and is acceptable to Śrīkaṇṭha also. Śrīkaṇṭha says little in III, 1, 25 to justify this claim; but what he says is not inconsistent with the position advanced. His conclusion is just negative, that the killing is non-injurious; how it is not an injury prohibited by Śruti may be explained in the manner of Kumārila and Appayya. Rāmānuja, however, goes further and makes of the act a positive advantage

up to heaven with a golden body, etc. The sacrificial act, thus, serves the interests of the animal as well as those of the sacrificer. In any case, no sin may be taken to attach to an act positively enjoined by Śruti.

to the animal; his position seems to be final and not to call for any completion. This contrast would support the view that Rāmānuja came after Śrīkanṭha. In any case, from the present context, there would seem to be little doubt as to Appayya's own belief in regard to this question. I owe the reference to Appayya's work to Mr. V. S. Ramanatha Śāstrin of the Postal Audit Office, Madras.

CHAPTER VI.

RELEASE—THE MEANS AND THE STATE.

The self's enjoyment and sorrow are due to his beginningless finitude and dependence. This state, however, is not endless, for, it is not of the essence of the jīva. It is possible for the individual to rise above his limitations, to become all-pervasive, to cease to sorrow, to cease to think of himself in terms of caste, status and condition, to have a vision of the world harmonised and free from discord, and to attain to a condition of lasting contentment, not subject to the distractions of sorrow and rejoicing. This condition of release or realisation can be brought about by meditation, necessarily preceded by correct knowledge of what is to be meditated on; for, he who meditates becomes what he meditates on, according to the tatkratunya. ¹ Contemplation of lower ends will lead to the realisation only of those ends. Release can come about by the contemplation of Him, who is eternally free from bonds, Śiva, the blue-throated consort of Umā, the Supreme Lord, the noble Being, the three-eyed God, by meditating on whom the sages attain to the First cause, the witness of all, beyond the utmost darkness. ² There is no release for those who are and elect to remain ignorant of Śiva. When

¹ Yathā kraturasmin loke puruṣo bhavati tathetaḥ pretya bhavati —Ch., III, 14, 1. "According as his will is in this world, so the man will be after he has departed hence." Dr. Jha's translation.

² Kaivalya, 7.

men get to roll up the sky like a piece of hide, then indeed may they hope to reach the end of sorrow without knowing Śiva.³

This Being is not an object of perception or other means of knowledge, such as are applicable to the finite world. He is to be realised by *saṃrādhana*,⁴ by knowledge in the form of meditation. The *Kāṭhaka Śruti*⁵ which declares that the Self is not to be obtained by the study of the Vedas nor by intelligence nor by much listening is quite clear on this point. The nature of Brahman can be apprehended by him alone who worships Brahman by contemplating Him. To such a one, the Self reveals His true nature.

If the *tatkratunyāya* applies to release, non-difference from Brahman may be expected to result for the devotee who meditates on Brahman. And this is just what happens.⁶ When Brahman appears to the constantly meditating devotees, there is no difference between the two in respect of the bliss and enjoyment attained by such realisation; by meditation on Brahman they acquire his distinctive characteristics (*asādhāraṇa-guṇāḥ*). Vāmadeva, for instance, speaks of himself as having become Manu and the Sun. We see Kṛṣṇa manifesting the powers and the form of the highest Lord (*param rūpam aiśvaram*) because of his having identified himself with the Lord in Yoga. By the force of constant meditation, Viśvāmitra acquired the capacity to create a new world, and Agastya the ability

Attainment of characteristics distinctive of Brahman, by meditation on Him.

³ *Svet.*, VI, 20.

⁴ III, 2, 23.

⁵ *Kāṭha*, II, 23.

⁶ III, 2, 24.

to drink up the ocean. Even within our experience we see that the magician by the incantation of the Garuḍa mantra acquires the virtues of Garuḍa in respect of immunity from snake-bites. Meditation which is fruitful of such results, is the only means of knowing Brahman. If, indeed, Brahman could be independently perceived, the injunction to meditate would be purposeless and futile; if it is not perceived, it cannot be the basis of inference either, for this means of knowledge requires the use of an example (dṛṣṭānta), and there can be no other being, possessing the characteristics distinctive of Brahman.

Meditation is prescribed in different forms in different contexts. Sometimes, the same form is mentioned in more than one text; and Śruti cannot possibly indulge in idle repetition; the presumption is that the vidyā varies with the context, even where the description appears to be identical. That there is difference between names and forms mentioned in the various vidyās, is apparent at the very outset. There is also difference of the attributes, and it is difficult to choose among these, adopting or rejecting any. Further, some modes of contemplation require initial purificatory ceremonies, like the Śirovrata⁷ of

Multiplicity of Vidyas: considerations determining their identity.

⁷“10. And this is declared by the following R̥k verse:

Let a man tell this science of Brahman to those only who have performed all (necessary) acts, who are versed in the Vedas, and firmly established in (the lower) Brahman, who themselves offer as an oblation the one R̥ṣi (Agni), full of faith, and by whom the rite of (carrying fire on) the head has been performed according to the rule (of the Ātharvanas).

11. The R̥ṣi Āngiras formerly told this true (science); a man who has not performed the (proper) rites, *does not read it.* *

the Ātharvaṇikas. Hence, in the multiplicity of injunctions, one seems to be left with no sure guidance.

There is not much point in the position that vidyās must be different, as Śruti may not indulge in repetition; for, it ignores the existence of different śākhās (branches) of the Vedas, while the student is expected to learn only his own śākhā. Since everything to be known has to be known through that śākhā, it has necessarily to repeat much that is common to other śākhās as well.⁸

It may well be that the texts mention both vidyās which are identical and those which are really different; again, along with reference to what may be contemplated, there may be mention of what need not or should not be meditated on. Some vidyās may require or allow of combination; in the case of others, combination may be neither desirable nor possible. The third quarter of the third adhyāya is almost entirely taken up with a consideration of these topics. One may, for convenience, classify the discussion under three heads, as cases where, (1) a specific mode of contemplation is prescribed, (2) apparently different modes of contemplation are identical, and (3) apparently identical vidyās are different. Guṇopasamhāra or combination of the qualities mentioned in different vidyās is necessary or even possible only when the vidyās are identical. Some of the principles determining identity of vidyās, etc., will be found discussed in Note G.

* * * * " *Muṇḍaka*, III, 2, 10 and 11: the translation is Max Müller's. The words underlined in the translation of verse 11, indicate the precise scope of the injunction as to Śirovrata and other such rites, to be confined to *the study of the Veda*.

⁸ III, 3, 1-4.

Where meditation has for its object the attainment of a desired and limited result, several such results may be aimed at, and to secure them different meditations may be combined.⁹ Not so, however, in meditating on the Highest Brahman. Of the various modes of contemplating him, such as the dahara ākāśa, the udgītha and so on, each aims at the realisation of Brahman; the results of each mode being identical, there is no advantage in combining the various modes. There is also the positive disadvantage that the change from one mode to another leads to distraction, thus bringing about the failure of contemplation to achieve its object.¹⁰ The modes of meditation on Brahman are, therefore, optional.

Even where contemplation of the parts seems to be prescribed by the indication of special results, meditation of the whole is always of superior value, the fruit thereof being correspondingly superior. Thus, he who meditates on Vaiśvānara as if different, *i.e.*, limited, eats food, while he who meditates on him as a whole, with organs considered as identical with the heavenly world and so on down to the earth, is said to “eat food *in all worlds, in all beings, in all selves*”, that is to say, is rewarded with the experience of Brahman.¹¹ The mention of other rewards, such as eating food, etc., indicates not an injunction, but an anuvāda, eulogistic of the final injunction and reward. This is parallel to the sacrifice offered to Vaiśvānara on twelve potsherds,

Meditation on the whole is necessary, not of the parts.

⁹ III, 3, 58.

¹⁰ III, 3, 57.

¹¹ *Ch.*, V, 11-18.

when a son is born. In this context, sacrifices on eight, nine, ten and eleven potsherds are also mentioned with appropriate rewards; but in the light of the sacrifice on twelve potsherds, the mention of the others is not considered injunctive.

The superiority of meditation on the whole is also shown by Śruti in this manner; King Aśvapati Kekaya interrogates the Ṛṣis who come to him as to what they worship, and when they give different replies, he identifies the entities mentioned with different parts of the body of Vaiśvānara, and says that the corresponding parts of their body would have decayed, faded or fallen off, if they had not gone to him for further instruction about Vaiśvānara. The futility and the danger of meditating only on the parts are thus indicated.¹²

The act of meditation is not to be performed just once, on the analogy of sacrificial rites. The latter do not perceptibly lead up to their results; their fruit is adṛṣṭa (unseen). Meditation, however, if practised unintermittently and with concentration is seen to bring about the desired result, viz., intuition of Brahman (Brahma-sākṣātkāra). Where the coming about of the result can thus be observed, the effort in relation thereto must continue to be made till the result is attained, as in the husking of paddy. Smṛti too enjoins repeated meditation and it praises the results thereof.¹³ That the act of knowing Brahman is one of meditation is seen from the interchangeable use of “veda” and “upā-

Meditation
should be repeated.

¹² III, 3. 55.

¹³ IV, 1, 2 and 13. Śrīkaṇṭha quotes from Manu Smṛti, “Ruk-mābham svapna-dhīgamyam vidyāt tu puruṣamparam: Know the Supreme Self that is golden coloured and attainable in dreams”; whether the Self is Śiva or Viṣṇu is a hotly contested question.

sīta”¹⁴ It is also well known that meditation involves a continuous representation and not a sporadic act of thought.¹⁵

Nor is the meditation to be continued only for such period as the person likes and then given up. It should be performed every day until death, and not given up at any time. Meditation which is to bring about the realisation of Brahman should not be interrupted in the middle. The Highest Brahman with his six-fold qualities (sarvajñatā, trpti, etc.) should be thought of constantly in order to realise His nature. That His nature can be made manifest is seen from the prayer addressed to Śiva “Yā te rudra śivā tanūraghorāpāpā kāśinī tayā nastanuvā śamtamayā girīśantābhicākaśiḥ, O Thou who drivest away the sorrows of samsāra, O spreader of happiness, from Thy joy-giving nature manifest to us that form of Thine which is characterised by unsurpassed Bliss—that personality which is auspicious, pleases all hearts, and is manifest to those who have destroyed all good and evil deeds in the fire of knowledge”¹⁶ The meditation necessary for such manifestation should continue uninterrupted throughout life.¹⁷

Repetition of the praṇava, wearing sacred ashes, etc., are subordinate and helpful to meditation in every case, not merely in the śākhās where they are mentioned. In this respect, they are like mantras, which,

**Auxiliaries to
meditation.**

¹⁴ Ch., III, 18, 1 and II, 18, 3; IV, 1, 4 and IV, 2, 2.

¹⁵ For Rāmānuja, this is the only valid argument. As for the difference between results which are dr̥ṣṭa and those which are adr̥ṣṭa, Rāmānuja makes his pūrvapakṣin brush it aside with the words “Knowledge is not a visible means to anything.”

¹⁶ Śvet., III, 5.

¹⁷ IV, 1, 12.

though belonging to one śākhā, are used in the performance of rites enjoined in other śākhās.¹⁸

Agnihotra and other similar acts should be performed throughout life, as they tend to create knowledge. Śruti says "Him the Brāhmaṇas seek to know by Scriptural recitations, sacrifices, gifts and the practice of austerity."¹⁹ The repetition of Vedic prayers induces the highest knowledge leading to the attainment of Parameśvara. That is why the recitation of the Śata Rudrīya is praised in the *Jābāla Śruti* and the *Kaivalya Upaniṣad*. We are told that even by the utterance of the name of Śiva, the unclean become clean, and the caṇḍāla becomes a worthy companion; "if a caṇḍāla mentions the word Śiva, talk to him, live with him, eat with him" says the *Muṇḍaka* (the reference cannot be traced).²⁰ Destruction of sin is ascribed to the repetition of the praṇava. Similarly, agnihotra, etc.,—which are dedicated to the Highest Lord, are due to His commandment and are directed to His worship,—cannot but lead to knowledge of Him.²¹

Though in the pursuit of Brahman, who is immanent in the whole universe, all considerations of time, place and posture would seem to be irrelevant, yet such of them must be taken to be prescribed as are calculated to favour concentration, which is essential to meditation.

Place, Time,
Posture, etc., suitable for contemplation.

¹⁸ III, 3, 53 and 54.

¹⁹ *Brh.*, IV, 4, 22.

²⁰ It is said that this verse must have been deliberately left out by all commentators from Śaṅkara downwards, that it must have been found in earlier texts of the *Muṇḍaka*, and that Śrīkanta who has evidently used this text should have preceded Śaṅkara. See Sentinathier's *Vīrabhadrastram*, pp. 29-30.

²¹ IV, 1, 16.

Thus, a seated posture is essential. This is expressly stated in the *Kaivalya Śruti* (sukhāsana-sthah). We are also told that the crane and the wife parted from the husband are examples of meditation, their minds being continually absorbed in one object. All the limbs are controlled, and the representation of the object is continuous like a stream of oil uninterrupted by any other thoughts. To achieve this result, concentration is necessary, and for that a sitting posture. That the immobility secured by this posture is characteristic of meditation is seen from the reference to the earth and other immovable objects as meditating, as it were.²² The Smṛti (Bhagavad Gītā)²³ also supports this view.²⁴

The same consideration applies to the choice of place, time, etc. Where the disturbing conditions of desire and aversion do not exist, there the mind becomes concentrated. The injunction to meditate in a temple, etc., applies primarily to prayer, though meditation too may be undertaken in such places if they specially favour concentration.²⁵

The practice of the Pāsupata vrata which is taught in the *Atharvaśiras* and also in the Purāṇas, leads to deliverance, even though it is not included in the āśrama dharmas, and its observance is usually prescribed only for a limited period, and for specific purposes. The only condition necessary is that the vrata should be observed not sporadically, but to the very end. Those who follow this vrata have to

**The Pasupata
Vrata.**

²² Ch., VII, 6, 1.

²³ VI, 11 and 12.

²⁴ IV, 1, 7 to 10.

²⁵ IV, 1, 11.

practise begging and acquire the virtues of calmness, etc. The object is liberation from bondage and from the condition of *paśutva*. The *vrata* is itself called *atyāśrama*,²⁶ since all the virtues of the various stages of life such as those of the student and the ascetic necessarily enter into it. If observed throughout life, it brings about liberation; its practice for a limited period brings about enjoyment.²⁷

The person who knows Brahman may not claim that to him all conduct is permissible. Even in such matters as food, Scripture requires the observance of injunctions and prohibitions, exception being made only when there is danger to life. This is seen from the story of Uṣasti Cākrāyana,²⁸ who ate the beans left over by another, but would not drink the water so left, as drinking water was not for him, then, a necessity of life. It is also said that purity of mind, strength of resolve and memory come from purity of food; the last requirement is nowhere sublated. Smṛti too says that only when the eating is necessary to avoid danger to life, does he who eat prohibited food remain untainted like a lotus leaf in water. There is also similar prohibition of other acts, which are prompted merely by inclination.²⁹ Those who follow prohibited modes of conduct act in contravention of the Lord's commands.

²⁶ It is pointed out by Sentinathier, by reference to various upa-brāhmanas, that the term *atyāśrama* denotes the *Pāśupata vrata*; see *NśB*, pp. 80, 81 and 566.

²⁷ III, 4, 48 and 49.

²⁸ *Ch.*, I, 10.

²⁹ III, 4, 28-31.

The Lord should be contemplated as identical with the self, not as different therefrom. The object of meditation is release from paśubhāva (the state of bondage) in which there is attachment to caste and creed and condition. Contemplation of the limited state will perpetuate the limitation; and in looking upon the Lord as other than the self, the latter has necessarily to be thought of as limited. One has to meditate, therefore, on oneself as free from these trammels and as identical with the glorious, independent and blissful Śiva. "I am Thou, Thou art I" are the words of the devotee, as mentioned in the *Jābāla Śruti*.³⁰ In the interpretation of this sūtra,³¹ the commentary parts company with Vaiṣṇava Viśiṣṭādvaita, according to which the Lord is to be contemplated as the Self of selves.

If, indeed, the meditating self looked upon Brahman as identical with himself as doer and enjoyer, it would not be possible for him ever to attain the intuition of the Infinite. It is because such characteristics of finite self-hood are suppressed and the qualities of freedom from sin and so on are alone contemplated that realisation of Brahman is possible, for, intuition is of the same character as what is meditated on. The fact of the self being embodied does not serve as a bar to the realisation of Brahman, only because the jīva contemplates the identity of Brahman with his own self, as free from the defects of bondage and embodiment.³²

³⁰ Śrīkaṇṭha does not refer to that Śruti by name as Śaṅkara does. Appayya Dikṣita both in *SMD* and elsewhere makes it clear that the text quoted from is the *Jābāla Śruti*.

³¹ IV, 1, 3.

³² III, 3, 51 and 52.

Liberation may take place even in this life; whether it does or not depends on the absence or otherwise of counter-acting conditions. Even sacrifice does not produce its fruit the moment it is accomplished. The analogy is, however, dangerous, as it may be pressed too far, even to the length of imagining varieties and grades of liberation, as in the fruit of karma; such procedure would be unjustified, for, release is the attainment of equality with Brahman, who is one only without a second.³³

The devotees of the Lord are favoured with divine illumination at the time of departure, for, they have worshipped Him by the performance of works enjoined in the Śruti (which contain His own commandments), avoided all actions not so enjoined, dedicated all fruits of action to Him, abandoned all desired fruit and been filled with the nectar of His wisdom; having been endowed with knowledge, they find pleasure only in devotion to Him, and desire only His grace.³⁴

The person who meditates on Brahman, reaches on his death the path of the gods, on passing along which he is finally led up by the person in the lightning to Brahman. It is said by Bādari that the non-human person (in the lightning) leads the devotees only to Hiranyagarbha, as leading up is appropriate only to a created Being. Further, the words "I come to the hall of Prajāpati", etc.,³⁵ indicate the same conclusion. Brahmā is spoken of as Brahman because of proximity, for, the former is the first-born

³³ III, 4, 50 and 51.

³⁴ IV, 2, 16.

³⁵ Cā., VIII, 14, 1.

of Brahman. Nor is there any violation of the declaration of non-return, for, at the end of the world-era, both Brahmā and those who inhabit his world return to Brahman.

Jaimini maintains that Nārāyaṇa is led up to, he being superior to Brahmā as the material cause of the latter; he too may be spoken of as Brahman as material cause of the world. This accords with the text, "So'dhvanah pāram āpnoti tad viṣṇoḥ paramam padam."³⁶ Further, the expression Prajāpati may well refer to the protector, Nārāyaṇa. The Yogins, therefore, reach the abode of Viṣṇu, dwell there, and, at the end of the great cycle, *i.e.*, on the last bodily existence coming to a close, pass on to the great Immortal Brahman and become released.

Bādarāyaṇa, however, maintains that those who meditate on Brahman become Brahman, and that final release comes to all except those who meditate on symbols. Śruti distinctly says that he who contemplates the three-eyed consort of Umā reaches Him who is the womb of all Beings, the witness of all, transcending darkness. But the other views contradict Śruti. That Brahmā or Viṣṇu cannot be the womb of all Beings, and that Śiva is above them both is seen from the *Śiva Saṃkalpa Upaniṣad*, "Brahma is greater than the great; greater still than that one is Hari; even greater than this one is Īśa." The *Kāṭhaka* text may be understood to use the term Viṣṇu in the general sense of the all-pervasive Supreme Brahman; for, what lies at the end of the six-fold path can be nothing less than the world of Śiva. Or else, the supreme abode of Viṣṇu who manifests himself as the universe is none other

* *Kāṭhaka*, III, 9.

than Parā-Śakti, Parākāśā (the supreme light), which is supreme Bliss; and this, we know, is but the Śakti of Śiva.

Those who worship Viṣṇu as the highest manifestation of Brahman reach his abode, and with all the glory of Viṣṇu manifested in themselves, at the end of the cycle, when the last bodily existence comes to a close, attain to Śiva and then are finally liberated. Final release for these is thus delayed, not denied.³⁷

He who has attained an intuition of Brahman and become equal to Brahman, views
The State of Release. the world as harmonised with Brahman for, he sees, hears and knows nothing else but Brahman.³⁸ For him, the world does not cease to exist altogether; but it is not perceived as such in its finitude and imperfection.³⁹ When the released self attains equality with Brahman, he becomes a veritable ocean of Bliss, of which the things of the world and the pleasures incidental thereto are indeed but tiny drops. The mukta can no longer perceive or follow the latter, since he is in enjoyment of the larger whole of which these are but infinitesimal parts. He sees nothing but Brahman who as supreme Bliss possesses the form of this world. He attains self-control, says the *Taittirīya Śruti*,⁴⁰ and the status of the ruler of mind, speech and sight; that is to say, his organs of perception are pure and of a different order to those of unliberated mortals. With such faculties, he becomes that, *i.e.*, Brahman whose body is ākāśa.

³⁷ IV, 3, 6-15.

³⁸ I, 3, 8.

³⁹ Cp., *RTS*, vs. 254-255; released souls perceive only the existentiality (*sattā*) of the world: *parasya vastunas sattā mātṛam*.

⁴⁰ *Taitt.*, I, 6.

This ākāśa is not the elemental ether, but the effulgent expanse of Intelligence (cidambara prakāśa śarīram). Thus it is that the world is not perceived *as such* by the released soul, but as harmonised with Brahman.⁴¹

The state of release which is participation in such unsurpassed Bliss is desired even by the gods, for their status is but fleeting and diminishes with time.⁴²

The negative characteristic of release is freedom from paśubhāva. The positive aspect is the attainment of Śivatva which is unlimited and untainted and the abundance of Supreme Bliss. The devotee who has been freed from the state of bondage by the destruction of his bonds in the torrential stream of the meditation “I am Śiva”, becomes Śiva himself; for, Śivatva is the absence of taint by any doṣa (defect) and the presence of all that is auspicious.⁴³ The Supreme Brahman is also of the same nature; and he who meditates on that becomes that. He attains that Being, who is unsurpassed

⁴¹ I, 3, 8. Cp. *Tiruvārūṭpāyan*, X, 1 and 3.

ஒங்குணர்வி னுள்ளடங்கி யுள்ளத்தி லின்பொருங்கத்
தூங்குவர்மற் றேதுண்டு சொல்.

எல்லா மறியு மறிவுரினு மீங்குவரொன்
றல்லா தறியா ாற.

Sinking in the supreme understanding, while delight sinks into their souls, they slumber in sacred peace. What other words are these? Though they have attained to the knowledge of everything, these “Knowers” here know nothing but the “Known!”—(Pope’s translation.)

⁴² I, 3, 25.

⁴³ The assertion “Śiva eva bhavati” is not quite borne out by the later statement about the attainment of śivatva. The latter would imply equality with Śiva as characteristic of release, while the former implies identity. But, as Appayya says, “eva” (alone) may be taken as equivalent to “iva” (like); thus, there will be no contradiction.

Bliss, the self-luminous witness, free from all impurities.

The state of release is the manifestation of the self's own nature; it is not the creation or the attainment of an external svarga (heaven). The manifestation of what is within comes about through the destruction of impurities that enveloped the self through time without beginning. The grace of Śiva secures release from the impurities and the states of waking, dreaming and sleep, and confers infinite Bliss. The kingdom of God is not an external state; it cometh not with observation. It is a revelation of what is within. It must also be remembered that the topic treated by Śruti,⁴⁴ in this connection, is the self. It is the ātman that is free from sin, etc., that one should try to understand; and it is the ātman that is sought to be explained further in that context.⁴⁵

The attainment of Śivatva is interpreted in different ways by Jaimini and Auḍulomi; according to the former, there is realisation of all qualities like freedom from sin, the possession of desires and purposes that come true and so on. The latter holds that there is identity only in respect of pure intelligence. Both sets of texts are true; and both views may be held together. The text "vijñāna-ghana eva" shows that the released soul is self-illuminated, not that he is intelligence only. The state of release is one of equality with Brahman in two respects: (1) self-illumination, (2) the possession of auspicious qualities.⁴⁶

Two Aspects of Śivatva: (1) Self-illumination, (2) Possession of auspicious qualities.

⁴⁴ Ch., VIII, 9, 3.

⁴⁵ IV, 4, 1 to 3.

⁴⁶ IV, 4, 5 to 7.

The released soul can by his willing obtain all objects of enjoyment. "When he desires the world of the fathers, by his own will the fathers rise up before him" says Śruti.⁴⁷ Of the beings that have thus ceased to be mere creatures, and have attained Śivatva, there can be no ruler. With the loss of paśutva, they have acquired independence. Impurity that causes contraction of the intellect (dhisamkoca) ceases for them, and hence they become omniscient; eternal wisdom (anādi bodha) comes about with the cessation of ignorance and the consequent love of bodily states and conditions;⁴⁸ there is freedom because of the non-existence of the bondage of karma, based on the misery due to old age and death; eternal satisfaction results from the enjoyment of one's own self as identical with unsurpassed Bliss; thence follow freedom from hunger, thirst, etc. Because his powers are never failing, his desires and his purposes always come true.

⁴⁷ IV, 4, 8.

⁴⁸ That the jīva becomes omniscient is an intelligible claim; but how can he who has been in bondage from time immemorial, and is released now, become anādi bodha? Indeed, the predication of anādi bodha would be inconsistent with becoming. Since, however, the Āgama (e.g., Sarvajñānottara) affirms the attainment of the eight qualities of Śiva, the attainment of anādi bodha must be understood somehow as true. The only rational interpretation, according to the Siddhāntin, is to take it that this quality of the Lord's, like other qualities of His, is reflected or manifested in the released soul. The equality of the released soul to Śiva has to be understood in a figurative sense. (See the *Drāviḍa Māpāḍiyam*, p. 322, sūtra 6, adhikaraṇa 2.) No such explanation is suggested by Śrīkaṇṭha; the only way of escape for him would seem to be the suggestion of a dual standpoint, one in time and the other a-temporal, the soul being anādi bodha from the a-temporal point of view. In such a case, the state of bondage would be not wholly real, but imagined or figurative. All this further strengthens the position of Appayya that what Śrīkaṇṭha really holds is the advaita doctrine.

The self in this state does not acknowledge even the Lord as ruler; for, having ceased to be a creature, he has gone beyond the sphere of the injunctions and prohibitions which constitute His commandments, and which have been in vogue in the long current of time.⁴⁹

Bādari holds that since released souls resemble the Lord, they have no body. Jaimini urges the opposite view on the ground of statements of manifoldness, such as "He is one, he becomes three"⁵⁰ and so on. The former view seems to have greater justification in view of such statements as the following: "by the mind perceiving the pleasures, he delights", etc.⁵¹ But Bādarāyaṇa is of opinion that either condition is possible and that both sets of statements hold good; just as the twelve days' sacrifice may be considered either a *sattra* (a sacrifice continuing for a length of time, wherein all persons engaged are principals) or an *ahina* (one that should be concluded within a stated short period, there being only one principal). The Paurāṇikas also say that the Yogins, strong as Śiva, became endowed with bodies or otherwise, as they desire.⁵² When disembodied, their experience is as that of dreaming selves; they enjoy, with the mind alone, Bliss which is the form of Brahman.⁵³ When embodied, the experience is similar to that of the waking individual. The fact of embodiment does not lead to the Yogin becoming tainted by the experience of anything which is *apuruṣārtha* (not contributing to the highest goal).

⁴⁹ IV, 4, 9. For the probable basis of this view, see *Mrgendra Agama*, II, 27 and Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakanṭha's commentary thereon.

⁵⁰ Ch., VII, 26, 2.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, VIII, 12, 5.

⁵² IV, 4, 10 to 12.

⁵³ IV, 4, 13.

He who has attained Śivatva and the control of speech, sight, etc., perceives the world to be of the nature of Brahman; for him, the phenomenal universe becomes Brahman whose body is the effulgent light of transcendent Bliss,⁵⁴ the Supreme Energy which, directly in the case of Parameśvara and the released one, and ultimately for others, is the means of realising their ends and their volitions.⁵⁵ Every Being partakes of this Bliss in some measure, though it is realised in full only by Brahman and the Yogins. Since Bliss is non-different from the Highest Being, Brahman is known as Bliss; the knowledge of Brahman attained by Bhṛgu is said to be established in the Supreme ākāśa. Since to the released soul, the world appears as Brahman embodied in this supreme ākāśa, there is no saṃsāra for him any more than for Brahman.⁵⁶

Released souls are all-pervasive and can enter all bodies. Their pervasiveness is like that of the light of a lamp, when the pot that covered it is destroyed. They reach to the highest places in the abode of Mahādeva and make them their own. They per-

⁵⁴ Cp. also IV, 4, 19, where released souls are said to enjoy the splendour of the perfect self-consciousness immersed in the world which is of one texture with the nature of Supreme Brahman, wherein Śiva and Śakti are in perfect unison. It is to be noted that the world is said to be perceived as *Brahman*, not as the *body* of Brahman, a point urged by Appayya in *śN* to prove that Śrīkaṇṭha's position is fundamentally that of the advaitin. The value of the argument is open to question, since, both here and in IV, 4, 14, Śrīkaṇṭha persistently refers not to Brahman alone, but to Brahman along with ākāśa or Śakti, that is to say, Brahman as embodied.

⁵⁵ The words "Yā muktānām parameśvarasya ca sāksādartha-kriyā-hetuḥ, paramparayānyeṣām" are also found in Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara Miśra's commentary on the Ananda Valli of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*. The Śaiva doctrine he there sets forth has many points in common with Śrīkaṇṭha's Śivādvaita. See *Bh-Bh.*, Ch. II.

⁵⁶ IV, 4, 14.

vade heaven and earth with their radiance, as also the world of Hiranyagarbha and all the cardinal directions. Nor is there any difficulty because of the Śruti mentioning the absence of specific cognition,⁵⁷ for, that text applies only to the states of deep sleep and death, not to release, as is manifest from the Śruti,⁵⁸ which indeed declares of him who has risen above the two states of sleep and death, the characteristics of omniscience and omnipotence, not absence of knowledge.⁵⁹

If he who knows Brahman becomes Brahman, there may be a multiplicity of Brah-
Equality with mans because of the multiplicity of
Brahman only in souls. There is in this nothing
respect of enjoy- to be avoided, for it is only
ment. the exercise of the five-fold func-
 tions of creation, etc., that should be vested in one Being. Wisdom and enjoyment may be equally possessed by a plurality of Beings without any conflict or other undesirable consequence. The five-fold functions are exercised only by the Lord. No doubt, the released soul is said to wander forth "eating the food he likes, putting on what form he likes,"⁶⁰ and so on; these statements relate to control of the objects of enjoyment, not to origination or rulership of the universe. Where the latter is treated of, there is mention only of the Lord, not of other selves, as in "whence verily these creatures are born,"⁶¹ "creating heaven and earth there is one shining Being".⁶² There is freedom to enjoy all objects in all the worlds; the business of creating those worlds is, however, excluded.

⁵⁷ *Brh.*, IV, 3, 21.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, IV, 5, 13, *Ch.*, VIII, 11, 1.

⁵⁹ IV, 4, 15 and 16.

⁶⁰ *Taitt.*, III, 10, 5.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, III, 1.

⁶² *Mahopaniṣad*, I, 12.

Nor can it be said that there is then no difference between bondage and release; for, enjoyment in the former state is subject to change, unlike that of the released soul, who, freed from the desire for human bodily frames and so on, wanders at will through the regions of the controllers of enjoyment from Sadāśiva to Brahmā, exercises the three-fold energy without restraint, and understands the world to be of the nature of Brahman, in whom are blended harmoniously Śiva and Śakti; he then fully realises his all-pervading self and experiences the splendour of perfect self-consciousness (*parāhambhāvanā*). This experience is what is referred to by the self that wings his way up in song: "I (am) the food, I the food, I the food! I (am) the eater of the food, I the eater of the food, I the eater of the food."⁶³

That the similarity to Brahman is in respect only of wisdom and enjoyment is also shown by Śruti and Smṛti. That the predication of equality need not apply to all aspects may be seen from experience. Both Brahman and the released souls enjoy Bliss in the mind, without the need of any external sense-organ. For both, the assumption of a body and sense-organs is optional. Here ends the similarity.⁶⁴

Exalted personages like Indra lose their state and return to the world, because of the exhaustion of the karma that gave them their status, and the growth of fresh karma (in the exercise of the functions of perception, enjoyment, etc.), which has to be worked out elsewhere. There is, however, no similar return for the released soul. Non-return is warranted by

The released soul does not re-
turn to samsara.

⁶³ *Taitt.*, III, 10, 6.

⁶⁴ IV, 4, 4 and 17 to 21.

Śruti. "He who behaves thus all his life, reaches the world of Brahman and does not return, yea, he does not return."⁶⁵ The Purāṇas also describe the state of Śiva (which differs from and is higher than the states of Viṣṇu and Brahmā) as that from which there is no return to this fearful world of saṃsāra. That state, which is known as svarga, is of the splendour of a million Suns. It is turīyātīta (beyond the fourth). Says the *Uttara Gītā*: "the fourth and the one beyond the fourth is the abode of Śiva, devoid of evil". It is primal, as it transcends the worlds and their (intermediate) causes. It is pure, as it does not generate attachment, aversion or greed, unlike the products of the world. It is ākāśa, the transcendent splendour, which is Supreme Bliss, eternal, uncreated.

Even universal destruction at the time of the final deluge does not affect released souls, as their being is included in the very Being of Śiva; for Śivatva is common to them all. Their state is not capable of increase or decrease. It is beyond the six paths (adhvās) and higher than the state of Viṣṇu. The selves that have attained equality with Brahman of unsurpassed Bliss and Splendour that is Śiva, become endowed with shining bodies, omniscience, omnipotence, tranquillity and other lordly powers, and, freed from all the traces of enveloping impurities, seeing Him everywhere, realising Him as their very self, attaining what places they like in His abode that is Supreme Light, and realising all their desires, shine in glory everywhere and for all time along with Him. Thus is everything settled to satisfaction.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Ch., VIII, 15, 1.

⁶⁶ IV, 4, 22.

NOTE G.

VIDYAS, THEIR IDENTITY, ETC.

From the discussion of the modes of meditation in the third quarter of the third chapter, some principles will be seen to emerge which are regulative of the injunction or prohibition of certain modes of contemplation, the identity of certain vidyās and the difference among others. Some of these principles are roughly formulated and illustrated in this note.

(1) *When is a vidyā enjoined?*

A vidyā is to be taken as enjoined, when (a) some novel and specific result is to be secured thereby, (b) there are specific Śruti declarations in respect of that mode of contemplation, and (c) Śruti persistently repeats certain statements or mentions a certain set of qualities.

(a) A person sips water before taking his food, and thinks of this water as clothing the vital air (prāṇa) that would otherwise be naked. The question is whether the act of sipping also forms part of the meditation, or only the clothing of the prāṇa. Not the former, as that is secured by a separate injunction by Smṛti; the latter, however, is a novel result; hence, the contemplation thereof is enjoined.⁶⁷

Again, the udgītha is prescribed as part of the sacrificial ritual directed to the attainment of certain results. Being thus only an auxiliary, it may be thought that it need only be chanted, not meditated on. This, however, ignores the text that whatever is performed with knowledge, faith, etc., becomes stronger, that is, to say, acquires the ability to remove hindrances to the attainment of the result of the main karma. Hence, the contemplation

⁶⁷ III, 3, 18.

of the udgītha has a distinct value, and should be practised.⁶⁸

The same reason applies to the contemplation of the udgītha as the highest of all essences (rasatamaḥ), though it may be thought that the statement⁶⁹ is only laudatory of what is really a subordinate element of ritual. But what is asserted here of the udgītha is something novel, and from this novelty, an injunction in relation thereto is to be presumed. Further, a statement that is but laudatory requires the proximity of a passage which is really injunctive; and in the present context, there is no other injunctive passage.⁷⁰

(b) The meditation on the udgītha as rasatamaḥ is also directly enjoined by Śruti⁷¹ in the words “udgītham upāsīta”.⁷²

(c) Injunction is implied by repeated statements of the Śruti, as, for instance, in the contemplation of Brahman as the consort of Umā, the person in the solar orb and so on. The modes mentioned in one context have to be understood in *all* meditation on the Highest, not merely in that context; for, repeated statements must prevail over any considerations arising from the nature of the topic alone. Thus the identity of teaching of the *Taittirīyaka* with other passages imparting knowledge of Brahman, can be easily shown. The statement of the former that everything is Rudra⁷³ is paralleled by the *Chāndogya* text “all this is Brahman”;⁷⁴ the text “Puruṣa is Rudra”⁷⁵ only repeats the same mark of Brahman as that mentioned in the *Puruṣa Sūkta* and the *Upakośala Vidyā*.⁷⁶ Nor need one boggle at the fact that a proper name Rudra is used in one context, for, that name means “He who drives away

⁶⁸ III, 3, 41.

⁶⁹ *Ch.*, I, 1, 3.

⁷⁰ III, 4, 21.

⁷¹ *Ch.*, I, 1, 1.

⁷² III, 4, 22.

⁷³ *Mahopaniṣad*, XXIV, 42.

⁷⁴ *Ch.*, III, 14, 1.

⁷⁵ *Mahopaniṣad*, XXIV, 42.

⁷⁶ *Ch.*, IV, 10-15.

the sorrows of saṃsāra'', and can denote no one short of Brahman. In view of this identity indicated by the repetitions of various texts, the contemplation of the consort of Umā, who dispels the sorrows of saṃsāra, is to be taken as enjoined in all the contexts.⁷⁷

Insistence by Śruti on a particular quality or set of qualities is an indication of an injunction to meditate thereon. Thus, the physical qualities of Śiva such as blue-throatedness, being partly dark and partly tawny, are repeated in nearly every instance of the mention of Śiva. These qualities are, therefore, to enter into the contemplation. The insistence on them serves a definite purpose, that of singling out the object of meditation and keeping it distinct. The need for making this distinction is clear from the Śruti which demands that, for release, Śiva alone should be contemplated to the exclusion of all else.⁷⁸

(2) *Identity of Vidyās and Guṇopasaṃhāra.*

The identification of vidyās and the mutual transference of qualities are called for where there is identity of (a) injunction and result, (b) object, (c) qualities, or when (d) the qualities are equal and complementary.

(a) The vidyās are identical when there is non-difference in respect of the injunction, the form prescribed and the name of the Being contemplated. Thus the meditation of the dahara vidyā is the same whether in the *Chāndogya*⁷⁹ or the *Taittirīya*,⁸⁰ for, though the śākhās are different, the quality of the injunction is the same. The words "vidyāt" and "upāsita" are of identical import. The result in either case is the attainment of Brahman. The name of the vidyā is also identical. Though initiatory ceremonies are prescribed in some cases as in the Śirovrata of the Ātharvaṇikas, they will be found to relate not to the vidyā, but to the study of the Veda. Hence the vidyās are identical.⁸¹

⁷⁷ III, 3, 43.

⁷⁸ III, 3, 39.

⁷⁹ *Ch.*, VIII, 1, 1-5

⁸⁰ *Mahopaniṣad*, XXIII, 41.

⁸¹ III, 3, 1-4.

(b) The chief vital air which is the object of contemplation in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*⁸² and the *Chāndogya*⁸³ is identical with what is mentioned in the *Kauṣītaki*.⁸⁴ All these speak of prāṇa as the eldest and the best; the former two also speak of it as the richest⁸⁵ and so on. These qualities too are to be imported into the meditation of prāṇa, not left out in the belief that each śākhā prescribes a particular mode of meditation and no more. When Devadatta, a teacher at Madhurā is encountered at Māhiṣmatī, his being a teacher is recalled to mind, though he does not teach at the latter place.⁸⁶

The qualities of Bliss, Truth, Knowledge, Infinitude, etc., should in all cases be understood to be characteristic of Brahman; for, the object of contemplation is the same in all Brahmadevyā, and these qualities are of the essence of Brahman. Nor may it be urged that the predication of a plurality of qualities will lead to the disruption of the unity of Brahman. Such a result may follow from the attribution of contrary predicates, such as blue and white, of the same subject; but there is no contradiction in ascribing all the attributes, blue, sweet-smelling, large and lily, to a blue flower. Plurality is not necessarily synonymous with discord.⁸⁷

Identity of the object makes it necessary to include negative qualities too in contemplation. Negative predicates, like imperishability, serve to distinguish Brahman from other possible objects of meditation, and hence cannot be ignored. The jīva, for instance, is excluded from contemplation, since those negative characteristics are not applicable to him. It must also be remembered that what constitutes an attribute is not its negative or positive character, but conformity to the nature of the substance

⁸² *Bṛh.*, VI, 1, 1.

⁸³ *Ch.*, V, 1, 1.

⁸⁴ *Kau.*, II, 14; III, 3 and 4, 8.

⁸⁵ *Ch.*, V, 1, 13. *Bṛh.*, VI, 1, 2.

⁸⁶ III, 3, 10.

⁸⁷ III, 3, 11.

it attempts to qualify.⁸⁸ As negative qualities like imperishability conform to the nature of Brahman as otherwise understood, they enter into the contemplation of Brahman. But the attributes so included shall be only such as are requisite to distinguish Brahman from all else. Other attributes, positive or negative, such as “doing all, desiring all”, etc., should be left out, as they are not distinctive of Brahman.⁸⁹

(c) The Śāṇḍilyavidyās of the *Agnirahasya*⁹⁰ and the *Bṛhadāranyaka*⁹¹ are identical, since there is identity in respect of the qualities of being of the form of the mind (manomayatva) and so on. The identity prevails in spite of the differences of other attributes, mentioned in the two vidyās, as, for instance, realisation of all purposes in one vidyā, control and rulership in the other. Another point of contrast is that meditation is prescribed as of ether (ākāśa) in the former context, and as of a grain of rice or barley in the latter. The qualities mentioned, though different, are not opposed, but complementary, since control and rulership follow from the realisation of all purposes. As for the modes of meditation, contemplation as ākāśa is prescribed only to indicate the purity and greatness of Brahman.⁹² It is unfortunate that Śrīkaṇṭha does not tell us how this is compatible with contemplation of the same Being as of such limited dimensions as a grain of rice or barley. The two attributions are neither identical nor complementary, but opposed. Rāmānuja does not notice this point of contrast, while Śrīkaṇṭha notices it in the pūrvapakṣa, but evades the task of

⁸⁸ That this is the nature of an attribute is shown by the Jāmādagnya puroḍāśa, where, though the mantra, “Agnirhotram vetva-
dhvaram” itself belongs to the Sāma Veda and must be chanted in the appropriate (ucchaistva) svara, yet, since it is part of the upasād belonging to the Yajur Veda, it is chanted in the svara of that Veda (upāmsu); the principle is that where there is apparently a difference between the attribute and that which it qualifies, the nature of the latter is the determining factor (III, 3, 33).

⁸⁹ III, 3, 34.

⁹⁰ Mādhyandina śākhā.

⁹¹ Brh., V, 6, 1.

⁹² III, 3, 19.

meeting it. He may, of course, have thought that the joint predication of extreme minuteness and extensive greatness as seen in the text “*aṇor aṇīyān mahato mahīyān*”, etc., was well-known and constituted a sufficient answer. If that be the explanation, at least a passing reference to that text would have been preferable to silence.

(d) Vidyās are identical where the qualities mentioned are complementary. This has been already shown in connection with the Śāṇḍilya vidyās above mentioned.⁹³ Again, the answers given to Uṣasti⁹⁴ and Kahoḷa⁹⁵ about Brahman relate to the same object, and supplement each other; they, therefore, must be taken together to constitute one vidyā.⁹⁶ Uṣasti is told by Yājñavalkya that Brahman is that which breathes with the up-breathing and so on; Kahoḷa is given to understand that Brahman is the Being that does not hunger or thirst and has no taint of grief, confusion, old age and death. The questions put by the two are similar; hence, only one object, the Highest Lord, could be indicated in both answers. Control of breath, etc., and freedom from limitation, etc., reside in the same Brahman. The fact that question and answer are repeated is quite consistent with the identity of the topic, as in the sad vidyā,⁹⁷ which teaches that Being alone this was in the beginning, one only without a second. In view of this identical reference it is understood that the two questioners Uṣasti and Kahoḷa should exchange ideas and supplement the information each has obtained with that of the other.

It has been already mentioned that the dahara vidyās of the *Chāndogya* VIII, 1, 1, the *Mahopaniṣad* XII, 28, the *Bṛhadāranyaka* IV, 4, 22 and the *Kaivalya Upaniṣads*,

⁹³ III, 3, 19.

⁹⁴ *Bṛh.*, III, 4, 1 and 2.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, III, 5, 1.

⁹⁶ III, 3, 35 and 36.

⁹⁷ *Ch.*, VI, 2 *et seq.* That the whole of this vidyā refers to one topic in spite of the repetition of questions and answers, is known in III, 3, 37; that the same Being is referred to is seen from oft-repeated words “That is the True, That is the Self, That thou art.”

are identical, the qualities mentioned in the different contexts being complementary.⁹⁸

(3) *When are vidyās different?*

Vidyās are different and should not be identified in the following cases: (a) where the objects are different; (b) where the objects are related as whole and part or as superior and inferior; (c) where there is a difference of connection, as in the location of the object; and (d) where significant details vary.

(a) The Self of Bliss alone is to be contemplated. The selves of food, breath, mind and consciousness, though mentioned in connection therewith as leading up thereto, do not enter into the vidyā. For, Śruti makes it clear that Śiva alone is to be contemplated to the exclusion of all else; and the exclusion would have no meaning, if, in meditation, these selves were included. Nor can it be said that the Self of Bliss is also of the same class as the other selves, which are excluded, on the ground that the expression “self” which occurs in the same context cannot bear a different significance and refer to Brahman; for, even in that context, the expression “self” denotes the Supreme Being, as that from which ether originates. The Self of Bliss is thus different from the other selves of the context. This is further confirmed by the fact that the text which mentions the transcendence of the other selves⁹⁹ does not say anything about the Self of Bliss being transcended or any other Self being attained. It goes without saying that the words of exclusion (sarvam anyat paritayajya) of the *Atharvaśikhā* cannot apply to unconscious matter, for, negation, on the principle of *ejusdem generis*,¹⁰⁰ excludes only that which is of the same kind. Hence, only the selves of food or earth, breath, etc., elsewhere known as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra and so on, are excluded.¹⁰¹

The above discussion provides us with an instance where contemplation is prohibited, *viz.*, where it is fruitless. Another case of prohibition is where the qualities

⁹⁸ III, 3, 38.

⁹⁹ *Taitt.*, II, 8.

¹⁰⁰ *Nañ iva yuktam anyasadrśādhikaraṇe, tathā hi arthagatib.*

¹⁰¹ III, 3, 14-17.

contemplated are likely to detract from the perfection of the Supreme Being. Such, for instance, are qualities of the Self of Bliss as having Joy for the head, Satisfaction as the right wing and so on.¹⁰² The predication of head, wings, etc., makes Brahman a Being with parts, capable of increase and decrease, growth and decay. These attributes conflict with the attributes we have elsewhere learnt to be characteristic of Brahman. They are not, therefore, to enter into the contemplation.¹⁰³

(b) The udgītha vidyā of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* I, 3, 1-7 is not the same as that of the *Chāndogya* I, 2, 1-7. The former prescribes meditation on prāṇa as the singer of the udgītha; the latter enjoins contemplation of the singing. Though in the introductory statement about the Devas and the Asuras going to Prajāpati and so on, there is agreement between the two vidyās, they are yet different because of the difference even of the topic. The Chandogas take it to be the praṇava, an *element* of the udgītha, while the latter as a whole is the topic according to the Vājasaneyins. Since the two topics are related as whole and part, the vidyās concerning them cannot be identical. The identity of name is of no value as an indication, for we see that even in ritual, one name "agnihotra" may apply both to the obligatory rite and the optional rite known as "kuṇḍapāyinām ayana".¹⁰⁴

Where objects of contemplation are related as superior and inferior, the latter may be meditated on as the former, not *vice versa*; for, some benefit may be derived from praising the servant as the master, none by treating the master as the servant. Similarly, the superiority of Brahman being known from Scripture, all adoration goes to Him, and it is the symbols like the mind, the Sun, etc., that are to be viewed as Brahman. Adoration of even such lowly beings as dogs is prescribed only in the view that they are pervaded by the Highest Brahman. The lowly are exalted by association with what is superior;

¹⁰² *Taitt.*, II, 5.

¹⁰³ *III*, 3, 12.

¹⁰⁴ *III*, 3, 6-8.

hence, manas and other symbols are to be meditated on in the light of Brahman who is higher than all these.¹⁰⁵

(c) Vidyās are different, where there is a difference of connection. Thus, meditation on the person within the right eye should not be identified with that on the person within the solar orb; this is so in spite of the affinity of the two names—aham and ahah, and the identity of the object of meditation, viz., Brahman; for, the connection of meditation is with the right eye in one case and the Sun in the other.¹⁰⁶

Meditations on Brahman vary with the qualities contemplated, though the object of these qualities is one. The offerings given to Indra the ruler, Indra the over-ruler, and Indra the self-ruler go to different Beings, in spite of the identity of the name, Indra. Again, though the king is but one individual, the services rendered to him by different persons vary with time, place, and circumstance.¹⁰⁷ The same idea is repeated in III, 3, 56 presumably to emphasise the fact that meditation on Brahman is the object not of one but of several injunctions, and thereby to refute those who consider such meditation as not enjoined at all.

(d) Vidyās are different where significant details vary. The puruṣa vidyā of the *Chāndogya* III, 16, 1 is different from that of the *Mahopaniṣad* LXXX, 101 (LXIV according to the Drāviḍa recension), though both liken puruṣa to a sacrifice; for, the elements mentioned in the latter, viz., the master, his wife, and the three-fold libations are not found in the former. The *Chāndogya*, further, teaches a different variety of three-fold libation; they correspond to the three periods of man's life, while those of the *Mahopaniṣad* correspond to morning, noon and evening. The fruit of the *Chāndogya* puruṣa vidyā is life for 116 years, while that of the other is inferred to be the attainment of Brahman, since it is subordinate to Brahmanvidyā.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ IV, 1, 5.

¹⁰⁶ III, 3, 20 and 21.

¹⁰⁷ III, 3, 42.

¹⁰⁸ III, 3, 24.

CHAPTER VII.

AN ESTIMATE.

Labels are convenient though they sometimes mislead. In so far as Śrīkaṇṭha admits a plurality of souls who are of the form of the Lord and are yet ruled and guided by the Lord, his system may be stayed Pluralistic Theism. Souls exist from eternity in a material milieu; the latter has no purpose other than helping to provide the means for the enjoyment of karma and thereby removing the impurity that veils the true nature of the soul. The Lord possesses Parā-Śakti as his attribute. This Śakti is of the form of the whole universe both intelligent and non-intelligent. Though the Lord through His Śakti is also of the form of the Universe, He yet transcends it and rules it; He is viśvādhikaḥ, not merely viśvākāraḥ. The system thus guarantees both the integrity of the souls (since they exist from eternity) and the independent existence of God as their ruler. It seeks to satisfy the demands both of the moral and of the religious consciousness. In seeking to fulfil ourselves we do not annihilate our being; we attain only our own full stature, so long veiled from our vision. And this, we obtain through the grace of our Lord, Who, though one with us, as Intelligence, is yet different from us, who engages in the five-fold activity solely with the object of helping us by bestowing His grace, when the time is ripe. Morality de-

mands the reality of moral agents and of moral ends. Religion relies on a Supreme Being who is with us and yet more than ourselves. Both demands are conceded in the Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha. It remains for us to enquire whether these demands are fully satisfied, whether Logic too is equally satisfied, if not, whether the dissatisfaction is, in any case, legitimate, and in what way, if any, the system is to look for completion.

Taking the conception of the world of matter, it seems to present two defects. In so far as it is caused, it is the product of Brahman. Each material element is directly produced by Brahman. But how can a Being which is Pure Intelligence evolve out of Himself an effect which is inert and entirely devoid of intelligence? The solution suggested is hardly satisfactory. It has been already said that the example of scorpions being originated from cow-dung can convince none. Assuming the truth of the alleged origination, it may be urged that the causation is due to the common factor in the cause and the effect, *i.e.*, the material nature of the cow-dung as well as the scorpion's body. Though Śrīkaṇṭha does not notice the difficulty, it may be thought that the illustration of the growth of hair, nails, etc., in the body only so long as the soul is present, provides a sufficient answer. This may, indeed, suffice to explain the evolution of one set of material forms from another, only as superintended by an Intelligent Being. In so far as the presence and supervision really make a difference to the process, that Being may be said to cause the process. But, on this hypothesis, the germs of the material world would have to be outside Brah-

The material world:

1. Relation to Brahman.

man, who would be only the operative cause. Such a doctrine is condemned by the Sūtras, and Śrīkaṇṭha fully acquiesces in the condemnation.

The transformation, it may be said, takes place *in* Brahman, and it is *of* the Śakti of Brahman. But this does not take us any nearer the solution of the problem. This energy of Brahman is Cit-Śakti; she is of the nature of Intelligence. On the one hand, she is said to be cidacid-prapañcākāra, of the form of the whole universe, intelligent and non-intelligent; on the other, she is that attribute of Brahman, in virtue of which Brahman is known to possess his six qualities and eight names and so on. From the side of the world, Cit-Śakti is both material and spiritual; from the side of Brahman, she is purely spiritual. This notion of finite-infinite, matter-spirit is very tempting; but its metaphysical difficulties do not vanish in spite of all the religious fervour which may be associated with that notion. In so far as the material world does exist, does it really qualify the Lord or not? In the former case, we have to conceive of Brahman as being material as well. On the latter hypothesis, that world should be declared to be either non-existent or to possess only a certain degree of reality, being a partial manifestation of Brahman. Since it obviously cannot be said to be non-existent, the latter alternative seems to be inevitable.

This conclusion is re-inforced on a consideration of the purpose served by the material world. We shall assume that it has somehow come into being, at the will of the Lord. What object does it serve? The release of souls which are eternally veiled in impurity seems to be the only purpose. It functions as the means for the experiencing and ripening of

2. The purpose
of material crea-
tion.

karma, this being the indispensable preliminary to the manifestation of grace and release. That is to say, the material universe always serves as a means to the realisation of others' ends; it is not an end in itself nor has it any ends of its own to be realised. There is release for souls, but not for matter. When it is said that both matter and soul are of the nature of the Supreme Spirit, it is hard to see any moral justification for the perpetual condemnation of one of the manifestations of Spirit to a doom of slavery to the other manifestation, which alone grows in stature from stage to stage and becomes equal to the Lord Himself in all except the five-fold functioning. But it is the soul that suffers, it may be said, and seeks release; matter cannot suffer and needs no salvation. The answer is unconvincing when we remember that what is prakṛti for this theory (as for most Indian Philosophy) includes the perceptive and determinative faculties.¹ Where these are not, there can be no suffering; and inversely, where these are, it is not unlikely that suffering will be present, though we may not be conscious of it.

It must also be remembered that for Śrīkaṇṭha who follows the Sūtrakāra, material embodiment itself serves to obscure the true nature of the soul

¹ Prakṛti includes within itself not merely what in Western terminology is understood by inert matter, but also the categories of sensation, perception, determination, and self-consciousness. The senses come into contact with objects; sense-impressions are analysed and synthesised into percepts by the mind; the principle of individuation refers these objects to the self; the intellect determines and resolves. All these are evolutes of prakṛti, according to the Sāṃkhya system, and of māyāśakti, according to the Śivādharma. In the Śivādvaita doctrine, they constitute what is termed acetana-prapañca. It will be seen that in treating the Non-intelligent universe thus conceived as barely instrumental, there are greater difficulties than in the case of Matter in the Western sense.

(III, 2, 5). And this doctrine makes the position all the more difficult to understand. The material world is undoubtedly the creation of Brahman. Why should He create it to veil the souls who are innately pure? That seems a rather fruitless thing to do. And that being done, to redeem souls alone while the instrument of their obscuration and release lies discarded, seems cruelty, which may be minimised, but not negated. Even if the object of cruelty could not perceive it, the act would none the less be cruel, because of the intention. How much less is the justification, then, in the case of an aspect of creation which comprises the perceptive and determinative faculties? Surely, God's standards of action cannot be inferior to human standards.

It will be seen that the difficulties are far less
3. Superiority if the material world be taken to
 of the Advaita be a manifestation of the Spirit,
 view. just for a purpose, disappearing
 when the purpose is achieved, in other words, if it
 be taken to be an illusory manifestation, a vivarta
 of Brahman. On this view of the advaitin, there
 is no permanent exaltation of souls over matter.
 The former too, *in their plurality*, are not real
 as such. When the individual is liberated, he be-
 comes Brahman; his exclusive individuality dis-
 appears along with the disappearance of the ma-
 terial world. Both are illusory and both are trans-
 cended finally. This theory, whatever its other
 merits and demerits may be, refuses at least to
 distinguish and exalt, unduly and for all time, one
 manifestation of spirit as against another.

The view that matter is also spiritual, that it
 presents Spirit arrested at an early stage of its
 growth would be more consistent with the demands

of Pluralistic Theism. But there is no indication of such a theory having found favour with Śrīkaṇṭha.

The demands both of the logical and the moral consciousness would seem to declare Śrīkaṇṭha's conception of the material universe to be inadequate. The derivation of the finite from the infinite, the insentient from the sentient, the changing from the unchanging still defies solution; and the postulation of an intermediary, sharing the character of both, serves to intensify and not to solve the problem. Further, a semi-independent entity, constituted solely to subserve another's interests for all time, is inconsistent with the notion of God as a moral creator and governor.

Turning next to the conception of souls, we may first take the Siddhāntin's criticism of their atomicity (aṇutva).

Souls:

1. Anutva; the Siddhāntin's criticism, in

(a) the Śivajñāna Siddhānt.

"15. If the soul is said to be *aṇu* or atomic, then it can pass away easily from the body from any of its outer passages. It cannot be kept up in the body. It cannot bear burdens and sufferings. It will be reducing it to the level of

material atoms which are Acit. Even as an atom, it will have an organism and accordingly it will be perishable.

16. If you say that the soul is located in some portion of the body, then it becomes limited like a form, and hence becomes perishable; and its intelligence cannot be felt all over the body. If you instance lamp and its spreading light, even then the soul will cognise the things nearest it, as the lamp can light only things near it. Else, as light, its intelligence must be felt through every sense at the same time.²

The verses do not indicate clearly the system criticised. Śivajñāna Yogin takes them to be

² *SJS*, IV, 2, 15 and 16; trn. by J. M. Nallaswami Pillai.

directed against the Pāñcarātras. If, as we believe, Śrīkaṇṭha belonged roughly to the same period as Rāmānuja, it is not improbable that the author of the *Siddhiār* intended his criticism to apply to Śrīkaṇṭha as well. So far as the doctrine of atomicity is concerned there is nothing distinctive in Śrīkaṇṭha's exposition, as compared with Rāmānuja's; and whatever may be said of the latter philosopher may well hold of the former too.

Prima facie, the Siddhāntin's criticism appears rather crude. The soul *ex hypothesi* is not physical and it seems grossly improper to treat aṇutva as atomicity in a physical sense. It may be thought that what is desired to be emphasised is the monadic rather than the atomic character of the soul. From such a point of view, much of the criticism would sound puerile and irrelevant. The soul is non-pervasive, unlike Brahman who is all-pervasive. If the soul too were all-pervasive, how could there be talk of departure from the body at death, going along a path, return to a fresh body and so on? Verily, that which exists everywhere can neither depart nor return. The soul is a spiritual atom, a finite intelligent being, for whom residence in a physical body is determined by karma and terminated by the fruition thereof.

As for location in a particular place and the analogy of the lamp, the difficulties are due to pressing analogies too far. Residence in a particular part of the body need not mean physical presence, a hypothesis which is manifestly absurd in the case of the immaterial soul. Spirit is *manifested* in space and time through the medium of one form rather than another. Even the all-pervasive grace of the Lord is, according to the Sid-

dhāntin, manifest in the līṅga,³ just as milk which is of the essence of the cow is found only in one part of its body, the udder. The physical analogy here is to be so understood as not to render the Lord's grace physical. Residence should in the same way be understood to signify manifestation. Nor is there a genuine difficulty about having to perceive through all the senses at the same time. Even light which is all-pervasive affects us not through the whole body but only through the eyes. Hence, though the soul's functioning pervades the whole body, cognition results only in particular modes and at particular times, the variations being due to the nature not of the soul, but of the senses.

When all this is said, it must yet be confessed that Śrīkaṇṭha's conception of the soul is distinctly unsatisfactory in view of his references to its size (parimāṇa). The soul is either physical or non-physical; if it is physical, the Siddhāntin's objections hold good; if it is non-physical, all talk of size is irrelevant and misleading. The attempt to find a half-way house between physical atomicity and non-physical pervasiveness may be interesting; but it is hardly more intelligible than the Jaina conception of a soul as big as the body it tenants.

The conception of the soul even as monadic (and not as atomic) is not without its difficulties. One of these relates to the possibility of a monad ever becoming all-pervasive, as it is alleged to become at the time of release. This difficulty will be noticed again later. In the meantime, we may note with interest an epistemological objection urged by

(b) the Paus-
kara Bhasya.

³ See *ŚJB*, XII, adhikaraṇa 2; also *Mokṣa Kārikā*, v. 113.

another Siddhāntin, Umāpati Śivācārya. If the soul is non-pervasive, asks this writer (commenting on *Pauṣkara Āgama*, verse 327), how comes one to see the pole-star or to judge that one sees it? The pole-star is certainly not in physical contact with the body. Nor can we say that its brightness alone is cognised somehow, for, brightness is not cognised of itself apart from that which is bright, *e.g.*, the Sun. The intelligence-energy of the individual present in the body must come into contact with the object cognised, the pole-star in this case; that is to say, the individual Cit-Śakti must be pervasive. But since Cit-Śakti is but an attribute of the self, it could not be pervasive, if the self itself were non-pervasive. Nor can it be argued that the self goes out of the body and comes into contact with the body perceived; for, the cognitive act is simultaneous in the case of the bodily senses which are proximate and the pole-star which is remote. The cognition takes the form, "I that am stout now perceive the pole-star"; and such cognition would be impossible, if the self were non-pervasive. (*PB*, pp. 274-276.)

It will be noticed that this argument is more subtle and far-reaching than that of the *Śiva-jñāna Siddhiār*;⁴ and without subscribing to it in full in

⁴ The argument based on the lamp-analogy is also mentioned and developed by Umāpati. If the self were really atomic, even pleasures and pains located in different parts of the body could not be cognised. The analogy of a lamp is not in point, for radiance has a special characteristic of diffusing itself, and it is not every object that can be compared to a lamp. The diffusion of the perfume of a spot of sandal-paste hardly furnishes a more satisfactory analogy, for the perfume spreads, if at all, only when wafted by a favourable breeze. The arguments based on texts relating to departure at death, return to a fresh body, etc., prove non-pervasiveness not of the soul, but of the puri-aṣṭaka. And the texts about the minuteness of the soul indicate nothing more than that it is to be grasped only by those of subtle intellect (*PB*, p. 275).

the form presented, one may yet recognise the difficulty of formulating any satisfactory theory of knowledge consistent with the monadism of the soul. Śrīkaṇṭha has a rather facile way of avoiding these difficulties, through his oft-repeated statements that individual cognitions and individual experiences of happiness are but fragments of Absolute Knowledge and Bliss to which they refer in all cases. The substrate of the judgment "the pot exists" is the existentiality not of the pot alone but of Brahman. The judgment "the pole-star exists" would refer in the same manner to Brahman and be mediated by His Cit-Śakti which certainly is pervasive. Such a mode of escape, however, does not take one very far; for, the question again arises as to the relationship between the pervasive Cit-Śakti of Brahman and the limited cit-śakti of the finite self. If the two are different, mediation by Brahman's Cit-Śakti is of no avail to explain the individual's knowledge of what is outside himself. If, however, the two are non-different, there cannot be any difference between their substrates either; Brahman and the jīva must be non-different, and there can no longer be any talk of the non-pervasiveness of the latter. Indeed, Śrīkaṇṭha's frequently expressed opinion that our judgments of existence refer to the existentiality of Brahman and so on would seem to be more consistent with Advaita than with the system which he propounds and calls Śiva-Viśiṣṭādvaita.

The problem about the coming into existence of the soul is conveniently shelved by the declaration that it is eternal and is eternally bound by impurity. It is not originated, for, origination would involve the dual fault in respect of karma—kṛta-nāśa and

2. Origin of
the soul.

akṛtābhyāgama, the destruction of what is acquired, and the influx of what is not acquired. One wonders, in passing, whether the difficulty is not over-rated, in view of the doctrine that when a person attains release, his good and evil karma go to his friends and enemies respectively.⁵ Here, at least, there appears to be an acquisition of karma on no other basis than, perhaps, that of friendship or enmity; and the problem of the destruction of karma seems to present no difficulty. May not the same process repeat itself in the case of the karma of all souls, thus making their origination and destruction possible? It may be replied that destruction of karma is possible only for souls that have been purified and have acquired knowledge, and that acquisition of other karma proceeds not at random, but on the friendly or other attitude maintained towards the released soul; in neither case is there indiscriminate origination or destruction. After birth one may acquire another's good or evil karma, but birth itself cannot come about except as the result of karma anterior thereto; and this forces us to conclude that what is called birth is not of the soul, but only of the name and form that are associated therewith. But the doubt is not entirely set at rest. It would seem preferable to explain the so-called acquisition of good or evil karma on the basis of one's own life than as a legacy from another's, and treat the legacy as figurative. And this is how the advaitin treats it. The statements about the getting rid of merit and demerit and their acquisition by others are to be taken as supplementing each other, for in the two passages "the good and evil deeds are not mentioned as something to

⁵ III, 3, 26.

be performed, but merely as implying a glorification of knowledge, the intended sense being 'Glorious indeed is that knowledge through whose power the good and evil deeds, the causes of *saṃsāra*, are shaken off by him who knows, and are transferred to his friends and enemies' * * * *

* * And as the statement about the obtaining of the good and evil deeds has only the purpose of glorifying knowledge (and is not made on its own account), we need not insist too much on the question how the results of actions done by one man can be obtained by others."⁶ The view that the two sets of passages are glorificatory is indeed mentioned by Śrīkaṇṭha, but not as his view; and Appayya, commenting on the passage, characterises it only as another view (*matāntaram*).

But though souls are unoriginated they are not independent existents altogether. Brahman's Cit-Śakti is of the form of the whole universe—both intelligent and non-intelligent. The first manifestation of Cit-Śakti is *puruṣa*, the enjoyer, otherwise known as Viṣṇu. He is the collective soul. Thus, on the one hand, we have unoriginated individuality, on the other, universal spirituality. The soul partakes of both. In time, he is not originated; but as a manifestation of Cit-Śakti, and of Brahman through Cit-Śakti, his being is rooted elsewhere than in himself. He comes into being, though not in a temporal sense. One has to distinguish, therefore, the temporal and a-temporal aspects of his being, and predicate particularity of the former and universality of the latter. This distinction of standpoints persists necessarily in the conception of Release.

* *Sāṃkhya Bhāṣya*, III, 3, 26; *SBE.*, XXXVIII, pp. 226-227.

The problem of release is the problem of how the monad becomes all-pervasive.

3. The Problem of Release.

(a) Equality with reservations.

The monad as monad is not self-contained. It enters into relation with other monads, limits and is limited by them, acts as restrained by them and as determined by the Lord, is ignorant and eternally dependent. How does this Being become omniscient, free, happy and pervasive so that there is nothing impossible to it in release except the five-fold activity of creation and so on? It was limited by impurity and by other souls; it was in bondage, among other things, to the will of the Lord. What happens to these limitations? The impurities, it is said, are worked out and vanish; but other souls and the Lord remain; yet the released one is independent of them all and is not controlled even by the Lord. How can this happen, except on the assumption that his desires and purposes are identical with those of the other released selves and the Lord? If this be so, what difference in individuality is there to justify any distinction among them? It may be said that at least as between the Lord and the souls there is this difference that the latter do not engage in the five-fold activity. But the limitation is arbitrary. Since the released soul has no ruler, who is there to dictate to it, "Thus far shalt thou go and no further"? Not even the Lord can get such a commandment obeyed. In so far as certain functions are reserved for the Lord, it must be by an act of self-denial on the part of the liberated souls who, realising their powers, yet limit their functions voluntarily, so as not to interfere with the Lord's creation, etc. But this is to exalt the soul above the Lord, a very unsatisfactory, if not blasphemous,

procedure.⁷

Nor do we get any clear idea as to the manner of life of these souls in release. Like the Lord, they are eternally contented. They do not have to seek satisfaction, for it waits at their doors, so to speak. Wisdom and enjoyment are of their very nature. There is then no call for activity of any kind. Their condition must be one of stagnation, more akin to death than to life. The Lord too would partake of that nature but for His engaging in activity for the benefit of the souls. Activity of this kind is denied, while no other kind of activity seems called for in the state of release. How then do the liberated souls differ from stones and sticks except in the reputed possession of intelligence? Their life is spent not in service, nor even in constantly singing the Glory of the Lord. Absorption in the Absolute is by far preferable to this static existence, where individuality persists, but to no purpose.

It is worth while examining a little further the continuance of plurality in release.

(b) Continuance of Plurality. Multiplicity without distinction is inconceivable. What then are the distinctions and how are they caused? They cannot be physical, for embodiment of the released is not compulsory; they take on physical forms at will, and if they choose, they may all assume identical forms. In any case, if they are physically limited, the predication of pervasiveness becomes

⁷ For a parallel heresy see *Paramokṣanirṇāsa Kārikā*, verse 4. As for the notion of omniscience divorced from omnipotence, that is condemned in unmistakable terms in the *Mokṣa Kārikā*, verses 118-129. The Siddhāntin's idea of Heaven would appear to be a *Commonwealth of Release*, where all citizens have equal rights and powers, but there is never any conflict, because of the absence of affections and aversions.

unintelligible. If the difference, on the other hand, be spiritual, that would mean that the desires and purposes of the souls are different. What else differentiates individuality but difference of endowment and purpose? Such differences are mostly the work of *māyā*, and, in release, that bond is passed. And, since in the state of release, all desires and all purposes come true, it is difficult to see how or why purposes should be different. It may indeed be urged that difference is consistent with co-operation, not merely with conflict, and that the kingdom of God is a realm of co-operative wills. On such a hypothesis, what is of supreme value is not what the individual is or has attained, but what he wills as a member of a whole, that is to say, the will of the whole, *i.e.*, the commandment of the Lord who is the whole. But this notion brings us up against the declaration that the released soul knows no one as a ruler, not even the Lord. If it be said that it is possible to carry out a supreme purpose by the realisation of it in one's own will, without taking it to be a command of the Lord, we go back to the original question, "since each one is capable of realising the Lord's will freely, what is there to distinguish one released soul from another?"

One may go further and say that the whole notion of a plurality of perfect Beings, who are independent and co-existent, is unintelligible; for, as Bradley would say, the plurality is necessarily related, by the relation at least of separation.⁸ And whatever is related is so far phenomenal and imperfect; for, relation, to be intelligible, is qualified by the terms it relates. That is to say, the terms become adjectives and lose their individua-

⁸ *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 141-143.

lity, a fate which the theist is exceedingly unwilling to contemplate for his souls. Thus, while bondage means the continuance of individuality (in the sense of particularity), release contemplates a state of pervasive universality; the former is consistent with plurality, not the latter. Since neither aspect can be given up and both are contradictory, what other procedure is there but to subordinate one to the other and make out that plurality is an appearance of the One?

The same conclusion would appear to be suggested by a consideration of the doctrine of impurities or bonds. If these were of the essential nature of the self, they could be negated only by the destruction of the self which they qualify. In other words, release would be impossible. Nor do these impurities get associated with the souls at a particular time, for, the association would require to be explained. And since prior to such tainting, all souls were presumably equal in innocence and bliss, while subsequent to it they differ in their experience of joys and sorrows, the agency responsible for the association (*i.e.*, the Lord) would be guilty of partiality and cruelty. To say that the association is eternal is no explanation. The analogy of verdigris in copper proves nothing, since it begs the question. That verdigris is unoriginated is matter for proof, not a proved fact. We do not know how or when it is originated; but this is hardly sufficient ground for a positive assertion to the contrary.

In any case, if the bonds are as real as the soul and if their association with the soul is equally real, it is not clear how there can be a final annihilation either of the bonds or of their

(c) Nature of
bondage.

(d) Advantages
of the Advaita
view.

connection. It may be possible to rise to a conception of reality where these do not appear as bonds at all, in the state which, as Śrīkaṇṭha is never tired of telling us, is characteristic of release, when the world is envisaged not as such, but as in harmony with the totality that is Brahman. But to make such a vision possible, the world itself must be treated as partly spirit, as a degree of manifestation thereof, real in so far as it manifests the *spirit* and an appearance in so far as it manifests but a *degree*. Since souls would rank correspondingly higher in the scale of spiritual manifestation, the material world could not claim equal reality therewith; it would be to a corresponding extent an appearance, an illusion (so long as that term is not taken to mean anything more than what has been above called appearance). On such a hypothesis, the origination of bondage would still be inexplicable; but redemption at least would be possible and intelligible. If matter were equally real, the difficulties of getting out of its clutches and keeping away for good therefrom, even after escape has once been effected, would be well-nigh insurmountable. The phenomenality of matter would thus appear to be a *sine qua non* of release, and with this admission we again find ourselves on the same road as the advaitin. *Sub specie temporis* the world-process would be a continuous stream, but *sub specie aeternitatis* it would appear to be a vast ocean wherein all conflicts are annulled and contradictions resolved. Finite experience would be a wave of time on the ocean of eternity.

It is easy to say that our concepts are those of finite experience and that we should not seek to apply them to the comprehension of the Infinite Bliss common to Brahman and the released souls.

The objection is valid enough to a certain extent. No one may expect to prove God by an inductive process or the creation of the world by a syllogism. But, if our concepts are to be condemned wholesale how can we predicate plurality even? For all we know, all the released souls may coalesce into one Being or become identical with Brahman. The only proper procedure on such a view would be wholesale non-co-operation with the intellect, a procedure not recommended or followed by Śrīkaṇṭha. Nor does the limitation of the exercise of the intellect by recognition of the authority of Śruti make any difference. For, where conflicting authorities claim to interpret Śruti, each to suit his own metaphysics, the employment of reason becomes more important than the bare text. In so far as we seek to understand the Real by the employment of concepts, it is up to us to choose the most intelligible; and this quality cannot be claimed by the concept of a plurality of independent reals.

The conception of the Supreme Being, as endowed with auspicious attributes, is not metaphysically intelligible. The texts which negate qualities are understood in this system, as in the Vaiṣṇava Viśiṣṭādvaita, to deny only objectionable qualities. But Śrīkaṇṭha has less justification than Rāmānuja for presenting such a view as final, for, the former is aware of the relativity of some at least of the attributes. He holds, thus, that the negation of hunger, thirst, old age and death can be intelligible only on the basis of Parameśvara being endowed with physical form, for, the attributes denied are relative to such a form and their negation would be unintelligible in the absence of such form.⁹ The reason-

⁹ III, 3, 38 and 39.

ing has only to be extended to show that all the auspicious qualities mentioned are relative and imply relativity in their possessor. The attributes of satyakāmatva and satyasamkalpatva (having desires and purposes which come true) are not intelligible in the case of an eternally perfect Being, in whom there is never any difference or tension between desire and realisation. To say that the desires of such a Being are eternally realised is less true than to say that He has no desires at all. Desire is relative to non-fulfilment. If desires are really present, the Being that entertains them is not perfect; if they are not really present, their attribution is only a mode of speech, as it were, and to that extent Brahman is more truly conceived as Nirguṇa. Every one of the auspicious qualities predicated of Brahman may be shown to be similarly relative and to infect the possessor with relativity, unless the predication be taken to be secondary, for empirical (vyāvahārika) purposes. There are theologians who, in their anxiety to conserve these qualities, would declare God to be finite;¹⁰ but Śrīkanṭha is not among them. Parameśvara is all that is, the material and the operative cause alike of the universe. If our author had pushed his analysis further, he might have landed in Advaita.

The double requirement of the omnipotence of God and the reality of freedom necessitates the conception of God as limited, but not by what is external to Himself. That He is self-limited, Śrīkanṭha does not say in so many words, but the notion is necessarily implied in his postulating the reality of both

¹⁰ See Rashdall's essay in *Personal Idealism*; on the whole subject of this paragraph, see the Chapter on "Goodness" in *Appearance and Reality*.

God and the jīvas, while insisting on the pervasiveness and omnipotence of God. So long as the reality of the material world is admitted there is a real limitation of Brahman by that the nature of which is opposed to His own; this could hardly be called self-limitation. If our notion of God is to be conserved, the material world has necessarily to be treated as an appearance. Only souls would be left then; and these being essentially of the same nature as God, limitation by them is practically self-limitation. Thus, again, we seem forced to the view of the advaitin, that matter is an appearance of Brahman.

Even in his conception of the mode of release, what Śrīkaṇṭha says would appear to demand fulfilment in the light of the system of the advaitin. Release is secured by meditation, but the contemplation must be of the identity of the Supreme Being with oneself.

The Mode of Release.

1. Meditation on identity of self with Brahman.

How in the absence of essential identity is such contemplation to be accomplished? If it be said that Brahman and the jīva are one as *cit*, what is it then that separates them? If that which constitutes the difference is equally real, it cannot be successfully ignored in meditation. And even if it could be ignored, the device would be of no greater utility than that of the ostrich burying its head. If it be not equally real or more real, the only intelligible alternative would seem to be the acceptance of the view that the differences are appearances of Brahman, who is the sole real; and this is the advaitin's position.

Action is said to prepare the way for knowledge, *i.e.*, meditation, by purifying the mind. In making this claim, the present system would appear to dif-

2. Jñāna-karma-samuccaya.

fer greatly from Advaita, which fails to see the utility of action in comprehending the ever-present, fully accomplished Brahman. But even here one may notice an identity. It is not all action that prepares the way for knowledge or co-operates therewith in securing release, but only such action whose fruit is not desired. Where the fruit is desired, that itself becomes the result of action and no other good may be expected; when the fruit is not desired, action as an element of a larger whole works towards release, just as the Sautrāmaṇi and the Bṛhaspatisava which are independent rites function also as elements of the Agnicayana and the Vājapeya respectively. The analogy here suggests that action works towards release only as subsumed in a larger whole; and this whole of which action is an element need not necessarily be of the form of action; for, the whole may not possess the distinctive characteristics of its component parts. It may be argued that even on this assumption, some efficacy at any rate is recognised for action, in the matter of securing release; and this is more than the advaitin will grant. To this, the reply will be two-fold: the advaitin does not make out that action is futile. The performance of ritual, the adoration of Brahman as Saguna, all these do purify the mind and lead up to final renunciation of the world's allurements, such renunciation being the indispensable pre-condition of the apprehension of Brahman as Nirguna. Further, it is not action that leads to mental purification, but renunciation. Where action with desire for fruit leads to a certain result, and action without that desire to a different result, *viz.*, release, the latter effect cannot be ascribed to the common factor in the two instances, but what is distinctive, *i.e.*, renunciation. And that

renunciation secures release is, verily, the position of the advaitin.

We may now turn to the consideration of the view that Śrīkaṇṭha was himself an advaitin. This is set forth by Appayya Dīkṣita with his usual dialectical skill in the latter portion of the *Ananda Laharī*, and in the *Śivādvaita Nirṇaya*.¹¹ The latter is the later work. Its arguments cannot be set out here in detail, as even a concise analysis will be too lengthy for the present work. The leading considerations that determine Appayya's view will be, therefore, briefly presented and appraised.

One may start with some of the minor considerations. In the commentary on sūtra I, 1, 1, Śrīkaṇṭha says that though by adhyayana one has heard of the identity of self and Brahman, one is yet far from comprehending it, in view of the manifold and apparent points of difference between the two. If Śrīkaṇṭha held the view that the jīva and Brahman are different, here was an opportunity of stating it; instead of doing so, however, he emphasises only the difficulty of comprehending the identity.

It is said that judgments like "the pot exists", "the cloth exists", reveal the existence of Brahman as the material cause of all, just as clay is the material cause of all things like pots wherein clay is present.¹² This dependence of all other things on Brahman would tend to show that Brahman is the sole real of which the world is an appearance.

Brahman does not change. The universe results not as a change of Brahman. In the process

¹¹ Published by the University of Madras, 1930.

¹² I, 1, 2.

of causation, both cause and effect are Brahman. This is akin to the advaitin's denial of change as ultimate.

Individual intelligence and bliss are fragments of the Intelligence and Bliss that make up Brahman.¹³ Further, the *Taittirīya* says that all grades of bliss from that of man up to that of Brahman are enjoyed by the akāmahataś-śrotriya, the sage who is no longer tormented by desires. This is not intelligible except on the basis of the identity of Brahman and the sage (that is to say, the jīva generally), for, the Bliss of one Being cannot be said to be identical with that of a different Being.

All such arguments are likely to be lightly brushed aside. For, Śrīkanṭha does not say that the jīva and Brahman are entirely different in nature. They have a common nature in so far as they are *cit* and this identity and no more, it may be said, is intended in I, 1, 1.

As for the reference of existential judgments to Brahman, it has been said elsewhere,¹⁴ that Brahman is not to be identified with such bare existence, as it presumably would be by the advaitin. Further, the reality of clay as the material cause does not exclude that of pot as the effect. Both are real; and in the same way both Brahman and the jīva are real.

It is certainly said that Brahman does not change. But the reality of change is not denied. There is change *in* Brahman; it is *of* Parā-Śakti which is of the form of the universe, intelligent and non-intelligent. This is not the same as the admission of the phenomenality of change.

¹³ I, 4, 27; IV, 4, 14.

¹⁴ II, 1, 15.

It is also true that the intelligence and bliss of the individual are derivative—from Cit-Śakti, i.e., the Intelligence and Bliss of Brahman. If the fact of derivation can establish identity, the identity of the jīva with Cit-Śakti will be proved; and this was never disputed, since from the first, the latter is said to be cidacitprapañcākāra. The bliss of the akāmahataś-śrotriya may be explained on the same footing, viz., identity with Cit-Śakti.

The above replies would be conclusive, if Cit-Śakti and Brahman were different. But, as repeatedly stated by Śrīkaṇṭha, they are non-different. It will not be possible, therefore, to shift what is inconvenient on to Cit-Śakti and preserve at the same time both the integrity of Brahman and the plurality of the universe. In the commentary on “Ākāśaś tal līṅgāt,”¹⁵ it is said that Brahman is not to be identified with the *elemental* ether; and it is made clear that the object of the qualification “elemental” is to secure the non-exclusion of the supreme ākāśa, wherefrom creation is declared to proceed, because of its non-difference from Brahman. Cit-Śakti, it would thus follow, is non-different from Brahman. Again, in the commentary on I, 3, 16, it is said that both the ākāśa within the heart and Brahman that is within that ākāśa are to be meditated on, since the qualities of freedom from sin, etc., are predicated of both. In discussing the modes of meditation on Brahman, it is determined that Bliss, etc., are to be contemplated in every case, unlike either the qualities of having joy for the head and so on, or the selves of

¹⁵ I, 1, 23.

food, breath, mind, etc. The former would lead to the conception of Brahman as extended and as capable of increase or decrease. The latter are excluded since Śruti distinctly enjoins meditation on Śiva alone, to the exclusion of all else. What is so excluded is not the sheath or covering of food, breath, etc., but the self of food and so on, as seen from the subsequent statement about the jīva attaining to those selves and passing beyond them. These selves are excluded from contemplation, but not the Self of Bliss, since no other self is said to be attained to thereafter. Nor is it of avail to argue that the term "self" in the context means only a limited self; for, even the same Śruti says that ether proceeded from ātman, where the word denotes not the finite self but Brahman. The Self of Bliss which is not transcended, which is always contemplated in Brahmavidyā, is thus non-different from Brahman. It may be said that since Cit-Śakti is of the form of the whole universe, the universe is also to be contemplated along with Cit-Śakti. But at this rate nothing is left out of the meditation and the clause of exclusion "sarvam anyat parityajya" becomes meaningless.

Another difficulty may present itself. Cit-Śakti is spoken of as the attribute of the Lord, as the abode of the Lord, as His seat and so on. In none of these capacities can the two be considered non-different. This is certainly the case; but this aspect of functioning does not exhaust the nature of Cit-Śakti, who is also Āmbikā, and in that capacity non-different from the Lord. That Āmbikā is non-different is seen from the characterisation of the Lord as kṛṣṇa-piṅgala, etc.

The identity of Cit-Śakti and Brahman is also established by the Sūtras "Ātmagr̥hītir itaravad

uttarāt”¹⁶ and “Īkṣati karma vyapadeśāt sah”¹⁷. It has been already noticed¹⁸ that while Śrīkaṇṭha is interested in establishing that Brahmaloṇa, to which released souls are led, is identical with Śivaloṇa, he does establish instead that Śiva and Viṣṇu are identical. This is not the conclusion which he desires or holds. What he means to establish is the identity of Śiva with Cit-Śakti that is the material cause of Viṣṇu. As an argument in favour of this position, he mentions the identity of Śiva and Viṣṇu which is proclaimed in many purāṇas.

Granted the truth of all this, is Śrīkaṇṭha's theory the same as the advaita doctrine? Certainly, for, as seen from the *Samkṣepa Śārīraka*, Advaita admits that Brahman has for empirical purposes, two attributes, Cit-Śakti and avidyā, and that these by their inter-action produce the universe. The *Pañcapādikā* mentions bliss, intelligence and eternity as attributes of Brahman, which, though non-different, appear as different. The existence of attributes and the creation of the world out of those attributes being thus admitted by the advaitin, there can be no difference between his view and that of Śrīkaṇṭha. But, it will be urged, surely there is a substantial difference in that the world for Śrīkaṇṭha is the result of transformation (pariṇāma), while according to the advaitin, it is illusory (vivarta). The two views are not diametrically opposed, as the objector imagines. Even the advaitin holds to the pariṇāma-vāda, for empirical purposes, as a preliminary to the illusion-theory. The latter is not a negation, but a development of

¹⁶ III, 3, 16.

¹⁷ I, 3, 12.

¹⁸ Chapter IV.

the transformation-theory. That this is the view of the advaita is shown again by the *Samkṣepa Śārīraka*.¹⁹

Even for Śrīkanṭha, the illusion doctrine is inevitable. He holds that Cit-Śakti is non-different from Brahman, and that she is also of the form of the world—intelligent and non-intelligent. Now, the non-intelligent world, because it is non-intelligent and subject to change, is at the other extreme from Brahman, who is pure unchanging Intelligence. It is not conceivable that this aspect of the universe can be *as such* non-distinct from Brahman; if non-difference were admitted, Brahman Himself would be inert and subject to change from without. The only possibility of understanding the oft-repeated identity of Cit-Śakti and Brahman is, therefore, to take the non-intelligent universe to be vivarta, to be a manifestation, *as it were*, of Brahman, the intelligent world alone being really identical therewith. There is no difficulty in understanding the latter part of the doctrine, since the identity of intelligent substances is self-evident, when name and form and all else that makes for difference is declared to be vivarta. Nor may it be objected that if one part of Cit-Śakti is illusory, the other must also be so; for, by such procedure, we shall be left with no souls to be released, and consequently with neither bondage nor release. There is also this distinction to be remembered that while the material world is created and impermanent, jīvas are eternal, and

¹⁹ Vivartavādasya hi pūrvabhūmir, Vedāntavāde pariṇāmayādaḥ Vyavasthite 'smin pariṇāmayāde Svayam samāyāti vivartavādaḥ; (Ch. II).

that from the identification of the latter with Brahman, none of the difficulties follow that are consequent on taking the material universe as non-different from Brahman. From all this it would follow that vivartavāda is a logical implication of Śrīkaṇṭha's teaching, and that he is, therefore, really an advaitin.

The above conclusion is supported by some overt statements of Śrīkaṇṭha. In all the three places where there is occasion to speak of departure from this life and along the path of the gods, an exception is made in favour of niranvaya-upāsakas, who gain release even here. It is clear in any case that passing along the path of the gods is not prescribed invariably for all. For, there are some Beings desirous of release, who have already attained to the stage of the gods. It is absurd to require these too in every case to start on and pass along the path of light and so on. Apart from this necessary exception, a further exception is made in the case of devotees of Brahman that is free from relation. The statement clearly shows sympathy with Advaita doctrine. Though Śrīkaṇṭha was out to set up a theistic system for the benefit of those whose intellects could not rise higher, he felt, quite rightly, that the highest truth should not be entirely concealed. The imperative nature of this regard for the highest truth is respected even by Upabrāhmaṇas like the Viṣṇu Purāṇa; though out to establish the absolute supremacy of Viṣṇu with a view to confirm the devotion of all those who worship him, the Purāṇa cannot help speaking of Viṣṇu as "Brahma samanantara," next to Brahman. Śrīkaṇṭha's references to niranvayopāsakas are based on the same principle.

**Non-departure
for Niranvaya
Upasakas.**

It is true, that with a view to support the conclusion he is ostensibly out to defend, he claims to interpret the text “na tasya prāṇā utkrāṃanti; his prāṇas do not depart” in the light of the other reading “na tasmāt prāṇā utkrāṃanti; from him the prāṇas do not depart”. But a little reflection will show that the latter reading should be interpreted in the light of the former, “tasmāt”, being taken to mean not “from the soul”, but “from the body”, the two being identified because of association. That this interpretation is the one which is most likely is evident from the fact that a contrast is intended to be drawn between the ignorant man and the enlightened one. In the case of the former, there is departure of the prāṇas at death; if the contrast is to be significant and effective, the same departure should be denied for the wise man. This is just what is stated in the Śruti, as is evident from Yājñavalkya’s reply to Ārtaḥhāga²⁰: “(The vital breaths) are gathered up in him, he swells, he is inflated, and thus inflated the dead lies to rest”.

It may be objected that in reply to the question after the next, Yājñavalkya replies that when every part of the dead person is merged in its appropriate element, as speech in fire and so on, what is left is karma. This would show that he was discussing with Ārtaḥhāga not the enlightened person, but the ignorant one, one who had not attained to a vision of the highest truth. How then can the statement about the vital air be taken to relate to the vidvān? The objection is due to ignorance of the context. It must be remembered that those who questioned Yājñavalkya in that assembly were out to confute him by all dialectical means, and not to obtain instruction from him. The number of interrogators,

²⁰ *Bṛh.*, III, 2, 11 (the translation is Max Müller’s).

the proud boasts of Gārgī about her questions which were as “two pointed foe-piercing arrows”, the utter inconsequence of the various questions propounded even by Ārtabhāga, beginning as they did with graha and atigraha and ending up with the eschatology of the avidvān, all these indicate and reinforce the position that the sense of any statement in this discussion should not be gathered from considerations of the context; for, the context is purposely misleading, being a further pitfall devised to entrap Yājñavalkya, who, however, was too clever for his adversaries.

What Śrīkaṇṭha has to say of the manner of meditation in IV, 1, 3, supports very strongly the case already made out for his being an advaitin. The self in meditation is to be identified with Brahman. The *Jābāla Śruti* that is quoted makes two statements, “I am Thou, Thou art I”. The repetition secures confirmation of a truth otherwise liable to doubt. It teaches the identity of the finite self with Brahman, not any other identity, say, that of the internal ruler with Brahman. The latter is not subject to doubt. If the information is required at all, it may be conveyed in a single statement “I am Thou”, repetition being unnecessary. It has also to be noted that the repetition takes on the converse form of the original statement; one is in the first person, the other in the second person. This difference combined with the repetition can be significant only as applied to the jīva and Brahman and their essential oneness. Nor is it sufficient to understand a relation between the two as of body and soul; for, in this case, whatever is applicable to the body may also be applied to the soul, but not *vice versa*; hence, the statement about the jīva which treats it as the

Identity not
merely imagined.

body of the Lord may be true, but not the other, as the embodied cannot be identified with the body. The only intelligible mode of understanding the statements is to take them both as referring to the identical Self, which is Brahman, and is also the jīva, when apparently limited.

Nor can it be urged that the non-difference of the two is merely imagined. For,
The Manner of Meditation. it is distinctly said that God bestows

His grace on His devotees by conferring on them His own form. Again, released souls like Sadāśiva and so on are said to perceive the whole world, not as the body of Brahman, but as harmonised with Brahman.²¹ Further, release can be attained only by the relinquishment of paśutva and the attainment of Śivatva; the qualities distinctive of the latter are not to be merely imagined, but meditated on with a view to the acquisition of the same. The identity is real enough, at least at the stage of release. And that it is not merely imagined is also established by the persistence of the consciousness of identity. The released self when he wings his way up in song gives expression to this consciousness.²²

Against all this, it may be urged that the āram-
Further Objections. bhaṇādhikaraṇa²³ establishes the identity of cause and effect, as in the case of clay and pot, and that the world which is effected by Brahman cannot, therefore, be unreal while Brahman is real. Brahman, as conceived by the advaitin is Nirguṇa, devoid of all qualities; while Śrīkaṇṭha explains the nirguṇa text as declaring freedom only from objectionable

²¹ IV, 4, 19.

²² *Taitt.*, III, 10, 5 and 6.

²³ II, 1, 15 *et seq.*

qualities (heya-guṇa-rāhitya). And where there is an opportunity to explain texts like “Tat tvam asi”, it is shown that the relationship not of identity, but of pervasion is taught, just as a faggot pervaded by fire is itself called fire. That the highest Self is distinct from the individual is also taught in the *sūṣṭyutkrānti* section, where attention is drawn to texts which describe the individual as embraced or mounted by the *Prājña* Self. The *adhi-kopadeśa sūtras*²⁴ also establish that Brahman is other than the *jīva*.

It is stated in reply that though all these indicate that the system of *Śrīkaṇṭha* is not Advaita, yet they do not prove that it is irreconcilable with Advaita. All that has here been undertaken is to prove that *Śrīkaṇṭha* expounded a system of philosophy which, though not purely non-dualistic, left the door open to Advaita, and that being himself an *advaitin*, he had to adopt this procedure. Thus, for instance, the *sūtra* “*adhikam tu bhedanirdeśāt*, but, more, because difference is taught,”²⁵ establishes difference between Brahman and the *jīva* in respect of knowledge, not in essence. The former is *sarvajña* (all-knower), while the latter is *kiñcijjña* (knower of what is limited and particular). On looking at the context, we see that the *sūtra* is intended to provide the answer to a doubt, how the Supreme Being failed to act in such a fashion as to bring about what is agreeable to Himself. The world of His creation is finite and filled with suffering which is bound to affect Him too as the internal ruler. It is no answer to this to say that Brahman is other than the suffering *jīva*; in spite of the difference, He may continue to

²⁴ II, 1, 22; III, 4, 8.

²⁵ II, 1, 22.

suffer. What really matters is that He in the fulness of His wisdom realises a harmony and a perfection denied to the limited knowers, and that consequently the suffering experienced by others does not exist for Him. There is then between the two selves a difference, not of substance, but of degree; and this does not militate against their essential identity. Nor can it be urged that difference is what is meant to be taught, because of the next sūtra²⁶ which compares the jīvas to inert matter (stones, etc.). For, what that sūtra means to assert is that since there is some difference even between the jīva and Brahman, the difference of unconscious matter therefrom follows *a fortiori*. Thus, it supports our own position that the material world is vivarta, and not of the essential nature of Brahman, the predication of identity being only figurative.

As for sūtra III, 4, 8, that is intended to show that Śruti teaching is not confined to the limited and particular self, but extends to Brahman who is more than the jīva. There is no attempt even here to make out a difference in essence between the two.

The suṣuptyutkrānti sūtra²⁷ too serves to establish no more than this relation of superiority. This may be seen from the fact that though the *prima facie* view of identity is based on the text “Tat tvam asi”, neither there nor in the final view is any attempt made to interpret that text so as to conform to the position that Brahman and the jīva are different. Such difference as is taught has, therefore, to be understood in conformity with the identity mentioned by that text. And this leads us to understand a difference of degree, not of nature.

²⁶ II, 1, 23.

²⁷ I, 3, 43.

It is true that in the *amśādhikaraṇa*²⁸ Śrīkaṇṭha offers another interpretation of “*Tat tvam asi*”, but this is negated by the teaching of the *ahaṅgrahādhikaraṇa*²⁹, which declares that devotees realise Brahman through contemplating their identity with Him, and thereafter teach this truth to their pupils by means of the text “*Tat tvam asi*”. In this context, at any rate, what that text teaches is taken to be identity, not pervasion as of the body by the soul or of the faggot by fire. It has been already noted that the repetition in the *Jābāla Śruti* is unintelligible, except on the supposition that complete identity in essence is intended to be taught. Since the view of identity is opposed to that of pervasion, it is clear that they cannot both be held as true. It, therefore, follows that in teaching the means of release, Śrīkaṇṭha abandoned what he had taught earlier as a suitable interpretation of the text “*That thou art*”.

Nor is the earlier sense entirely unjustifiable.

**Adhikari-
bheda:** *dasa*
marga.

Among those who seek release, there are different grades. Those who have completely turned away from the things of this world and can comprehend Brahman as free from attributes are very few indeed. Next to them come those who understand *Saguṇa* Brahman, worship Him and can identify themselves with Him in meditation. These in course of time by devoted worship of the Lord gain the clearness of understanding and strength of mind necessary for the perception of the highest truth. But there is a lower class still, of persons who cannot envisage their identity with even *Saguṇa* Brahman, who can conceive of themselves as

²⁸ II, 3, 42, *et seq.*

²⁹ IV, 1, 3.

only bodies for that Soul, as servants of that Supreme Master. For these, to whom the *dāsa mār-ga* (the path of servitude) alone is open, the only intelligible conception is that of pervasion by the Lord. It is for their benefit that Śrīkanṭha indicates the notion of the soul as an *aṃśa* of the Lord. By meditating thus, they attain to states like the lordship of hosts, etc., and from these they move on to release. Śrīkanṭha's object was to furnish a commentary that would primarily serve those who were qualified to contemplate their identity with Saguna Brahman; but in the interests of the highest truth he had to give indications of what was suitable to other persons of other grades of fitness as well; hence his reference to the *śarīra-śarīri-bhāva* on the one hand and the *niranvaya-upāsakas* on the other. The final view is that of Advaita, according to which the material world is *vivarta*. That this view does no violence to the thought of the *Sūtrakāra* is also evident from the discourse between *Suvarcalā* and *Śvetaketu* in the *Mokṣadharmaparva* of the *Mahābhārata*, written by Vyāsa, who was also the author of the *Brahma Sūtras*.

In offering the doctrine of Saguna Brahman, Śrīkanṭha has no doubt re-interpreted even passages whose primary import seems to be *nirguṇa*. This is justifiable on the ground that those who are capable of appreciating only a certain degree of truth, should be confirmed in the apprehension thereof, even by the denial of anything higher; for, their minds should not be allowed to waver in uncertainty. To serve this end, even condemnation of their own final views is permissible to a certain degree. This is illustrated by Āpastamba who, in order to confirm people in the

**Condemnation
of Advaita justified:
Analogy of
Āpastamba.**

duties of the house-holder's life (which is the stage of life suitable for most) disparages the claims of superiority put forward in favour of the ascetic order, and makes out that the life of the house-holder is superior even to that of the ascetic, though he himself is a believer in renunciation. The object of the condemnation is to safeguard those who, desirous of attaining the spiritual goal, are easily carried away by the vaunted glories of samnyāsa, even when they have not attained the requisite degree of mental firmness and distaste for all worldly things; such persons, led away from their moorings, distracted by conflicting calls, will have no peace of mind or of body, and will inevitably fall like the proverbial person between two stools; they should, therefore, be made anyhow to hold fast to that which they can fully comprehend. It is in this spirit that when Yudhiṣṭhira wants to renounce, even Rṣis point out to him the superior virtues of the house-holder's state, and urge him to stick thereto. Śrī-kaṇṭha's saguṇa interpretation too is conceived in the same spirit.

It may still be objected that the purpose Śrī-kaṇṭha had in view would most suitably have been achieved by the composition of an independent treatise, not by the distortion of texts which admittedly bear a different significance. But this is to ignore the fact that the Sūtras allow of both kinds of interpretation, one nirguṇa and the other saguṇa, the former ultimate, the latter intermediate. This possibility is indicated by Śaṅkara himself in several places. The commentary on the first sūtra mentions two sets of attributes, purity, intelligence, etc., and omniscience, and omnipotence, etc.,—the former consistent with the nirguṇa and

The Sūtras
have a secondary
saguṇa sense.

the latter with the *saguna* conception. The third *sūtra* (*Śāstrayonitvāt*) is again interpreted in two ways. *Nirguna* Brahman is understood on the basis of *Śruti*; he who is the author of *Śruti* is *Saguna* Brahman.

If Śaṅkara himself intends a secondary *saguna* doctrine, where then is the necessity, **Need for a fresh bhāṣya inculcating saguna doctrine.** it may be asked, for a fresh commentary to set forth the same doctrine. There is, however, need for a fresh commentary in that Śaṅkara does not develop freely what is for him throughout only a secondary doctrine. Though he seems to believe that the Supreme *Saguna* Being is Śiva, he does not openly make any such identification. Subtle indications, such as the use of the name *Paramēśvara*, the distinction from *Samhāra Rudra*, the treatment of *Viṣṇu* as an object of comparison with the Supreme Being, all these cannot enter into or stimulate the heart of the average devotee. What Śrīkanṭha attempts and achieves is to show that *Paramēśvara* alone is the Supreme Being of the *Śruti*, that He is higher than *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu*, and *Rudra*, that he is attained at the end of the path of light and so on.

If Śaṅkara does not develop the *saguna* doctrine sufficiently, why does he refer to it at all? The answer is that he has necessarily to make such reference even to establish the doctrine of the *Nirguna* Brahman. In the identification of the various supreme entities mentioned in the *Upaniṣads* as *ākāśa* (ether), *akṣara* (the imperishable), *attā* (eater) or *antaryāmin* (internal ruler), the *Sūtrakāra* takes it that the reference is clearly to Brahman in each case, **Reference to saguna vidya necessarily involved in establishing the nirguna doctrine.**

to the exclusion of both the *pradhāna* and the *jīva*. But to establish this unambiguous reference, one necessarily has to indicate the qualities not possessed by either the *pradhāna* or the *jīva*, i.e., make use of the concept of Brahman as *Saguṇa*. It is only from this stage that one can pass on to the concept of *Nirguṇa* Brahman, the former concept serving as a necessary stepping-stone. It is with the help of the *saguṇa* concept that *prima facie* views are refuted; and even in release, it is the attainment of *Saguṇa* Brahman that later becomes the attainment of *Nirguṇa* Brahman, at the time of the final release of all.³⁰ Hence it is that Śaṅkara treats of *Saguṇa* Brahman, though he does not develop the doctrine. Even what he has to say of *Nirguṇa* Brahman is necessarily very brief, because of non-extensiveness of content. It is the early preparatory stages that always require and come in for the most detailed treatment. Thus, though all the Vedas have for their object the attainment of the highest goal of man, they are for the most part concerned with the performance of *karma*, which purifies the mind for the reception of enlightenment. Similarly, the treatment of *Saguṇa* Brahman in the *Śūtras* is more extensive than that of *Nirguṇa* Brahman.

³⁰ This interesting doctrine of release from the *advaitin's* point of view is set out in the concluding pages of the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*. Presenting, as it does, a close parallel to the theistic notion of release as the attainment of the nature of the Lord (*Īśvara bhāva*), it leads one to minimise the difference between *Advaita* on the one hand and *Viśiṣṭādvaita* or *Śivādvaita* on the other. But the two conceptions of *mukti* are not identical, as none knew better than Appayya himself; for, nescience has ceased to exist for the *advaitin* who has intuited the Infinite Impartible Brahman; the *Viśiṣṭādvaitin* does not rise to this intuition and hence for him imperfection and nescience persist; the lordship attained by the former knows no reservations, while the equality attained by the latter does not extend to the five-fold activity of the Lord. See *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*, pp. 450, 451; also *Śivādvaita Nirṇaya*, pp. 75-78.

Other commentaries like Rāmānuja's cannot be interpreted in the same manner as favouring pure non-dualism; for they condemn Advaita in no uncertain terms and not a doctrine of theirs lends support to Advaita; whereas, as has been shown rather extensively, Śrīkaṇṭha's system provides many such indications. He alone has written a commentary suited to all grades of competency among those who seek release.

Systems like Ramanuja's cannot be similarly interpreted. Appayya's position set forth (almost in his own words) in the preceding pages shows considerable skill and a realisation of most of the difficulties that have to be encountered. If the conclusion, however, is to be anything more than a *tour de force* of interpretation, all facts have to be considered; and it would appear that some, at least, have not been attended to in the measure that they deserve. One of these is the *anūtva* (atomicity) of the *jīva*, a cardinal doctrine with Śrīkaṇṭha. It may be said that as contrasted with *vibhūtvā* (pervasiveness), characteristic of Brahman and the released souls, there is a difference only of degree, not of substance. But absolute difference was never characteristic of Śrīkaṇṭha's position; *some* community of nature is always admitted; and even with that admission, it is possible to keep that doctrine distinct from Advaita. He does not say, for instance, as Śaṅkara does, that the limitation is not of the soul, but is due to *buddhi* (the determinative faculty). To say that the difference between the *jīva* and Brahman is one of degree, does not explain it away. Hence, Appayya's explanation of the *adhikopadeśa sūtras* has little point.

It is true that released souls, according to Śrīkanṭha perceive the world, not as the body of Brahman but as harmonised with Brahman. But since this Brahman is spoken of as the perfect union of Śakti and Śiva, and Śakti is elsewhere spoken of as the body of Śiva, it cannot be thought that all reference to the body of Brahman is here excluded. Further, it must be remembered that while, for the advaitin, Brahman would be pure Intelligence, according to Śrīkanṭha, the Intelligence of Brahman and of released souls perceives the diversity of the universe. Brahman is vipaścit, He whose intelligence perceives manifold kinds of things.³¹ His experience is not a bare unity, but a unity-in-diversity. To divest it of the richness of its content and reduce it to bare intelligence requires more substantial justification than the existence of different grades of competency among those who seek release. It may be possible to re-interpret those statements in the light of such a doctrine, but it has not been conclusively proved that Śrīkanṭha was aware of or countenanced such a doctrine.

It has been said that the *susuptyutkrānti sūtra*³² teaches but a difference of degree. The qualification "but" is question-begging, the question being whether that difference is not sufficiently vital to differentiate the jīva from Brahman. In any case, the argument is very unsatisfactory in that it proceeds on nothing more substantial than that no dualistic interpretation is offered of the text "That thou art";

³¹ Vividham vastujātam paśyanti, vimṛśanti cid yasya saḥ, III, 2, 16.

³² I, 3, 43.

no dualistic interpretation is necessary for the purpose of that sūtra, where the difference is perfectly patent, as between the embracer and the embraced, the mounter and the mount. From the texts one would be justified in understanding a relation of otherness, not one of more and less. The contrast is even intensified by reference to the fact that in sleep and departure, the jīva is conscious of nothing, while the Self that mounts or embraces the other is all-knowing.

The sūtra about stones, etc.,⁸³ is explained away on the ground that what is here intended is the inculcation of the doctrine that in spite of the identity implied by the ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa,⁸⁴ Brahman is different from the material world. The difference is shown by comparison with the jīva who, even though intelligent, is yet different from Brahman. Now, it is not Appayya's case that stones are different from Brahman in the same sense that the jīva is, though to a greater extent. And yet, in the absence of community of nature understood in some such way, the comparison is unintelligible. Further, if comparison is to be valuable, it should be made with that, the truth of which is established. If the jīva is not really other than Brahman, comparison with the jīva can establish nothing as to the identity or otherwise of the material world in relation to Brahman. Whatever statement is made about the latter may as well be made direct. On Appayya's interpretation, the comparison appears futile. Not so, however, on the straight interpretation of the sūtras. The jīva is different from Brahman, and the material world is still more

⁸³ II, 1, 23.

⁸⁴ II, 1, 15 *et seq.*

different. The former conclusion is established on the basis of the latter, which itself requires no further proof than the mere statement. What Śrīkanṭha says of the material world is not the conclusion of an argument, but an independent step to the conclusion that the Supreme Being is other and higher than the world of both intelligent and non-intelligent beings.

It is true that in his criticism of the *bhedābheda* vāda Śrīkanṭha objects to the postulation of two contradictory qualities at the same time of the same subject. If he is consistent in the application of the Principle of Non-contradiction he cannot make out both that the *jīva* is an *aṁśa* of Brahman, and that he can identify himself with Brahman. In any case, the first statement cannot be reconciled with the sense of complete identity conveyed by the double statement of the *Jābāla Śruti*. But we are making a fairly large assumption in taking the contradiction to have been as clearly present to Śrīkanṭha's mind, as it was to Appayya's, or as it is to us, in the light of Appayya's exposition.

It is just possible that the mystic identification with Brahman was taken for granted, while its implications were not fully brought out. The doctrine of the magician's acquisition of the powers of Garuḍa was familiar to Śrīkanṭha as shown by his citation thereof. It is urged by Appayya that this identification is not really on all fours with the mystic attainment of Brahman, for, the consciousness of identity persists in the state of release, while the magician never really becomes Garuḍa, nor is conscious of identity therewith. To this it may be replied that the identification in this case

Contradictories
are not accepted,
only when con-
tradiction is ap-
parent.

too is real, as is proved by a far more certain test than the consciousness thereof, *viz.*, practical success in nullifying the effect of the poison in him who has been bitten by a snake. This pragmatic test, one may contend, is far more conclusive than any bare consciousness of identity. As for the magician not actually becoming Garuḍa, that is irrelevant; for, the object of contemplation is not the bird, but the inspiring divinity thereof. And we see that, for practical purposes at least, the self of the magician acquires the powers of that divinity and functions as that divinity. Identification characteristic of release may be of a similar character. The *jīva* may continue to be an *aṁśa*, may be external to the Lord, as it were, and yet may acquire release and the powers of the Lord in respect of wisdom and enjoyment, by mystic contemplation.³⁵

No doubt, a doctrine of the kind above set forth is more consistent with the Siddhānta notion that the *jīva* is pervasive, not atomic, and that he takes on the forms and properties of whatever he comes in contact with. But, for Śrīkaṇṭha the *jīva* is an *aṇu*, and though atomicity need not be a physical property, the monadism of the soul is, as we have seen, difficult to fit into any satisfactory theory of knowledge. The *jīva* is indeed said to be a knower, though he is *kiñciḥjña*; he is sometimes spoken of as knowledge also. This community of nature between the *jīva* and the Lord is, however, not made intelligible. It is not known if Śrīkaṇṭha was aware of or ever entertained the

³⁵ See further *Drāviḍa Māpāḍiyam*, p. 315; the possibility of the mystic identification being but imagined (*āropita*) is discounted by the Siddhāntin: (see *PB*, p. 238).

doctrine of the soul as Sat-asat. Perhaps, the mutual contradiction of the attributes was too apparent to allow him to consider that doctrine seriously. That he took those attributes to be contradictory is evident from what he says in II, 2, 31. But even without accepting this Siddhānta doctrine, it is possible to find some support for Śrīkaṇṭha's position.

As for the two statements of identity in the *Jābāla Śruti*, it is just possible that the commentator did not realise pure-non-dualism as their implication.³⁶ Further, the doctrine of mystic identification is common to the Āgamas, notably the *Sarvajñānottara*. This Āgama distinguishes not three but four categories, the fourth being Śiva, who is other than Pati. The latter is the Lord who exercises the five-fold activity in relation to the world, while Śiva, who may be spoken of in Advaita language as *niṣprapañca brahman* (Brahman with no taint of the world), is characterised mostly by negative attributes. Pati in this doctrine corresponds to the advaitin's *Īśvara*. Meditation for the purpose of release must be of the self as non-distinct from Śiva:

Ahamātmā śivo hy anyañ paramātmēti yañ smṛtaḥ |
Evam yopāsayen mohāt na śivatvam avāpnuyāt ||

Śivonyas tv ahamevānyañ prthagbhāvam vivarjayet |
Yaśśivasso 'ham eveti hy advayam bhāvayet sadā ||

He who thinks 'I am the self, Śiva the Supreme Self, is, indeed, different' or he who because of delusion meditates thus does not attain Śivatva. Abandon the thought of difference—'Śiva is other than myself',—contemplate (them)

³⁶ The implication is not realised by Rāmānuja or by many of his modern exponents. See P.N. Srinivasachari, *RFS*, p. 92.

always as not two, (but) in the form—‘what is Śiva, that is myself’.³⁷

There is no repetition here as in the *Jābāla Śruti*, but the form even of the single statement is worth noting;³⁸ for it is not the śārīra śabda that is predicated of the śārīri, the individual of the universal, whereof it is a partial realisation, but *vice versa*; “I myself am what is Śiva”; so runs the declaration. This is not consistent with the view that Brahman and the jīva are related as soul and body. And yet the Āgama is not directed to the teaching of Advaita as understood by Appayya or other followers of Śaṅkara, this view being evidently condemned in verse 24, of the tripadārtha-vicāra-prakaraṇa: “kecit sāmānyamadvaitam vadanti bhrāntacetasaḥ, some with confused minds, speak of mere Advaita.”³⁹

Now, it is possible that Śrīkaṇṭha was expounding nothing more than the doctrine of this Āgama, though he cited the *Jābāla Śruti*, as being appropriate to the Vedānta that he was commenting on. On this construction, the texts about niranvaya-upāsakas may refer to the devotees of Śiva, as distinct from those who contemplate the Lord engaged in the five-fold activity. For those who have understood this Āgama, which is deservedly designated as supervening over all other knowledge (sarva, jñāna, uttara) and contemplate Śiva who transcends all tattvas, as devoid of speech and mind and

³⁷ *Sarvajñānottara, Śiva-ananya-sākṣātkāra-pāṭala*, vv. 12, 13.

³⁸ The Tamil Translator expresses in his rendering both aspects of the relationship:

சிவனே நான், நானே சிவன்.

See P. Muthiah Pillai's edition, p. 48.

³⁹ That the view of this Āgama is identical with that of the Śaiva Siddhānta is set forth clearly and without too much elaboration in the *Drāviḍa Māpḍiyam*, sūtra, 6, adhikaraṇa, 2.

names, as eternal, without parts and without change, imperishable, as devoid of characteristic marks (aṅgam), as beyond the senses and not capable of being attained to by them, as beyond all hymns, as free from both creation and destruction, for such devotees there may be release without departure on the path of the gods.⁴⁶ Thus, the exceptions to departure, made by Śrīkaṇṭha in his commentary, may have nothing to do with the Nirguṇa Brahman of Advaita doctrine.

It does not follow from all this that Śrīkaṇṭha's position, as it stands, is logically uncontestable. If the non-advaitic interpretation of the *Sarvajñānottara* is correct there is still the difficulty that it seems to be based on the view that the jīva is Sat-asat and takes on the form of whatever he comes in contact with, a view unacceptable to Śrīkaṇṭha as involving a contradiction. If one could show that he was aware of this implication or of the contradiction between the interpretations he offered in the amśa and the ahaṅgrahādhikaraṇas, one would inevitably have to conclude that none of these theories appealed to him as final, that he was himself an advaitin, and that he adapted and toned down the ultimate truth for the comprehension of the multitude, a process necessarily involving a number of unresolved contradictions. But that he was aware of the contradictions in his doctrine is not proved. The contradiction is not apparent from the names, as in the characterisation of a doctrine as bhedābheda, nor from the very

⁴⁶ It is clear from the *Mokṣa Kārikā*, verse 117 that immediate release on the dissolution of the physical body is recognised in the case of preceptors and those enlightened by the ceremony of *dīkṣā*. These are different from the *sādaka* who obtains equality with Śiva only at the close of all the enjoyment which is his due.

presentation as in the Syād-vāda of the Jainas. Even the *Sarvajñānottara* which possibly Śrīkaṇṭha draws on does not use apparently contradictory expressions like Sat-asat of the soul. Hence it is not improbable that the faults in his doctrine were not patent to Śrīkaṇṭha, a reasonable supposition in the case of any merely human thinker. The existence of a fallacy does not of itself establish the awareness thereof. That Śrīkaṇṭha was aware of the defects of his exposition, has not been proved by Appayya Dīkṣita. Great credit is, however, due to the latter, for indicating a mode of reconciliation of Śivādvaita with the Advaita of Śaṅkara. There is not sufficient ground to believe that Śrīkaṇṭha was aware of the possibility of reconciliation or desired it. That he did not take active part in the polemical warfare against Advaita, is certainly a point greatly in his favour, but that is very inadequate support for the position that he himself was an advaitin.

It may be interesting to notice a little further, the Siddhānta doctrine which turns the tables on Appayya Dīkṣita and maintains that Nirguṇa Brahman-vidyā is not a goal, but a stage in the realisation of Brahman as endowed with all auspicious qualities, as non-different from and in constant union with Parā-Śakti, as, in short, Śiva the Supreme Being.⁴¹ The conception of Brahman as characterless is, indeed, superior to the conception of Him as possessing one or other of the guṇas constituting prakṛti. Nirguṇa Brahman is higher than sāttvika Brahman, but this is

⁴¹ See Sentinathier: *Mahā Ugra Vīrabhadraśtram*; also the Introduction to his *NṣṢB*; Ambalava Nāvala Parāśakti: Introduction to *PB*, pp. 556-557; *Schomerus*, pp. 322-325, 332, 387.

to say nothing more than that He is above prakṛti. In this sense Brahman is identical with the jīva, for puruṣa too in the Śaiva scheme of categories (as in the Sāṃkhya), is higher than prakṛti. But there are other categories above puruṣa, what are called the vidyā tattvas and the Śiva tattvas, and God is He who transcends all these as well. The strongest argument in the armoury of the advocate of this view is based on the schematism of the thirty-six categories, from Śiva down to the earth, all of which Śrīkaṇṭha recognises at least implicitly, while the Nirguṇa Brahmanavādins recognise only twenty-four, from the earth upwards. The latter too speak of thirty-six tattvas, but the other twelve are not new categories as in the Śaiva doctrine, but sub-divisions of those already included in the twenty-four.⁴² Thus, the ten vital airs, prāṇa, etc., are included in vāyu (air), avidyā is but prakṛti that is at the root of these twenty-four tattvas, while the jīva is the expression of rājasa guṇa and hence not an entity falling outside the categories already mentioned. Any Being that is superior to prakṛti alone, will still be below the twelve categories known as Śiva and vidyā tattvas. In so far as one turns away from the senses and their objects

⁴² The lists of tattvas of Āgamic Śaivism and of the Advaita are given below:

(a) *The Āgamic list*: The five Śiva tattvas:—Śiva, Śakti, Sādākhya, Īśvara and Suddhavidyā; the seven vidyā tattvas:—Asuddha māyā, Kalā, Kāla, Niyati, Vidyā, Rāga and Puruṣa; the twenty-four ātmatattvas:—the five gross elements, the five tanmātras, the five organs of cognition, the five organs of action, ahaṃkāra, buddhi, manas and prakṛti.

(b) *The Ekātmavādin's list*: The five elements, the five tanmātras, the five organs of action, the five organs of cognition, the ten vital airs beginning with prāṇa (prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, samāna, nāga, kūrma, kṛkara, devadatta and dhananjaya), manas, buddhi, ahaṃkāra, citta, avidyā, and the jīva.

which are affected or differentiated by the qualities of prakṛti, one attains the realisation of Brahman without qualities; but one is a long way yet from the supreme goal. For, that final limit cannot be reached until the vidyā and Śiva tattvas are also subsumed, i.e., until Śivatva is attained. Śiva has qualities, though they are not the guṇas of prakṛti. Thus, instead of Śivādvaita being a half-truth on the way to Advaita, the latter is presented as an intermediate stage in the realisation of the former.

In so far as it professes to be an exposition of Śrīkanṭha's position, as expounded in the *Brahma Mīmāṃsā*, this view has little to go upon. That Śrīkanṭha recognised the thirty-six tattvas can apparently be shown only by referring to his quotations of the Purāṇic text "Śaktyādi ca pṛthivyantam Śiva-tattvasamutbhavam". Whenever this text is quoted, it will be found that the commentator is interested not in the number or nature of the categories, but in the relation between Śiva and Śakti and the pervasion of the world by the First Cause as mud-pots by mud.⁴⁸ The conclusion based on such slender grounds is sought to be bolstered up by a reference to Appayya Dikṣita, while at the same time whatever is distinctly advaitic in what Appayya has to say is lightly dismissed as a fraudulent interpolation. The procedure here is very objectionable. It is a legitimate ambition to try and interpret the philosophy of the author of the only extant commentary on Śrīkanṭha's Bhāṣya in such a manner as to harmonise with one's own notion of Śivādvaita; but facts cannot be brushed aside as

⁴⁸ See I, 2, 1; II, 1, 16; and II, 2, 38.

forgeries, whenever inconvenient. Thus, the repetition in the *Jābāla Śruti* is inexplicable on the notion of Brahman being related to the soul, as the soul to the body. This view is common to the *Sivārkamanidīpikā*, the *Ānanda Laharī* and the *Sivādvaita Nirṇaya*. It is a fundamental doctrine and on it are based most of the arguments for the advaitic interpretation of Śrīkaṇṭha's position. Since it is common to all three works, there is little possibility of its being an interpolation. If, on the contrary, its genuineness is admitted, the arguments based thereon follow naturally, and there is no justification for holding any part of those works to be corrupt or spuriously ascribed to Appayya. It is suggested that the latter portions of the *Ānanda Laharī* and the *Sivādvaita Nirṇaya* are corrupt. This can hardly be; for the earlier portion of the latter (and later) work mentions many of the arguments advanced in the latter half of the other work, and urges objections thereto, the answers to the objections being provided later on. If the arguments so mentioned in the first part are not Appayya's whose else are they? And whose was the daring but clumsy hand that interpolated into the *Ānanda Laharī* arguments apparently refuted in another work? Even if we overlook the lack of necessary evidence to establish forgery, the argument advanced to support that hypothesis seems hardly plausible. And this is strikingly evident when we remember that one of the earliest verses of the *Sivat-tattva-vivekam*⁴⁴ makes out that though Brahman is really nirguṇa, He is yet understood and worshipped as associated with māyā (māyā śabalita), thus indicating at the same time, His re-

⁴⁴ Verse 13.

lative inferiority to Nirguṇā Brahman, and His superiority to the guṇa mūrtis,—Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra. The whole of that work, indeed, is devoted to establishing the supremacy of Śiva, not absolutely, but only as the fourth form of the Absolute (turiya mūrti).

It must also be remembered that when Brahman is realised as Nirguṇa, the world is also realised to be fictitious. The transcendence of that realisation cannot establish of the world that it is other than fictitious. The saguṇa vidyā that supervenes on nirguṇa vidyā will still have to recognise the illusory nature of the world, a conclusion that is not known to be acceptable to Śrīkanṭha and is certainly not acceptable to those who advance the view under discussion. When in the realisation of Nirguṇa Brahman all distinctions vanish, it is matter for legitimate inquiry how they are expected to be re-introduced at a later stage.⁴⁵

Nor have the advocates of this view any reasonable explanation to offer of Śrīkanṭha's reference to niranvaya-upāsakas. These passages they say, are interpolations unworthy of credence. Such arguments have little weight, when they proceed on no other basis than that certain passages fail to harmonise with their own view of Śrīkanṭha's teaching. The procedure is, in its way, even more one-sided than the attempt to make out that Advaita was the real view of Śrīkanṭha, his theism being intended for people whose mental capacity is too poor to enable them to seize and to hold the notion of Nirguṇa Brahman. The advantage, indeed, is with

⁴⁵ The Siddhānta doctrine of a patijñāna, superior to the advaita, which is but paśu-jñāna, deserves to be examined in greater detail, on a future occasion. We are concerned for the present, with the attempt to impute such a doctrine to Śrīkanṭha and Appayya.

the latter view, for it attempts not to exclude any passage, but to include and harmonise all.

To interpret the *Vedānta Sūtras* as teaching a system of theism which had also independent support in the Śaiva Āgamas, that was the service of Śrīkaṇṭha to Vedāntic thought. In the course of his exposition we come across many loose ends and ragged edges, such as have been pointed out here and there in the present exposition. These are almost necessarily incidental partly to the task of reconciliation and partly to the theistic nature of the system. Theism is essentially the voice of the religious consciousness and to this consciousness contradictions as such need count for little.⁴⁶ But the major considerations of morality and religion receive a full measure of attention at the hands of our author. The reality of the world and the individual, the relative freedom of the human will, the essentially ordered nature of the world, which is such that even Divine Omnipotence has to respect and not to overthrow it, all these are features of permanent value in any doctrine of God; and those are the dominant ideas of Śrīkaṇṭha's theism. That there is no rabid condemnation of other systems and that the way seems to be left open to reach to the logical fulfilment of the thought in a system of pure-non-dualism, these are further features of merit. Śrīkaṇṭha had the gift to perceive in the *Sūtras* a doctrine of the Supreme Being as Śiva, the auspicious one, the Being whose throat shows for all time the mark of His grace to His creatures, the consort of Umā who is the Supreme Light of Intelligence and Bliss, the three-eyed cause of the destruction and the subsequent re-creation

⁴⁶ See Bradley, *Essays in Truth and Reality*, p. 430.

of the Universe, the God who is the agent in all action and yet is as but the senior partner in every enterprise (not interfering with the freedom and responsibility of his junior partners), He who bestows Grace on His devotees by conferring on them His own form even in respect of blue-throatedness and so on, He who is supreme but not exclusive, He who grants release earlier or later to all, even those who follow other gods. It is for this vision that Śrīkaṇṭha deserves to be revered by all, not for the half-hidden pre-suppositions or possible developments of his thought.

APPENDICES.

It is not claimed for these lists that they are exhaustive; it is believed, however, that they are accurate, as far as they go.

APPENDIX I

SUTRA READINGS

A

Readings unique to Srikantha.

II, 1.

17: Sattvāccāparasya (not "avarasya," as in other texts).

II, 3.

48: Asantatescāvyatirekaḥ (not "avyatikaraḥ").

III, 1.

22: Tatsvābhāvyāpattirupapatteh (*neither* "Sābhāvyāpattiḥ," etc., *nor* "Tat sābhāvyāpattiḥ," etc.).

III, 3.

2: Bhedāditi ced ekasyāmapī (*neither* "Bhedānneti cen naikasyāmapī" *nor* "Bhedānneti ced ekasyāmapī").

29 & 30: Upapannastallakṣaṇārthopalabdherloka-vat: gaterarthavattvam ubhayathānyathāhi virodhaḥ (not in the reverse order, as read by Śaṁkara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Ānanda Tīrtha, Vallabha, Vijñāna Bhīkṣu, and Baladeva).

38: Kāmādayastatratatra cāyatanādibhyaḥ (not "Kāmādītara," etc.).

IV, 2.

4: So'dhyakṣeṇa tadupagamādibhyaḥ (not "So'dhyakṣe tadupagamādibhyaḥ").

B

**Readings common to Srikantha and Ramanuja,
and occasionally to other commentators as well,
but not to Saṁkara.**

N: Nimbārka; M: Madhva; Bh: Bhāskara; R: Rāmānuja;
Ś: Śaṁkara; Śri: Śrikanṭha.

I, 1.

9: Pratijñā virodhāt (omitted by all except N).

I, 2.

16: Ata eva ca sa brahma (omitted by all others except N, who reads "tad brahma" not "sa brahma").

19: Antaryāmyadhidaivādhilokādiṣu taddharma-
vyapadeśāt (M agrees with Ś in omitting
"loka" in "lokādiṣu"; N agrees with Bh in
adopting present text).

20 & 21: Na ca smārtamataddharmābhilāpāc-
chārīraśca; ubhayepi hi bhedenainamadhī-
yate (the second sūtra does not begin with
"Śārīraśca ubhayepihi", etc., as in other
texts).

I, 3.

3: Nānumānamatacchabdāt, prāṇabhṛcca (not two
sūtras as elsewhere).

34 & 35: Kṣatriyatvāvagatēśca; uttaratra caitra-
rathena liṅgāt (not one sūtra).

38 & 39: Śravaṇādhyayanārthapratīṣedhāt; smṛteś-
ca (not one sūtra; N adopts the present
reading).

I, 4.

26 & 27: Ātmakṛteḥ; pariṇāmāt (not one sūtra).

II, 1.

11 & 12: Tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt; anyathānumeyamiti
cet evamapyanirmokṣaprasaṅgaḥ (not one
sūtra).

II, 1.

- 18: *Asadvyapadeśānneti cen na dharmāntareṇa vākyaśeṣāt, yukteḥ śabdāntarācca* (one sūtra, not two; N adopts the present reading).
- 20: *Yathā ca prāṇādiḥ* (not *prāṇādi*; N adopts present reading).
- 35: *Na karmavibhāgāditi cen na anāditvāt, upapadyate cāpyupalabhyate ca* (not two sūtras; N adopts present reading).

II, 2.

- 1: *Ṛacanānupapattēś ca nānumānam, pravṛtteś ca* (not two sūtras).
- 8: “*Abhyupagame'pyarthābhāvāt*” comes after “*Anyatrābhāvācca na tṛṇādivat*” (II, 2, 4) in Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Nimbārka and Ānanda Tīrtha; whereas the fifth sūtra according to Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja is “*Puruṣāśma-vaditi cet tathāpi*”.
- 18: *Itaretarapratyayatvāt upapannamiti cen na saṅghātabhāvānimittatvāt* (M & N also adopt this reading; Ś reads “*Itaretarapratyayatvāditi cenna utpattimātranimittatvāt*”, and Bh reads “*Itaretarapratyayamanyatvādupapannam iti cen na, saṅghātabhāvānimittatvāt*”).
- 31: Śrī, R and Bh omit the sūtra read as “*kṣaṇikatvācca*” by Ś and M, and as “*kṣaṇikatvāt*” by N.
- 38: Śrī, R and Bh omit “*Sambandhānupapattēś ca*” (read as a separate sūtra by Ś, M and N).

II, 3.

- 3: *Gauṇyasambhavāt, śabdācca* (not two sūtras).
- 5 & 6: *Pratijñāhāniravyatirekāt; śabdebhyaḥ* (not one sūtra).
- 12 & 13: *Pṛthivī; adhikārarūpaśabdāntarebhyaḥ* (not one sūtra).

II, 3.

- 18: Nātmā śruteḥ, etc., not Nātmā'śruteḥ, etc. (na + ātmā + āśruteḥ).
 27: Vyatireko gandhavat, tathā hi darśayati (not two sūtras; N adopts present reading).
 34: Upādānāt, vihāropadeśācca (not two sūtras, nor in the order "Vihāropadeśāt; upādānāt", as read by Ś, Bh, N, and M).
 43: Mantra varṇāt (not mantravarṇācca; Bh adopts present reading).

II, 4.

- 2: Gaṇyasambhavāt, tatprāk śruteś ca (not two sūtras).
 13: Jyotirādyadhiṣṭhānam tu tadāmananāt, prāṇavatā śabdāt (not two sūtras).
 16: Bhedaśruter, vilakṣanyācca (not two sūtras; N adopts present reading).

III, 1.

- 9: Caraṇāditi cen na tadupalakṣaṇārtheti kārṇājiniḥ. (not "upalakṣaṇārtheti", etc.; N adopts the present reading).

III, 2.

- 4 & 5: Are read as sūtras 5 & 6 by Ś, Bh, N, and M.
 12: Bhedāditi cen na pratyekamatadvacanāt. (not "Na bhedāditi", etc.; N adopts present reading).
 20: Vṛddhihrāsabhāktvamantarbhāvādubhayasamañjasyādevam, darśanāc ca (not two sūtras).

III, 3.

- 24: Puruṣavidyāyāmapī ca itareṣāmanāmnānāt (not "puruṣavidyāyām iva", etc.; N adopts present reading).
 32: Aniyamassarveṣāmavirodhaś śabdānumānābhyām (not "sarvāsām", etc.; N adopts present reading).

III, 3.

- 31: "Yāvadadhikāram", etc., comes before the above sūtra, and not after it, as in Ś, Bh, N, and M.
- 35: Antarā bhūtagrāṃavat svātmano'nyathā bhe-dānupapatter iti cen na upadeśavat (not two sūtras, nor "upadeśāntaravat"; N reads as one sūtra, but "upadeśāntaravat").
- 46: Vidyaiva tu nirdhāraṇāt, darśanāc ca (not two sūtras; N adopts present reading).

III, 4.

- 7: Niyamāt (not "niyamācca").
- 27: Śamadamādyupetasyāt tathāpi tu tadvidhes-tadaṅgatayā teṣāmapī avaśyānuṣṭheyatvāt (Ś, Bh, N, and M omit "api" in "teṣā-mapi").
- 42: Upapūrvamapītyeke bhāvamaśanavat taduk-tam (not "apītyeke").
- 46: "Śruteśca" is read as sūtra 46 by Ś; it is omitted by Bh, Śri, N, and M.
- 50: Aihikamaprastutapratibandhe taddarśanāt (Ś, Bh, and N read "api" between "aihiham" and "aprastuta").

IV, 1.

- 19: Bhogena tvitare kṣapayitvātha sampadyate (Ś and Bh omit "atha" between "kṣapayitvā" and "sampadyate").

IV, 2.

- 11: Asyaiva copapatterūsmā (Ś and Bh introduce "eṣa" between "upapatteḥ" and "ūsmā").
- 12: Pratiṣedhāditi cenna śārīrāt, spaṣṭo hy eke-ṣām (not two sūtras; Bh and N adopt the present reading).
- 20: Yoginaḥ prati smaryate smārte caite (Ś and Bh introduce "ca" after "prati").

IV, 8.

- 5: "Ubhaya vyāmohāt tatsiddheḥ" read as sūtra 5 by Ś is omitted by all others.
 13: Na ca kārye pratyabhisandhiḥ (not "prati-patyabhisandhiḥ").
 14: Apratikālabhanānnayatīti bādarāyaṇaḥ ubhayathā ca doṣāt tatkratuś ca (not "ubhaya-thādoṣat", etc.; M adopts the present reading).

The expression "present reading" has been used to refer to the reading adopted by Śrīkaṇṭha.

C

**Readings common to Śrīkaṇṭha and
 Saṃkara or others, but not to
 Ramanuja.**

II, 3.

- 44: Api ca smaryate *not* api smaryate.
 49: Ābhāsā eva ca *not* ābhāsa eva ca.

III, 1.

- 15: Api ca sapta *not* api sapta.

III, 4.

- 30: Api ca smaryate *not* api smaryate.

IV, 2.

- 2: Ata eva ca sarvāṇyanu *not* ata eva sarvāṇyanu.

IV, 4.

- 8: Saṃkalpādeva tu tacchruteḥ *not* saṃkalpādeva tacchruteḥ.

Nimbārka agrees with Śrīkaṇṭha in the reading of II, 3, 49 and III, 4, 30.

Note.—It will be seen from Appendices I: A, B and C that the difference in textual readings between Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja extends only to about 13 sūtras, that the difference is of little significance in respect of the texts noted in I: C, and that there is a very large degree of correspondence between the readings of the two.

APPENDIX II

Doctrinal affinities to the Śruti-sukti-mala of Haradattacarya.

SLOKAS

- 11 to 14: Reference to Śiva as the head; yasmai namas tacchirah. The Divya Śiśumāra of the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, II, 19 mentions all other deities and identifies them with other parts of the body. Śiva alone is the head, the Being worthy of adoration. (*Br. M.*, IV, 1, 5).
- 17: Śiva stands related to the Universe as controlling it, as the embodied one stands in relation to the body. This is the significance of such passages as “Śva-bhyaś śvapatibhyaś ca vonamaḥ”. (*Br. M.*, IV, 1, 5).
- 25: Rudra, as a name of Śiva, the Supreme Being, means he who drives away the sorrows of bondage (saṃ-sāra rug drāvakaḥ). (*Br. M.*, I, 1, 2; IV, 1, 12).
- 36 to 39: The principal deity inculcated by the *Mahā-nārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* is Śiva, as determined by the rules of interpretation upakrama, upasaṃhāra, etc. Nārāyaṇa is but an upāsaka (a devotee), as established by the method of residues and the text “tasyāś śikhāyāmadhye paramātmā vyavas-thitaḥ”. (*Br. M.*, I, 2, 3, and 4; 8).
- 42: Nārāyaṇa's identity with the Supreme Brahman is of the same kind as that experienced by Ṛṣi Vāmadeva or the identity of the magician, who incants the Garuḍa Mantra, with Garuḍa. (*Br. M.*, I, 1, 21; III, 2, 24).
- 43, 44: The teaching imparted and the form exhibited by Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna, came from the Lord, having been acquired by Yoga. (*Br. M.*, I, 1, 31; I, 2, 6).
- 44: The non-mention of Viṣṇu among the vibhūtiś of Śiva in the *Mahopaniṣad*, is cured by his being mentioned as such in the *Kaivalya Upaniṣad*. (*Br. M.*, I, 2, 4).

SLOKAS

- 45: Nārāyaṇa is mūla prakṛti; Śiva operates thereon as nimitta kāraṇa. (*Br. M.*, I, 2, 3 and 8).
- 56 & 57: The person within the Sun is Śiva as seen from the appellations Hiraṇyagarbha, Ambikāpati, Umāpati, etc. Śrīkaṇṭha refutes the reference to Nārāyaṇa implied in passages like “dhyeyas sadā savitr maṇḍala madhyavartī, etc.” He also explains “Kapyāsam puṇḍarikam, etc.”, a text not referred to by Rāmānuja in this context. (*Br. M.*, I, 1, 21 and 22).
- 87: In the *Camaka*, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Indra, and other deities are mentioned along with objects desired, such as food, etc.; Śiva, by the method of residues, must be the bestower of these gifts, He not being mentioned with the rest. (*Br. M.*, III, 2, 38).
- 108: The Vedas, whether self-created or created by the Lord Śiva, are of unquestionable authority. Other sciences may claim truth only in so far as they do not contradict the Śruti and the degree of truth possessed by each depends on the status of its author. (*Br. M.*, I, 1, 3).
- 111: “Adhvanām adhvapate śreṣṭhasyādhvanah pāramāśīya” is a Vedic hymn (from the Ekāgni Kāṇḍa) mentioning the adhvās, their relative superiority and inferiority and their relation to Śiva, as their Lord. The adhvā doctrine is thus not an āgamic innovation. The Āgamas proceeding from Śiva, the supreme ascetic, must have greater authority than the Kalpa Sūtras, at least, the latter being revealed only by other ascetics, lower in the scale of perfection. (Cp. *Br. M.*, I, 1, 3 and II, 2, 38).
- 138: Not even Śiva can arbitrarily change the nature of things. Birth is not voluntary, but due to karma. (Cp. *Br. M.*, III, 3, 30, where it is said that the continuance of saṃsāra is not possible apart from karma; also III, 1, 22, where it is said that one thing cannot become another).

APPENDIX III-A.

Resemblances between Srikantha's Bhasya and the Sri Bhasya.

I, 1.

1: Interpretation of "atha" as marking the introduction of a fresh topic in the continuous treatment of what is essentially one Śāstra, this usage of "atha" being paralleled by the commencement of Chapter III of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*.

4: Discussion of the theory that words denote only acts or things pertaining to acts, and the consequent objection that Śruti cannot give us knowledge of an already accomplished Being. Rāmānuja's treatment of this topic occurs under sūtra I, 1, 1.

13 *et seq*: The ānandamaya self is definitely and finally settled to be Brahman, the position not being provisionally accepted and finally refuted, as by Śaṅkara.

21: The interpretation of kapyāsam puṇḍarikam, as the lotus made to bloom forth by the Sun. This interpretation does not find a place in the *Śrī Bhāṣya*, in the discussion of the present sūtra which treats of the golden person within the Sun, but in the *Vedārtha Saṅgraha*.

32: Rāmānuja and Śrikanṭha agree in taking the sūtra to mention with approval the existence of three forms of meditation on Brahman—in itself, in the bodies of the enjoyers, and as the object enjoyed. This is mentioned by Śaṅkara only as an alternative interpretation.

I, 2.

- 24: The rūpopanyāsa is taken to refer to *Muṇḍaka*, II, 1, 4, ff., as by Śaṅkara in the first of the views presented by him. But there is no mention of Śaṅkara's second view taking the reference to be to *Muṇḍaka*, II, 1, 10.
- 32: The subject-matter of the sūtra is considered to be the identification in contemplation of the prāṇāhuti with the agnihotra.

I, 3.

- 14: Agreement in respect of the text cited, referring to people who wander about over hidden treasure, not knowing the treasure (*Ch.*, VIII, 3, 2), and also in respect of the last sentence of Śrīkaṇṭha's bhāṣya; this bhāṣya is very condensed while Rāmānuja's is explanatory.

I, 4.

- 6: The two agree in the enumeration of the three questions propounded by Naciketas, as relating to Upāsya, Upāsana and Upāsaka, unlike Śaṅkara who takes the three to refer to the boons, which related respectively to the welfare of the father of the Naciketas, the knowledge of the Trināciketa fire, and the selves (both higher and lower).
- 9 & 10: The interpretation of "ajā" with reference to the *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*; as also the explanation of the term "unborn" as applied to prakṛti that is controlled by the Lord.
- 13: The expression "pañcajanāḥ" occurs almost immediately after the reference to the Lord "Jyotiṣām jyotiḥ", the light of lights; hence "pañcajanāḥ" probably has the same sense as the first jyoti, which here means the senses, which light up their objects, as it were.

II, 1.

- 18: The defects of the effect do not inhere in the cause. The conception of the world as the body of the Lord; change, ignorance, etc., belong to the body, while permanence, omniscience and so on belong to the Lord.
- 15-20: General agreement as to the identity of cause and effect and the notion of the former as sūkṣma—cidacid—prapañca—viśiṣṭa—Brahman, the latter being sthūla—cidacid—prapañca—viśiṣṭa—Brahman.
- 22: Reference to and criticism of the bhedābheda—vāda. (This occurs in II, 1, 21 of the *Śrī Bhāṣya* and is not in the same terms as Śrīkaṇṭha's).

II, 2.

- 23: Both commentators refer to the flight of birds in ākāśa as disproving the Buddhist view of ākāśa as a form of non-existence.
- 30: This is recognised by both as a separate adhi-karaṇa, refuting the Mādhyamika doctrine; Śaṅkara does not recognise a new topic, while Bhāskara omits even the sūtra.

II, 3.

- 4: The words “anuṣaṅgepi śravaṇāvṛttāviva” occur in both commentaries, in answer to an objection that the same word cannot be taken both literally and in a secondary sense, unless it is used more than once, as happens in the case of the word “Brahman”. This objection is set forth by Rāmānuja, but not by Śrīkaṇṭha.
- 7: Common illustration from the reference by a father to his many sons; he says he has ten sons, indicates them and mentions some by name; the others not named are also his sons. Similarly, whatever is a modification is originated and ākāśa is among these.

II, 3.

- 8: Both give the same reason for treating of the origination of vāyu in a fresh topic, the reason being that the next sūtra speaks of the origination of fire, which is said to come out of vāyu.
- 10-16: General resemblance in respect of the doctrine that fire, water, and earth are caused by Brahman, not by each preceding element in the causal chain.
- 17: Words have Brahman for their primary and not their secondary sense. To support this interpretation, a negative particle has to be imported into the text of the sūtra; and the two commentators agree as to this importation. (Tadvyapadeśo bhāktah read as tadvyapadeśah abhāktah).
- 29-32: General agreement in interpreting these as concerned in justifying the use of the name "knowledge" in the case of the self who is the "knower".
- 45: Relationship of the jīva to Brahman compared to that of a part to the whole, light to what is luminous, quality to the qualified, genus to species, the body to the embodied.

II, 4.

- 2: Gaṇyasambhavāttatprākśruteśca: both commentators take the first part of the sūtra to state that the passage about the senses having existed prior to creation, is not to be interpreted literally, as it is gaṇī; they differ from Śaṅkara, who thinks that that part of the sūtra asserts the impossibility of taking the statements about the creation of the senses as gaṇī in significance.
- 3: Speech is itself one of the senses; and speech is impossible in the absence of name and form, of which the Lord is the Creator; hence one at least of the senses is created. The

II, 4.

above interpretation is common to both, but Rāmānuja's mode of stating it is fuller and clearer, though in the previous sūtra, his commentary is meagre as compared with Śrīkaṇṭha's.

- 15: Agreement in respect of the siddhānta that the senses are distinct from mukhya prāṇa. The support from Smṛti "Indriyāṇi daśai-kam ca" is also common to both.
- 16: Agreement in respect of the siddhānta that the senses are different from mukhya prāṇa.
- 17: Śaṅkara says that the next sūtra "māmsādi bhaumam yathāśabdāmitarayośca" is a reply to *some* foreseen objection, but does not specify the objection. Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha indicate this objection, *viz.*, that whatever may have happened before the creation of Brahmā, at least after his creation, he should be recognised as the Being that renders tripartite, as this function is continued even later, *e.g.*, in the triple partition of food into fæces, flesh and the mind.

III, 2.

- 1-6: Agreement in respect of arrangement of the sūtras (*see* Appendix I), as also in the interpretation thereof, esp. the doctrine that dreams are māyāmātram. Dreams are wonderful in that they are momentary and can be perceived only by the individual experiencing them, and hence their creation must be ascribed only to the Lord who alone has satyasamkalpa.
- 20: Though Brahman resides within, He does *not* participate in increase and decrease. The sūtra, as it stands, contains no negative particle, to show that such participation is denied. Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja agree in importing this particle.

III, 3.

- 2: Agreement in the interpretation of the words “ekasyām api” as referring to the identity of vidyā in spite of repetitions, such repetitions being due only to differences among learners. (In the previous sūtra Śaṅkara and Śrīkaṇṭha mention the identity of the pañcāgni-vidyās of the Chandogas and the Vājasaneyins, but Rāmānuja makes no reference to this.)
- 8: The illustration from the word “agnihotra” used of different objects of injunction going by the same name, is common to both commentators.
- 9: The vyāpti mentioned in this topic is interpreted by both to extend only to the whole of the Chāndogya, not to all the Vedas.
- 12: “Priyaśirastvādyaprāptiḥ”, etc.; both commentators understand the sūtra to say that the predication of joy as the head and so on would make Brahman subject to increase and decrease, while Śaṅkara says that joy, etc., are capable of increase and decrease and these are characteristic of plurality, which is not to be imported into Brahma-vidyā.
- 14-17: Both understand the sūtras to relate to certain Taittirīya passages, while Śaṅkara considers the viśaya-vākyas to come from the Kaṭha and Aitareya Upaniṣads (but see Appendix III-C).
- 19: Agreement in taking the sūtra to discuss the identity of the Śaṅḍilya vidyās in the Agni-rahasya and in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. In one case greatness is mentioned, and realisation of all purposes; in the other, smallness, control and rulership. But the vidyās are identical, since they are equal in respect of manomayatva and other guṇas; thus the two pairs of qualities are not op-

III, 3.

posed. There is, however, another difference noticed by Śrīkaṇṭha—that Brahman is to be meditated on, in one case as ether, and in the other as rice or barley. This is a more serious difficulty which Śrīkaṇṭha evades, while Rāmānuja avoids it altogether, as he does not mention it at all.

- 26: Agreement in the doctrine that the abandonment of puṇya and pāpa necessarily goes with their being taken up by others, since there can be neither mere abandonment nor mere taking up.
- 34: “Iyadāmananāt” is taken by both to be part of Akṣaraddhi adhikaraṇa, stating that only so much has to be imported as will effectively bring about the meditation of Brahman as different from all other things. Śaṅkara understands the sūtra to relate to those texts which speak about the “two birds”.
- 36: “Vyatihāro viśiṃṣanti hi itaravat” is understood by both to state that since the answers given to Uṣasti and Kahoḷa relate to the same Being, there should be an exchange of ideas between the two vidyās. They differ from Śaṅkara, who takes the sūtra to refer to the meditation on “I am Thou. Thou art I” and the frequent passage of the mind from one to the other.
- 37: All the questions and answers refer to one and the same thing, the Highest Lord, as seen from the words repeated at the end of every answer “That is the True, That is the Self, That thou art.” Rāmānuja condemns Śaṅkara’s interpretation; Śrīkaṇṭha is content with stating his own position which is the same as Rāmānuja’s.
- 39: Though Śrīkaṇṭha makes out that the sūtra declares itself against the rejection of qualities like blue-throatedness, etc., in the medita-

III, 3.

tion of Brahman, there is agreement between him and Rāmānuja in respect of the appeal made to the authority of Śruti. Those who recognise the authority of Śruti must admit that in the case of Dharma and Brahman, not cognisable by other means of knowledge, that form which is taught in the Śruti should be recognised.

40: In the view of Śrīkanṭha, the sūtra establishes that the higher knowledge of the released person relates to Brahman with qualities and not to Brahman devoid of attributes, and that the negative texts indicate the absence only of objectionable qualities. The same topic is dealt with by Rāmānuja, a little more elaborately in the three sūtras 38, 39 and 40.

56: Repeats the idea of III, 3, 42, that meditations may have to be kept distinct in spite of their having an identical object. Both Śrīkanṭha and Rāmānuja justify the repetition on the ground that it is directed to the refutation of those who maintain that knowledge is not an object of injunction, presumably by showing that not one but many injunctions apply to knowledge.

III, 4.

11: "Vibhāgaś śatavat" is taken by both to refer to the case of a person getting two hundred, a hundred each from the sale of the gem and of the lands.

IV, 1.

16-18: Constitute the agnihotrādhikaraṇa; both commentators agree on the efficacy of agni-hotra, etc., especially, in sūtras 17 and 18.

IV, 2.

11-13: Agreement with Rāmānuja, from the statement about the heat of the subtle body right up to the mention of the support given by

IV, 2

Śruti to the doctrine of departure by the mūrdhanya nāḍi.

- 20: The expression “kāla” used in the Gītā teaching about the paths, is interpreted by both to refer to the presiding deities, who serve as guides from stage to stage of the paths mentioned; Śaṅkara understands “kāla” to mean time.

IV, 4.

- 7: The state of liberation is one of equality with Brahman in respect of both self-illumination and the possession of all auspicious qualities. Śaṅkara would admit the latter aspect, only “with a view to the world of appearances”.
- 15 & 16: Both commentators affirm pervasiveness to be characteristic of the released soul and justify this. The attribute mentioned in the sūtra is taken by Śaṅkara to be more a power of multiplication than one of pervasion, being comparable to the lighting of several lamps from the flame of one lamp; in any case, pervasiveness being, according to him, a minor lordly power it may be attained long before release and is in no way characteristic of that state.
- 17-21: As treated by both Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja, sūtra 21 “Bhogamātrasāmyalingācca” repeats the ideas and arguments of sūtra 17: “Jagatvyāpāravarjam prakaraṇāt asannihi-tavācca”. Śaṅkara takes up a different line of interpretation and thus avoids the redundancy. Sūtra 17 is concerned to establish the dependence of the released soul on the Lord for whatever powers the former acquires. This notion of dependence promptly dismisses all notions of equality, though there may be considerable similarity left; what this similarity extends to, is determined by sūtra 21, as Śaṅkara interprets it.

APPENDIX III-B.

Resemblances between Srikantha's Bhasya and the Samkara Bhasya.

I, 1.

2: Judgments like "san ghaṭah, san paṭah" reveal, in their existential aspect, the continuous presence of Brahman.

I, 3.

30: The sūtra "madhvādiṣvasambhavādanadhikāram Jaiminiḥ" forms part of the Devatādhikaraṇa, not a new topic.

40 & 41: "Kampanāt" and Jyotirdarśanāt" constitute two new topics.

II, 1.

3: Agreement in respect of the argument that the Yoga possesses but a limited degree of validity, the primary object of that Smṛti being to teach "citta-vṛtti-nirodhah".

II, 3.

9: The sūtra is taken to declare that Brahman is unoriginated, though the last sentence of Śrikanṭha's commentary connects with Rāmānuja's view of the sūtra as establishing that everything but Brahman is originated.

19: This is an adhikaraṇa by itself establishing that the jīva is a cogniser; the topic is distinct from that of the succeeding sūtras 20 to 32, though Rāmānuja reads all these as belonging to one adhikaraṇa.

II, 4.

15: Agreement in respect of the pūrvapakṣa that the sense-organs are functions of the mukhya prāṇa; the *prima facie* view, according

II, 4.

to Rāmānuja, is that the mukhya prāṇa is also a sense-organ.

III, 1.

12-21: For Śrīkaṇṭha as for Śaṅkara the statement of the pūrvapakṣa is confined to sūtra 12 while for Rāmānuja it goes on to sūtra 16, the “ārohāvaroha” of sūtra 13 being understood by the latter as ascent and descent after sojourn in Yamaloka. The reference to Citragupta in sūtra 16 is also common to Śaṅkara. (The seven hells constitute Yama-loka, for though they are primarily controlled by Citragupta and others, they function under the direction of Yama.)

III, 2.

7: In the statement of the pūrvapakṣa favouring the disjunctive interpretation of the statements as to the nādis, purītat, and so on, the same arguments are used as by Śaṅkara, viz., identity of purpose (i.e., sleep), the illustration from the use of rice excluding that of barley, and so on.

10: Agreement with Śaṅkara in contrasting swoon with sleep in respect of the distortion of countenance present in the former case, but not in the latter.

III, 3.

1 & 2: Assertion of the identity of the two pañcāgni vidyās.

5: Agreement in respect of general exposition, and the illustration from the upasamhāra of the complementary elements of one religious duty, say, agnihotra.

9: Agreement in the recognition of a new topic (the vyāptyadhikaraṇa). Śaṅkara undertakes an elaborate inquiry into the precise nature of the sāmānādhikaraṇya between prāṇava and udgītha, whether it is adhyāsa or apavāda or ekatva or viśeṣaṇa, and con-

III, 3.

cludes that the last alone is appropriate. Śrīkanṭha takes this conclusion for granted, and passes on from sāmānādhikarāṇya to viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyatā (the latter relationship is said to *come about*, but *how* we are not told). In the conclusion that the praṇava is qualified by the udgītha, there is agreement; but not in the argument, where Śrīkanṭha presumes what is proved by Śaṅkara, and shows agreement with Rāmānuja.

- 10: In the statement of both pūrvapakṣa and siddhānta (about the prāṇa which is mentioned as the best being understood to be also the richest, etc., these other qualities finding mention only in certain texts), Śrīkanṭha has far greater affinities with Śaṅkara than with Rāmānuja, even down to the illustration from the attributes of Devadatta as known at one place, being called to mind when he is encountered at another place.
- 31: Agreement in the recognition of a new topic treating of persons placed in certain responsible positions, like Vasiṣṭha and so on.
- 41: Affinity in respect of the declaration of the independent and injunctive character of the meditation on the udgītha, though the text is couched in the indicative mood.
- 57: The vidyās are optional. To pass to a fresh mode of contemplation would distract the mind which has already attained its goal by one such method.

III, 4.

- 14: Reference is made to "Na karma lipyate nare" unlike Rāmānuja who cites the text "Īśāvāsyam idam sarvam", etc.
- 51: Liberation is one and uniform, there being no grades therein, as in the fruit of karma; for, the fruit of all meditation is asserted to be the condition of Brahman which is one.

III, 4.

(Rāmānuja takes sūtras 50 and 51 to deal with knowledge leading to worldly exaltation and that which brings about release, there being no prescription as to the time when either result is attained, the only determinant being the absence of counteracting conditions.)

IV, 1.

- 1: Meditation on Brahman has to be repeated, not performed just once, as in the prayājas: there is no analogy with the latter, since this is directed to securing an unseen result, whereas Brahmanvidyā is a means to a visible result; and where the result can be seen, repetition is necessary till the result is attained, as in the husking of paddy.
- 3: Brahman is to be contemplated as identical with the self, not as other than the self.
- 6: The whole argument about the super-imposition of Āditya, etc., on the udgītha savours strongly of Śaṅkara, in respect of both the pūrvapakṣin's attitude of indifference as to which is to be superimposed on the other, and the appeal to the text "yadeva vidyayā karoti, tadeva vīryavattaram bhavati" in support of the siddhānta.

IV, 2.

- 1, 2 & 3-6: Speech merges in the mind, the mind in the chief vital air and so on, at the time of departure. The merger is not one of essential nature, as of an effect in its material cause, but one of function only; it is not interpreted, as by Rāmānuja, to indicate a mere "going-with" or a conjunction.
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APPENDIX III-C.

Topics distinctively treated by Srikantha.

I, 1.

17-20: The whole topic disposes of the notion of Hiranyagarbha as the First Cause. The expression Prajāpati is equated with Paśupati. The sūtra “Kāmācca nānumānāpekṣā” receives a novel interpretation, to the effect that the creation ascribed to the *desire* of Prajāpati is only avāntara sṛṣṭi and that Prajāpati is only the śeṣa of Brahman, as seen from Śruti.

21 & 22: The golden person within the Sun is none other than the three-eyed Śiva, though only two eyes are mentioned; there is no mention of the third eye, as that is generally closed, and cannot be compared to the lotus that has opened out; the golden person is not Nārāyaṇa, as may be seen from the reference to Rudra, Hiranyabāhu, Āmbikāpati and so on.

31: While Śaṅkara takes śāstra dṛṣṭi to reveal identity, Rāmānuja holds that the knowledge attained is to the effect that all names denote Brahman, all other objects being His bodies, as it were. Śrīkanṭha gives both interpretations, the latter first. That he himself believed in the realisation of parāham-bhāva is shown in his commentary on IV, 1, 3; IV, 4, 19, and so on.

I, 2.

3-8: Nārāyaṇa is not Brahman, the former being an upāsaka and the latter upāsya, and for various other reasons. The *Mahopaniṣad* identifies Parameśvara with the Supreme

I, 2.

Brahman; the mention of Nārāyaṇa comes later and cannot avail to disturb the identification already effected.

9 & 10: The cause of destruction must also be the cause of creation. Hence, Parameśvara alone is the First Cause.

11: The two selves that entered the cave are the jīva and Parameśvara, as enjoyment may be predicated of both, though the object of enjoyment is different in either case. The real difference between the two is not in respect of enjoyment, but in that the former is paratantra, while the latter is svatantra, the former ignorant, the latter knowing, the former anādi-mala-baddha, the latter anādi-mala-mukta.

18: The Self that is of the size of the thumb is Brahman.

20: A jumbling together of different constructions is seen here. Pradhāna and the jīva are excluded from identification with the antaryāmin, the former on the ground that what it possesses, viz., inertness, non-intelligence, etc., are incompatible with antaryāmitva, the latter because of what it does not possess, viz., sarvaniyāmakatva, etc., which are qualities required in the internal ruler.

30 & 31: Śrīkaṇṭha like Śaṅkara takes "abhi-vyakti" to mean "manifestation", and "anusmṛti" to be "remembrance", unlike Rāmānuja who understands thereby "definiteness" and "meditation" respectively. But in sūtra 31, Śrīkaṇṭha, unlike Śaṅkara (and like Rāmānuja), is thinking not of the prādeśa-mātra but the description of head and limbs in a human being. In Sūtra 30, Śrīkaṇṭha seems to agree with Śaṅkara.

33: The declaration of Śruti that the Lord is present within as enjoyer is illustrated by re-

I, 2

ference to the text “Śivo mā viśāpradhāya”,
etc.

I, 3.

- 1: “Dyubhvädyāyatana” sūtra. The pūrvapakṣa relates to vāyu, according to our author, not to the pradhāna as for Śaṅkara or to the jīva as for Rāmānuja. Further, this exemplifies a peculiarity of Śrikanṭha’s Bhāṣya—the attempt to confine each sūtra to a consideration of a particular topic or view or aspect. Thus, the pūrvapakṣa about pradhāna and the jīva is considered in I, 3, 3.
- 3: The reading of the sūtra corresponds to Rāmānuja’s, but the mode of interpretation differs. The syntactical construction of a single sūtra would suggest the application of the same reasoning to both the alternatives contained therein; that is to say, non-mention by Śruti would be applied equally to pradhāna and the jīva, as grounds for excluding them; but in one case, non-mention is urged, and in the other, the incompatibility of omniscience, etc. Where two different sets of grounds are given, the reading as two sūtras would be preferable. Śrikanṭha gives the reading of Rāmānuja, but not his interpretation.
- 7 & 8: Samprasāda, according to Śaṅkara, means deep sleep and since bhūmā is taught in addition to the bliss of deep sleep, it must mean Brahman. The reference cannot be to prāṇa. The pūrvapakṣa about prāṇa is set out and refuted elaborately. “Prāṇa” is used throughout as meaning vital air, not as denoting the jīva. For Rāmānuja, the suggestion to be refuted concerns the jīva; the contention that the vital air is here meant is lightly brushed aside, even by the pūrvapakṣin, as a preliminary to the main argument. Śrikanṭha apparently refutes both suggestions at one breath; for to him prāṇa means

I, 3.

jīva. Thus, the greater part of Śaṅkara's argument and some part of Rāmānuja's become for him irrelevant. Either suggestion is possible, that Śrīkaṇṭha takes Rāmānuja's conclusion for granted, or that the latter expounds in detail what was set forth concisely by the former. Śrīkaṇṭha subjoins a disquisition on the mukta, whose vision is of a world harmonised with Brahman, though the world does not cease to exist for him.

12: Parameśvara is the person that is seen (the object of realisation), not Ilirāṇyagarbha or Nārāyaṇa. Between Śiva and Viṣṇu, there is a difference only of function, as between the operative and the material causes of the world.

16: Both the daharākāśa and the being that resides therein are prescribed as objects of meditation, since freedom from sin, etc., are predicated of both. The two are related as dharma and dharmin, not as abode and he who abides.

41: The uttama puruṣa, said to be attained to when the self's own form is manifested, is Brahman, *i.e.*, Parameśvara, not Nārāyaṇa, though the latter is generally denoted by the expression Puruṣottama. The etymological significance has to be taken here, and that refers to Śiva, who alone is higher than the world, higher than the jīvas.

I, 4.

5: To refute the Sāṃkhya appeal to the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, Śaṅkara shows that the context refers to the Self by citing several texts such as "avyakatāt puruṣaḥ parah" and so on, and incidentally mentions "yacedvānmanasī prājña", etc. Rāmānuja does not mention this verse, presumably because it relates to the wise man, not the highest Self. Śrīkaṇṭha, however, quotes only that verse, depart-

I, 4.

ing in this respect even from Śaṅkara, who apparently takes it to refer to the individual. Appayya argues that the citation proves Śrīkaṇṭha to have held the individual and Brahman to be non-different.

14 & 15: These, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, form part of the preceding topic, the saṅkhyopasaṅgraha adhikaraṇa which determines the sense of the expression pañcajanāḥ to be the sense-organs. Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Rāmānuja take both sūtras to establish that Brahman alone is the cause; they meet difficulties raised on the ground of conflicting accounts of the creational order or conflicting statements about the cause, that it was "sat" and again that it was "asat". The former class of objections has little weight; and as for the latter, it can be shown by upakrama, upasaṃhāra, etc., that "asat" means not non-existence, but Brahman. On this, Śrīkaṇṭha would appear to introduce a refinement; just as by upakrama and other marks it is shown that "asat" means Brahman, similarly, it must be determined with reference to what precedes and follows that pañcajanāḥ refers to the senses. The procedure is rather clumsy, goes against the usual practice of Śrīkaṇṭha, to render each sūtra and topic clearly defined, and on the whole, seems a needless refinement.

27: The doctrine of apūrva pariṇāma has distinctive features in that it rests on the doctrine of Śiva and Śakti, the former of whom existed in the beginning, while the latter followed from Him. As a result of this, the Lord who, in his kāraṇāvasthā, had name and form for his body only in a subtle state, then desired to have for his body the distinctions made manifest. Parameśvara is qualified by

I, 4.

māyā; the latter is an amśa of the former. Both are necessary for the production of the world, just as both soul and body are necessary for the growth of hair, nails, etc. Māyā in the capacity of enjoyer is called puruṣa (and this collective puruṣa is called Nārāyaṇa).

II, 1.

4-7: Both Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja mention the production of scorpions from cow-dung in answer to the objection based on dissimilarity of alleged cause and effect. They also meet objections to the validity of the instance; it may be said that scorpions could not come out of dung, but for some identity of nature between the two. Śaṃkara investigates and demolishes the alleged identity, proves that mere reasoning can lead nowhere and appeals to Śruti. Rāmānuja prefers to adduce what he considers to be a more satisfactory instance, viz., the production of worms in honey. It is not known how this is a better instance. Śrīkaṇṭha has recourse neither to the worm nor to Śruti, since he does not notice the difficulty at all. But he too mentions another instance, the growth of hair, nails, etc., and he has already shown that this effect, though non-different from the body, comes into being only when the body is presided over by the soul. If he had noticed the difficulty, he could hardly have given a more effective reply.

8-12: Constitute a new topic, the apītyadhikaraṇa.

18: In refuting the theory that “asat” is the cause, the doctrine of Śiva and Śakti is set forth again.

19: The expression “paṭavacca” is explained in the light of a folded piece of cloth being unrolled and set up as a tent; the illustra-

II, 1.

tion is also found in the *Sivajñāna Siddhiār* and the *Ratna-traya* (RTS).

24: In disposing of the objection that instrumental causes are required for creation, an irrelevant suggestion is introduced about diversity in the effect possibly requiring diversity in the cause too; and this is refuted by appealing to the instance of the growth of hair, nails, etc. (diverse effects) in the single puruṣa.

28: The word “ātman” in “Ātmanicaivam vicitrās ca hi” is taken to refer to the jīva, not Brahman as interpreted by Rāmānuja. Śaṅkara too understands the reference to be to the jīva, but there the similarity stops, the purpose of the present argument being the same as that understood by Rāmānuja, viz., to show that Brahman, who is known through Śruti alone, may quite conceivably possess diverse attributes. The argument is slightly different from Rāmānuja’s. The non-intelligent world itself is not homogeneous, but contains elements with diverse attributes; the jīva possesses attributes different from these, such as being agent, enjoyer, and so on. Hence Brahman may well have manifold diverse attributes.

34 *et seq*: These are treated as a separate topic, different from that inaugurated by sūtra 32, “Na prayojanavativāt”; a full discussion of karma, release and the need for creation is introduced at this stage.

II, 2.

11: The expression “ubhayathā” denotes having regard to vipāka (of adṛṣṭa) or not having regard thereto; while Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja take the alternatives to relate to the inherence of adṛṣṭa in souls or in atoms.

II, 2.

18: In the criticism of the Buddhist causal chain (itaretarapratyaya) it is said that the mistaking of mother-of-pearl for silver does not produce silver, and that since the person who is enlightened passes away at the very same instant, there can be no production of desire or aversion or any of the other elements in the chain. Rāmānuja says that the mistaken notion about the mother-of-pearl does not explain the existence of the collocation known as mother-of-pearl, and it is this which is difficult to explain on the Buddhist hypothesis of kṣaṇikatva. And, he adds, since the subject that is thus deluded is itself momentary and passes away with the moment of the delusion, the consequent desire and aversion and their results will be effected, if at all, in a series of different subjects; and it is absurd to say that one man's ignorance is the cause of another's suffering. The objection so stated is coherent and forcible. There is no point in saying that the mother-of-pearl though mistaken for silver does not really produce silver, for that it does produce silver is not the Buddhist contention. Rāmānuja's criticism is more to the point. And the statement about the enlightened person (viduṣaḥ) makes little sense; it is possible to understand it to say that though ignorance ceases for the enlightened person, since it is essentially one and homogeneous, its continuance in other subjects may produce desire and hatred even for the vidvān. The interpretation is strained and hardly suitable. One possible solution is that the word "avi-
duṣaḥ" has been wrongly read as "viduṣaḥ". The printed texts do not countenance this view.

25 & 26: These are treated as a separate topic concerned with the refutation of the Sautrānti-

II, 2.

kas. The fact is recognised by Rāmānuja also, but he does not mark a fresh topic.

31: In the criticism of Jainism, Śrīkanṭha makes no reference to the Pāñcāstikāya doctrine, though Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja refer to it, the former as of secondary and the latter as of primary importance.

35-38: Though recognising the fact that a Śaiva Āgama doctrine is here refuted, Śrīkanṭha claims authority for both Vedas and Āgamas, the only difference being that the former may be studied by the first three castes alone, while the study of the latter is open to all; he also suggests that the criticism is directed only against the Hiranyagarbha Āgama or that it may even be an answer to an avāntara śaṅkā, a casual doubt, as to whether the Lord may be the efficient cause alone. Rāmānuja considers all Śaivite systems to be refuted in this adhikaraṇa.

41: Śrīkanṭha takes this sūtra to be not a criticism of the Pāñcarātra, but a modified statement of that doctrine, which even as thus modified, is unacceptable, as seen from sūtra 42. He agrees with Rāmānuja in the interpretation of sūtra 41, but not of sūtra 42.

II, 3.

8: The discussion as to the origination of vāyu is set out more elaborately than need be. This shows that our author does not always go in for conciseness; nor is he always careful, for in discussing a similar problem with reference to ākāśa, the claim of eternity made on behalf of it is neither investigated nor refuted.

14: That the elements are all caused immediately by Brahman is shown by reference to the names of the controlling deities—Sadāśiva,

II, 3.

Ratheśvara, Rudra, Janārdana and Brahmā, who are all forms of Parameśvara.

- 15: Though prāṇa and the senses are elsewhere spoken of as having originated either before or along with the elements, that is not irreconcilable with the order here set forth, as the sense-organs are constituted out of the elements and are of their inner being. Śaṅkara takes the sūtra to state that the order of involution is the reverse of that in evolution. Rāmānuja understands the sūtra to justify the immediate causation of each element by Brahman, as only then is it possible to justify statements as to creation which mention the reverse order of what is adopted here.
- 29-32: These sūtras are interpreted so as to justify the appellation of "knowledge" in the case of the self who is the "knower"; in this there is agreement with Rāmānuja, though the topical division adopted is that of Śaṅkara, according to whom, the jñādhikāra begins and ends with II, 3, 19.
- 41: Śaṅkara refutes the charge of vaiṣaṃya, Rāmānuja that of vaiyarthya; Śrīkaṇṭha meets both. The illustration employed is also distinctive; a young lad employed to carry a log of wood along with an older and stronger partner, without whose help he cannot even move the log, is yet the subject of commands, in so far as the lad has to make an effort to co-operate.
- 48: This is read as "Asantateścā'vyatirekaḥ" while the others read the latter half as "avyatikaraḥ". Śrīkaṇṭha understands from his reading that though the selves are manifold and discontinuous, there is yet a common feature of all their experiences. They all say "I am short, I am a brāhmin" and so

II, 3.

on. Experiences of the state of bondage are thus essentially similar, *though not mixed up* (asamkīrṇam). This absence of mixing up or confusion is what is meant by the reading “avyatikaraḥ”, as adopted and understood by Rāmānuja. It is difficult to see what occasion there is in the present context for Śrīkaṇṭha to deny the possibility of confusion. Rāmānuja’s statement is direct—that there is no confusion as to the merit and demerit of the various souls, as they are all distinct. Our author says, first that though they are distinct, their experiences are essentially similar; and having so read and interpreted the sūtra he adds, as an after-thought, that in spite of the similarity, the experiences are not mixed up. And there is a further after-thought offered as an indication of the purpose of this sūtra; it shows that the eternal infinite experience of released souls is very different in kind from that of the limited entities in bondage. Śrīkaṇṭha cuts a rather poor figure as interpreter, though as the statement of a logical position what he says is intelligible.

III, 2.

- 7 & 8: Discussing the resting place of the self in deep sleep, Śamkara and Rāmānuja conclude that Brahman alone *directly* is the place of deep sleep, while adding that the other places mentioned are subsumed, not excluded. Śrīkaṇṭha does not state this or any other conclusion explicitly, contenting himself with the formula “samuccaya eva”, meaning that all the statements made about the resting place should be taken together, not as exclusive of one another.
- 10: Śrīkaṇṭha mentions only three states besides that of swoon, while Śamkara and Rāmānuja enumerate four, death being the fourth. It

III, 2.

is only on this enumeration that the statement about swoon being half-way to death, is intelligible.

- 11: One of the passages cited in the siddhānta portion describes Śiva as paśupāśa vilakṣaṇa; Rāmānuja cites passages to establish the characteristics and supremacy of Viṣṇu.
- 14: The term "arūpavat" in "arūpavadeva hi", etc., is understood to mean ākāśa, the support of name and form being the function thereof. Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja take the literal sense of the word, "that which is formless."
- 16: "Āha ca tanmātram." The mention of one form, that of undifferentiated knowledge, does not exclude other forms or attributes, as the mention of a golden crown does not exclude the possibility of its being set with gems. Further, Śruti itself predicates experience of diversity by Brahman, in referring to Brahman as vipaścit; vipaścit means "vividham vastujātam paśyanti vimṛśanti cid yasya saḥ."
- 17: Śrīkaṇṭha cites passages which describe the qualities of Śiva and glorify Him; the passages cited by Rāmānuja glorify Nārāyaṇa.
- 21: Śrīkaṇṭha commences a new topic, the prakṛtāitāvattvādhikaraṇa, while for Rāmānuja, a fresh topic commences only with sūtra 26. The manner in which the transition is effected from sūtra 21 to 22 is also different in the two. The opponent, according to Rāmānuja says that the denial of forms by the words "neti, neti" may be interpreted to mean the exclusion of all the attributes perceived as apparently belonging to Brahman; to this the reply is that Brahman is not the object of perception (sūtra 22). Śrīkaṇṭha's pūrva-pakṣin says that Brahman is but the exist-

III, 2.

ence that is revealed in all our judgments like "the pot exists," "the cloth exists," and so on; and the denial is intended to show that pot, etc., do not as such qualify Brahman. But Brahman cannot be the object of perception; hence the existence that is perceived as an accompaniment and an implication of our existential judgments is not Brahman.

24: The phrase "karmanyabhyāsāt" is interpreted in the light of the sense of identity with Brahman achieved by Vāmadeva and others, and after the analogy of the magician who acquires immunity from snake-poison by his incantation of the Garuḍa Mantra.

28: Though agreeing with Rāmānuja in the general position that the non-intelligent world is also an attribute of Brahman, a different ground is assigned for not accepting the relationship of species and genus mentioned in III, 2, 27. On this view as well as on that of III, 2, 26, it is thought that the defects of the world would attach to Brahman. Śrīkanṭha would seem to have treated the genus as a concrete universal; not so, Rāmānuja.

35, 36: Constitute a characteristic fresh topic devoted to the glorification of Śiva and the exaltation of Him over Nārāyaṇa.

40: To show that Brahman alone is the dispenser of rewards, Saṃkara quotes texts referring to the Supreme Being, as Himself causing the performance of good and bad acts. Rāmānuja cites texts proving the efficiency of minor deities and infers their leading up to Brahman as their antaryāmin. Śrīkanṭha refers from the first to the deities as ensouled by Brahman; "Parameśvarātmakatayā vāy-vādinām" and so on.

III, 3.

- 4: In showing that Śruti teaches the identity of the vidyās Śrikanṭha, unlike Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, cites complementary passages, anticipating in part the purport of the next sūtra. Incidentally he utilises the opportunity to choose such passages as glorify Śiva. The passages selected are the *Mahānārāyaṇa* and the *Kaivalya* texts descriptive of the physical attributes of Śiva and the *Chāndogya* passages descriptive of the other perfections which He possesses, though endowed with bodily form.
- 5: This prescribes guṇopasaṃhāra and is treated as a distinct topic by Śrikanṭha.
- 9: In recognising a new topic, Śrikanṭha takes for granted the conclusion of Śaṅkara that vyāpti is viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva, and proceeds to set out arguments similar to Rāmānuja's.
- 11: All the attributes—Bliss, Truth, Knowledge, etc.,—should be understood in every meditation on Brahman; their number does not conflict with the unity of Brahman. It is only the attribution of contrary qualities like blue and white or short-horned and long-horned of the same subject, that introduces contradiction into the subject; not the predication of qualities like blue, sweet-smelling, large and lily in the case of a blue flower. Śrikanṭha strikes an independent note and his argument is more subtle than that of Śaṅkara or of Rāmānuja.
- 14: Begins a new topic, the question being whether the sheaths of food, etc., are to be contemplated, they being apparently stages on the path of Bliss; the answer is in the negative, since their contemplation is of no value, and is excluded besides, for, these are not sheaths, but selves, and contemplation of any self except Śiva is excluded by Śruti. The

III, 3.

topic here discussed is mentioned by Rāmānuja as the import of sūtra 16 only, the previous two sūtras forming part of the preceding adhikaraṇa. The difference between the two extends to sūtra 17 also, “Anvayāditi cet syādavadhāraṇāt”, Śrīkaṇṭha’s explanation requiring the interposition of a negative particle; if it be said that the annamaya, etc., are also the objects of contemplation because of the connection of the word “Self” no, we reply, because of insistence. We are told repeatedly that the ānandamaya self is other than these and that Śiva alone is to be contemplated and so on. Rāmānuja takes the sūtra to justify the interpretation of the term “Self”, as the highest Self, when used in conjunction with ānandamaya, in spite of the fact that it means only lower selves in the rest of the context, when spoken of in conjunction with annamaya and so on; for even in that context, the self in statements like “from the Self, ether emanates” refers to the highest Self. This interpretation, like that of Śaṅkara, who is concerned throughout with the explanation of an Aitareya passage, does not require a negative construction of the sūtra. Passages glorifying Śiva find place in the commentary on sūtras 15 and 17.

- 17: Śrīkaṇṭha agrees with Rāmānuja only to the extent of considering the viṣaya vākyas to come from the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. While the latter says that the expression “Self” as denoting Brahman is to be understood as what is immanent in the annamaya, etc., sheaths, the former would have it that the expression is used in different senses in the two cases; the ānandamaya self is the Supreme Being, while the other selves are merely limited and particular and should not en-

III, 3.

ter into the meditation of the Highest; it is these that are excluded by the text “*Sarvam anyat parityajya*”.

22: The maṇḍala vidyās of the *Chāndogya* and the *Taittirīya* (*Mahānārāyaṇa* portion) are identical. Though the latter refers only to golden arms (*hiranyabāhu*) yet the later mention of lordship of gold (*hiranyapati*) leads to the inference that all the limbs are golden even to the tips of the finger-nails, in the words of the *Chāndogya*. The sūtra constitutes a fresh *adhikaraṇa* and glorifies Śiva.

25: This sūtra, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, discusses whether the introductory passage of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* “*Śam no mitras śam varuṇaḥ*”, etc., is part of the vidyā, the answer being in the negative, on the ground that as seen from the sense of the passage, it is part of Vedic study, not meditation. Śaṅkara takes the sūtra to apply to all such passages wherever found, as they form part of sacrificial ritual, like the *Ātharvanika* passage “*pierce the śukra, pierce the heart*”. Rāmānuja agrees with Śaṅkara, but applies the reasoning to the *Taittirīya* passage also, though that does not refer to any sacrificial ritual.

27-30: Śrīkaṇṭha considers 27 to 29 to state the pūrvapakṣa and 30 to state the siddhānta. According to Śaṅkara, 27 and 28 state the siddhānta the pūrvapakṣa being understood; 29 and 30 deal with related but different questions. Rāmānuja takes 27 and 28 to state the siddhānta; the pūrvapakṣin raises an objection in sūtra 29, to which sūtra 30 furnishes the reply. The position of the last two sūtras is reversed in Śrīkaṇṭha's text, that reading being adopted by none of the other commentators—Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhva, Vijñānabhik-

III, 3.

ṣu, Vallabha and Baladeva. The position taken up is distinctive. Until the moment of final release, when Brahman is attained and the self stands revealed in its own form, there is saṃsāra; this does not end merely with death and so long as there is saṃsāra, karma also persists. (The matter has been dealt with more extensively in Chapter I; see also Appendices I: A and IV.)

- 32: At the end of the commentary on the sūtra, there is a reference to nirānvaya—upāsakas for whom there is no departure by the devayāna.
- 38: Constitutes a new topic raising the question of the propriety of importing physical qualities like blue-throatedness into every vidyā, and deciding in favour of the importation.
- 39: This is, again, a fresh topic. The qualities mentioned in the last sūtra should on no account be omitted, since there is emphatic repetition. Śruti being our only source of information, whatever is taught thereby should be recognised.
- 42: Though the object of all vidyās is one, viz., Brahman, the vidyās themselves are different, because of difference of attributes. Brahman is likened to a king who demands different services from different servants. This illustration is distinctive, the comparison to Indra who receives different oblations in different capacities, being common to Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja also.
- 43: On the ground of the superiority of vākya to prakaraṇa, the oft-repeated qualities of Brahman such as Umāśahāyatva should be contemplated in every vidyā. Rāmānuja applies the same reasoning to the contemplation of Nārāyaṇa in every case.

III, 4.

- 13: This is treated by Śrīkaṇṭha as referring to “Īśāvāsyam idam sarvaṃ”, etc., a text mentioned by Rāmānuja only in connection with sūtra 14.
- 20: Śrīkaṇṭha discusses rather fully the justification for saṃnyāsa and the stage when it may be adopted, whether one may or should pass to it straight from brahmacarya and so on.
- 22: It is said that the udgītha should be meditated on as the highest of all essences (rasatamaḥ) because of injunctive words. The sūtra uses the expression “bhāva śabdācca”; bhāva means becoming; both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja take the trouble to show that forms denoting becoming or origination have injunctive force, while Śrīkaṇṭha merely identifies bhāva with command, without any further ado.
- 32-35: Āśrama karma should be performed even by those who have no knowledge (*not* desire for release). Action may both lead to knowledge and reside as an element thereof. The two kinds of action are identical, because action possesses both the above characteristics (*not* because it is both enjoined and not prohibited *nor* because it is mentioned by both Śruti and Smṛti). They prevent knowledge from being overpowered (*not* the individual from being overpowered by passion, etc.). The words in brackets indicate the interpretation offered by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.
- 38: Āśrama dharma, it is said, has a special efficacy in promoting knowledge, while Rāmānuja thinks that acts not exclusively pertaining to any āśrama conduce to knowledge.
- 47: Śruti closes with the mention of the householder's state to show that vidyā is attain-

III, 4.

able at all stages, not because the house-holder has to practise the virtue of all the āśramas (Śaṅkara) or because pāṇḍitya, bālya, and mauna apply to all, not merely to ascetics (Rāmānuja).

48, 49: The Pāśupata vrata, if practised to the end and not merely for a limited period, leads to liberation. Though this is not expressly included in āśrama dharma, the virtues of chastity, begging, control of the senses, etc., are associated with this vrata. Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja hold that sūtras 47, 48 and 49 deal with the same topic and that sūtra 49 refers to bālya, the state of non-manifestation (of arrogance, etc.).

50: Liberation may take place even in this life, if there are no counter-acting conditions; there is, however, no restrictive rule, as we see that Vāmadeva and others gained knowledge in this life, as the result of a previous life.

IV, 1.

3: Meditation is to be of Brahman as identical with the self, not as another Being. This is in great, though not complete agreement with Śaṅkara's view; it differs from Rāmānuja's interpretation according to which God is the Self of souls, as souls are the selves of bodies. This analogy elsewhere freely used by Śrīkaṇṭha is here abandoned.

5: This is treated as a new Brahmadrṣṭyadhi-karaṇa, after Śaṅkara, though the argument is largely a repetition of that of sūtra 4, except where the praise of Śiva comes in. Rāmānuja's treatment of the two as belonging to the same topic seems more justifiable.

19: The question whether the cycle of re-birth is never-ending is discussed only with reference to "persons in office", possibly because Śrī-

IV, 1.

kaṇṭha considers the general question to have been already raised and answered.

IV, 2.

7: This relates to non-difference between the ignorant man and the enlightened one in respect of departure. The sūtra is read as a fresh topic. The last word of the sūtra "anupoṣya" is not found in some Manuscripts and is not commented on by Śrīkaṇṭha. It seems to mean "unburnt (adagdha)", and is used by Śaṅkara to confirm and by Rāmānuja to refute the advaitin's position.

8-10: Śrīkaṇṭha's topical division is the same as Śaṅkara's, but the interpretation is independent up to sūtra 10, which relates to the non-destruction of the subtle body along with the gross one.

13: At the close of the commentary, there is, again, a reference to niranvaya—upāsakas, for whom release comes about even with death.

14: The subtle elements to which the jīva is united are merged into Brahman, not as in their material cause, but only to the extent of their being indistinguishable therefrom. The alternatives contemplated are not return to Brahman and to causal substances (Śaṅkara) or return to Brahman, as opposed to their persistence and production of effects in conjunction with some other soul (Rāmānuja), but merger of being contrasted with merger of function. In adopting this interpretation, Śrīkaṇṭha anticipates in part sūtra 15, "Avibhāgo vacanāt".

IV, 3.

1: Once again, there is a reference to the niranvayopāsakas, for whom departure along the path of light, etc., is not needed. The reference to and the interpretation of the *Taittirīya* passage "vyapoḥya śīrṣa kapāle", etc., is also distinctive.

IV, 3.

6-15: Śrīkaṇṭha considers Bādari, Jaimini, and Bādarāyaṇa to discuss the state which is led up to by the person in the lightning. To this extent, he agrees with Śaṁkara, but the latter considers Bādari's view to be the *sid-dhānta* and Jaimini's the *pūrvapakṣa*. Rāmānuja, like Śrīkaṇṭha, considers both Bādari and Jaimini to be refuted by Bādarāyaṇa in sūtra 14, but, unlike Śrīkaṇṭha, he takes the discussion to be not about the state led up to, but the person led up, whether it is he who meditates on the conditioned Brahman or he who contemplates the Highest Brahman.

IV, 4.

4: For Śrīkaṇṭha, equality with Brahman is in respect of the fulfilment of all desires; for Rāmānuja it is in respect of the purity attained on putting off the body. For the former, the *pūrvapakṣa* is based on the text that Brahman is one without a second, while for Śaṁkara, it relates to the distinction between agent and object, dweller and abode and so on.

9: This mentions the eight qualities of Śivatva realised by the released soul.

10-14: The citation of the *Svetāśvatara* passage to establish the *prima facie* case for *videhatva* of released souls is distinctive. Arguments like the one based on "manasaitān kāmān paśyan ramate", etc., are common to Śaṁkara. Sūtra 14 discusses rather elaborately whether released souls, because of enjoyment consequent on the possession of bodies, will continue to be affected by *samsāra*, and decides that there is no ground for the fear, since they perceive all this as of the nature of Brahman. The position is supported by reference to the *Taittirīya* passage

IV, 4.

“Etat tato bhavati, ākāśā śarīram brahma”, etc., and the beatific calculus.

- 22: The sūtra declaring non-return is not a separate topic for Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja. It is led up to from the previous sūtra, which affirms similarity between the Lord and the released soul, only in certain respects. “May not the difference imply return to saṃsāra?” is the question to which, in the view of those two commentators, the present sūtra furnishes a reply. For Śrīkaṇṭha there is an independent question “do the liberated ever return?”, a doubt due to the knowledge of what happens to exalted personages like Indra. The discussion is very elaborate and is conducted with special reference to certain Purāṇic verses (from the *Śivadharmot-tara*); these are extensively commented on in the light of Upaniṣadic texts and the *Vedānta Sūtras* also.

APPENDIX IV.

Extracts from the commentaries of Nimbarka,
Ramanuja and Srikantha on Vedānta
Sūtras, III, 3, 29 and 30.

Nimbarka.

III, 3.

29: Gaterarthavattvam ubhayathā'nyathā hi virodhaḥ.
.

30: Upapannastallakṣaṇārthopalabdherlokavat.
.

Commentary.

Brahmopāsakasya śarīra viyoga kāle sarvakarmakṣaye'pi panthā upapannaḥ
yathā bhūpasevakasya bhaumārtha siddhis-
tadvat. Sasthūlaśarīra sarva karmakṣaye'pi
vidyāprabhāvāt viśiṣṭa sthāna gamanārtham
sūkṣmaśarīram anuvarttate.

Ramanuja.

29: Gaterarthavattvam ubhayathā'nyathā hi virodhaḥ.

Commentary.

Dehaviyogakāla eva hi sarvakarmakṣaye sūkṣma-
śarīrasyāpi vināśasyāt, tathā sati kaivalyāt-
mano gamanam nopapadyate. Ata utkrānti-
samaye viduṣo niśēṣakarmakṣayo anupapan-
naḥ. Attrottaram—

30: Upapannastallakṣaṇārthopalabdherlokavat.

III, 3.

Commentary.

Upapanna evoktrāntikāle sarvakarma kṣayaḥ.

Ataḥ kṣīṇakarmano'pi sūkṣmaśarīrayuktas-
ya devayānena gamanamupapadyate. Katha-
m sūkṣmaśarīramapyārambhakakarma vi-
nāśe'vatiṣṭhati iti cet, vidyā sāmartyāditi
brūmaḥ. Vidyā hi svayam sūkṣmaśarīrasyā-
nārambhikāpi prākṛtasukhaduḥkhopabhoga-
sādhana sthūlaśarīrasya sarvakarmaṇām ca
niravaśeṣakṣaye'pi svaphalabhūta-brahma-
prāpti pradānāya devayānena pathainam
gamayitum sūkṣmaśarīram sthāpayiti. *Loka-*
vat—yathā loke sasyādisamṛddhyarthamāra-
bdhe taṭākādike taddhetuṣu tadicchādiṣu
vinaṣṭeṣvapi tadeva taṭākādikam aśithi-
lam kurvantastatra pāṇiyapānādikam kur-
vanti, tadvat.

Srikantha.

29: Upapannastallakṣaṇārthopalabdherlokavat.

Commentary.

Dehaviyogakāle sarvakarmakṣaye'pi gatividhiru-
papanna eva brahmopāsakānām
Lokavat. yathā loke rājāśritānām puruṣaṇām
anitarapuruṣasādhāraṇa sarvārthasiddhiḥ.
Ato mārgaśrutirapi na bādhyate, dehaviyo-
gakāle sakala karmakṣaye'pi vidyāmāhāt-
myāllīnga śarīrāvasthānena mārgagatiḥ . .
. Evam prāpte siddhānta ucyate—

30: Gaterarthavattvam ubhayathā'nyathā hi viro-
dhah.

Commentary.

. Yadyapi vidyā sāmartyād devayānena
gatisattaddeśaviharācandrasamvādādikam
agrimavihārādivadupapadyate, tathā'pi yā-
vadbrahmaprāpti dhīsamkocarūpasamsārānu-

III, 3.

vṛttiḥ vidyāsāmarthyānnopapadyata iti tan-
 mūlabhūtakarmaleśānuvṛttiravaśyam eṣṭavyā.
 Na ca parameśvarasaṃkalpaviśeṣādeva tada-
 nuvṛttiḥ syāditi vācyam, tasyaivāsmābhiḥ
 karma (mūla) tayocyamānatvāt. Na hi as-
 manmate vihitaniṣiddhācaraṇaprayuktapara-
 meśvarasaṃkalpavyatirekeṇa puṇyapāpe staḥ.

GLOSSARY.

A.

Abheda,
non-difference.

Abhrasabheśāna,
the Lord of the hall of gold, *i.e.*, Naṭarāja.

Abhyāsa,
repetition, such as may serve as an indication of purport.

Acitprapañca,
the non-intelligent world.

Adhikaraṇa,
a section comprising one or more sūtras, treating of a particular topic; it is made up of five elements—the subject-matter, the doubt, the *prima facie* view, its refutation and the conclusion.

Adhikāra,
competency.

Adhikāravidhi,
a prescription as to competency for undertaking any act.

Adhikāribheda,
difference of persons in respect of competency.

Adhikāritva,
possession of competency.

Adhikopedeśa,
the teaching that the Supreme Being is higher and greater than the universe.

Adhvās,
lit. paths; in Siddhānta terminology, they are conduits of the Divine Energy.

Adhyayana,
learning by rote.

Adhyāsa,

super-imposition.

Adṛṣṭa,

unseen potency.

Advaita,

non-dualism.

Advaitins,

non-dualists.

Agnicayana,

the name of a sacrifice.

Agnihotra,

one of the obligatory rites prescribed for those in the house-holder's order of life.

Ahaṅgrahādhikaraṇa,

the section of the *Vedānta Sūtras* prescribing contemplation of the Supreme Being as the self.

Ahaṁkāra,

egoity or individuation.

Aikyavāda,

a variety of Śaivism, which denied the existence of the impurity known as āṇava.

Ajā,

unborn; also a she-goat.

Ajīva,

what is other than the finite self; one of the two classes of substances recognised by the Jainas.

Ajñā,

ignorant one.

Ajñāna,

ignorance.

Ahaccamayam,

systems which, in the opinion of the Siddhāntin, have a correct perception of the central truth.

Ahappuraccamayam,

systems which, in the opinion of the Siddhāntin are half-in and half-out of the truth.

Akāmahataśśrotriya,

a sage untormented by desires.

Akṣara,
imperishable.

Aluptaśakti,
energy that can never decrease.

Aṃbikā,
the consort of Śiva.

Aṃśa,
part or element.

Aṅga,
what stands in a subsidiary relation to the principal
(aṅgi).

Aṅgi.
the principal to which others are subsidiaries (aṅgas).

Āñjana,
a synonym for the impurity known as āṇava.

Anantaśaktitva,
omnipotence.

Anādi bodha,
eternally illumined.

Ānāśrama,
not pertaining to a recognised order of life.

Annām,
food or the earth.

Annamaya,
consisting of food (or matter).

Antaradhikaraṇa,
the section of the *Vedānta Sūtras* treating of the Lord
as the golden person within the Sun.

Antaryāmin,
the internal ruler.

Anugraha,
the bestowal of grace.

Anupapatti,
inappropriateness, inconsistency.

Anuvṛtti,
continuance or persistence or following after.

Aṇutva,
atomicity.

Apacāra,

transgression or defect.

Apaśūdrādhikaraṇa,

the section of the *Vedānta Sūtras*, excluding *sūdras* from the study of the *vedānta*.

Apāna,

the down-going vital air.

Apauruṣeyatva,

the property of not having been originated by any person.

Aprāptaviśaya,

contentless.

Apratisamkhyā,

continuous, but imperceptible, one of the Buddhist classifications of the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*).

Apuruṣārtha,

not contributory to the *summum bonum*.

Apūrvā,

novel; a certain unseen potency resulting from acts which are transient, and serving to bring about their results in this or the next birth.

Apūrvaparīṇāma,

a peculiar and novel kind of evolution.

Apūrvavidhi,

an injunction in respect of an act whose result is not known except from the injunction.

Arcirādimārga,

the path of the Gods, beginning with light and so on.

Ardhanārīśvara,

the Lord, half of whose form is that of His consort.

Arthavāda,

what is eulogistic or explanatory, and not injunctive.

Aśuddhi,

impurity.

Athavā,

or else.

Atigraha,

an element in a sacrifice; also applied to *apāna*, name, form, sound, etc., by *Yājñavalkya*.

- Avasthā*,
state, e.g., waking, dreaming, etc.
- Asambhava*,
non-origination.
- Asat*,
lit. non-existent; but more strictly, the primal condition, devoid of name and form.
- Asādhāranaguna*,
distinctive property.
- Aśuddha-māyā*,
that form of energy which provides the means and instruments for action and individuation, which are impure.
- Avaidikapāśupata*,
a system of Śaivism opposed to the Vedas.
- Avāntaraśaṁkā*,
an intermediate doubt or objection.
- Avidyā*,
ignorance.
- Avyakta*,
unevolved.
- Ācārya*,
preceptor.
- Ādityas*,
a class of superhuman Beings.
- Āgama*,
a body of revealed Scripture, other than the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, possibly developed independently of the latter.
- Āgamānta*,
the philosophy of the Āgamas.
- Ākāśa*,
ether; according to Śrīkaṇṭha's etymology, it is that which shines everywhere, the radiant expanse.
- Ālayavijñāna*,
the sum total of our conscious states; "the foundational fact of reality revealing itself in individual minds and things."

Anandam,
bliss.

Anandamaya,
full of bliss.

Āṇandavalli,
the second chapter of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*.

Anumānika,
what is inferred; used of the *pradhāna* of the *Śāṃkhyas*.

Āṇavamala,
the impurity which, according to the *Siddhāntins* has been associated, without a beginning, with finite selves of all grades.

Āpastamba,
a Hindu codifier of about the 3rd century B.C., author of the *Gr̥hya* and *Śrauta Sūtras*.

Āraṃbhana,
taking hold; origination.

Āraṃbhanādhikaraṇa,
the section of the *Vedānta Sūtras* which treats of the universe as not other than its cause, *Brahman*.

Ārtabhāga,
one of those who with *Gārgi* and others questioned *Yājñavalkya*, with a view to humble him.

Āśrama,
a recognised order of life (four such are recognised).

Āśramadharma,
the duties of the recognised orders of life

Āśrava,
the aggregate of the senses, in *Jaina* terminology.

Ātharvanika,
pertaining to the *Atharva Veda*.

Ātman,
the self.

Āvaṇi,
a month of the *Tamil* calendar, corresponding to August-September.

B.

Bandha,
bondage.

Bālya,
a child-like state of freedom from desire and aversion.

Bhava,
existence; a name of Śiva.

Bhavāni,
the consort of Śiva, in the aspect of enjoyment.

Bhedābheda,
difference and non-difference.

Bhīma,
terrible; a name of Śiva.

Brahmā,
a member of the Hindu triad of deities, the creator.

Brahmacarya,
the student's order of life.

Brahman,
the Supreme Reality.

Brahmavit,
one who knows Brahman.

Brahmavidyā,
knowledge of Brahman.

Brāhmin,
a member of the first of the four castes, one who is
pre-eminently a possessor of Brahma-knowledge.

Brhaspatisava,
a sacrifice.

Buddhi,
intellect; the determinative faculty.

C.

Caṇḍāla,
an out-caste.

Cid-ākāśa,
the radiant expanse of Intelligence.

Cidacitprapañca viśiṣṭa,
qualified by the world, intelligent and non-intelligent.

Cit,

intelligence.

Citsakti,

Intelligence-energy.

Citta,

the mind.

D.

Dahara Akāśa,

the small ether within the heart.

Daharopāsanā,

the meditation of the Supreme Being as the small ether within the heart.

Dāsamārga,

the path of servitude.

Devayāna,

the path of the gods, beginning with light, etc.

Dhanañjaya,

one of the vital airs.

Dharma,

duty, especially religious duty

Dr̥ṣṭānta,

example, that which illustrates the co-presence or co-absence of the major and middle terms, in a syllogism.

Durgā,

the consort of Śiva, in the aspect of warrior.

Dvyaṇuka,

a compound of two paramāṇus (primal atoms).

E.

Ekāgnikāṇḍa,

a portion of the *Taittirīya Samhitā*, treating of the hymns to be used in stated ceremonies, such as marriage and so on.

Ekātmavāda,

the doctrine that there is but One Self, which alone is real.

G.

Garuḍa-bhāvanā,

the meditation of Garuḍa, whereby one acquires the powers of Garuḍa.

Garuḍa-mantra,

a spell by the incantation of which one acquires the virtue of Garuḍa, to expel the poison of snakes.

Gati,

departure (along the path of the gods or that of the fathers).

Gauḍa deśa,

Bengal.

Godohana,

a special vessel to be used by the sacrificer who desires plenty of cattle.

Graha,

an element in a sacrifice; also applied to prāṇa, speech, the eye, the ear, etc., by Yājñavalkya.

Guṇa,

attribute; in Sāṃkhya terminology, one of the three constituents of Primal Nature.

Guṇamūrti,

form endowed with attributes.

Guṇi,

the subject of attributes.

Guṇopasaṃhāra,

the understanding, in one form of meditation, of attributes mentioned in another form of meditation.

Guru-pūjā,

ceremonies in commemoration of preceptors.

H.

Hara,

a name of Śiva.

Hari,

a name of Viṣṇu.

Hetu,

cause or reason; the middle term of a syllogism.

Heyaguna,

a quality that has to be abandoned.

Hiranyagarbha,

a name of Brahmā.

Hiranyagarbhasmṛti,

a name for the Yoga system of philosophy.

I.

Ichhāśakti,

the emotional aspect of energy.

Indra,

the lord of heaven.

Itaretarapratyaya,

dependent causation.

Itihāsa,

epic.

Īkṣata,

saw or desired.

Īkṣati-karma,

what is perceived by released souls.

Īśāna,

the Lord (specifically applied to Śiva).

Īśvara,

the Lord (specifically applied to Śiva).

Īśvarabhāva,

the nature of Īśvara, the ruler of the universe.

J.

Jagadguru,

world-teacher.

Japa,

incantation.

Jāti,

genus.

Jīva,

the finite self.

Jīvaghaṇa,

the collective finite self, i.e., Brahmā.

- Jīvanmukti*,
release while still embodied.
- Jñādhikāraṇa*,
the section of the *Vedānta Sūtras* treating of the finite
self as the knower.
- Jñāna*,
knowledge.
- Jñānaśakti*,
the cognitive aspect of energy.
- Jyotiḥ*,
light.
- Jyotiṣṭoma*,
a sacrifice.

K.

- Kaivalya*,
release.
- Kaivalya-lakṣmī*,
the goddess of release.
- Kalā*,
one of the thirty-six categories recognised by Śaiva
Siddhānta.
- Kalpa*,
aeon.
- Kāṇāda*,
followers of Kaṇāda, founder of a school of Indian
Atomism, known as the Vaiśeṣika.
- Kapyāsam puṇḍarīkam*,
the lotus that has blossomed out with the Sun.
- Karma*,
action; also accumulated merit and demerit, which
have to be worked out by enjoyment, unless en-
lightenment supervenes.
- Karmakāṇḍa*,
the section of scripture treating of the performance
of rites and ceremonies.
- Kāla*,
time or death.

Kālāmukha,

a sect of Śaivites, considered beyond the pale of orthodoxy.

Kālī,

the consort of Śiva, functioning as the destroyer.

Kāma,

desire.

Kāṇḍa,

section.

Kāṇva,

one of the recensions of the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad.

Kāraṇa doṣaḥ,

defect in the cause, instrumental or material.

Kārikā,

a concise statement in verse of doctrines (especially philosophical or grammatical).

Kīñcijjñā,

he whose knowledge is limited.

Kriyāśakti,

the conative aspect of energy.

Kṛkara,

one of the vital airs.

Kṛṣṇapiṅgala,

dark and tawny.

Kṣatriya,

a member of the warrior or ruling caste.

Kṣetrajñā,

the self.

Kuṇḍalinī,

the pure energy of the Lord (according to the Śaiva Āgamas).

Kuṇḍapāyinām ayana,

an optional rite, sometimes denoted by the word "agni-hotra" which usually denotes another rite which is obligatory.

Kūrma,

one of the vital airs.

L.

Lakṣaṇā,

the secondary sense.

Laya,

merger.

Liṅga,

a characteristic mark; the middle term; a symbol of Śiva, possibly phallic.

M.

Madhutva,

being of the nature of nectar.

Mahāmāyā,

the supreme energy which provides means for both enjoyment and release; also called anāhata bindu.

Mahāpātaka,

a major sin.

Mahāvākyās,

, the enunciations of the cardinal truth of non-duality.

Mala,

impurity; often used more specifically that variety known as āṇava mala.

Malatraya,

the three-fold impurities; in the Siddhānta system, these are āṇava, karma and māyā.

Manana,

reflection.

Manas,

mind.

Manomayatva,

being of the nature of mind.

Mahat,

the Great one; intellect, in the Śāṅkhya scheme of categories.

Matāntaram,

the view of some others.

Mauna,

silence; repeated contemplation.

Mayaṭ,

a suffix signifying modification or abundance.

Mādhyamikas,

a school of Buddhists, who held to the doctrine of universal void.

Māyā śabalita,

associated with the energy known as māyā.

Māyāśakti,

the wondrous energy which provides means and instruments of enjoyment.

Mīmāṃsaka,

an adherent of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school of philosophy.

Mokṣa,

release.

Mokṣadharmā parva,

a sub-section of the Śānti parvan (Ch. XII) of the *Mahābhārata*.

Mokṣakāmī,

one desirous of release.

Mokṣalakṣmī,

the goddess of release.

Mukhyaprāṇa,

the chief vital air.

Mukta,

the released one.

Mūrdhanyanāḍi,

the 101st artery, passing up through the skull.

N.

Naciketas,

the bright youngster of the Kāṭha Upaniṣad, who prayed for and obtained knowledge of the self, as a boon from the lord of death.

Naiyāyika,

an adherent of the Nyāya (a realistic, atomistic) school of Indian philosophy.

Naṭarāja,

Śiva as the dancer.

- Nāga*,
one of the vital airs.
- Nāmarūpam*,
name and form.
- Nānāgamavidhāyin*,
one who has settled the sense of the various Āgamas.
- Nārāyaṇa*,
a name of Viṣṇu.
- Nārāyaṇa anuvāka*,
a section of the Mahānārāyaṇ Upaniṣad, devoted to the praise of Nārāyaṇa.
- Nimittakāraṇa pariṇāmavāda*,
the doctrine that the universe results from the transformation of what is the operative cause as well.
- Niranvaya*,
non-related.
- Niranvaya-upāsaka*,
a devotee of the non-related.
- Nirguṇa*,
attributeless.
- Nirguṇa Brahman*,
Brahman without attributes.
- Nirgunabrahmavādin*,
one who holds that the Absolute is attributeless.
- Nirjara*,
penances (Jaina).
- Niśvāsa*,
breath.
- Niṣprapañca*,
not connected with the world; not phenomenal.
- Niyamavidhi*,
a prescription as to the particular mode of performing an act, when more than one mode is possible.
- Niyati*,
order; one of the categories recognised by the Śaiva Siddhānta.

P.

Ī'adārtha,
principle or category.

Paddhati,
a liturgical manual.

Pañcajanāḥ,
the five senses.

Pañcāgnividyā,
the knowledge of the five fires, taught by Pravāhaṇa
Jaivali to Gotama.

Paramākāśa,
the supreme ether, the expanse of bliss.

Paramāṇu,
prime atom.

Parāhambhāvanā,
perfect self-consciousness.

Parā-Śakti,
supreme or fundamental energy.

Parjanya,
rain.

Parīṇāma,
transformation.

Parisaṃkhyāvidhi,
a prescription prohibiting all else except what is en-
joined therein.

Parokṣa,
mediate.

Paśu,
the bound creature (soul).

Paśubhāva,
the state of the bound creature.

Paśupati,
lord of the bound creature, a name of Śiva.

Paśutva,
the condition of the bound creature; a synonym for
āṇava.

Pati
the Lord.

Pauruṣeyatva,
being originated by a person.

Pāñcarātras,
the followers of the Pāñcarātra Āgamas.

Pāṇḍitya,
full understanding of the sense of the Upaniṣads.

Pāpa,
sin; a synonym for ānava.

Pārijāta,
one of the five trees of Paradise, which yields whatever is desired.

Pāśa,
bonds (three in number; the same as Malatraya).

Pāśupatādhikaraṇa,
the section of the *Vedānta Sūtras*, criticising the Pāśupata Āgamas.

Pāśupatas,
a sect of the followers of Śiva (Paśupati).

Phalam,
fruit, result.

Pradhāna,
Primal Nature, the non-intelligent principle recognised by the Sāṃkhya.

Pradyumna,
the mind; the second of the manifestations said by the Pāñcarātras to have proceeded from the Lord.

Prajāpati,
a name of Brahmā; applied to Viṣṇu, as protector of Beings, or to Śiva, as Paśupati, lord of the creatures.

Prakarana,
context.

Prakṛti,
the non-intelligent principle, recognised by the Sāṃkhya.

Pralaya,
the deluge.

Pranava,
the mystic syllable Om.

Prapañca,

the universe.

Prasiddhānatiprasiddha,

clear but not quite obvious.

Praśna,

question; the name of an Upaniṣad.

Pratiṣṇā,

promissory statement.

Pratītyasamutpāda,

dependent origination; "dependently-co-ordinated-existence."

Prayogavidhi,

a prescription as to a course of procedure.

Prāṇas,

vital airs; the senses.

Puṇḍarikākṣa,

the lotus-eyed, a name for Viṣṇu.

Puraccamayam,

external faith, one lying outside the truth.

Purappuraccamayam,

the most external faith, the one farthest removed from the truth.

Purāṇa, legend,

mythology.

Purītat,

pericardium.

Puruṣa,

the Spirit, the intelligent principle recognised by the Sāṃkhya.

Puruṣottama,

the supreme person; a name of Viṣṇu.

Pūjā,

worship.

Purvācāryāḥ,

early preceptors.

Pūrvapakṣa,

prima facie view.

Pūrvapakṣin,

one who urges the *prima facie* view.

Pūrvāpūrva-ācārya,

a long antecedent preceptor.

R.

Rasatamaḥ,

the best of essences.

Rāga,

affection or passion.

Ṛṣi,

sage.

Rudra,

a name of Śiva, lit., he who drives away the sorrows
of the migratory cycle.

Rūpa,

form; colour.

S.

Sadvidyā,

meditation of the Supreme Being as the one second-
less existence, from which all this came forth.

Saguṇa,

endowed with attributes.

Salāyatana,

the six organs of sense, in Buddhist terminology.

Samavāya,

inherence or organic relationship.

Samāna,

equal; also the name of one of the vital airs.

Samākhyā,

one of the means of determining significance.

Sambhava,

origination.

Samhāra,

destruction.

Samhṛti,

destruction.

Samjñāna,
understanding.

Samnyāsa,
renunciation.

Sampatti,
imaginative identification.

Samsāra,
the migratory cycle; bondage.

Samskāra,
disposition; also purification.

Samvara,
in Jaina doctrine, the ignorance that envelopes knowledge.

Samgrahaśloka,
a verse summarising what has been mentioned before.

Samkalpa,
purpose.

Samkarṣaṇa,
the first manifestation of the Supreme Being, according to the Pāñcarātra school.

Samkucita,
contracted.

Sandhyādhikaraṇa,
the section of the *Vedānta Sūtras* treating of dreams.

Sankhāra,
disposition.

Saptarṣi,
the seven sages; the stars of the Great Bear.

Sarayū,
the name of a river.

Sarvajña,
he who is omniscient.

Sarvajñatā,
omniscience.

Sarvaniyāmakāḥ,
director of all.

Sarvaśabdavāci,
what is denoted by all names.

- Sarvātmā*,
the self of all.
- Sat*,
existence.
- Satkāryavāda*,
the doctrine that the effect is pre-existent in the cause.
- Sattā*,
existentiality. . . .
- Satyakāma*,
a desire which comes true.
- Satyasaṁkalpa*,
a purpose which comes true.
- Sautrāmaṇi*,
a sacrificial rite, prescribed for expiating "the evil effects of too free indulgence in the Soma drink".
- Sautrāntikas*,
a realist school of Buddhists.
- Sādākhyā*,
one of the categories recognised by the Śaiva Siddhānta.
- Sākṣātkāra*,
immediate realisation.
- Sāṁkhya*,
one of the six schools of Indian philosophy.
- Sāyaṇa*,
a commentator on the Vedas; believed to have lived in the 14th century A.D.
- Setu*,
embankment.
- Siddhānta*,
the final position; a variety of Śaiva doctrine considered by its adherents to be the final form and the crown of Śaiva philosophy.
- Smṛtis*,
traditional lore, as distinguished from revealed scripture.
- Soma*,
the Moon.

Sparsā,

contact; touch.

Sṛṣṭi,

creation.

Sthāna,

place; one of the means of determining significance.

Sthūla,

gross.

Sthūla-cidacid-viśiṣṭa brahman,

Brahman qualified by the world, intelligent and non-intelligent, in a gross form.

Sthiti,

sustentation.

Sukṣma-cidacit-viśiṣṭa-brahman,

Brahman qualified by the world, intelligent and non-intelligent, in a subtle state.

Suṣuptyukrāntyadhikaraṇa,

the section of the *Vedānta Sūtras*, treating of the finite self in sleep and at departure.

Suvarcalā,

daughter of Devala; wife of Śvetaketu.

Sūtra,

aphorism.

Sūtrakāra,

the author of the aphorisms, (the *Vedānta* aphorisms in the present context), i.e., Bādarāyaṇa.

Svarūpa,

essential nature.

Svatantra,

self-determining.

Syādvāda,

the Jaina doctrine that every substance partakes to some extent of existence and describability and their opposites, combined in one of seven ways.

Śakti,

energy.

Śaktu,

flour.

- Śarīra-sarīri-bhāva*,
the relationship of the body and the embodied.
- Śarva*,
the destroyer; a name of Śiva.
- Śākhā*,
a branch (of Scriptural tradition).
- Śaivas*,
those who worship Śiva as the Supreme Being.
- Śirovrata*,
an initial purification ceremony, prescribed for the study of the Atharva Veda.
- Śiva*,
lit. He who is auspicious; the name of the Supreme Being according to some; others say it is the name only of one of the Hindu triad, the others being Brahmā and Viṣṇu.
- Śivaśakti*,
the energy that is Śiva and is of Śiva.
- Śivatva*,
the nature of Śiva.
- Śivācārya*,
a preceptor of the Śaiva persuasion.
- Śivādvaita*,
the doctrine of Śiva as the Supreme Being, non-different from the entire universe, as the material and the instrumental cause thereof.
- Suddha*,
pure.
- Suddha-māyā*,
that form of energy which provides the means and instruments for action and individuation, which are pure.
- Śūnya*,
void.
- Śūnyavāda*,
the doctrine of the void; the doctrine of relativity, as some modern expositors of the Mādhyamika doctrine choose to call it.

Śravaṇa,

lit. hearing, the initial comprehension of the sense of Scripture.

Śruti,

what is heard, *i.e.*, Scripture.

Śvetaketu,

a sage of the Upaniṣads, he to whom the teaching "That thou art" was imparted by his father.

T.

Tanha,

thirst or desire (in Buddhist philosophy).

Tanmātra,

subtle element.

Tantu,

thread.

Taṭastha,

inert; also used of a definition which proceeds *per accidens*.

Tatkratunyāya,

the maxim "what a man contemplates, that he becomes."

Tattva,

category; truth.

Tādātmya,

identity of nature.

Tāmasic,

pertaining to *tamas*, of the nature of darkness and inertia.

Tirobhāva,

concealment.

Tirodhāna,

concealment.

Trivṛtkarāṇa,

tri-partition.

Tryaṇuka,

the compound of three *dvyāṇukas*.

Turīya-mūrti,

fourth form, other than the triad of creator, sustainer,
and destroyer, or of the creator, the bound souls,
and their bonds.

Turiyātita,

beyond the fourth state, which is itself beyond the
state of deep dreamless sleep.

U.

Ubhayalingatva,

possession of two sets of characteristics—positive and
negative.

Ucchaistva,

the high voice prescribed for chanting verses of the
Sāma Veda.

Udāna,

one of the vital airs.

Udgītha-vidyā,

a mode of meditation on the Supreme Being.

Udumbara,

a species of wood.

Ugra,

a name of Śiva.

Umā,

the consort of Śiva.

Upabrāhmaṇas,

the legendary accounts of the exploits of Śiva, Viṣṇu,
etc.; these serve to make clear the sense of Scripture,
where the latter is obscure.

Upakrama,

the introduction.

Upaniṣads,

the philosophical treatises which developed after the
earlier mainly ritualistic portions of the Veda.

Upapatti,

appropriateness or soundness.

Upapātaka,

a minor sin.

Upasāḍ,

a sacrificial festival, forming part of the Jyotiṣṭoma.

Upasamhāra,

the conclusion.

Upādāna,

the material cause.

Upāmsu,

the first of the seven qualities of voice, that which is prescribed for chanting hymns of the Yajur Veda, with little sound and without intentional usage of udātta, etc.

Upāsaka,

he who meditates.

Upāsana,

devout meditation.

Upāsya,

what is meditated on.

Utpatti,

Origination.

Uttamapuruṣa,

the Supreme person.

V.

Varuna,

the lord of the ocean.

Vājapeya.

a sacrifice.

Vājins,

certain deities to whom the whey is to be offered.

Vākya,

a sentence.

Vākyabheda,

“a divergent statement;” the fallacy that results when a Scriptural statement is made out to convey more than one sense.

Vāmadeva,

an ancient seer who had realised his identity with Brahman and said that he became Manu and the Sun.

Vāsanā,
mental impression.

Vāyu,
air.

Vaibhāṣikas,
a school of realistic Buddhists.

Vairāgya,
non-attachment.

Vaiśeṣikas,
an atomistic school of Indian philosophy.

Vaiṣamya,
inequality of dispensation, partiality.

Vaiṣṇava,
a follower of the religious system which holds Viṣṇu
to be the Supreme Being.

Vaiyarthya,
futility.

Vedanā,
sensation.

Vedāntaśravaṇa,
the initial understanding of the sense of the Upaniṣad
texts.

Vibhu,
pervasive.

Vibhutva,
pervasiveness.

Vicikitsā,
doubt.

Vidura,
a step-brother of the kings Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Pāṇḍu;
the son of a hand-maid, he was a śūdra by caste.

Vidvān,
the enlightened one.

Vidyā,
knowledge; but more strictly, meditation, in Śivād-
vaita.

Vidyānuguna-karma,
action helpful to meditation.

Vidyā-sāmarthya or mākātmya,

the power or glory of the meditation.

Vijñāna,

knowledge or intellect; also used of the self.

Vijñānavādin,

a school of idealistic Buddhists, who denied the reality of anything beyond consciousness.

Vikāśabda,

a term signifying a modification.

Vilambi,

one of the years of the Hindu cycle.

Vimala,

free from impurity.

Viniyoga,

employment or application.

Viññāna,

consciousness.

Vipaścī,

he whose intelligence perceives the entire diversity of things.

Vipāka,

maturation.

Virajā,

a river bounding Viṣṇu-loka and separating it from the world of Śiva, the attainment of which is release.

Viśiṣṭādvaitin,

an adherent of the doctrine of qualified non-dualism, i.e., that Brahman and the world are non-dual, in the same way as substance and attribute.

Viśvādhika,

transcending the universe.

Viśvākāra,

of the form of the universe.

Viśvedevas,

the All-gods.

Viṣṇu,

one of the three deities of the Hindu triad; the protector.

Viṣṇuloka,
the world of Viṣṇu.

Vivartavāda,
the doctrine that the material world is an illusory appearance of Brahman.

Vrātya,
one who by neglect of prescribed ceremonies has ceased to belong to the (Aryan) fold.

Vṛddhavyavahāra,
the doctrine that words come to acquire significance through the knowledge of their association with acts.

Vṛtti,
a short commentary.

Vṛttikāra,
the author of a commentary (or the commentary known as the *Vṛtti*).

Vyākhyāna,
a commentary.

Vyāna,
one of the vital airs.

Vyāsa,
a sage, the reputed author of the *Mahābhārata* epic, believed to be identical with Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the *Vedānta Sūtras*

Vyūhas,
emanations or manifestations.

Y.

Yadā-tama-mantra,
the hymn relating to the primal state of darkness when there was neither being nor non-being, but Śiva alone existed.

Yama,
the lord of death.

Yamaloka,
the seven hells, presided over by Chitragupta and others, controlled by Yama, the lord of death.

Yati,
an ascetic.

Yājñavalkya,

an Upaniṣadic sage.

Yoga,

a school of Indian philosophy which combined the dualism of the Sāṃkhya, with a belief in God and the prescription of a practical discipline for the control of the mind.

Yudhiṣṭhira,

the eldest of the sons of Pāṇḍu; a *Mahābhārata* hero.

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